Source: US nuclear force still uses floppy disks – BBC News.
Remember this every time the Left says the government invented the Internet
30 May 2016 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, economic history, economics of bureaucracy, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, politics - USA, Public Choice, survivor principle Tags: entrepreneurial alertness, industry policy, Internet, picking roses, picking winners
How much do you get paid if you can pick winners? @JulieAnneGenter @simonjbridges
05 May 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, entrepreneurship, fisheries economics, politics - New Zealand Tags: entrepreneurial alertness, hedge fund managers, industry policy, picking winners, superstar wages, superstars
Electric cars have joined the long list of mendicant mendicant businesses that have been backed by the New Zealand government of late. Picking winners again.
The payrolls of entire government departments in New Zealand are not enough to hire a single successful hedge fund manager to pick winners for their political masters. To get on the list of the top 25 hedge fund managers, you need to earn at least $300 million a year.
The 25 highest-earning hedge fund managers and traders made a combined $12 billion in 2015, slightly less than the $12.5 billion the 25 top-earning hedge fund managers together made in 2014.
Why do investment advisors sell and often give away their sage advice? If their insights were any good, they could trade on the share market before others caught on and make a killing!
I will give a personal example based on the skills of bureaucracies in picking winners. The test of my hypothesis is based on the transferability of human capital across jobs.
My graduate school professors in Japan included many retired bureaucrats from the Ministry of Finance and MITI. These agencies were heralded by Joe Stiglitz and others for picking winners and guiding Japanese companies to choose the right technologies and what to export.
The skills that my graduate school professors learned at picking winners over their careers with the Ministry of Finance and MITI in the high-growth years in the 1970s would now be available to them in their retirements to trade on their own account.
Page 32 of "An Illustrated Guide to Income" more economic #dataviz at: bit.ly/12SEI9p http://t.co/HYm0II2UNI—
Catherine Mulbrandon (@VisualEcon) May 08, 2013
My graduate school professors should quickly become very rich after retiring because of the skills they learned in picking winners while at the Ministry of Finance and MITI, which should cross over into their private share portfolios. The rich lists world-wide should be full of retired industry and finance ministry bureaucrats.
Instead, my graduate school professors took the train and bus to work and their families lived off their salaries in standard sized Japanese government apartments. All looked forward to their annual bonus of 5.15 months salary.
If governments are any good at picking winners, people should be willing to pay big time to get jobs at ministries of finance and ministries of international trade and industry to get access to their unique and highly secret skills they learn therein on how to pick winners.
I am still waiting for that tell-all book by an insider on these skills. Why is there no Picking Winners for Dummies on Amazon kindle as yet?
Why Private Investment Works & Govt. Investment Doesn’t
27 Apr 2016 1 Comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economic history, economics of media and culture, economics of regulation, industrial organisation, survivor principle Tags: industry policy, picking winners, The fatal conceit, The pretence to knowledge
Picking winners and @stevenljoyce’s repayable grants to 11 more tech start-ups @JordNZ
13 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice, rentseeking, survivor principle Tags: corporate welfare, creative destruction, entrepreneurial alertness, Hollywood economics, industry policy, picking losers, picking winners
Minister for Science and Innovation Steven Joyce picked a few more winners today. Eleven more start-up technology companies are to be funded $450,000 each in repayable loans to commercialise their technology. The loans are from Callaghan Innovation’s incubator network.
To cut a long diatribe short, I find these sums of money rather piddling. I have encountered this corporate welfare program before at a presentation.
My reaction then as is now: by handing out such small grants, some will succeed, some will fail. Importantly, there will never be one big disaster to bring the whole show down. There is political safety in diversification.

This is not the case with, for example, film subsidies. If Sir Peter Jackson and others finally produce a box office bomb, it will be all too glaring that the taxpayers backed a Hollywood loser with hundreds of millions of dollars. $500 million in subsidies in the case of Avatar.

By peppering small sums of money across the economy, there is no similar risk from this repayable grant scheme for the commercialisation of products.

Did the New Zealand film industry just eat our lunch? By Jason Potts
01 Nov 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, economics of media and culture, fiscal policy, industrial organisation, job search and matching, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice, rentseeking, survivor principle Tags: film subsidies, Hollywood economics, industry policy, offsetting behaviour, The fatal conceit, The pretense to knowledge, unintended consequences

James Cameron is going to film the next three instalments of the Avatar franchise in New Zealand. He promises to spend at least NZ$500 million, employ thousands of Kiwis, host at least one red-carpet event, include a NZ promotional featurette in the Avatar DVDs, and will personally serve on a bunch of Film NZ committees, and probably even bring scones, all in return for a 25% rebate on any spending he and his team do in the country (up from a 20% baseline to international film-makers) that is being offered by the New Zealand Government.
The implication that many media reports are running with is that this is a loss to the Australian film industry, that we should be fighting angry, and that we should hit back at this brilliantly cunning move by the Kiwi’s by increasing our film industry rebates, which currently are about 16.5% (these include the producer and location offsets, and the post, digital and visual effects offset) to at very least 30%. These rebates cost tax-payers A$204 million in 2012, which hardly even buys you a car industry these days.
So what are the economics of this sort of industry assistance? Is this something we should be doing a whole lot more of? Was the NZ move to up the rebate especially brilliant? First, note that James Cameron has substantial property interests in New Zealand already, so this probably wasn’t as up for grabs as we might think. But if that’s how the New Zealand taxpayers want to spend their money, that’s up to them. The issue is should we follow suit?
The basic economics of this sort of give-away is the concept of a multiplier “”), which is the theory that an initial amount of exogenous spending becomes someone else’s income, which then gets spent again, creating more income, and so on, creating jobs and exports and all sorts of “economic benefits” along the way.
People who believe in the efficacy of Keynesian fiscal stimulus also believe in the existence of (>1) multipliers. Consultancy-based “economic impact” reports do their magic by assuming greater-than-one multipliers (or equivalently, a high marginal propensity to consume coupled with lots of dense sectoral linkages). With a multiplier greater than one, all government spending is magically transformed into “investment in Australian jobs”.
So the real question is: are multipliers actually greater-than-one? That’s an empirical question, and the answer is mostly no. (And if you don’t believe my neoliberal bluster, the progressive stylings of Ben Eltham over at Crikey more or less make the same point.)
But to get this you have to do the economics properly, and not just count the positive multipliers, but also account for the loss of investment in other sectors that didn’t take place because it was artificially re-directed into the film sector, which no commissioned impact study ever does.
This is why economists have a very low opinion of economic impact studies, which are to economics what astrology is to physics.
What does make for a good domestic film industry then? Look again at New Zealand, and look beyond the great Weta Studios in Wellington, for Australia and Canada both have world-class production studios and post-production facilities. Look beyond New Zealand’s natural scenery, for Vancouver is an easy match for New Zealand and Australia pretty much defines spectacular.
No, the simple comparison is that New Zealand is about 20% cheaper than Australia and 30% cheaper than Canada. New Zealand has lower taxes, easy employment conditions and relatively light regulations (particularly around insurance and health and safety). It’s just easier to get things done there.
If Australia really wants to boost its film industry, it might look more closely at labour market restrictions (including minimum wages) and regulatory burden and worry less about picking taxpayer pockets and bribing foreigners.
This article was originally published on The Conversation in December 2013. Read the original article. Republished under the a Creative Commons Attribution No Derivatives licence.
Did government pick the Internet as a winner? @stevenljoyce @dpfdpf
31 Oct 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, Austrian economics, comparative institutional analysis, economic history, economics of bureaucracy, economics of media and culture, industrial organisation, Public Choice, survivor principle Tags: creative destruction, entrepreneurial alertness, industry policy, Internet, picking losers, picking winners, The fatal conceit, The meaning of competition, The pretense to knowledge
Should We Subsidize Scientific Research?
18 Aug 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, Public Choice, rentseeking, survivor principle Tags: competition as a discovery procedure, economics of science, industry policy, losers, picking winners, R&D, The meaning of competition, The pretence the knowledge
If bureaucrats were any good at picking winners, they would be hedge funds managers
30 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, economics of bureaucracy, entrepreneurship, financial economics, human capital, industrial organisation, labour economics, managerial economics, occupational choice, organisational economics, rentseeking, survivor principle Tags: active investing, corporate welfare, efficient markets hypothesis, entrepreneurial alertness, hedge funds, industry policy, passive investing, picking winners, The fatal conceit, The pretence to knowledge
Page 32 of "An Illustrated Guide to Income" more economic #dataviz at: bit.ly/12SEI9p http://t.co/HYm0II2UNI—
Catherine Mulbrandon (@VisualEcon) May 08, 2013
Page 33 of "An Illustrated Guide to Income" more economic #dataviz at: bit.ly/10M7lqR http://t.co/FcmaqZWB32—
Catherine Mulbrandon (@VisualEcon) May 09, 2013
The hedge fund industry held $2.9 trillion of assets in June. Exchange-traded funds did better econ.st/1DdXgWS http://t.co/CK2foqMOpw—
The Economist (@EconEconomics) August 01, 2015
The Amtrak and KiwiRail bailouts compared
18 Jul 2015 1 Comment
in economic history, economics of bureaucracy, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, Public Choice, rentseeking, transport economics Tags: Amtrak, corporate welfare, expressive voting, industry policy, KiwiRail, privatisation, rational ignorance, rational irrationality, state owned enterprises
Figure 1: Amtrak and KiwiRail bailouts, (exchange rate US$1:NZ$1.53), 2008 – 2015
Sources: Federal Funding Received by Amtrak | Mercatus and New report: Corporate welfare in the 2015 budget – Taxpayers’ Union.
New Zealand with its KiwiRail does a good job of keeping up with the Amtrak bailout especially when you look at figure 2, which computes the bailouts on a per capita basis.
Figure 2: Amtrak and KiwiRail bailouts per capita (2014 populations), (exchange rate US$1:NZ$1.53), 2008 – 2015
Sources: Federal Funding Received by Amtrak | Mercatus and New report: Corporate welfare in the 2015 budget – Taxpayers’ Union.
Can NZ double migrant investors and entrepreneurs from $3.5 billion to $7 billion at no cost to taxpayers!?
07 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, economics of bureaucracy, entrepreneurship, income redistribution, industrial organisation, managerial economics, organisational economics, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice, public economics, rentseeking, survivor principle Tags: corporate welfare, entrepreneurial alertness, industry policy, industry targeting, The fatal conceit, The pretence to knowledge
I didn’t notice any discussion in the Cabinet paper of a government doing this before and whether their investment promotion efforts succeeded or not. This latest policy proposal cannot even count as evidence-based policy dreaming, much less a serious contribution to public policy.

Hoping to double incoming foreign investor and entrepreneur migration from $3.5 billion to $7 billion inside three years without spending any extra public money is breathless public policy making. I am sure lots of governments previously tried to get something for nothing.
It will be helpful if ministers pointed to where overseas governments have been successful in doubling foreign investment by simply reprioritising existing investment promotion efforts.
There are at least 2,500 national, provincial and city investment promotion agencies out. Some of them must have been subject to some sort of evaluation as to their success.

This overseas literature review would be in addition to the recent findings of the Ministry of Economic Development about the poor performance and perhaps futility of the foreign direct investment promotion by New Zealand Trade and Enterprise.
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Imagine how much bigger a boost in foreign investor and entrepreneur migration lays before us if actual real new money was put on the table.
via beehive.govt.nz – Strategy targets international investors and Evaluation of NZTE investment support activities [929 KB PDF]
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Moondoggle: The Forgotten Opposition to the Apollo Program – The Atlantic
05 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, defence economics, economic history, politics - USA Tags: industry policy, picking winners, R&D, smart industry policy, space programme

…many people believe that Project Apollo was popular, probably because it garnered significant media attention, but the polls do not support a contention that Americans embraced the lunar landing mission.
Consistently throughout the 1960s a majority of Americans did not believe Apollo was worth the cost, with the one exception to this a poll taken at the time of the Apollo 11 lunar landing in July 1969.
And consistently throughout the decade 45-60 percent of Americans believed that the government was spending too much onspace, indicative of a lack of commitment to the spaceflight agenda. These data do not support a contention that most people approved of Apollo and thought it important to explore space.
HT: Moondoggle: The Forgotten Opposition to the Apollo Program – The Atlantic.
A tale of two cities – Hong Kong’s and Singapore’s different paths to prosperity
13 Oct 2014 Leave a comment
in development economics, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation Tags: Alywn Young, development economics, Hong Kong, industry policy, industry targeting, rent seeking, Singapore, tale of two cities, tyranny of numbers
Hong Kong and Singapore had different paths to prosperity. Alywn Young found that Hong Kong had made real productivity gains, but Singapore grew by a massive dose of savings and investment, including foreign investment.
For most of the post-war era, the Hong Kong government adopted a policy of minimal intervention. the government of Singapore has pursued maximalist policies involving widespread state participation in economic activity and aggressive industry targeting policies.
The share of investment in Singapore’s GDP rose from 9% in 1960 to 43% in 1984, while Hong Kong’s remained steady at about 20%. Productivity growth in the aggregate non-agricultural economy was a miserable -0.3% in Singapore and 2.3% in Hong Kong.
What does this mean in practical terms? Real consumption, real consumer spending, per capita in Hong Kong is 20% or more higher than in Singapore!
Hong Kong actually enjoyed their prosperity. Robert Barro explains this in a comment on Young’s paper:
In 1985, when Singapore’s per capita real GDP was 102% of Hong Kong’s, the consumption was only 70% of Hong Kong’s. To put it another way, Hong Kong’s per capita real consumption grew by 5.9% per year from 1960 to 1985, about the same as for GDP, whereas Singapore’s grew by only 2.8% per year, much less than GDP.
In terms of output per capita and output per worker, the growth of Hong Kong and Singapore are equally impressive. Hong Kong does much better in terms of productivity growth.
Hong Kong did not require as rapid capital accumulation as Singapore. Since capital accumulation is financed either by domestic saving or foreign saving, people in Hong Kong can afford to save less or borrow less from foreign economies. Saving less now means more consumption now.
In the case of Hong Kong, their living standards are far superior to Singapore’s. The government of Singapore wasted a good 20 to 30% of national income on industry targeting and compulsory savings.
Hong Kong experienced rapid total productivity growth, while Singapore experienced no improvement whatsoever in total productivity during its East Asian Tiger years. Young (1992, 1994, 1995) demonstrated that from 1967 onward total factor productivity growth in Singapore was next to nil, and for significant parts of the period most likely negative. Only productivity allows a nation to support and enjoy high wages.


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