The essence of science for the Anti-science Left @NZGreens @GreenpeaceNZ #GMOs
30 Aug 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, environmental economics, global warming, health economics Tags: Anti-Science left, climate alarmism, economics of agriculture, global warming, GMOs, Greenpeace, New Zealand Greens, precautionary principle
@nzlabour @NZGreens There just isn’t no missing million out there hanging out for that hard-left clarion call @rsalmond
22 Aug 2015 1 Comment
in applied price theory, constitutional political economy, economics of information, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice Tags: British Labour Party, British politics, economics of advertising, Eric Crampton, expressive voting, false consciousness, Leftover Left, median voter theorem, New Zealand Greens, New Zealand Labour Party, rational ignorance, rational rationality
Rob Salmond has written a great blog this week on the ideological spectrum of New Zealand voters based on the New Zealand Election Study.

In the course of his blog he drove a tremendously big stake through the heart of the old left fantasy that if Labour or Greens goes left, a large block of voters not voting for them now or not voting at all (the missing million voters) will shake lose its false consciousness and follow you:
But “pulling the centre back towards the left” is massively, massively hard.
You win those people over by being relevant to them as they are, not by telling them they’re worldview needs a rethink. It is just basic psychology. Tell people they were right all along; they like you. Tell people they were wrong all along; they don’t.
And if you win a majority of centrists, you win. The New Zealand Election Study series records six MMP elections in New Zealand – the three where Labour did best among centrists were the three Labour won.
That’s another message from the academic study I quoted above – in Germany, Sweden, and the UK, the elections where the left did best among centrists were the elections where they took power. As their popularity among centrists declined, so did their seat share.
What is more disturbing for the old left fantasy of the missing million is voting for the Labour Party or Greens is correlated with ignorance rather than knowledge.
Furthermore, the more people know about economics, the less likely they are to vote for the left as Eric Crampton explains:
When they get to the polls, the ignorant are significantly more likely to support the Labour Party (4% increase in predicted probability for a standard deviation increase in ignorance) and significantly less likely to support the Green party (1% decrease in predicted probability) and United Future (0.5% decrease in predicted probability).
Understanding economics strongly predicted supporting National in 2005, which comes as little surprise: the National Party leader was former Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. A standard deviation increase in our “economic thinking” index correlates with a 5.7% increased probability of voting National, a 1.5% decreased probability of voting NZ First, and a slight decrease in the probability of voting United Future and Maori.
To make matters worse, Crampton found that joining political organisations does little to cure ignorance of politics or otherwise lead to a political awakening. Sometimes active political affiliation reduces ignorance, other times such organisational membership intensifies ignorance.
via Salmond on the centre | Kiwiblog and StephenFranks.co.nz » Blog Archive » Why the left wants everyone to vote.
When do rising incomes increase child poverty?
22 Aug 2015 2 Comments
in economic history, labour economics, politics - New Zealand, poverty and inequality, welfare reform Tags: child poverty, family poverty, Leftover Left, measurement error, New Zealand Greens
Summary of the 222 pages of MSD's Household Incomes report: kids are still missing out BIG time. #itsnotchoice http://t.co/4x7dm1O0Wg—
Child Poverty NZ (@povertymonitor) August 13, 2015
AHC = after deducting housing costs
BHC = before deducting housing costs
‘anchored line’:
- this is the line set at a chosen level in a reference year (now 2007), and held fixed in real terms (CPI adjusted)
- the concept of ‘poverty’ here is – have the incomes of low-income households gone up or down in real terms compared with what they were previously?
‘moving line’:
- this is the fully relative line that moves when the median moves (e.g. if median rises, the poverty line rises and reported poverty rates increase even if low incomes stay the same)
- the concept of ‘poverty’ here is – have the incomes of low-income households moved closer or further away from the median?
Bryan Perry, Household Incomes in New Zealand: trends in indicators of inequality and hardship 1982 to 2014 – Ministry of Social Development, Wellington (August 2015), p. 133.
Source: Bryan Perry, Household Incomes in New Zealand: trends in indicators of inequality and hardship 1982 to 2014 – Ministry of Social Development, Wellington (August 2015), p. 133.
Is child poverty in New Zealand 245,000 children or 305,000 children?
260,000 kids in income poverty, 180,000 in material hardship, 10% in severe poverty, 3in5 in poverty for a long time http://t.co/Oy5cWftvwU—
Child Poverty NZ (@povertymonitor) May 21, 2015
If you base your estimate of child poverty on the 60% of median income after housing costs moving line, which is the number of low income households who moved further away from 60% of median income, a median which increased by 5% last year, the figure is 305,000 children after housing costs. 45,000 children are in households that is not as close to the median as last year but are not necessarily any poorer than last year in terms of money coming into the house.
45k more children in #poverty this year than last, that’s 305k Kiwi kids without life's basics. C'mon @johnkeypm! http://t.co/K8zeQpgA79—
UNICEF New Zealand (@UNICEFNZ) August 13, 2015
If you base your estimate on the anchored line, which is the number of low income households whose income has gone up on down compared to what they were on previously,the number of children in poverty has increased from 235,000 to 245,000 after housing costs. About 10,000 children are poorer than last year – poorer enough than last year to be classified as in poverty.

@NZGreens @TransportBlog cars rule in Auckland! Auckland commuting times by transport mode
21 Aug 2015 1 Comment
in job search and matching, labour economics, occupational choice, politics - New Zealand, transport economics, urban economics Tags: Auckland, bicycles, commuting times, compensating differentials, expressive voting, green rent seeking, Inner-city Left, New Zealand Greens, public transport, rational irrationality, search and matching, The fatal conceit, The pretense to knowledge
I am not surprised only 7% of Auckland’s take public transport to work considering it takes much longer than any other form of commuting.
The average commute by public transport is 40 minutes as compared to less than 25 in a car. 74% of Aucklanders drive to work and another 9% are a passenger in a car.
No information was available on those who bike to work because only 1% of Aucklanders bike to work. Only 2% of all New Zealanders take a bike to work. The sample size was therefore too small. Yet another reason to ban bikes at night. Few commute on this mode of transport in Auckland.
The near identical commuting distances irrespective of the mode of transport except walking is further evidence that people are quite discerning in balancing commuting times and job selection as per the theory of compensating differentials. Indeed, average commuting times in Auckland are much the same as the average commuting time in America.

The Auckland transport data showing people commute much the same distance by any mode of transport bar walking also validates Anthony Downs’ theory of triple convergence.

Improving the commuting times in one mode of transport will mean people simply take the mode of peak hour transport that is suddenly become less congested while others who were not going to commute at peak times or start commuting at peak times as Anthony Downs explains:
If that expressway’s capacity were doubled overnight, the next day’s traffic would flow rapidly because the same number of drivers would have twice as much road space.
But soon word would spread that this particular highway was no longer congested. Drivers who had once used that road before and after the peak hour to avoid congestion would shift back into the peak period. Other drivers who had been using alternative routes would shift onto this more convenient expressway. Even some commuters who had been using the subway or trains would start driving on this road during peak periods.
Within a short time, this triple convergence onto the expanded road during peak hours would make the road as congested as it was before its expansion.
Why @NZGreens @nzlabour @GreenpeaceNZ hate applied welfare economics
21 Aug 2015 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, economics of regulation, energy economics, environmental economics, health economics, international economics, labour economics, law and economics, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice Tags: antiforeign bias, antimarket bias, expressive voting, Greenpeace, Leftover Left, make-work bias, methodology of economics, New Zealand Greens, New Zealand Labour Party, rational ignorance, rational irrationality
Quotation of the Day from French Economist Frederic Bastiat in the 1850s http://t.co/2ECWtb6m9u—
Mark J. Perry (@Mark_J_Perry) August 14, 2015
@NZGreens @GreenpeaceNZ Senator Leyonhjelm on the blood on the hands of the modern Luddites
19 Aug 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, development economics, economic history, economics of information, economics of media and culture, economics of regulation, environmental economics, environmentalism, growth disasters, growth miracles, health economics, liberalism Tags: Anti-Science left, expressive voting, GMOs, golden rice, Greenpeace, Luddites, New Zealand Greens, precautionary principle, rational ignorance, rational irrationality, The Great Escape
Good as Gold: Can Golden Rice and Other Biofortified Crops Prevent Malnutrition? ow.ly/QQ1VT #Harvard http://t.co/O3SwpGhsXD—
Golden Rice (@Golden_Rice) August 13, 2015
INFOGRAPHICS: The Impacts of #Biotechnology: A Close Look at the Latest Study ow.ly/GUi4U @FoodInsight http://t.co/JQsmrm2Lv1—
Golden Rice (@Golden_Rice) January 07, 2015
Anti-Golden Rice keyboard
Used by opponent to debate against supporters of #goldenrice
@EcoSenseNow @Golden_Rice http://t.co/q6xt5j7hb1—
Golden Rice Now (@paulevans18) August 21, 2015
.@gpph If this girl could have eaten #goldenrice for lunch, she would not be blind today. ALLOW GOLDEN RICE NOW http://t.co/3UlwHAdWdZ—
Golden Rice Now (@paulevans18) July 29, 2015
The Canadians are coming! The Canadians are buying up our land! What has @NZGreens to say about that?
17 Aug 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, entrepreneurship, financial economics, politics - New Zealand Tags: Australia, Canada, China, FDI, Japan, Left-wing hypocrisy, left-wing popularism, New Zealand Greens, right-wing popularism
Canada was the largest source of foreign investment during the period, as its pension fund bought 18 properties in a portfolio from AMP and increased its stake in Kaingaroa Forest.
@metiria @NZGreens 20,000 drop in children in hardship in 2014
13 Aug 2015 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, economic history, income redistribution, labour economics, politics - New Zealand, poverty and inequality, Public Choice, welfare reform Tags: child poverty, family poverty, family tax credits, Leftover Left, New Zealand Greens, Twitter left
The material hardship measure shows a falling child material hardship rate using a threshold equivalent to the ‘standard’ EU level, down from a peak of 21% immediately after the GFC to 14% in 2014.
Using the more severe threshold, there was a slight rise through the GFC to 10% and a small fall to 8%, the level it was at before the GFC.
Source: Bryan Perry, Household Incomes in New Zealand: trends in indicators of inequality and hardship 1982 to 2014 – Ministry of Social Development, Wellington (August 2015), p. 133.
Source: Bryan Perry, Household Incomes in New Zealand: trends in indicators of inequality and hardship 1982 to 2014 – Ministry of Social Development, Wellington (August 2015), p. 133.
@metiria @NZGreens child poverty is driven by housing unaffordability – by Green opposition to RMA reform
13 Aug 2015 1 Comment
in applied welfare economics, economic history, economics of regulation, labour economics, politics - New Zealand, poverty and inequality, urban economics Tags: antimarket bias, child poverty, expressive voting, family poverty, green rent seeking, housing affordability, land use planning, Leftover Left, New Zealand Greens, NIMBYs, rational ignorance, rational irrationality, RMA, zoning
#moreinclusivenz @povertymonitor Killer graphs & #infographics by NZ Children's Commissioner. Shameful content, NZ http://t.co/mG987C5kh0—
Isabella Cawthorn (@fixiebelle) July 26, 2015
Nothing much has happening to child poverty before housing costs in New Zealand since the early 1980s. It is after housing costs poverty that is crucifying the children in New Zealand.
Source: Bryan Perry, Household Incomes in New Zealand: trends in indicators of inequality and hardship 1982 to 2014 – Ministry of Social Development, Wellington (August 2015), Table F6 and table F7.
An economy that is not working for all of us, is simply not working. http://t.co/zZu0LOy7ED—
Green Party NZ (@NZGreens) August 13, 2015
From HES 2013 to HES 2014 median household income rose 5% in real terms (5% above the CPI inflation rate)…
On the AHC moving line measures, child poverty rates in HES 2014 are around the same as their peak after the GFC. A good amount of the rise from HES 2013 to HES 2014 is due to the large rise in the BHC median, as noted above, rather than a change in the numbers in low income per se.
The parties that oppose measures to increase the supply of land and reduce the cost of housing through reform of the Resource Management Act and its many restraints on the supply of land are the New Zealand Labour Party and New Zealand Greens.
Children's views on poverty #childpovertynz occ.org.nz/assets/Uploads… http://t.co/wZHJ19QcpN—
Child Poverty NZ (@povertymonitor) September 08, 2015
It’s Time to Name a Price on KiwiRail – how much more in losses before committing to shutting it down?
30 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in industrial organisation, international economics, politics - New Zealand Tags: bailouts, corporate welfare, KiwRail, New Zealand Greens, TPPA
If a TPPA means no more bailouts for KiwiRail, that is a major benefit from the agreement not previously brought to public attention.
New Zealand shouldn’t be signing an agreement that ties future governments’ hands. #TPPANoWay http://t.co/dawreBzLia—
Green Party NZ (@NZGreens) July 30, 2015The KiwiRail bailouts add 1 to 2 percentage points to the company tax of every New Zealand business. Cutting the company tax by 1-2% by not bailing out KiwiRail would be a major public benefit. I now have one more reason to favour the TPPA.
For all the TPP's flaws, the biggest trade deal in years is good news for the world econ.st/1SjmwS3 http://t.co/UokBxoOXgf—
The Economist (@EconBizFin) July 30, 2015A trade agreement tying the hands of future governments preventing them from bailing out failing state-owned enterprises would be a major gain that could more than offset and indeed pay for the higher drug prices that may result from longer patent lives for new drugs.
Utopia, you are standing in it!
In the finest public service traditions of free and frank advice, the New Zealand Treasury in its budget advice this year advised ministers to contemplate shutting down KiwiRail.
Treasury recommended the Government fund KiwiRail for one more year and undertake a comprehensive public study to look into closing the company. The study is public so that people were informed of the costs of running the rail network compared with any benefits it provided. The Government rejected the idea.
Figure 1: State-owned enterprise welfare, Vote Transport and Vote Finance (KiwiRail), Budgets 08/09 to 15/16
KiwiRail has been a constant thorn in the taxpayers’ side. Since this rail business was acquired in 2008 for $665 million as a commercial investment, Crown investments have totalled $3.4 billion – see Figure 1.
Fortunately in the 2015 budget, the Minister of Finance signalled that the government’s patience with the KiwiRail deficits is not unlimited. KiwiRail…
View original post 204 more words
Split voting analysis for the Greens in the 2014 election
09 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in politics - New Zealand, Public Choice Tags: 2014 New Zealand election, ACT, Grant Robertson, James Shaw, Labour Party, MMP, National Party, New Zealand Greens, split voting, ticket splitting
Split voting analysis suggests there are not a lot of blue green National voters. Few Green Party voters split their party vote and give their electorate vote to National with the exception of tactical voting in Epsom. The Greens and Labour fight for the left-wing vote and that’s about it.
Source: The Electoral Commission.
In the electorate of Epsom, many Green voters voted for the National candidate as a tactical ploy to defeat the ACT party candidate.
Source: The Electoral Commission.
In Wellington Central, the National Party won the party vote with 14,689 party votes. The Greens came second with 11,545. The deputy leader of the Labour Party, Grant Robertson, came a miserable third in the party vote with 9,306 party votes.
Source: The Electoral Commission.
Grant Robinson nonetheless won the seat easily on Green electorate seat votes and more than a few National Party electorate votes.
Indeed, so many of Grant Robinson’s votes came from Greens and National voters that the Greens have a good chance of winning Wellington Central if they tried. More so now that the Green Party leader stands in the seat.
The Greens need to win Wellington Central in the election after they go into a coalition with Labour in government in New Zealand because of the 40% drop in green votes every time they go into government everywhere else.
The Greens have a party vote of 10.7% at the moment. Some of that are Labour voters parking their vote with them while they’re grumpy. A significant part of the rest will be lost when they go into government. Enough of that party vote is risk to push the Greens below the 5% threshold necessary to win any list seats in Parliament.
The Green vote drops 30% after going into government
25 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in politics - New Zealand, politics - USA Tags: Australia, Australian Greens, New Zealand Greens, Tasmania, Tasmanian Greens
The Australian Greens suffered dramatic drops in their vote when they got anywhere near the reins of power.
First consider the Tasmanian Greens. They were in a confidence and supply agreement in 1989 in the Tasmanian House of Assembly and then Cabinet ministers from 2010.
As Figure 1 shows, the Green primary vote dropped dramatically after each spell near power – from 21.6% to 13.8%.
Figure 1: Tasmanian Greens primary vote, House of Assembly
The Australian Greens suffered the same fate when they entered into a confidence and supply agreement after the 2011 Australian Federal Election. Figure 2 shows that their vote dropped by 1/3rd.
Figure 2: Australian Greens Senate primary vote
What lessons does this have for the New Zealand Greens and their ambitions for Cabinet portfolios after the 2017 election? Figure 3 shows of their part vote only got a comfortable distance from the 5% minimum threshold for list MPs after Labour lost power and popularity after the 2008 election.
Figure 3: New Zealand Greens party vote
In the 2005 election, the Green party vote was below 5% at the end of election night after rose above that after early and postal votes were count P.
Part of the boost in the vote of the Greens in the 2008 and 2011 New Zealand general elections can be explained by grumpy Labour voters going elsewhere while waiting the call home to a credible Labour government in waiting.
The Greens need to buy an insurance policy and win an electorate seat such as Wellington Central where their new leader James Shaw stood at the last election. The Labour Party came third in the party vote last time but won the seat comfortably because the Greens chose not to seek the electoral vote.
The Green vote can only head south under James Shaw or why he must win Wellington Central
30 May 2015 Leave a comment
in politics - New Zealand, Public Choice Tags: expressive voting, James Shaw, New Zealand Greens, New Zealand Labour Party, rational ignorance, rational irrationality, swinging voter, tactical voting, vote parking
The New Zealand Greens have elected a new male co-leader. James Shaw is a first term MP who is supposed to consolidate and build the green vote from 10%. At the last election, the Greens were targeting a 15% party vote. Their vote fell from 11.1% to 10.7%.
I doubt that he can do it because much of the improvement of the Green vote since the 2005 election has been an expense of the Labour Party.
The Green vote was pretty sickly at 5-7% when the Labour Party was popular in government between 1999 and 2005. In the 2005 election, the Greens failed to reach the 5% party vote threshold necessary to win seats in Parliament on election night. It was only saved by absentee and postal votes that pushed its party vote up to 5.3%.
Maybe 30% of the Green vote, perhaps more, is made up of disgruntled Labour Party voters awaiting the call home. These disgruntled Labour voters will vote for the Labour Party again when it is fit for government.
Once there is a Labour–Green government in New Zealand, the Green vote faces the recurring theme that green parties lose a substantial part of their vote whenever they get into government such as happened federally in Australia and in Tasmania.
If the Greens go into government with about 7% of the party vote in the 2017 or 2020 New Zealand general elections, the Greens face the real prospect of of being voted out of Parliament completely in the 2023 New Zealand general election if their vote drops below 5%.
James Shaw happened to run for the Wellington Central electorate in the 2014 general election. He did not ask for the electorate vote in that election. Only the party vote.
Wellington Central has one of the highest green party votes in New Zealand. The Green party vote is 2000 more than Labour’s party vote in Wellington Central although the National Party won the party vote with 14,000 party votes.
Given the fact that the Greens may dropped below 5% by 2020, James Shaw would be wise to try to win Wellington Central in 2017 as a safety margin. If a party wins electorate seat under MMP, their party vote counts towards winning list MPs even if they win less than 5% of the party vote.
To add a twist to the tail, the deputy leader of the Labour Party, Grant Robertson, is the sitting member for Wellington Central with a margin of 8000 votes. If the current leader of the opposition fails at his job, Grant Robertson is his natural replacement.
There’s not much room at the top of the Labour Party list for defeated electoral seat candidates because of the last election Labour’s party vote was so low that it was only eligible for five list MPs. The last of these was the current leader of the opposition prove wasn’t even elected on election night but got back into Parliament on postal and absentee votes.
To complicate Grant Robinson’s golden parachute even further, the Labour Party has a policy that 50% of its caucus should be female by 2017 and the party list should be drawn up with that gender quota in mind. Grant Robertson may be a victim of this policy if he does not win Wellington Central.
More than a few careers hinge on the election of James Shaw as male co-leader of the Greens including the very survival of his party. It would be a tight race, but James Shaw could win Wellington Central.
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