Machiavelli, Mises, Milton Friedman, W.H. Hutt and Walsingham’s Manual on practical public policy advising

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Ludwig Von Mises worked as an economic-policy advisor to the Vienna Chamber of Commerce from 1909 to 1934. As Richard Ebeling notes:

What comes out from reading Mises’s policy writings from this period of his European career is that if you had asked him a fiscal, or monetary, or regulatory-policy question in the context of his role as analyst at the Chamber of Commerce, he would not have said, and did not simply say, "laissez-faire" — abolish the central bank, deregulate the economy, and eliminate taxes.

Mises accepted the context of which his policy options must be worked out. Ebeling went on to note that Mises seemed to think in three policy horizons:

  1. The most optimal institutional and policy arrangements in society for the fostering of the classical-liberal ideal of freedom and prosperity, based on the knowledge that he thought sound economic theory could provide;
  2. the actual circumstances of the present, but focused on the intermediary goals that would be leading in the direction of that more distant, "optimal" horizon; and
  3. current situation and the immediate future

In the 1970s, Rothbard criticised Milton Friedman for advocating indexation of prices and wages as a method to reduce some of the negative effects from an on-going inflation. Rothbard regarded this as a sell-out.

Richard Nixon’s responses to Milton Friedman were rather more flattering in terms of his policy purity:

I don’t care what Milton Friedman says, he’s not running for re-election.

In 1922, during the worsening Great Austrian Inflation, Mises proposed indexation of wages and prices. Ebeling explained Mises as follows:

  • what was inefficient and unnecessary in the three-tiered Austrian bureaucratic system of federal, provincial, and municipal regulators and taxing authorities;
  • what specific reforms should be introduced, how they could be experimented with in smaller regions of Austria; and
  • how best to overcome the resistance of those in the bureaucracy fearful of losing their jobs

Milton Friedman was purer than this – always the first best advice:

The role of the economist in discussions of public policy seems to me to be to prescribe what should be done in the light of what can be done, politics aside, and not to predict what is ‘politically feasible’ and then recommend it.

Little wonder that Friedman had little time for those economists who promised more than they could deliver and warned less than they should of the hazards and difficulties that may lie ahead the particular policies that were being considered:

A major problem of our time is that people have come to expect policies to produce results that they are incapable of producing. …

we economists in recent years have done vast harm—to society at large and to our profession in particular—by claiming more than we can deliver.

We have thereby encouraged politicians to make extravagant promises, inculcate unrealistic expectations in the public at large, and promote discontent with reasonably satisfactory results because they fall short of the economists’ promised land.

W.H. Hutt steered the middle course that I favour:

In our judgment, the best you will be able to get away with is programme A along the following lines; but if you could find a convincing way of really explaining the issue to the electorate, our advice would have to be quite different.

We should have to recommend programme B, along the following lines.

James Buchanan emphases political realities in a similar way:

We start from here, from where we are, and not from some idealized world peopled by beings with a different history and with utopian institutions. Some appreciation of the status quo is essential before discussion can begin about prospects for improvement.

Ebeling ends by saying:

Even as that uncompromising and principled proponent of individual liberty and the free market, Mises was called upon in his role as policy analyst and advocate to sometimes devise "second-" and "third-best" policy proposals in an imperfect world dominated by collectivist and interventionist ideas and practices.

for those who have sometimes asked, "Well, but how do you apply Austrian Economics to the ‘real world’ of public policy?" here is the answer by the economist who has been considered the most original, thoroughgoing, and uncompromising member of the Austrian School over the last one hundred years! His policy analyses provide us with warning signs and guideposts to assist us in thinking about and designing better policies for our own time.

In The Prince, Machiavelli said in a chapter on how to choose wise advisors and avoid flatterers.

Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the wise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires, and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions.

With these councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either overthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions that he falls into contempt…

A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every one from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning the things of which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger be felt.

I think Mises read less of Machiavelli and more of the now 400 year old book written by an French courter called  not to A Practical Guide for Ambitious Politicians, or Walsingham’s Manual which Gordon Tullock republished in 1961.

I have a copy of this rare book republished in 1961 which was translated again in 2007 under the title Treatise on the Court. The Early Modern Management Classic on Organizational Behaviour.

For Mises to survive and prosper as a policy advisor as he struggled for position within a small elite group amidst fierce competition, he had to know how organisations worked, how to find the levers of power and press them. That is why is pitched his advice in light of the immediate,medium term or long term policy horizon horizon as set out in the dot points above.

Walsingham’s Manual has a whole chapter on when the courtier should warn of the hazards and difficulties that may lay ahead and when he should humour the prince in his inclinations that mesh well with what Mises did. There is another chapter on how to deal with rival courtiers that made Sir Humphrey proud:

Those who feel compelled to compete with you will not be won over by shows of respect or veneration. You can, however, coax them onto a different path by

  • encouraging them to aim for a goal more ambitious than yours,
  • helping them achieve this goal,
  • offering to help advance their ambitions, and
  • playing down your own goal as being too insignificant for them to aspire to.

Imply that you have no choice but to pursue your goal because you aren’t capable of competing (as they are) for any­thing better. By way of contrast, praise your competitors’ reputation, power, abilities and merit: suggest that they can do far better than you and should set their sights higher.

If ever you come to fear that a competitor may get ahead of you, raise doubts and insecurities in his mind about what he wants to do. Discuss the pros and cons of the matter, but always in a way that reinforces why he should give up and look elsewhere.

Your best and quickest course, though, is to disguise or hide your objective until it’s too late for anyone to compete with you or block you.

Pushing an ambitious plan too openly may repel the very people who would have helped you if you’d been more discreet, making your task more difficult and damaging your chances of success.

Then, if you do prevail, you’ll attract more envy than you would have otherwise, and if you fail, you’ll look that much more foolish. Your safest course is to do as rowers do, turning your back on your objective and showing every sign of having some other destination.

Double standards watch: was Milton Friedman a double secret communist agent?

In March 1975, Friedman had a 45-minute meeting with Pinochet while he was on a private visit to Chile. Friedman later wrote a letter to that tin-pot military dictator proposing some economic remedies. That advice was the same advice he gave to countries all around the world such as to the government of India in 1955 .

Friedman advocated quick and severe cuts in government spending and inflation, deregulation, a floating exchange rate  and more open international trade policy and to

provide for the relief of any cases of real hardship and severe distress among the poorest classes.

Milton Friedman first visited China in 1980. According to Ronald Coase’s book on Chinese economic reform, as part of that visit, Friedman gave a week long seminar to Chinese government officials.  Friedman met with the  leadership of this totalitarian dictatorship. Friedman returned again as a guest of the Chinese government in 1988 and 1993:

Milton Friedman and his wife Rose visited China in 1980 and 1988 to learn about the economic reform that was taking place there and to share their economic knowledge and insights with the Chinese people.

Friedman gave lectures in numerous cities and held discussions with government officials, managers, bankers, students, professors and even with ordinary people in their homes and on the streets.

In their second visit they met with Zhao Ziyang… General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, to discuss China’s economic reform.

In his meetings with the Chinese leaders when he first visited China in 1980, Friedman strongly emphasised

the importance of unfettered markets, pointing to China’s neighbour, Hong Kong, as a model to be followed by mainland China.

Steven Cheung wrote about  those visits and the extremely sophisticated discussions Friedman had with top Chinese officials and their economic advisers in 1988 with Cheung as his translator.  The only two points they disagreed on was the control  that the Communist Party had over the society  and when  to loosen exchange-rate controls. Cheung said that Zhao’s rationale for delay deserved a good grade in any graduate exam. Following Friedman’s meetings with Zhao, he said the general secretary

was the best economist I have ever met from a socialist country

Subsequent to his 1988 meeting  with Zhao Ziyang,  Milton Friedman wrote him a letter that gave much the same advice that he gave to Pinochet. Friedman also advised the Chinese against following the market socialism model of Yugoslavia  because although it would work for a while before further economic growth required privatisation.

Why is it wrong to have one 45 minute meeting with the tin-pot dictator and yet give seminars and detailed policy advice to a totalitarian dictatorship. Friedman would spend the rest of his life being defamed as an accomplice to evil for meeting Pinochet for 45 minutes. Friedman later noted that he gave communist dictatorships the same advice he gave Pinochet:

It’s curious. I gave exactly the same lectures in China that I gave in Chile. I have had many demonstrations against me for what I said in Chile.

Nobody has made any objections to what I said in China. How come?

If the same standard of evidence is applied to all people who visit dictatorships, Friedman must be a Communist agent or at least a collaborator and responsible for all the horrors that took place in China before and after he visited: the Great Leap Forward and the cultural revolution would be examples. Friedman also visited Yugoslavia: market socialism is his fault as well.

Capitalism is a profit AND loss system

The economic miracle that has been the United States was not produced by socialized enterprises, by government-union-industry cartels or by centralized economic planning. It was produced by private enterprises in a profit-and-loss system. And losses were at least as important in weeding out failures as profits in fostering successes. Let government succor failures, and we shall be headed for stagnation and decline.  - Milton Friedman

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Margaret Thatcher, Hayek & Friedman | Margaret Thatcher Foundation

Thatcher read Hayek’s Road to Serfdom as an undergraduate at Oxford. She took away two key lessons for her life: you cannot compromise with socialism, even the mild social democratic forms; and she saw her own party was doing just that, which put her deeply at odds with its leadership.

After she became Leader of the Opposition, Thatcher cut short a leftish member of her own  Conservative Party Research Department by showing him a copy of The Constitution of Liberty, slamming it down on the table declaring “this is what I believe”.

Thatcher’s relationship with Milton Friedman was different to that of Hayek and not as long standing. Friedman met Thatcher for the first time at a dinner in 1978.

After Thatcher came to office in 1979, Friedman was a critic of the monetary regime of the Thatcher government, questioning her monetary policy targets,  questioning the raising of the value added tax to finance income tax cuts,  and urging deeper spending cuts in the 1979 budget. Friedman was also a strong critic of the monetary policies of the Fed at that time as well, arguing that they lacked credibility, transparency and were very erratic.

In a letter to the Times on 3 March 1980 Friedman stated that he opposed “fine-tuning” and strongly preferred:

a steady monetary and fiscal policy announced long in advance and strictly adhered to

Hayek disagreed with Friedman about the role of gradualism in a letter to the Times on 26 March 1980:

The chief practical issue today is how fast inflation can be and ought to be stopped.

On this, I am afraid, my difference from Friedman makes me take an even more radical position.

The reason is that I believe that the artificial stimulus which inflation gives to business and employment lasts only so long as inflation accelerates, that is, so long as prices turn out to be higher than expected.

Inflation clearly cannot accelerate indefinitely, but as soon as it ceases to accelerate, all the windfalls due to prices turning out higher than expected, which kept unprofitable businesses and employment going, disappear.

Every slowing down of inflation must therefore produce temporary conditions of extensive failures and unemployment.

No inflation has yet been terminated without a “stabilization crisis”.

To advocate that inflation should be slowed down gradually over a period of years is to advocate a long period of protracted misery. No government could stand such a course.

Milton Friedman’s general views on Britain when Thatcher first came to office were clear-cut and were also stated in his letter to the Times on 3 March 1980:

…while monetary restraint is a sufficient condition for controlling inflation, it is a necessary but not sufficient condition for improving Britain’s productivity – the fundamental requirement for restoring Britain to full economic health.

That requires measures on a broader front to restore and improve incentives, promote productive investment, and give a greater scope for private enterprise and initiative.

Both Hayek and Friedman wrote privately about the Thatcher policies of the early 1980s, decrying them as gradualism. So much for the retired professors as the ring masters of neo-liberalism and Thatcher as their pawn.

Friedman and Hayek disagreed with each other, in important respects, about both gradualism in monetary policy and  macroeconomics in general.

Thatcher did not follow their conflicting policy advice to her. At best, Thatcher was a wayward disciple of squabbling prophets.

Friedman was a strong critic of Austrian macroeconomics and its supposed role in the 1930s policy response or lack of a response to the Great Depression:

I think the Austrian business-cycle theory has done the world a great deal of harm.

If you go back to the 1930s, which is a key point, here you had the Austrians sitting in London, Hayek and Lionel Robbins, and saying you just have to let the bottom drop out of the world.

You’ve just got to let it cure itself. You can’t do anything about it. You will only make it worse. You have Rothbard saying it was a great mistake not to let the whole banking system collapse.

I think by encouraging that kind of do-nothing policy both in Britain and in the United States, they did harm.

Hayek was equally critical of the macroeconomics of Milton Friedman and his methodology in general:

I do indeed regard the abandonment of the whole macroeconomics nonsense as very important, but it is for me a very delicate matter and I have for some time avoided stating my views too bluntly and would not have time to state them adequately.

The source of the difficulty is the constant danger that the Mont Pelerin society might split into a Friedmanite and a Hayekian wing.

 I have long regretted my failure to take time to criticise Friedman’s Positive Economics almost as much as my failure to return to the critique of Keynes General Theory after I had dealt with his Treatiese.

It still seems to me paradoxical that Keynes, who was rather contemptuous of econometrics, should have become the main source of the revival of macroeconomics – which incidentally was also the reason why Milton was for a time a Keynesian.

I believe a good and detailed critical analysis of macroeconomics would be very desirable.

Brad Delong pointed out in 2000 that the New Keynesian macroeconomic research program was developed in the 20th century monetarist tradition mostly in the work of Milton Friedman.

Tom Sargent argued in 1981 that Thatcher’s medium term economic strategy was gradualism, and the sustained budget deficits would result in unpleasant monetarist arithmetic:

…In order that the current British plan be viewed as credible it is necessary that the large prospective government deficits over the next several years be counterbalanced by prospective surpluses further down the line.

It is difficult to point to much either in current legislation,  or equally importantly, in the general British political climate that could objectively support such an outlook.

…Gradualism invites speculation about future reversals with U-turns in policy.

Large contemporary government deficits unaccompanied by concrete prospects for future government surpluses promote realistic doubts about whether monetary restraint must be abandoned sooner or later to help finance the deficits.

Such doubts not only call into question the likelihood that the plan can successfully permanently reduce inflation, but also can  induce high real cost in terms of depressed industry and lengthened unemployment in response to what may be viewed as only temporary downward movements in nominal aggregate demand that the monetary restraint induces.

What did Thatcher actually do?

by discrediting socialism so thoroughly, she prompted in due course the adoption by the Labour Party of free market economics, and so, as she wryly confessed in later years, “helped to make it electable”.

The archives of the Margaret Thatcher foundation has released extensive correspondence and other documents about Thatcher, Hayek and Friedman.

via MT, Hayek & Friedman | Margaret Thatcher Foundation.

You’re an ideologue; no, you’re the ideologue!

I find that people who call out other people and opposing analysis as ideological are themselves ideologues. They cannot see political differences as other than ideological cat fights.

This is rather than an honest difference of opinion over the effectiveness of different options to achieve a common end as Milton Friedman explained:

I venture the judgment, however, that currently in the Western world, and especially in the United States, differences about economic policy among disinterested citizens derive predominantly from different predictions about the economic consequences of taking action – differences that in principle can be eliminated by the progress of positive economics – rather than from fundamental differences in basic values, differences about which men can ultimately only fight.

Hayek attributed to his opponents nothing more than intellectual error. Hayek (1948) believed that:

we must recognize that it may be genuine error which leads the well-meaning and intelligent people who occupy those key positions in our society to spread views which to us appear a threat to our civilization. Nothing could be more important than to try to understand the sources of this error in order that we should be able to counter it.

Hayek (1968) continues:

The worst mistake a fighter for our ideals can make is to ascribe to our opponents dishonest or immoral aims. I know it is sometimes difficult not to be irritated into a feeling that most of them are a bunch of irresponsible demagogues who ought to know better…

we ought to realize that their conceptions derive from serious thinkers whose ultimate ideals are not so very different from our own and with whom we differ not so much on ultimate values, but on the effective means of achieving them.

William Baumol and Alan Blinder described the role of economics in policy debates as follows:

While economic science can contribute the best theoretical and factual knowledge there is on a particular issue, the final decision on policy questions often rests either on information that is not currently available or on tastes and ethical opinions about which people differ (the things we call ‘value judgments’), or on both.

Lester Thurow said that differences in the valuation of outcomes is at the basis of most disagreements:

Liberal and conservative economists most frequently disagree on who ought to be hurt and who ought to be helped. Their technical disagreements on who will be hurt and who will be helped are much less frequent.

Karl Popper argued that who made an argument is of little value. He said that the growth of knowledge depended not on the ethics of the individual scientists but on the critical spirit to scientific community as a whole. The critical scrutiny of others polices the truth:

The genuine rationalist does not think that he or anyone else is in possession of the truth; nor does he think that mere criticism as such helps us achieve new ideas.

But he does think that, in the sphere of ideas, only critical discussion can help us sort the wheat from the chaff.

He is well aware that acceptance or rejection of an idea is never a purely rational matter; but he thinks that only critical discussion can give us the maturity to see an idea from more and more sides and to make a correct judgement of it.

Peter Drucker championed a business rule of never making a decision until there is disagreement; only then do you know what you are planning to do:

Unless one has considered alternatives, one has a closed mind.

This above all, explains why effective decision-makers deliberately disregard the second major command of the textbooks on decision-making and create dissension and disagreement, rather than consensus.

Decisions of the kind the executive has to make are not made well by acclamation.

They are made well only if based on the clash of conflicting views, the dialogue between different points of view, the choice between different judgments.

The first rule in decision-making is that one does not make a decision unless there is disagreement

Alfred P. Sloan said at a meeting of one of his top management committees:

“Gentlemen, I take it we are all in complete agreement on the decision here.”  Everyone around the table nodded assent.

“Then,”continued Sloan, “I propose we postpone further discussion of this matter until our next meeting to give ourselves time to develop disagreement and perhaps gain some understanding of what the decision is all about”.

The Great Liberator – Larry Summer’s Obituary for Milton Friedman

via The Great Liberator – New York Times.

Milton Friedman explains Director’s Law of of Public Expenditure

Milton Friedman – links to all of his on-line papers, filmed and taped lectures, TV shows and TV interviews

see Rose and Milton Friedman at the Hoover Institution for everything on-line in every possible modern and old fashioned media format. For example,  if you missed it, watch his ten-part television series Free to Choose and his 46-minute appearance on the Phil Donahue Show

Milton Friedman

The web page is hard to find through Google unless you know it is already there. Just managed to remembered that it was at the Hoover Institution.

Macroeconomic forecasting has had a turbulent history

Most early discussions argued against econometric forecasting in principle:

  • Forecasting was not properly grounded in statistical theory,
  • It presupposed that causation implies predictability, and
  • The forecasts themselves were invalidated by the reactions of economic agents to them.

A long tradition argued that social relationships were too complex, too multifarious and too infected with capricious human choices to generate enduring, stable relationships that could be estimated.

These objections came before Hayek’s point that much of all social knowledge is not capable of summation in statistics or even language.

The limitations of forecasting are well-known. Forecasts are conditional on a number of variables; there are important unresolved analytical differences about the operation of the economy; and large uncertainties about the size and timing of responses to macroeconomic changes. Shocks to the output, prices, employment and other variables are partly permanent and partly transitory.

At the practical level, forecasting requires that there are regularities on which to base models, such regularities are informative about the future and these regularities are encapsulated in the selected forecasting model.

We have very little reliable information about the distribution of shocks or about how the distributions change over time. Forecast errors arise from changes in the parameters in the model, mis-specification of the model, estimation uncertainty, mis-measurement of the initial conditions and error accumulation.

In the 1980s, data mining and publications bias were so strong and statistical inferences were so fragile that Ed Leamer’s 1983 Let’s Take the Con out of Econometrics paper made up-and-coming applied economists despair for their professional field and for their own careers:

The econometric art as it is practiced at the computer terminal involves fitting many, perhaps thousands, of statistical models. One or several that the researcher finds pleasing are selected for reporting purposes.

This search for a model is often well intentioned, but there can be no doubt that such a specification search invalidates the traditional theories of inference….

[A]ll the concepts of traditional theory…utterly lose their meaning by the time an applied researcher pulls from the bramble of computer output the one thorn of a model he likes best, the one he chooses to portray as a rose.

… This is a sad and decidedly unscientific state of affairs we find ourselves in.

Hardly anyone takes data analyses seriously.

Or perhaps more accurately, hardly anyone takes anyone else’s data analyses seriously.

Like elaborately plumed birds who have long since lost the ability to procreate but not the desire, we preen and strut and display our t-values [which measure statistical significance].

Leamer still doubts the progress towards techniques that separate sturdy from fragile inferences. Economists by and large simply do not want to hear that they cannot make major conclusions from the data sets. But not that they really do, but that is for a forthcoming post.

Before the great moderation spread wide, Brunner and Meltzer found that in the 1970s and 1980s, the 95% confidence intervals on next year’s forecasts for Gross Domestic Product and the Consumer Price Index are such that government and private forecasters in the USA and Europe could not distinguish between a recession and a boom, nor say whether inflation will be zero or ten per cent.

A review this week by Ahir and Lounganishows found that recent forecasting by the private and public sector has not improved:

none of the 62 recessions in 2008–09 was predicted as the previous year was drawing to a close.

Figure 1. Number of recessions predicted by September of the previous year

Source: Ahir and Loungani 2014, “There will be growth in the spring”: How well do economists predict turning points?” http://www.voxeu.org/

A policy-maker who adjusts policy based on forecasts for the following year has little reason to be confident that he has changed policy in the right direction.

While at graduate school, I wrote what was published as Official Economic Forecasting Errors in Australia 1983-96.

Australian Treasury forecasting errors were so large relative to the mean annual rate of change in real GDP and the inflation rate that, on average, forecasters could not distinguish slow growth from a deep recession or stable prices from moderate inflation.

The biography of Paul Keating by Edwards suggested that the Government of the day was well aware of the poor value of forecasts. So much so that forecasts may not have actually played a significant role in monetary policy making in Australia in the late 1980s onwards. John Stone said this to Keating when he assumed office as Treasurer in 1983:

As you know, we (and I in particular) have never had much faith in forecasting.

Not infrequently, our forecasts turn out to be seriously wrong.

… We simply do the best we can, in as professional manner as we can — and, if it is any consolation, no one seems to be able to do any better, at least in the long haul.

We always emphasize the uncertainties that attach to the forecasts — but we cannot ensure that such qualifications are heeded and plainly they often are not

To cast my results in Milton Friedman’s nomenclature for monetary lags, the recognition lag on a forecasting based monetary policy appears to be infinite because forecasters do not know if there will be a recession or 10% inflation afoot when their monetary policy changes take hold in 18 to 24 months.

John Cowperthwaite, Hong Kong and the dangers of collecting statistics

The Colonial Office sent John Cowperthwaite to Hong Kong in 1945 to serve eventually as its financial secretary from 1961.

This Scotsman was very much a disciple of Adam Smith. In his first budget speech, in 1961, he said:

In the long run, the aggregate of decisions of individual businessmen, exercising individual judgment in a free economy, even if often mistaken, is less likely to do harm than the centralised decisions of a government, and certainly the harm is likely to be counteracted faster.

In his decade as financial secretary, real wages rose by 50 % and the share of the population in acute poverty fell from 50% to 15%. Milton Friedman met Cowperthwaite in 1963 and asked about the lack of economic statistics. Cowperthwaite answered:

“If I let them compute those statistics, they’ll want to use them for planning.” Friedman thought “How wise”.

Murray Rothbard got into a debate with George Stigler in the early 1960s about the dangers of collecting statistics. Rothbard argued that:

The individual consumer, in his daily rounds, has little need of statistics; through advertising, through the information of friends, and through his own experience, he finds out what is going on in the markets around him. The same is true of the business firm.

The businessman must also size up his particular market, determine the prices he has to pay for what he buys and charge for what he sells, engage in cost accounting to estimate his costs, and so on.

But none of this activity is really dependent upon the omnium gatherum of statistical facts about the economy ingested by the federal government. The businessman, like the consumer, knows and learns about his particular market through his daily experience.

… Statistics are the eyes and ears of the bureaucrat, the politician, the socialistic reformer. Only by statistics can they know, or at least have any idea about, what is going on in the economy.

… Cut off those eyes and ears, destroy those crucial guidelines to knowledge, and the whole threat of government intervention is almost completely eliminated

Cowperthwaite refused to collect economic statistics

for fear that I might be forced to do something about them

This action bias is a common bias of bureaucracies. Peter Lilley in the UK said:

…when there is a problem – a perceived political problem – officials come up with a range of options which excludes one option. I observed this when I was a humble PPS at the Department of Environment and suggested that we always ought to include this option on the list and it became known as “Lilley’s option” and that was do nothing.

Other psychological biases of bureaucracies are motivated reasoning, the focusing illusion, the affect heuristic and the illusion of competence. When Friedman asked him in 1963 to explain the mechanism which kept the Hong Kong dollar pegged to the pound, Cowperthwaite said that the Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank (through which the currency peg was operated) did not understand it:

Better they shouldn’t. They would mess it up.

His 2008 Guardian obituary noted that when asked what was the key thing that poor countries should do, Cowperthwaite once remarked:

They should abolish the office of national statistics.

The ideal faceless bureaucrat, Cowperthwaite said of his record:

I did very little. All I did was to try to prevent some of the things that might undo it.

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Milton Friedman on the power of greed

So that the record of history is absolutely crystal clear. That there is no alternative way, so far discovered, of improving the lot of the ordinary people that can hold a candle to the productive activities that are unleashed by a free enterprise system.

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The market is the basis of social peace as well as prosperity

Milton Friedman pointed specifically to the anonymity and impersonal nature of the market as a way that people that would otherwise hate each other if they met on any other basis could instead co-operate, work productively together and become friendly with each other.

“The great virtue of a free market system is that it does not care what colour people are; it does not care what their religion is; it only cares whether they can produce something you want to buy. It is the most effective system we have discovered to enable people who hate one another to deal with one another and help one another.”

Milton Friedman

Benevolence is not enough. The market process ensures that the unpopular and unpleasant also get fed and have jobs. The market is the basis of social peace as well as the only method by which the masses escaped from grinding poverty.

A taxonomy of political disagreement

It is just too comforting to think that those you disagree with are ignorant or steeped in moral turpitude, preferably both.

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Milton Friedman argued that people agree on most social objectives, but they differ often on the predicted outcomes of different policies and institutions.

This leads us to Robert and Zeckhauser’s taxonomy of disagreement:

Positive disagreements can be over questions of:
1. Scope: what elements of the world one is trying to understand?
2. Model: what mechanisms explain the behaviour of the world?
3. Estimate: what estimates of the model’s parameters are thought to obtain in particular contexts?

Values disagreements can be over questions of:
1. Standing: who counts?
2. Criteria: what counts?
3. Weights: how much different individuals and criteria count?

Any positive analysis tends to include elements of scope, model, and estimation, though often these elements intertwine; they frequently feature in debates in an implicit or undifferentiated manner.

Likewise, normative analysis will also include elements of standing, criteria, and weights, whether or not these distinctions are recognised.

The origin of political disagreement is a broad church indeed in a liberal democracy. Those you disagree with are not evil, they just disagree with you. As Karl Popper observed:

There are many difficulties impeding the rapid spread of reasonableness. One of the main difficulties is that it always takes two to make a discussion reasonable. Each of the parties must be ready to learn from the other.

A nice case against the notion of the ignorance and moral turpitude of your opponents is the obituary by Brad DeLong for Milton Friedman which was as good as any written saying:

His wits were smart, his perceptions acute, his arguments strong, his reasoning powers clear, coherent, and terrifyingly quick. You tangled with him at your peril. And you left not necessarily convinced, but well aware of the weak points in your own argument

AND

Milton Friedman’s thought is, I believe, best seen as the fusion of two strongly American currents: libertarianism and pragmatism. Friedman was a pragmatic libertarian. He believed that–as an empirical matter–giving individuals freedom and letting them coordinate their actions by buying and selling on markets would produce the best results… For right-of-center American libertarian economists, Milton Friedman was a powerful leader. For left-of-center American liberal economists, Milton Friedman was an enlightened adversary. We are all the stronger for his work. We will miss him.

What is neoliberalism? Please tell me – show me one.

I want to meet someone who believes neoliberalism was the leading light of the economic reforms since 1980. They can then tell me what neoliberalism is. Please, tell me.

The prefix “neo-” makes “neoliberalism” sound like something that morphed into something bad. Is neoliberalism something more than a sustained sneer – a personal attack as a way of avoiding debate?

Not only is there no single definition of neoliberalism, there is no one who identifies himself or herself as a neoliberal. At least communists and socialists were proud to be called so.

In Neoliberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan, Taylor Boas & Jordan Gans-Morse went in search of anyone who identifies one’s self as a neoliberal:

  • They did not uncover a single contemporary instance in which an author used the term self-descriptively, and only one – an article by New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman (1999) – in which neoliberal was applied to the author’s own policy recommendations.
  • Digging into the archives, they did find that while Milton Friedman (1951) embraced the neoliberal label and philosophy in one of his earliest political writings, he soon distanced himself from the term, trumpeting “old-style liberalism” in later manifestoes (Friedman 1955). See “Neo-liberalism and its Prospects”, Milton Friedman Papers, Box 42, Folder 8, Hoover Institution Archives. 1951. Hardly a smoking gun?

What Boas and Gans-Morse found, based on a content analysis of 148 journal articles published from 1990 to 2004, was that the term is often undefined. It is employed unevenly across ideological divides; it is used to characterise an excessively broad variety of phenomena.

That is academic speak for neoliberalism is an empty slogan.

Neoliberalism was supposed to rule the roost under Reagan, Thatcher, Hawke and Lange-Douglas. The local branches of neoliberalism were Thatchernomics, Rogernomics, and Reaganomics.

Milton Friedman is said to have mesmerised several countries with a flying visit. The Friedman Monday Conference on ABC in 1975 and by Hayek in 1976 are still ruling the Australian policy roost, if some serious public commentators are to be believed.

In the 1980s and up to the mid-1990s, despite all the neo-liberal deregulation and Milton Friedman taking over monetary policy, mentioning Friedman’s name at job interviews would have been extremely career limiting, and that was at the Australian Treasury.

Back then, the much less radical Friedman was just graduating from being a wild man in the wings to just a suspicious character.

If you name dropped Hayek in the early 1990s, any sign of name recognition would have indicated that you were being interviewed by educated people.

When the Left gets on its high horse and goes on about Hayek and Friedman running neoliberalism, with Hayek as Friedman’s mentor, it is refreshing to remind all how little they had in common on macroeconomics. The University of Chicago Department of Economics did not offer Hayek a job in the late 1940s despite his outstanding record at LSE as Keynes’ principal critic in the 1930s.

While working at the next desk to a monetary policy section in the late 1980s, when mortgage rates were 18%, I heard not a word of Friedman’s Svengali influence:

  • The mantra for several years was that the market determined interest rates, not the Reserve Bank. Joan Robinson would have been proud that her 1975 Monday conference was still holding the reins.
  • Monetary policy was targeting the current account. Read Edwards’ biography of Paul Keating’s time as Treasurer and Prime Minister and his extracts from very Keynesian treasury briefings to Keating signed by David Morgan that reminded me of Keynesian Macro 101.

As a commentator on an Australian Treasury seminar paper in 1986, Peter Boxhall – freshly educated from the 1970s Chicago School – suggested using monetary policy to reduce the inflation rate quickly to zero. David Morgan and Chris Higgins almost fell off their chairs. These Treasury Deputy CEOs had never heard of such radical ideas.

In their breathless protestations, neither Morgan nor Higgins were sufficiently in tune with their Keynesian education to remember the role of sticky wages or even the need for monetary growth reductions to be gradual and, more importantly, credible, as per Milton Friedman.

By the way, Friedman’s presidential address to the AEA in 1967 is now recognised as perhaps the single most influential journal article of the 20th century. That article is the essence of good communication and empirical testing of competing hypotheses as was his 1976 Noble Prize lecture. No wonder both were hidden from impressionable undergraduates such as me a few years after.

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NOT A LOT OF PEOPLE KNOW THAT

“We do not believe any group of men adequate enough or wise enough to operate without scrutiny or without criticism. We know that the only way to avoid error is to detect it, that the only way to detect it is to be free to inquire. We know that in secrecy error undetected will flourish and subvert”. - J Robert Oppenheimer.