Workplace safety arises as a by-product of economic growth. Risks in the workplace and outside that would not countenance now were routine a few decades ago because the risk of eliminating them was high.
The soon to take effect New Zealand health workplace safety legislation makes it much more difficult to have independent directors and part-time directors of companies. That will both weaken the ability of shareholders to prevent insider control as well as introduce a diversity of views onto boards of directors.
The resignation of Sir Peter Jackson is an example of this. Talented entrepreneurs are no longer able to run large numbers by sitting on the board and intervening on a management by exception basis.
Rupert Murdoch as an example of an executive able to run a global empire. He would ring up the chief executives of his subsidiaries for one minute to month. If they are talking about something interesting, he would listen for longer. He was the ultimate one-minute manager who built a global empire around his supreme entrepreneurial talent.
The new legislation on workplace safety will increase the cost of building a successful business from the ground up. Entrepreneurs will not be able to quickly intervene in the company and dismiss underperforming executives who look after things while they are away. This is because they are not on the Board of Directors.
One constraint on the growth of any firm is entrepreneurs have a limited span of control (Coase 1937; Williamson 1967, Lucas 1978; Oi 1983a, 1983b). A span of control is the number of subordinates that an individual supervisor has to control and lead either directly or through a hierarchical managerial chain (Fox 2009). There are only so many tasks that even the most able of entrepreneurs can carry out in one day. Over-stretched spans of control motivate entrepreneurs to hire professional managers and delegate to them a wide range of decision-making rights over the firms they own (Williamson 1975; Foss, Foss and Klein 2008).
Entrepreneurs and the professional managers they hired to assist them must divide their respective time between monitoring employees, identifying new business opportunities, forecasting buyer demand and running the other aspects of their business (Lucas, 1978; Oi 1983, 1983b, 1988; Foss, Foss, and Klein 2008). The larger is the firm, the more employees there are for the entrepreneur to direct, monitor and reward. These costs of directing and monitoring employees will increase with the size of the firm and larger firms will encounter information problems not present in smaller firms (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Stigler 1962)
The time of the more talented entrepreneurs is more valuable because they had the superior managerial skills and entrepreneurial alertness to make their firms large in the first place and remain deft enough to survive in competition. Time spent on the supervision of employees is time that is spent away from other uses of the talents that got these more able entrepreneurs to the top and keeps them there (Williamson 1967; Lucas 1978; Oi 1983b, 1988, 1990; Idson and Oi 1999; Black et al 1999).
Firms in the same industry tend to exhibit systematic differences in their organization of production and the structure of their workforces because entrepreneurial ability is the specific and scarce production input that limits the size of a firm (Lucas, 1978; Oi 1983b). The less able entrepreneurs tend to run the smaller firms while the better entrepreneurs tend to lead both the currently large firms and the smaller firms that are growing at the expense of market rivals (Lucas 1978, Oi 1983b; Stigler 1958; Alchian 1950).
There has been a tremendous improvement in the working conditions over the 20th century. The main driver was the incentive and employers to provide safe workplaces as real wages grew. Adam Smith noted that more dangerous and unpleasant jobs always attracted a wage premium as he explains in the Wealth of Nations:
The five following are the principal circumstances which, so far as I have been able to observe, make up for a small pecuniary gain in some employments, and counterbalance a great one in others: first, the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the employments themselves; secondly, the easiness and cheapness, or the difficulty and expense of learning them; thirdly, the constancy or inconstancy of employment in them; fourthly, the small or great trust which must be reposed in those who exercise them; and, fifthly, the probability or improbability of success in them.
First, the wages of labour vary with the ease or hardship, the cleanliness or dirtiness, the honourableness or dishonourableness of the employment. Thus in most places, take the year round, a journeyman tailor earns less than a journeyman weaver. His work is much easier. A journeyman weaver earns less than a journeyman smith. His work is not always easier, but it is much cleanlier. A journeyman blacksmith, though an artificer, seldom earns so much in twelve hours as a collier, who is only a labourer, does in eight. His work is not quite so dirty, is less dangerous, and is carried on in daylight, and above ground.
Honour makes a great part of the reward of all honourable professions. In point of pecuniary gain, all things considered, they are generally under-recompensed, as I shall endeavour to show by and by. Disgrace has the contrary effect.
The trade of a butcher is a brutal and an odious business; but it is in most places more profitable than the greater part of common trades. The most detestable of all employments, that of public executioner, is, in proportion to the quantity of work done, better paid than any common trade whatever.
Hunting and fishing, the most important employments of mankind in the rude state of society, become in its advanced state their most agreeable amusements, and they pursue for pleasure what they once followed from necessity. In the advanced state of society, therefore, they are all very poor people who follow as a trade what other people pursue as a pastime. Fishermen have been so since the time of Theocritus. A poacher is everywhere a very poor man in Great Britain. In countries where the rigour of the law suffers no poachers, the licensed hunter is not in a much better condition. The natural taste for those employments makes more people follow them than can live comfortably by them, and the produce of their labour, in proportion to its quantity, comes always too cheap to market to afford anything but the most scanty subsistence to the labourers.
Disagreeableness and disgrace affect the profits of stock in the same manner as the wages of labour. The keeper of an inn or tavern, who is never master of his own house, and who is exposed to the brutality of every drunkard, exercises neither a very agreeable nor a very creditable business. But there is scarce any common trade in which a small stock yields so great a profit…
The wages in any particular job will vary with the risks that are known to the worker in that job. That is an important qualification.
Competition in labour markets ensures that the net advantages of different jobs will tend to equality. This theory of the labour market originating in Adam Smith, which drives much of modern labour economics became to be known as the theory of compensating differentials.
Firms can choose their production technology to offer workers greater safety or they can economize on safety and offer the savings to workers in the form of higher wages. There is a trade-off in offering more safety or higher wages, holding constant the level of profits. As Kip Viscusi explains:
Wage premiums paid to U.S. workers for risking injury are huge—in 1990 they amounted to about $120 billion annually, which was over 2 percent of the gross national product, and over 5 percent of total wages paid.
These wage premiums give firms an incentive to invest in job safety because an employer who makes his workplace safer can reduce the wages he pays. Employers have a second incentive because they must pay higher premiums for workers’ compensation if accident rates are high.
One of the effects of safety regulation is the employers no longer have to pay this wage premium in more dangerous or disagreeable jobs but as Fishback wrote:
Studies of wages before and after the introduction of workers’ compensation show, however, that non-union workers’ wages were reduced by the introduction of workers’ compensation. In essence, the non-union workers “bought” these improvements in their benefit levels.
Even though workers may have paid for their benefits, they still seem to have been better off as a result of the introduction of workers’ compensation. Many workers had faced problems in purchasing accident insurance at the turn of the century. Workers’ compensation left them better insured, and allowed many of them to spend some of their savings that they had set aside in case of an accident.
What literature there is about suggest that workers overestimate small risks and underestimate large risks. Surveys of manufacturing employment show that one third of workers quit because they found out the job they accepted was more dangerous than they expected.
One clear trend of the 20th century is as countries got richer, workers demanded more safety at work and larger wage premiums. Market incentives for better worker safety dwarf legal incentives such as from being sued, which in turn dwarf regulatory incentives.
There is also evidence of a glass coffin effect. About 95% of workplace deaths of men. Indeed, there are some interesting journal papers about how occupational choice is affected by motherhood, sole motherhood and sole fatherhood. Single parents are more cautious about their occupational choices.
CHART: Here's a gender gap I don't think most women want to close. Next "Equal Job Fatality Day" occurs in 2026. pic.twitter.com/MNlovX0j52
It is unfortunate that the unions in New Zealand opposes a risk based system of workers’ compensation. The current system is not only no fault, employers pay premiums based on the risks of their industry, not of their individual workplace. There is plenty of evidence to show the charging premiums based on the risks of an accident and the previous record of workplace safety greatly reduces workplace deaths and injuries as Viscusi explains:
The workers’ compensation system that has been in place in the United States throughout most of this century also gives companies strong incentives to make workplaces safe. Premiums for workers’ compensation, which employers pay, exceed $50 billion annually. Particularly for large firms, these premiums are strongly linked to their injury performance.
Statistical studies indicate that in the absence of the workers’ compensation system, workplace death rates would rise by 27 percent. This estimate assumes, however, that workers’ compensation would not be replaced by tort liability or higher market wage premiums.
There is a large literature on what money can buy in terms of improved child outcomes. Central to the left-wing view is the poorer are just like everyone else but they have less money. Susan Mayer, a proud registered Democrat all her life, kick-started the literature challenging this with her book in 1997.
More money does help the children of poor families but the effect is considerably less–and more complicated–than is generally thought because as Mayer says ‘once children’s basic material needs are met, characteristics of their parents become more important to how they turn out than anything additional money can buy.
Doubling the income of poor families would lift most children above the poverty line, it would have virtually no effect on their test scores and only a slight effect on social behaviour. Among her findings, which have largely survive the test of time, are:
Higher parental income has little impact on reading and mathematics test scores.
Higher income increases the number of years that children attend school by only one-fifth of a year.
Higher income does not reduce the amount of time sons are idle as young adults.
Higher income reduces the probability of daughters growing up to be single mothers by 8 to 20 percent.
Mayer found that as parents have more money to spend, they usually spend the extra money on food, especially food eaten in restaurants; larger homes; and on more automobiles. As a result, children are likely to be better housed and better fed, but not necessarily better educated or better prepared for high-income jobs. Mayer said that her findings do not endorse massive cuts in welfare:
My results do not show that we can cut income support programs with impunity…Indeed, they suggest that income support programs have been relatively successful in maintaining the material living standard of many poor children.
Mayer found that non-monetary factors play a bigger role than previously thought in determining how children overcome disadvantage as she explains. Parent-child interactions appear to be important for children’s success, but the study shows little evidence that a parent’s income has a large influence on parenting practices.
Mayer said that if money alone were responsible for overcoming such problems as unwed pregnancy, low educational achievement and male idleness, states with higher welfare benefits could expect to see reductions in these problems. In reality
once we control all relevant state characteristics, the apparent effect of increasing Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits is very small.
Social economics has been here before. In the 1960s, the Coleman Report rather than finding that investing in schools improved child outcomes found that most variation between child outcomes depended on family backgrounds. When we talking about schools not matter in too much we are talking about average bad schools and average good school not American inner-city schools into war zones.
Behavioural genetics has been a bit of a blow to those that think greater parental investment can raise child outcomes as Bryan Caplan has explained:
Economists like Nobel laureate Gary Becker have been studying the family for decades. Like most modern parents, economists usually take it for granted that “parental investment” has large, lasting effects on adult outcomes.
And yet adoption and twin researchers find surprisingly little evidence for this this assumption(link is external)! With a few notable exceptions, the measured effect of upbringing on adult outcomes is small to zero. Adoptees barely resemble their adopting families, identical twins are much more similar than fraternal twins, and identical twins raised apart are often as similar as identical twins raised together. Almost all traits run in families, but the overarching reason is heredity.
Caplan notes that while it is extremely difficult for parental investments to change the adult outcomes of his children, it is well within his power to give his children a happy childhood.
After two lost decades from 1974 where there was real wage stagnation and next to no real GDP growth, following the Mother of All Budgets in 1991 under Ruth Richardson and the passage of the Employment Contracts Act in the same year, real wages growth returned after a hiatus of 20 years. These 20 years of real wage stagnation were the good old days if the Leftover Left is to be believed.
Keith Ng stumbled onto an interesting point in a Twitter feud yesterday before he muted me about what is the poverty rate for. Are we interested in the poverty rate before government transfers and other social assistance or after them? Why?
@JimRose69872629 the effectiveness of government welfare in reducing poverty)
If you are making the case for more assistance to the poor, the correct poverty rate measure is after the existing government assistance. Interestingly, most of those making the case for greater assistance to the poor use the before government transfer measures of poverty rates.
The reason why the correct measure is after government assistance is you are attempting to measure whether the assistance to date has provided people with an adequate standard of living. The before government assistance poverty rate provides no insight into that question.
Time to demand proper action. To begin, Fix Working for Families by spending at least $1 billion immediately. https://t.co/kPL1Nvm7Gw
The recent calculation by the Treasury of inequality based on income and consumption illustrates this. Most people are concerned about what people have to spend rather than how much they earn when thinking about topping them up with government social assistance.
As the above chart shows, consumption inequality in New Zealand has not changed much since 1984 while income inequality has. Which is more important how much people have to spend or how much they are? Growing inequality is not a reason for more government assistance to the poor in New Zealand because it simply has not got worse for 30 years.
The reason that the before government assistance poverty rate is used is this rate is a relative measure that does not fall by that much. It therefore helps dramatise the politics of poverty and perhaps strengthen your case in the eyes of low information voters.
The emphasis on paid work as the solution to child poverty is very worryinghttp://t.co/sZrDaRvypc
The better guide is the poverty rate after government assistance because that tells you how much extra you really need to top up the incomes of the poor to ensure they have an adequate minimum standard of living. The before government assistance poverty rate provides no insight into the success of social insurance and the welfare state regarding the adequacy of income support for the poor.
The official poverty rate in the USA missed poverty falling to near zero by the eve of the Global Financial Crisis in 2007 as shown in the chart below. That is no small oversight. It calls into question whether the official poverty rate which is based on a percentage of the median income is a useful guide to the magnitude of social problems before us.
Meyer and Sullivan calculated a consumption based measure of poverty and found that the poverty rate fell much faster than previously single digits.
People worry about poor not have enough, not how much income they have before taxes and social insurance. The official poverty rate is before tax and social insurance and therefore before how much the poor actually have to get by with after receiving social assistance of all types and sources.
Interestingly, the divergence between consumption-based poverty and income-based poverty started with the election of Reagan and picked up the US federal welfare reforms in 1996. The number of children in poverty in deep poverty fell immediately after those 1996 US welfare reforms. There is a lesson in that for New Zealand.
Indeed, increases in the median income can increase poverty without anyone being poorer. This is because the gap between the median income earners and the poor increased such as the New Zealand in 2014 without any of the poor experiencing a fall in income and social support.
Apart from a bump in the late 80s, the top income earners in New Zealand really are not doing much better than they were in the 1950s or 1920s. The rich are not getting richer in New Zealand. They are just holding their own.
Why Evolution is True is a blog written by Jerry Coyne, centered on evolution and biology but also dealing with diverse topics like politics, culture, and cats.
In Hume’s spirit, I will attempt to serve as an ambassador from my world of economics, and help in “finding topics of conversation fit for the entertainment of rational creatures.”
“We do not believe any group of men adequate enough or wise enough to operate without scrutiny or without criticism. We know that the only way to avoid error is to detect it, that the only way to detect it is to be free to inquire. We know that in secrecy error undetected will flourish and subvert”. - J Robert Oppenheimer.
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