Richard Posner on the drivers of interest group capture of regulatory agencies
09 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
The shape of the welfare state in the USA
08 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in fiscal policy, income redistribution, labour economics, labour supply, politics - USA, public economics, welfare reform Tags: effective marginal tax rates, Obama care, poverty traps, welfare reform
One in five Americans on Medicaid; this image does not include those on Medicare –those over 65 who get their healthcare paid by the government.
The economics of federalism: states as decentralized competitors and political markets
08 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
The role of bribery in the developing world
08 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in development economics, economics of bureaucracy, growth disasters, growth miracles, rentseeking Tags: bribery and corruption
Remarks Read to Honor Gordon Tullock at the 2014 SEA Meetings (Extended Version) – Coordination Problem
07 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in Gordon Tullock Tags: Gordon Tullock
Tullock was an irascible, but very charming man to those who knew and worked with him.
His gruff exterior, combined with a quick and biting wit often at others expense, led many to misunderstand him.
He was simply one of the quickest and cleverest social scientists to practice in the second half of the 20th century.
Modern democracy: the power to replace governments at periodic elections
07 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, Public Choice Tags: checks and balances, constitutional political economy, public choice, retrospective voting
Citizens do have sufficient knowledge and sophistication to vote out leaders who are performing poorly or contrary to their wishes. Modern democracy is government subject to electoral checks.
The power of the electorate to turn elected officials out of office at the next election gives elected officials an incentive to adopt policies that do not outrage public opinion and administer the policies with some minimum honesty and competence.
A representative democracy enables the adult population, at very little cost in time, money or distraction from private pursuits commercial or otherwise:
- to punish at least the flagrant mistakes and misfeasance of officialdom,
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to assure an orderly succession of at least minimally competent officials,
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to generate feedback to the officials concerning the consequences of their policies,
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to prevent officials from (or punish them for) entirely ignoring the interests of the governed, and
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to prevent serious misalignments between government action and public opinion.
Enough of politics and elections, I have a life to lead, don’t you? Too many want to remake democracy with the faculty workshop as their model.
Such deliberation has demanding requirements for popular participation in the democratic process, including a high level of knowledge and analytical sophistication and an absence, or at least severe curtailment, of self-interested motives.
It’s time to end wind welfare
05 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in energy economics, rentseeking Tags: corporate welfare, green rent seeking, wind welfare
Kokoro Scanner monitors your pulse to tell if you’re telling fibs | Daily Mail Online
05 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in economics of bureaucracy, economics of crime, politics
More on More Efficient Tax Systems Leading to Bigger Government
02 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, liberalism, Public Choice Tags: Casey Mulligan, Gary Becker, growth in government, public choice
…in Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government (NBER Working Paper Number No. 6789) , [Gary Becker and Casey Mulligan] conclude that flatter and broader taxes also tend to encourage bigger government because taxpayers offer less resistance to increases in flat tax rates than in rates of more onerous and less efficient forms of taxation.
Any decline in the resistance of taxpayers leads to larger government budgets since an endless number of groups agitate for greater government support.
Flat tax rates, such as the VAT and Social Security taxes on earnings, usually start at very low levels but invariably increase over time.
The VAT is now 20 percent and higher in some countries. And payroll taxes began at a modest 2 percent in the 1930s in the United States, but have been increased 21 times to the present 15 percent combined rate on employees and employers.
Utopia, you are standing in it! 
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