How to argue for inequality and neoliberalism when arguing dead set against it
17 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in economic growth, economic history, human capital, income redistribution, labour economics, labour supply, politics - New Zealand, poverty and inequality, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: Leftover Left, neoliberalism, top 1%
On 12 August last, Closer Together New Zealand posted a chart showing average hourly wages had been stagnant for 20 years and then started growing again in 1993. Closer Together New Zealand then rounded up the usual suspects of the Left over Left.
Later that month in a comment on that post, a chart was posted showing that inequality had been increasing quite rapidly in the late 1980s and early 1990s in New Zealand. There were a range of economic reforms Closer Together New Zealand didn’t like in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Closer Together New Zealand did not notice their second chart showed there had been a large increase in inequality, and their first chart showed that this was followed by the return of regular average hourly wages after 20 years of stagnation.
I am not so vulgar as to suggest correlation is causation, but it is amusing to watch that one day a chart is posted showing a resumption of wages growth after 20 years of wage stagnation and the next day a chart is posted showing that the major economic developments in the preceding years were a large increase in inequality and substantial economic liberalisation.
To add to my amusement, a companion site Inequality A New Zealand Conversation posted a chart showing the top 1% had not had much at all in income growth for the last 20 years while most everyone else had. This spike in the incomes of the top 1% prior to about 1994 was followed by the resumption in average wages growth after 1994.
Personal cameras as evidence that criminal deterrence works and works well
16 Jul 2015 1 Comment
in economics of crime, law and economics, managerial economics, organisational economics, personnel economics, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA Tags: body cameras, crime and punishment, criminal deterrence, police, prisons
Hutt City Council parking wardens are the latest in a long line of frontline staff to wear lapel cameras to deter assaults and verbal abuse. These lapel cameras are another illustration about how criminals and miscreants respond to incentives and are deterred by a greater prospect of being caught, convicted and punished. In the case of lapel cameras, there is a greater prospect of been identified and recorded for later proceedings.

The introduction of personal cameras in New Zealand prisons in high risk areas lead to a large reduction in the number of incidents of violence and abuse towards prison staff. Chief custodial officer Neil Beales said:
The use of on body cameras has led to a 15 to 20 per cent reduction in disruptive incidents (which can range from very minor to more serious) in units where cameras were used, compared with units where they were not used.
Even hardened prison inmates respond to incentives and a greater prospect of being caught and punished.

The introduction of personal cameras is not a priority for the New Zealand police. Mention was made of a six year long budget freeze as one of the reasons.
The first randomized controlled trial of police body cameras in the USA showed that cameras sharply reduce the use of force by police and the number of citizen complaints.

In Seattle, where a dozen officers started wearing body cameras in a pilot program in December, the police department has set up its own YouTube channel, broadcasting a stream of blurred images to protect privacy.
Poverty rates among immigrants and natives across the OECD
16 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in income redistribution, labour economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, poverty and inequality, welfare reform Tags: Australia, child poverty, economics of immigration, family poverty
NIMBY: Where, When, And to Which Developers It Happens in the USA
15 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, environmental economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, urban economics Tags: green rent seeking, Inner-city Left, land supply, land use planning, NIMBYs, zoning
Does education pay in New Zealand?
14 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of education, human capital, labour economics, occupational choice, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA Tags: College premium, graduate premium
Immigrants and their children across the OECD
14 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in labour economics, labour supply, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, population economics Tags: Australia, economics of identity, economics of immigration
Why is Labour so staunch on its left-wing policies – the voters must come to them – but opportunistic on race?
11 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, international economics, law and economics, politics - New Zealand, property rights, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: antiforeign bias, antimarket bias, left-wing populists, New Zealand First, New Zealand Labour Party, political opportunism, racism, rational ignorance, rational irrationality, right-wing populists, traditional labour voter, working class Tory
Figure 1: who won the electorate vote of New Zealand First party voters, 2014 New Zealand election
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Source: Electoral Commission.
New Zealand First vote splitting data in Figure 1 suggests many more Labour voters vote New Zealand First than for the National Party with their electorate votes.
1/3rd of voters who gave their party vote to New Zealand First voted Labour with their electorate vote. This compares to one in five New Zealand First voters who gave their electorate vote to the National Party.
The Labour Party can win back some traditional Labour voters by borrowing populist policies from New Zealand First and its ageing leader such as prohibiting foreigners from buying New Zealand land.
Who mentioned Shane Jones?
In politics we don't pull our punches, unless you've got one of the world's best in town! http://t.co/Xiz2l36btg—
Winston Peters (@winstonpeters) August 08, 2013
Voter turnout among voting age people
11 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
Under the shy Labour voter theory, countries with low turnouts should have right-wing governments and countries with high turnouts should have left-wing governments. Do they?
Voter turnout among voting age people
Turkey 86%
Sweden 83
France 71
Mexico 65
UK 61
US 54pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015… http://t.co/lmMcqqM4JD—
Conrad Hackett (@conradhackett) June 01, 2015
A living wage helps well-off households more!
10 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, econometerics, income redistribution, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: activists, British economy, British politics, do gooders, expressive voting, living wage, rational ignorance, rational irrationality, The fatal conceit, The pretence to knowledge, unintended consequences
Do Living Wage advocates realise it helps richer households more than poorer ones? My take: telegraph.co.uk/finance/budget… … http://t.co/YPTB6v7tSB—
Fraser Nelson (@FraserNelson) July 10, 2015
Hopeless KiwiRail bailout reporting by Radio New Zealand
10 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, economics of bureaucracy, economics of media and culture, politics - New Zealand, rentseeking, transport economics Tags: corporate welfare, KiwiRail, media bias, privatisation, public ownership, Radio New Zealand, state owned enterprises
This morning on 9 to noon on Radio New Zealand, Kathryn Ryan, the compere of the program, repeatedly claimed that the government pumped $1 billion into the KiwiRail Turnaround Plan between 2010 and 2014. I was so annoyed by this that I made a broadcasting standards complaint while the program was still being broadcast on my mobile as a one finger typist.
The report on 9 to Noon was in response to the government putting KiwiRail on notice, giving it two years to identify savings and reduce Crown funding required or risk the possibility of closure. Since KiwiRail was acquired in 2008 for $665 million as a commercial investment, Crown investments (taxpayers bailout) totalled $3.4 billion – see Figure 1.
Figure 1: State-owned enterprise welfare, Vote Transport and Vote Finance (KiwiRail), Budgets 08/09 to 15/16
Source: New Zealand budget papers, various years.
Table 1 shows that the KiwiRail Turnaround plan of $1.272 billion since the 2009-10 Budget is only a small part of the bailout of KiwiRail. 9 to Noon simply ignored the $210 million in the 2015 budget for KiwiRail for no explicable reason and instead talked about a $1 billion Turnaround plan rather than the $1.272 billion Turnaround plan.
Table 1: State-Owned Enterprise welfare, Vote Transport and Vote Finance (KiwiRail), Budgets 2008/09 to 2015/16, $million
| 08/09 |
09/10 |
10/11 |
11/12 |
12/13 |
13/14 |
14/15 |
15/16 |
|
|
New Zealand Railways Corporation Loans |
405 |
55 |
250 |
108 |
11 |
|||
|
KiwiRail Turnaround Plan |
20 |
250 |
250 |
250 |
94 |
198 |
210 |
|
|
KiwiRail Equity Injection |
323 |
25 |
29 |
|||||
|
Rail Network and Rolling Stock Upgrade |
105 |
71 |
10 |
|||||
|
New Zealand Railways Corporation Loans |
55 |
|||||||
|
New Zealand Railways Corporation Increase in Capital for the Purchase of Crown Rail |
376 |
|||||||
|
Crown Rail Operator Loans |
140 |
|||||||
|
Crown Rail Operator Equity Injection |
7 |
|||||||
|
Total |
578 |
530 |
376 |
510 |
680 |
119 |
209 |
239 |
Source: New Zealand budget papers, various years.
Other parts of the bailout of KiwiRail include $405 million in loans to the New Zealand Railways Corporation in the 2009-10 budge – see table 1. There was a $323 million equity injection in the 2012-13 Budget – see table 1. KiwiRail has also caused write-downs in the Crown balance sheet of an incredible $9.8 billion since it was repurchased in 2008.
9 to Noon ignored at least two thirds of the cost to the taxpayer of bailing out KiwiRail by only limiting its reporting to part of the KiwiRail Turnaround Plan. It ignored the contribution in the most recent budget to that plan. That does not meet broadcasting standards of accuracy or professional responsibility.
Any reasonable listener will infer, as I did when listening, that the entire cost of the bailout of KiwiRail is represented by the Turnaround Plan of about $1 billion. If listeners were left with that impression, they were misled by 9 to Noon and Radio New Zealand.
It usually begins with the RMA – fewer warm, dry homes as an unintended consequence of regulatory restrictions on land supply
10 Jul 2015 1 Comment
in applied welfare economics, economics of regulation, industrial organisation, labour economics, law and economics, politics - New Zealand, poverty and inequality, property rights, survivor principle, urban economics Tags: consumer products standards, do gooders, economics of regulation, nanny state, offsetting behaviour, rent control, The fatal conceit, The pretence to knowledge, urban economics
The Government admits that its proposed insulation and smoke alarm standards for rental properties could push up rents by more than $3 a week. Under legislation to be introduced in October, social housing would have to be retrofitted with ceiling and underfloor insulation by next July, and all other rental homes by July 2019.

An important driver of lower quality housing in New Zealand is the restrictions on land supply. The costs of those restrictions, land makes up 60% of the cost of new houses rather than 40%. Land prices have doubled and tripled in a number of cities. As the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment has said:
The median price of sections has increased from $94,000 in 2003 to over $190,000 today (compared with $NZ 100,000 per section in the US), ranging from Southland ($82,000) to Auckland ($308,000)…
Section costs in Auckland account for around 60% of the cost of a new dwelling, compared with 40% in the rest of New Zealand.
The RMA is the Resource Management Act and was passed just before New Zealand housing prices started to rise rapidly.

Source: Dallas Fed; Housing prices deflated by personal consumption expenditure (PCE) deflator.
Higher land prices for new houses spill into the prices of existing houses, which are now much more expensive than they need to be but for the RMA inspired land supply restrictions in Auckland and elsewhere in New Zealand.

One way in which homeowners and landlords can keep costs down when buying a house either for their own use or as an investment property is not to invest in insulation and smoke alarms. Deposits are less, mortgages are less and rents are less. It all adds up.
$3 is not much for some but it is enough that some parents cannot find $3 or so per week to feed their children breakfast. Joe Trinder, the Mana News editor blogged about the great expense of feeding the kids for ordinary families.

Put simply, you cannot argue that a few dollars is a lot of money to people on low incomes but ignore the consequences for their welfare of a $3 per week increase in their rents.
If tenants were willing to pay for insulation, landlords would provide well-insulated rental properties to service that demand. Walter Block wrote an excellent defence of slumlords in his 1971 book Defending the Undefendable:
The owner of ghetto housing differs little from any other purveyor of low-cost merchandise. In fact, he is no different from any purveyor of any kind of merchandise. They all charge as much as they can.
First consider the purveyors of cheap, inferior, and second-hand merchandise as a class. One thing above all else stands out about merchandise they buy and sell: it is cheaply built, inferior in quality, or second-hand.
A rational person would not expect high quality, exquisite workmanship, or superior new merchandise at bargain rate prices; he would not feel outraged and cheated if bargain rate merchandise proved to have only bargain rate qualities.
Our expectations from margarine are not those of butter. We are satisfied with lesser qualities from a used car than from a new car.
However, when it comes to housing, especially in the urban setting, people expect, even insist upon, quality housing at bargain prices.
Richard Posner discussed housing habitability laws in his Economic Analysis of the Law. The subsection was titled wealth distribution through liability rules. Posner concluded that habitability laws will lead to abandonment of rental property by landlords and increased rents for poor tenants.
https://twitter.com/childpovertynz/status/618985237628858368
What do-gooder would want to know that a warranty of habitability for rental housing will lead to scarcer, more expensive housing for the poor! Surprisingly few interventions in the housing market work to the advantage of the poor.
Certainly, there will be less rental housing of a habitability standard below that demanded by do-gooders in the new New Zealand legislation. In the Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics entry on renting, Werner Hirsch said:
It would be a mistake, however, to look upon a decline in substandard rental housing as an unmitigated gain.
In fact, in the absence of substandard housing, options for indigent tenants are reduced. Some tenants are likely to end up in over-crowded standard units, or even homeless.
The straightforward way to increase the quality of housing in New Zealand without increasing poverty is to increase the supply of land.
As land prices fall, both homebuyers and tenants will be able to pay for better quality fixtures and fittings because less of their limited income is paying for buying or renting the land.

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