George Stigler on income redistribution policies
23 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
in George Stigler, income redistribution, liberalism, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: evidence-based policy
Robert Lucas on the defining belief of the Left over Left and the Greens
23 Jan 2015 Leave a comment

Voter profiles – utilitarian/instrumental, swinging and expressive | Alex White
23 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, Public Choice Tags: expressive voting, rational ignorance, rational irrationality, voter demographics
I just came across this great blog by Alex White on the three types of voters: utilitarian/instrumental, swinging and expressive. His diagrammatic expressions of them are superb. Most enlightening.

His first diagram above shows three consumer types of engagement with a brand: utilitarian, low involvement and expressive.
- Utilitarian decision making is one that is typically high involvement, but are partly price sensitive;
- Low involvement buyers do not spend a lot of time researching the features of the product or service, beyond a cursory glance; and
- Expressive consumers are ones who make in depth purchases where there is a high engagement. Their decision to purchase precedes research. The research itself serves to rationalise the purchase decision. Often, they will feel a relationship with the brand and identify with the brand’s values.
White then overlaps these brand engagement profiles on voter profiles in the next diagram made up of utilitarian/instrumental, swinging and expressive and then fleshes out these voter types depending on whether they are rusted or swinging.

- The rusted-on utilitarian voter votes on a specific issue and are loyal to the party that represents the best fit with that issue. For example, the Greens and forestry, or Labor and education. So long as they view the party as best fitting or addressing their issue, they’ll vote for that party.
- A swinging utilitarian voter listens to announcements during campaigns, and tries to make a decision based on what is best for them. These swinging voters are susceptible to the pork barrel promises. Utilitarian voters are sensitive to their expectations being met.
- The swinging low engagement voter has no party familiarity, no interest in politics, and do not do any assessment of party policies; they make up their mind based on availability of the party on Election Day (so the presence of people handing out how-to-votes is important). They see no difference between parties; they are completely switchable, so there is no brand loyalty. A low involvement voter is really looking at the absence of negatives.
- The rusted on expressive voter votes to convey their values or beliefs, and often strongly identify with the party, or with a party leader. They are partisans who seek out research or information to justify their support for that party. The have a strong emotional connection to the party, or they may be ideologues and identify with a political philosophy rather than the party.
- The swinging expressive voter is an ideologue whose voting decision is based on their political ideology. For example, strong environmentalists who support the Greens Party because of their commitment to conservation rather than to the Party itself. The swinging expressive voter may change their vote if they feel a party ceases to represent their value set or beliefs. The expressive voter expectations align with their values or ideology. Their relationship to the party can be very committed, but also very critical. They may tolerate or forgive lapses on policy areas outside the voter’s core values — and they can be passionate advocates.
Alex White has set out a great topology of voters, and how a political party or lobby group should appeal to different types of voters based on their engagement and information needs. White is secretary of UnionsACT, the peak body for 33 unionists Unions in Canberra.
Now we know how many drivers Uber has — and have a better idea of what they’re making – The Washington Post
23 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, rentseeking Tags: taxi regulation, Uber
Francis M. Bator on the high road and the low road for the public sector economists.
23 Jan 2015 Leave a comment

Eamonn Butler on how economical with the truth Oxfam was on global inequality
22 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
in development economics, growth disasters, growth miracles, income redistribution, liberalism Tags: evidence-based policy, Leftover Left, Oxfam, top 1%
Today Parliament commemorates 750th anniversary of first Parliament summoned by Simon De Montfort
21 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
in economic history, politics, Public Choice Tags: British parliament, UK politics
Offsetting behaviour alert: only fools and politicians would believe that a minimum wage increase increases net pay and conditions
20 Jan 2015 1 Comment
in income redistribution, labour economics, minimum wage Tags: minimum wage, offsettinh behaviour, The fatal conceit, unintended consequences

John Schmitt lists 11 margins along which a minimum wage might cause changes in net pay and conditions:
- Reduction in hours worked (because firms faced with a higher minimum wage trim back on the hours they want),
- Reduction in non-wage benefits (to offset the higher costs of the minimum wage),
- Reduction in money spent on training (again, to offset the higher costs of the minimum wage),
- Change in composition of the workforce (that is, hiring additional workers with middle or higher skill levels, and fewer of those minimum wage workers with lower skill levels),
- Higher prices (passing the cost of the higher minimum wage on to consumers),
- Improvements in efficient use of labour (in a model where employers are not always at the peak level of efficiency, a higher cost of labour might give them a push to be more efficient),
- “Efficiency wage” responses from workers (when workers are paid more, they have a greater incentive to keep their jobs, and thus may work harder and shirk less),
- Wage compression (minimum wage workers get more, but those above them on the wage scale may not get as much as they otherwise would),
- Reduction in profits (higher costs of minimum wage workers reduces profits),
- Increase in demand (a higher minimum wage boosts buying power in overall economy), and
- Reduced turnover (a higher minimum wage makes a stronger bond between employer and workers, and gives employers more reason to train and hold on to worker.

Richard McKenzie argues that the biggest impact of a minimum wage increase is reductions to paid and unpaid benefits for minimum wage workers, including health insurance, store discounts, free food, flexible scheduling, and job security resulting from higher-skilled workers drawn to the higher minimum wage jobs:
- Masanori Hashimoto found that under the 1967 minimum-wage hike, workers gained 32 cents in money income but lost 41 cents per hour in training—a net loss of 9 cents an hour in full-income compensation.
- Other researchers in independently completed studies found more evidence that a hike in the minimum wage undercuts on-the-job training and undermines covered workers’ long-term income growth.
- Wessels found that the minimum wage caused retail establishments in New York to increase work demands by cutting back on the number of workers and giving workers fewer hours to do the same work.
- Fleisher, Dunn, and Alpert found that minimum-wage increases lead to large reductions in fringe benefits and to worsening working conditions.
- Marks found that workers covered by the federal minimum-wage law were also more likely to work part time, given that part-time workers can be excluded from employer-provided health insurance plans.
McKenzie also argued that if the minimum wage does not cause employers to make substantial reductions in fringe benefits and increases in work demands, then an increased minimum should cause
(1) An increase in the labour-force-participation rates of covered workers (because workers would be moving up their supply of labour curves),
(2) A reduction in the rate at which covered workers quit their jobs (because their jobs would then be more attractive), and
(3) A significant increase in prices of production processes heavily dependent on covered minimum-wage workers.
Wessels found that minimum-wage increases had exactly the opposite effect as intended: labour force participation rates went down; job quit rates went up, and prices did not rise appreciably.
These are findings by Wessels are consistent only with the view that minimum-wage increases make workers worse off, rather than better off in terms of net pay and conditions. After the minimum wage increase, the net advantages and disadvantages of menial jobs are less than before. Fewer workers enter the workforce and more quit their jobs.
McKenzie was the first economist to argue that a minimum wage increase may actually reduce the labour supply of menial workers. Employment in menial jobs may go down slightly in the face of minimum-wage increases not so much because the employers don’t want to offer the jobs, but because fewer workers want these menial jobs that are offered.
The repackaging of monetary and non-monetary benefits, greater work intensities and fewer training opportunities make these jobs less attractive relative to their other options. This reduction in labour supply by low skilled workers is why the voluntary quit rate among low-wage workers goes up, not down, after a minimum wage increase. As McKenzie explains
Economists almost uniformly argue that minimum wage laws benefit some workers at the expense of other workers.
This argument is implicitly founded on the assumption that money wages are the only form of labour compensation. Based on the more realistic assumption that labour is paid in many different ways, the analysis of this paper demonstrates that all labourers within a perfectly competitive labour market are adversely affected by minimum wages.
Although employment opportunities are reduced by such laws, affected labour markets clear. Conventional analysis of the effect of minimum wages on monopsony markets is also upset by the model developed.
McKenzie argues that not accounting for offsetting behaviour led to a fundamental misinterpretation in the empirical literature on the minimum wage. That literature shows that small increases in the minimum wages does not seem to affect employment and unemployment by that much.
…. wage income is not the only form of compensation with which employers pay their workers. Also in the mix are fringe benefits, relaxed work demands, workplace ambiance, respect, schedule flexibility, job security and hours of work.
Employers compete with one another to reduce their labour costs for unskilled workers, while unskilled workers compete for the available unskilled jobs — with an eye on the total value of the compensation package.
With a minimum-wage increase, employers will move to cut labour costs by reducing fringe benefits and increasing work demands
Proponents and opponents of minimum-wage hikes do not seem to realize that the tiny employment effects consistently found across numerous studies provide the strongest evidence available that increases in the minimum wage have been largely neutralized by cost savings on fringe benefits and increased work demands and the cost savings from the more obscure and hard-to-measure cuts in nonmoney compensation.
McKenzie is correct in arguing that the empirical literature on the minimum wage is dewy-eyed. The first assumption about any regulation is the market will offset it significantly.
In the course of undoing the direct effects of the regulation, there will be unintended consequences such as the remixing of wage and nonwage components of remuneration packages of low skilled workers covered by the minimum wage. Greg Mankiw concludes that:
The minimum wage has its greatest impact on the market for teenage labour. The equilibrium wages of teenagers are low because teenagers are among the least skilled and least experienced members of the labour force.
In addition, teenagers are often willing to accept a lower wage in exchange for on-the-job training. . . . As a result, the minimum wage is more often binding for teenagers than for other members of the labour force.

Denying Problems When We Don’t Like the Solutions
20 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, Public Choice Tags: advocacy bias, anti-capitalist mentality, Anti-Economics Left, Anti-Science left, expressive voting

There is often a curious distinction between what the scientific community and the general population believe to be true of dire scientific issues, and this skepticism tends to vary markedly across groups.
…What causes such radical group differences? We suggest, as have previous accounts, that this phenomenon is often motivated.
However, the source of this motivation is not necessarily an aversion to the problem, per se, but an aversion to the solutions associated with the problem.
This difference in underlying process holds important implications for understanding, predicting, and influencing motivated skepticism.
In 4 studies, we tested this solution aversion explanation for why people are often so divided over evidence and why this divide often occurs so saliently across political party lines.
Studies 1, 2, and 3—using correlational and experimental methodologies—demonstrated that Republicans’ increased skepticism toward environmental sciences may be partly attributable to a conflict between specific ideological values and the most popularly discussed environmental solutions.
Study 4 found that, in a different domain (crime), those holding a more liberal ideology (support for gun control) also show skepticism motivated by solution aversion.



HT: http://today.duke.edu/2014/11/solutionaversion and http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/11/10/conservatives-dont-hate-climate-science-they-hate-the-lefts-climate-solutions/







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