Labour productivity growth in New Zealand since 1951
13 Dec 2015 Leave a comment
in economic growth, economic history, macroeconomics, politics - New Zealand Tags: labour productivity, lost decades
Rejoinder to @geoffsimmonz and Jess Berentson-Shaw on are we all sexists – Part 1
07 Dec 2015 1 Comment
in applied price theory, discrimination, econometerics, gender, job search and matching, labour economics Tags: Armen Alchian, Gary Becker, gender wage gap, unconscious bias

Morgan Foundation researchers Jess Berentson-Shaw and Geoff Simmons were good enough to write a long reply to my recent post on the role of unconscious bias in the gender wage gap. My post was in reply to a Friday whiteboard session by Geoff Simmons.
I thought the best way to start is to summarise their reply in terms of how my rejoinder will be structured:
- There is a persistent, known but unexploited entrepreneurial opportunity for pure profit arising from employers not hiring women on merit because of an unconscious bias against them. This unconscious bias among employers against women explains 20-30% of the gender wage gap. Most of the rest of that gap is due to factors such as differences in occupation and education.
- The gender wage gap is smaller at the bottom of the labour market because of the minimum wage.
- The gender wage is smaller in the middle than at the top of the labour because of “far more standard contracts in the middle”. I take this to mean recruiting firms set a hiring standard and make a wage offer. This does not mean they have a free hand in their wage posting. A higher wage offer attracts better qualified applicants. Posting a low wage attracts fewer candidates that meet their hiring standard from other jobs and from the ranks of the unemployed. The available evidence suggests that one-third of job matches are based on wage bargaining and two-thirds through wage posting. Wage posting is more common in larger firms, the public sector and where there is collective bargaining. Wage bargaining is more profitable for occupations and jobs with a high dispersion in workers’ skills and productivity and in tighter labour markets.
- The gender pay gap is largest for the top 10% of female wage earners because “… what scientific evidence supports the argument that better paid women have the ability to negotiate pay & conditions better? The very fact that there is a consistent and large gap between highly paid men and women suggests that where MORE negotiation, discretion, more complex selection processes are involved the more women are discriminated against”. The available evidence is wage posting is less common the more skilled is the worker. It pays to invest more in scrutinising recruits against hiring standards and to consider offer matching when the wage is higher for applicants and for employees threatening to quit. The payoff from a longer job search is greater the higher is the wage. There is a greater chance of higher skilled jobseeker of finding a better paid match between their more idiosyncratic skills and backgrounds in vacancies elsewhere or which might appear later. Low skilled jobseekers invest less in job search because one vacancy is frequently as good as another in their occupational and industry labour markets. The higher skilled are also more geographically mobile than the low skilled and more likely to live in cities and earn the urban wage premium.
- “Better paid professional women may have more options than lower paid women but they still have fewer than their male equivalents.” I take this to mean the greater the ability of workers to move from employer to employer, the better are they paid. Women have a weaker average attachment to the labour market. The human capital interpretation of this is woman and mothers in particular have lower productivity because they have spent less time accumulating on-the-job human capital. In the search and matching interpretation, women have less search capital. Workers start out as job shoppers: the longer a worker shops around, the more likely after a succession of job matches that they chance upon better paying job and occupational matches. Women through career interruptions for motherhood spend less time in the labour market, accumulate less search capital and are therefore are paid less. Women find it harder to work their way into the better-paying job matches.
- “Removing unconscious bias requires cultural change and will take time to resolve but it is possible to do with concerted effort.” This as example of what Adam Smith called the overweening conceit of youth.
My reply to the original Friday whiteboard session by Geoff Simmons relied on invisible hand explanations. Nozick argued that invisible hand explanations of social phenomena must have a filter and an equilibrating mechanism.
Geoff Simmons’ hypothesis about the gender wage gap is an invisible hand explanation: 20-30% of the gender wage gap is driven by unconscious bias. There could be no greater an invisible hand than an unconscious one.
There must be a mechanism in Geoff Simmons’ hypothesis that guides market participants to not hire and not promote women on merit. Not hiring on merit forfeits profit. There must be a filter that penalise hiring on merit.
The market has a filter and an equilibrating mechanism that constitute its invisible hand. The equilibrating mechanism – the mechanism that prompts people to hire on merit – is price signals. Prices are a signal wrapped in an incentive. If prices go up, buy less and look for other options, if they go down, buying more is profitable. The filter, which is more of an invisible punch than an invisible hand, is profits and losses. Higher costs, lower profits, loss of market share, insolvency and bankruptcy drive out the entrepreneurs who fail to hire on merit.
Entrepreneurs that hire on merit are more likely to survive in market competition than those that do not. Entrepreneurs must adapt or die.
There is no similar institutional filter in Geoff Simmons hypothesis to ensure that not hiring on merit is the unintended outcome from the decentralised behaviour of countless employers and job seekers trying to improve their own circumstances. Self-interested employers are not prompted by price signals to not hire on merit. More importantly, their chances are surviving in market competition are increased rather than are reduced if employers resist the temptations arising from their unconscious biases against women.
This institutional context is the reverse of what should be for unconscious bias against women to survive in market competition as suggested by Geoff Simmons. Firms that hire on merit should have a lower probability of survival, not a higher chance of staying in business if the unconscious bias hypothesis is to prevail in the face of market competition.
Geoff Simmons and Jess Berentson-Shaw is they didn’t address my extensive comments about the market as an evolutionary process. They did not explain how market competition would not penalise employers who fail to hire on merit for any reason including unconscious bias. That is the fundamental flaw, a fatal flaw in their reply to my comment on their Friday whiteboard session.
Most of all, Geoff Simmons and Jess Berentson-Shaw succumb to what Robert Nozick christened normative sociology. This is the study of what the causes of social problems ought to be.

For Geoff Simmons and Jess Berentson-Shaw, the gender wage gap ought not be the result of the conscious choices of women making the best they can do what they have. The gender wage gap must be the result of the bad motivations of employers and other external forces. The bad motivations must be unconscious because conscious prejudice is rare these days.
The unconscious bias hypothesis suffers from the same floors as the occupational crowding and occupational segregation hypotheses. Neither the unintentional bias hypothesis nor the occupational crowding and segregation hypotheses have a filter and an equilibrating mechanism that guides employers into make unprofitable choices about hiring. These hypotheses must explain how unconsciously biased employers survive in competition with less unconsciously biased employers.
Central to Gary Becker’s theory of prejudice based discrimination is competition in the market will slowly wear down prejudice-based discrimination in the same way that it drives out any other practices inconsistent with profit maximisation and cost minimisation. Profit maximisation gets no respect in the theory of unconscious bias and the gender wage gap put forward by Geoff Simmons and Jess Berentson-Shaw.
If there are sufficient number of less unconsciously biased employers, there will be segregation. Some employers will hire a large number of women because they have the pick of the crop and will be more profitable to boot at least in the short run.
The more unconsciously biased employers will have a large number of men working for them and will be less profitable and more likely to fail. At worst, men and women will be paid to same but most women will work for these less unconsciously biased employers. The possibility of labour market segregation rather than gender wage gap was not considered in the unconscious bias hypothesis.
Unconscious bias is a preference-based explanation of the gender wage gap. The young are the last to notice the rapid social change that came before them. Cultural and preference based explanations underrate the rapid social change in the 20th century. As Gary Becker explains:
… major economic and technological changes frequently trump culture in the sense that they induce enormous changes not only in behaviour but also in beliefs. A clear illustration of this is the huge effects of technological change and economic development on behaviour and beliefs regarding many aspects of the family.
Attitudes and behaviour regarding family size, marriage and divorce, care of elderly parents, premarital sex, men and women living together and having children without being married, and gays and lesbians have all undergone profound changes during the past 50 years. Invariably, when countries with very different cultures experienced significant economic growth, women’s education increased greatly, and the number of children in a typical family plummeted from three or more to often much less than two.
Goldin (2006) showed that women adapted rapidly over the 20th century to changing returns to working and education as compared to options outside the market. Their labour force participation and occupational choices changed rapidly into long duration professional educations and more specialised training in the 1960s and 1970s as many more women worked and pursued careers. The large increase in tertiary education by New Zealand after 1990 and their move into many traditionally male occupations is another example.
The main drivers of the gender wage gap are unknown to recruiting employers such as whether a would-be recruit is married, how many children they have, whether their partner is present to share childcare, how many of children are under 12, and how many years between the births of children. Spacing out the births is a major driver of the gender pay gap but this information is unknown to employers when hiring. As Polachek explains:
The gender wage gap for never marrieds is a mere 2.8%, compared with over 20% for marrieds. The gender wage gap for young workers is less than 5%, but about 25% for 55–64-year-old men and women. If gender discrimination were the issue, one would need to explain why businesses pay single men and single women comparable salaries. The same applies to young men and young women.
One would need to explain why businesses discriminate against older women, but not against younger women. If corporations discriminate by gender, why are these employers paying any groups of men and women roughly equal pay? Why is there no discrimination against young single women, but large amounts of discrimination against older married women?
… Each type of possible discrimination is inconsistent with negligible wage differences among single and younger employees compared with the large gap among married men and women (especially those with children, and even more so for those who space children widely apart).
The main drivers of the gender wage gap are of no relevance to entrepreneurs making a profit. These findings are devastating to the notion that there is some sort of discrimination against women on the demand side of the labour market.
Employers lack the necessary information to implement any unconscious bias they might have against women in fact is mainly a bias against older women and mothers and mothers in particular the space out the births of their children. The emergence of the gender wage gap is through the supply-side choices of women because employers lack the necessary information to drive the emergence of a gender pay gap.
The career cost of a family is central to the emergence and size of the gender pay gap because it leads to self-selection on the supply-side in terms of human capital to mitigate the cost of careers breaks.
The gender gap is fairly minor before the age of 30. The female full-time employment rate drops by 10 percentage points after women enter their 30s before recovering by the time women reach the age of 50 (Johnston 2005). The gender wage gap also widens between the ages 35 to 64 when women are raising children; the biggest gap is for the ages of 44 to 44; a wage gap of 22 per cent (MWA 2010). The first child is estimated to reduce New Zealand female earnings by 7 per cent and second child reduces earnings by 10 per cent (Dixon 2000, 2001).
This self-selection of females into occupations with more durable human capital, and into more general educations and more mobile training that allows women to change jobs more often and move in and out of the workforce at less cost to earning power and skills sets. Chiswick (2006) and Becker (1985, 1993) then suggest that these supply side choices about education and careers are made against a background of a gendered division of labour and effort in the home, and in particular, in housework and the raising of children. These choices in turn reflect how individual preferences and social roles are formed and evolve in society.

Source: On Equal Pay Day, key facts about the gender pay gap | Pew Research Center.
Tiny differences in comparative advantage such as in child rearing immediately after birth can lead to large differences in specialisation in the market work and in market-related human capital and home production related work and household human capital (Becker 1985, 1993). These specialisations are reinforced by learning by doing where large differences in market and household human capital emerge despite tiny differences at the outset (Becker 1985, 1993).
Many women choose educational and occupational paths that give them more control over their hours worked, and lowers the cost of time spent on maternity leave and the associated depreciation of skills during career breaks and reduced hours (Polachek 1978, 1981; Bertrand, Goldin and Katz 2010; Katz 2006; Sasser 2005). Women over the entire run of the 20th century often end up in jobs that reduced the career cost of a family and rapidly changed their plans when new opportunities emerge (Katz 2006).
The prospect of children drives the early choices of women on education and occupations. Careers requiring continuous commitment, long hours and great sacrifices do not attract and retain as many women (Bertrand, Goldin and Katz 2010; Goldin 2006). Goldin and Katz (2011) found that differences in the reductions on the cost of career breaks was a major driver in the influx of women into previously male dominated occupations.
The key is what drives the rapid changes in the labour force participation and occupational choices of women. Some of the factors are global technology trends such rising wages and the emergence of household technologies and safe contraception and antidiscrimination laws. All of these increased the returns to working and investing in specialised education and training.
Up until the mid-20th century, women invested in becoming a teacher, nurse, librarian or secretary because these skills were general and did not deprecate as much during breaks. When expectations among women of still working at the age of 35 doubled, there were massive increases in female labour force participation and female investments in higher education and specialised skills (Goldin and Katz 2006).
In summary, Geoff Simmons and Jess Berentson-Shaw put forward an invisible hand explanation of the residual in the gender wage gap that lacks that all-important invisible punch. There is no market mechanism which penalises employers who rise above their unconscious bias against women to hire on merit. The invisible hand rewards employers that hire on merit with higher profits and penalises those that indulge a bias of whatever origin. The invisible hand consists of an invisible finger and an invisible punch. The invisible finger points the way forward through price signals; the invisible punch slaps down those entrepreneurs whose attentions wander from their bottom line when deciding who to hire and promote.
Part two of this reply will address the particulars of the reply of Geoff Simmons and Jess Berentson-Shaw. In particular, the search and matching aspects of their explanation and whether we are all sexists.
Will global warming boost economic growth? @GreenpeaceNZ @RusselNorman The revenge of the broken window fallacy
03 Dec 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, economic growth, entrepreneurship, environmental economics, global warming, macroeconomics, Robert E. Lucas Tags: climate alarmists, endogenous growth theory, entrepreneurial alertness, exogenous growth theory, global warming, Matthew Kahn, neoclassical growth theory, offsetting, Robert Solow, unbalanced growth, unintended consequences
The modern macroeconomics of the Global Financial Crisis
02 Dec 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, budget deficits, business cycles, economic growth, economic history, economics of regulation, Euro crisis, fiscal policy, global financial crisis (GFC), great depression, great recession, macroeconomics, monetary economics Tags: adverse selection, bank panics, bank runs, banking crises, deposit insurance, economics central banks, financial crises, moral hazard, sovereign defaults
Is promoting R&D New Zealand’s path to prosperity?
02 Dec 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, economic growth, economic history, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, macroeconomics Tags: creative destruction, endogenous growth theory, entrepreneurial alertness, innovation, international technology diffusion
Michael Reddell was right to run his sceptical eye over the enthusiasm of the New Zealand government for promoting local R&D. Politicians are obsessed with boffins in lab coats who invent thing rather than the entrepreneurs who risk import technologies and adapt them to local markets.
New Zealand is a technology follow-up. 99% of global R&D is undertaken abroad. The key innovation policy question for New Zealand is how to adopt those technologies rather than how to invent them.
https://img.quozio.com/img/a6dd47b6/1025/The-fraction-of-US.jpg
Appropriate institutions and distance for the global technological frontier
As technology followers such as New Zealand approach the global technological frontier, the institutions appropriate for continued productivity growth change.
As a country moves closer to the global technological frontier, the impact of each successive technology import will decline. The latest imported technology is usually a smaller and smaller upgrade on before. A more skilled workforce and greater entrepreneurship is needed to squeeze out all of the available productivity and product quality gains from the latest imported technologies.
The institutions appropriate to further growth are context-dependent
The political, tax and regulatory institutions that favour the more ready-made implementation of more standardised imported technologies do not necessarily favour the growing demand for the domestic innovations in New Zealand as the global technological frontier nears. There is a growing demand for more highly skilled workers to master and adapt the leading-edge technologies to the distinctive circumstances of each New Zealand workplace to stay ahead in rapidly changing competitive environments and meet the changing needs of customers.
Productivity growth is not manna from heaven. Every increase in productivity and in product quality and variety are the sum of many inventions that must be first discovered by prospective innovators building on past ideas and developed, tested, adopted and adapted by profit-minded entrepreneurs and workers. Investments in R&D, in human capital and in on-the job learning and in the entrepreneurial judgments about risking investments in the new technologies that all underpin further growth in productivity are all influenced by public policies.
Moving from implementation-based to innovation-based policy regimes
As a country approaches the global technology frontier, continued technological imitation is no longer enough to keep productivity growing at the trend rate of two per cent per year. There must be an institutional switch from a technology implementation-based policy regime to an innovation-based policy regime.
The end by 1990 of the EU’s productivity convergence on the USA has been partly attributed to not making the policy shift from technology implementation enhancing institutions to innovation enhancing institutions. EU members invested far less than the USA in R&D and tertiary education had more rigid labour and product markets, had less entry and exit of firms, and much higher taxes.
Institutions must adapt to distance from the technological frontier
As a country approaches the global technology frontier, there must be younger firms, fewer incumbents, better educated workers, more R&D, more entry and exit, more flexible product and labour markets and lower taxes. These dynamic entrepreneurial features were not common-place in pre-1984 New Zealand.
New Zealand too had to switch to institutions that enhanced innovation and entrepreneurial entry just to return to growing at the global trend rate of 2 per cent per year. The political, tax and regulatory institutions appropriate prior to 1973 when New Zealand was a colonial farm for the UK are different to the institutions that are growth-enhancing in a less sheltered economic environment. There is no reason to suppose that the rising burden of knowledge and product proliferation has in any way ebbed to lighten the pressure for continued reform.
The institutional foundations of prosperity and stagnation
Questions about greater prosperity of New Zealand must be correctly posed and should focus on the fundamental causes of productivity growth rather than the proximate causes. The proximate causes of productivity and prosperity are the accumulation of more human and physical capital and technological progress.
Institutions are the fundamental cause of prosperity and cross-country differences in per capita incomes. Institutions determine the incentives and constraints on working, learning and investing, and influence, in a profound way, investments in physical and human capital and R&D and the importing of new technologies. It is premature to conclude that the national institutions and policies of OECD member countries are fairly similar and that the institutional differences that they do have are minor in their impact on respective national productivity and income levels.
There have been periods of prosperity, divergence, depression, recovery, catch-up and no catch-up at difference times in OECD member countries and usually for country-specific reasons. These large changes in fortune are not by chance. The differences in policy that gave rise to these divergences in income levels and extended periods of prosperity and stagnation should be open to analysis so that policy improvements can be discovered for possible application in New Zealand.
The Productivity Hub is a partnership of agencies which aims to improve how policy can contribute to the productivity performance of the New Zealand economy and the wellbeing of New Zealanders. The Hub Board is made up of representatives from the Productivity Commission, the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Statistics New Zealand and the Treasury
The Productivity Hub yesterday hosted a symposium in Wellington with the title “Growing more innovative and productive Kiwi firms”. “Growing” things is usually something gardeners do – people doing stuff to things. So the title perhaps carried somewhat unfortunate connotations of successful firms being the products of government action. That probably wasn’t their intention, at least not wholly, but then again it wasn’t entirely out of line with the list of attendees – 161 names, of whom at least 150 would have been bureaucrats, academics, and the like. There appeared to be only a very…
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Australian and New Zealand detrended real GDP growth, PPP, 1956 – 2014
01 Dec 2015 Leave a comment
in economic growth, economic history, macroeconomics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand
I have updated my estimates of Australian and New Zealand detrended real GDP growth for the 2014 working age population statistics from the OECD. The charts show:
- the lost decades of New Zealand growth between 1974 and 1992;
- the return of trend growth between 1992 and 2007 but no rebounding to recover lost ground;
- the effects of the global financial crisis in Australia and New Zealand; and
- a return to trend growth in New Zealand since about 2010 but not in Australia.

Source: Computed from OECD Stat Extract and The Conference Board. 2015. The Conference Board Total Economy Database™, May 2015, http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/
The real GDP data in the above chart is detrended by 1.9% per annum. 1.9% growth per year is the trend real GDP growth rate of the USA in the 20th century. The growth rate of the USA is taken as the growth rate of the global technological frontier. A flat line in the above chart is real GDP growth at 1.9% per year. A falling line is real GDP growth in that year of less than 1.9%; a rising line is growth that is greater than 1.9% in that year.

Source: Computed from OECD Stat Extract and The Conference Board. 2015. The Conference Board Total Economy Database™, May 2015, http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/
The Swedish and Danish actual and equilibrium unemployment rates since 1962
27 Nov 2015 Leave a comment
in economic history, job search and matching, labour economics, unemployment
The Danish equilibrium unemployment rate has been surprisingly stable since 1982 despite rather volatile actual unemployment. The Swedish unemployment rate was allowed to increase in line with the economic crisis in the early 1990s and that was it. How nice it must be for the Danes and Swedes to have such stable labour market institutions.

Source: OECD Economic Outlook November 2015.
The Danes have a highly deregulated labour market. There were major economic and welfare state reforms in Sweden in the early 1990s in response to high unemployment. These institutional developments barely showed up in their equilibrium unemployment rates.
Australian and New Zealand actual and equilibrium unemployment rates since 1964
27 Nov 2015 Leave a comment
in economic history, job search and matching, labour economics, unemployment
The Australian and New Zealand equilibrium unemployment rates are much more obedient. They neatly track actual unemployment with few exceptions for recessions. So much so is this close tracking of the actual unemployment rate by the equilibrium unemployment rate that you wonder what extra the latter concept adds.

Source: OECD Stat and OECD Economic Outlook November 2015.
Fact checking @Bernie Sanders latest presidential debate
27 Nov 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, economic growth, labour economics, politics - USA, poverty and inequality, welfare reform Tags: 2016 presidential election, Leftover Left, Twitter left
French and Italian actual and equilibrium unemployment rate since 1968
26 Nov 2015 1 Comment
in economic history, job search and matching, unemployment
Unlike the USA, the OECD’s host country’s actual and equilibrium unemployment rates track each other rather too closely for comfort. In contrast, Italian unemployment hardly ever catches up with the Italian equilibrium unemployment rate. In common with the US equilibrium unemployment rate, the Italian equilibrium unemployment rate was rather stable for quite some time.

Source: OECD Stat and OECD Economic Outlook November 2015
US and UK actual and equilibrium unemployment rates since 1971
26 Nov 2015 2 Comments
in economic history, job search and matching, labour economics, unemployment
I can’t think of a charitable explanation of why the equilibrium unemployment rate is so stable in the USA and yet tracks actual unemployment with a bit of a lag in the UK. There is a large literature showing that the equilibrium unemployment rate in the USA has gone up and down quite significantly if only for demographic reasons related to the baby boomers passing through the workforce in large numbers in the 70s.

Source: OECD Stat and OECD Economic Outlook November 2015.
Where are British taxes spent?
26 Nov 2015 1 Comment
in budget deficits, defence economics, economics of education, fiscal policy, health economics, labour supply Tags: ageing society, British economy, British politics, demographic crisis
Government debt since 1880
23 Nov 2015 Leave a comment
in economic history, fiscal policy, macroeconomics Tags: sovereign debt, sovereign debt crises, sovereign defaults
Eurosclerosis, Swedosclerosis, the British Disease and rising inequality harming economic growth
21 Nov 2015 2 Comments
in currency unions, economic growth, economic history, Euro crisis, fiscal policy, macroeconomics, politics - USA Tags: British disease, British economy, Eurosclerosis, France, sick man of Europe, Sweden, Swedosclerosis, Twitter left
The Washington Centre for Equitable Growth have joined the Wall Street Journal in falling for that dodgy OECD hypothesis about rising inequality holding back economic growth.
The chart below shows stark differences between egalitarian Sweden and France, and the more unequal UK since 1970 in departures from a trend growth rate of 1.9% in real GDP per working age person, PPP.

Source: Computed from OECD Stat Extract and The Conference Board. 2015. The Conference Board Total Economy Database™, May 2015, http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/
In the above chart, a flat line is growth at the same rate as the USA for the 20th century, which was 1.9% for GDP per working age person on a purchasing power parity basis. The USA’s growth rate is taken as the trend rate of growth of the global technological frontier. A falling line in the above chart is growth in real GDP per working age person, PPP, at below this trend rate of 1.9%; a rising line is above trend rate growth for that year.
- Sweden really had been the sick man of Europe until it turned its back on high taxing, welfare state socialism in the early 1990s.
- France has been in a long decline so much so that the global financial crisis is hard to pick up in the acceleration in its long decline in the mid-1990s.
Britain did very well, both under the neoliberal horrors of Thatcherism and the betrayals by Tony Blair of a true Labour Party platform. The UK grew at above the trend annual growth to 1.9% for most of the period from the early 1980s to 2007.
Neither France or Sweden, despite their egalitarian economies, kept up with the US growth rate since 1970. Under the OECD’s hypothesis, if France and Sweden had been more unequal, their trend growth rates would have been even more appalling since 1970.

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