https://twitter.com/bargemUK/status/687610265400152065
Source: Gerrymandering Is Even More Infuriating When You Can Actually See It | WIRED.
Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law
11 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, politics - USA, Public Choice
https://twitter.com/bargemUK/status/687610265400152065
Source: Gerrymandering Is Even More Infuriating When You Can Actually See It | WIRED.
08 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, Public Choice Tags: 2016 presidential election, median voter theorem
07 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, discrimination, economic history, law and economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, property rights, Public Choice Tags: Aboriginal land rights, Maori economic development, native title, racial discrimination
From 1965 onwards, 1/3rd of terrestrial Australia – 2.5 million sq kms of land – was returned to indigenous owners, with half of that since the Native Title decision in 1993. Tasmania pioneered aboriginal land rights with the Cape Barron Island Act 1912.

Source: Jon Altman, The political ecology and political economy of the Indigenous land titling ‘revolution’ in Australia, March 2014 Māori Law Review.
New Zealand extinguished native title twice in its history with the 2nd of these takings of Māori land by the last Labour government with the foreshore and seabed legislation. In her op-ed today, has Jacinda Ardern forgotten why the Māori party came into being?
Unlike New Zealand, Australia welcomed migrants from a wide range of ethnicities after the Second World War. It abolished the White Australia policy in the 1960s along with any discrimination in its Constitution against aboriginals.
Australia takes 8 times as many refugees as New Zealand on a per capita basis.
Sweden – the OECD's highest per capita recipient of asylum seekers bit.ly/1vfFEUh http://t.co/y6DmdJjAsE—
Guardian Data (@GuardianData) December 02, 2014
This redress of indigenous grievances was done out of the generosity of the Australian heart. Aboriginals are a tiny minority in Australia with little independent political pull.
02 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, politics - USA
02 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, politics - USA
02 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, economics of information, Public Choice
The rise of Jeremy Corbyn has reminded me of how lazy political activists happen to be. For all their lifelong agitating, they think that as soon as they get a degree of prominent, their work is done. Suddenly, everyone who has disagreed with accidentally prominent activists for all that life will flock to their side and they will win the next election.

The thing about being a political fringe dwelling is you are a political fringe dweller. Only a tiny percentage of the population support you. To get anything above that requires hard work and a considerable amount of compromise to expand your base.
Those that already agree with you already agree with you. If you want more to agree with you, you have to start agreeing with those that disagree with you rather than they agree with you. It is a slow laborious process of compromise.

Occasionally, parties rush to prominence. Left-wing and right-wing populists are examples of these as are the anti-immigration parties. Their support is soft and can quickly disappear. Trump, Corbyn and Sanders should remember this.
Most of all, political activists who slip into prominence forget that voters tend to vote retrospectively: on past performance and out of anger than voting for a particular agenda of the alternative parties.
Because of this political ignorance and apathy, Richard Posner championed Schumpeter’s view of democracy. Schumpeter disputed the widely held view that democracy was a process by which the electorate identified the common good, and that politicians carried this out:
Schumpeter’s theory of democratic participation is that voters have the ability to replace political leaders through periodic elections. Citizens do have sufficient knowledge and sophistication to vote out leaders who are performing poorly or contrary to their wishes.
The power of the electorate to turn elected officials out of office at the next election gives elected officials an incentive to adopt policies that do not outrage public opinion and administer the policies with some minimum honesty and competence.
That lack of competence and judgement are what will bring Trump, Corbyn and Sanders down. They are just not up to the job. There are better left-wing and right-wing populists and firebrands about.
The outcome of Schumpeterian democracy in the 20th century, where governments are voted out rather than voted in, is most of modern public spending is income transfers that grew to the levels they are because of support from the average voter.
Political parties on the Left and Right that delivered efficient increments and stream-linings in the size and shape of government were elected, and then thrown out from time to time, in turn, because they became tired and flabby or just plain out of touch.

There is considerable excitement about how popular and elite preferences seem to have equal chances are being implemented.
If Americans at different income levels agree on a policy, they are equally likely to get what they want. But what about the other half of the time? What happens when preferences across income levels diverge?
When preferences diverge, the views of the affluent make a big difference, while support among the middle class and the poor has almost no relationship to policy outcomes. Policies favored by 20 percent of affluent Americans, for example, have about a one-in-five chance of being adopted, while policies favored by 80 percent of affluent Americans are adopted about half the time. In contrast, the support or opposition of the poor or the middle class has no impact on a policy’s prospects of being adopted.
These patterns play out across numerous policy issues. American trade policy, for example, has become far less protectionist since the 1970s, in line with the positions of the affluent but in opposition to those of the poor. Similarly, income taxes have become less progressive over the past decades and corporate regulations have been loosened in a wide range of industries.
This is a dewy eyed view of democracy that would make HL Mencken proud. The notion of a democracy is governed by the rule of law, checks and balances and the protection of minority rights is lost in these dewy eyed conception is a democracy. As Matthew Yglesias said:
…the idea that the point of democracy is to implement legislative outcomes that are supported by broad-based surveys seems almost like a straw man dreamed up by an eighteenth-century monarchist.
Gilens concedes that other values—the protection of minority rights, for example—may also be important, but this misses the forest for the trees. The purpose of a political system is to resolve political questions in a satisfactory way….
The watchword of democracy should not be responsiveness but rather accountability.
In a well-functioning system, voters should elect a team of politicians and then fire them if their performance is seen as unsatisfactory. Seen in this light, the problem with American democracy today is that the intersection of counter-majoritarian legislative procedures and increased partisan polarization has blurred the lines of responsibility.
My confidence in the median voter theorem returned when Bryan Caplan and Sam Peltzman pointed out that it is difficult to point to a major government program in the 20th century that does not have majority support.
Director’s law is the bulk of public programmes are designed primarily to benefit the middle classes but are financed by taxes paid primarily by the upper and lower classes. Based on the size of its population and its aggregate wealth, the middle class will always be the dominant interest group in a modern democracy.

Within this framework of accountability and voting on the basis of performance rather than promise, there is considerable rotation of power. The fact that this particular activist or populists stumbled onto the treasury benches does not mean much. They usually got there because the previous administration was no longer seen as competent. Nothing more than that.
02 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, development economics, economics of regulation, growth miracles, international economics, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice, rentseeking
The key reason why China joined the World Trade Organisation and other trade agreements is to bring some semblance of law to an authoritarian country. 
Source: AEAweb: AEJ: Macro (6,2) p. 29 – Free Trade Agreements and the Consolidation of Democracy via Max Roser.
Both the elites and ordinary people are prospering tremendously from the rise of capitalism in China, Vietnam and other places. A move away from this liberalisation to a more authoritarian setting would cost too many people too much money.
In the course of these economic liberalisations, China and Vietnam, for example, changed from totalitarian dictatorships to tin-pot dictatorships. As long as you keep out of politics in these countries, there is a fair degree of freedom and much more freedom compared to the days of communism.
Percentage employed in agriculture in the world's major economies over the last 50 years. https://t.co/UbaDnaE8Lr—
Robert Wilson (@CountCarbon) January 08, 2016
01 Feb 2016 1 Comment
in applied welfare economics, constitutional political economy, economics of regulation, income redistribution, politics - New Zealand, public economics

I am sure there will be lots of squabbling over parameters and assumptions of any tax, spending or regulation proposal submitted to the independent costings unit proposed recently by the New Zealand Greens.
The bigger problem is static and dynamic scoring. There is some history of doing this for taxes but little for spending and that is before you consider externalities. Imagine the squabbling over roading proposals and their externalities. The practical hurdles to dynamic scoring are:
Against that is dynamic scoring removes the bias against pro-growth policies in current budgetary scoring:
[A] theoretical advantage of accurate dynamic scoring is that it is not biased against pro-growth policies compared to the current conventional scoring method. By ignoring macroeconomic effects, the conventional method overstates the true budgetary cost of pro-growth policies, such as infrastructure investments, and understates the cost of anti-growth policies.
The bigger problem is something I learnt when costing a tax proposal for an election campaign. There was an error because I did the costing on a spreadsheet while I had a bad head cold.
The advantage of the error was the policy, as a result of this minor error in the tabulations attracted considerable attention from the major parties.
I was advised by a very wise head that this tabulation error in the dynamic scoring was not so bad a problem. This was because the tabulation error gave our side a chance to have a go at them again in the media. The policy announcement stayed in the new cycles for longer than otherwise and attracted attention from the big parties.
If a policy is too good, too perfect, the other parties will kill it with silence. You get only one bite in the news cycle and that is it.
If your policy announcement is killed by silence, at least you are guaranteed a chance to go at it again when the proposed independent costings unit a week or so later in the election campaign. You might disagree of those costings just to attract attention in the next new cycle.
Given the size, ambition and nebulous externality content of Green party proposals, they will benefit considerably from getting another go by questioning the Parliamentary budget office costings. That guarantees at least two new cycles to every one of their budgetary and regulatory announcements. No wonder they have proposed this independent costings unit.
If the New Zealand Greens do not like the costing from their proposed independent costings unit, they can just rage against neoliberalism and the conservative bias of economists. They cannot lose in terms of another bite of the 24-hour news cycle.
As a starter to feigning disagreement with any independent costings of their tax, spending and regulation proposals, Milton Friedman argued that people agree on most social objectives, but they differ often on the predicted outcomes of different policies and institutions. This leads us to Robert and Zeckhauser’s taxonomy of disagreement:
Positive disagreements can be over questions of:
1. Scope: what elements of the world one is trying to understand?
2. Model: what mechanisms explain the behaviour of the world?
3. Estimate: what estimates of the model’s parameters are thought to obtain in particular contexts?
Values disagreements can be over questions of:
1. Standing: who counts?
2. Criteria: what counts?
3. Weights: how much different individuals and criteria count?
Any positive analysis tends to include elements of scope, model, and estimation, though often these elements intertwine; they frequently feature in debates in an implicit or undifferentiated manner. Likewise, normative analysis will also include elements of standing, criteria, and weights, whether or not these distinctions are recognised. There is a rich harvest for nit-picking to keep the story going.
01 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, politics - Australia
The principal argument against the republic is it results in a president as the head of state.
In the last Republican debate in 1999, the Republican movement split between those who wanted an appointed president and an elected president.
An elected president would quickly get ideas above his station because of the popular mandate. Imagine Dick Smith as president.

It would be a good pub quiz game to list the people would be wholly unsuited as president but would be likely to be elected. Boring people such as those who currently occupy the position such as judges and retired military would not have much of a chance of being elected.
The Irish president, for example, is elected but is completely circumscribed in powers. The only power they have to exercise independently is whether to dissolve parliament after a motion of no confidence.
27 Jan 2016 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, fiscal policy, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice
The focus group work of Lord Ashcroft after the 2015 British general election reinforces what was learnt about the New Zealand Labour Party’s drift away from the values of the working class.

Source: The Unexpected Mandate: my review of the 2015 election and the unusual parliament that preceded it – Lord Ashcroft Polls.
In the 2014 election in New Zealand, the Labour Party promised to extend the in work tax credit for families to welfare beneficiaries. This was worth about $60 a week.
The following week was the worst week that Labour Party MPs and party workers experienced in their door-knocking. In their own Heartland electorates, the Labour Party door knockers received a hostile response to that proposal.
Working class Labour voters believe they had earned that family tax credit by working and it should not be paid to people who do not earn it by working.
There is a re-occurring theme among those who stopped voting labour everywhere is that Labour Party is are now too concerned about scroungers and are not interested enough in rewarding strivers, and in particular those who strive to improve themselves in the working class.
Ashcroft’s research after the 2010 British general election found that British voters who had stopped voting Labour after previously supporting it believed that the Labour Party did not have the right answers to important questions. 7 out of 10 of these voters believe that the expenditure cuts of the Conservative party when necessary.
Importantly for labour parties everywhere, two thirds of voters would take a lot of persuading before they voted for the British Labour Party again. Labour would need to change quite fundamentally before they did so again.
Many said they would wait until Labour had been re-elected and served a full term before they themselves considered voting Labour again. That means two thirds of the vote lost by Labour were unwilling to vote Labour again until the 2025 general election. They had really given up on Labour despite their support for it in the past. Issues such as a perception that Labour elected the wrong brother as its leader in 2010 were minor in comparison to this.
Fortunately for the Conservative Party, research among Labour Party members and Labour supporters in the trade unions tells a very different message as to why Labour lost the 2010 British general election.
These Labour Party members and supporters thought the voters were wrong to not vote for them according to the Ashcroft research after the 2010 election:
They thought they had lost because people did not appreciate what Labour had achieved; that voters had been influenced by the right-wing media; and that while Labour’s policies had been right, they had not been well communicated.
More than three quarters thought their party had not deserved to lose, and most rejected the idea that the Labour government had been largely to blame for the economic situation.
They thought the swing voters they had lost (and needed to win back) were ignorant, credulous and selfish. More than half thought the coalition would prove so unpopular that Labour would probably win the 2015 election without having to change very much.
The strength of British Labour in the eyes of many voters is it is seen as compassionate and concerned about fairness. Unfortunately for British Labour, many of the people who do not currently vote for Labour but are receptive to these messages of compassion and fairness re fiscal conservatives according to the Ashcroft research:
I found in my focus groups that this message was best received by those already most inclined to vote for the party.
It was less effective for those who had harder questions, particularly about how all this compassion and decency would be paid for. As one of our participants put it, ‘it’s all well and good to say we’re nicer people and we care about you more, but I want someone who can sort out the country’.
23 Jan 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, Austrian economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, development economics, economic history, F.A. Hayek Tags: capitalism and freedom
18 Jan 2016 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, international economic law, international economics, politics - New Zealand, public economics
Oxfam New Zealand and fellow travellers at home and abroad are attacking the sovereignty of the Cook Islands and other tax havens by demanding that the developed countries gang up on them because they offer low company tax rates.
All that plucky rhetoric of TPPA no way and how international economic agreements violate the sovereignty of countries and developing countries in particular is forgotten in a flash.
Apparently, the same governments that were at the beck and call of the corporate elites when negotiating international trade agreements, can be trusted to negotiate international tax treaties that take into the account the interests of developing countries, the Pacific Islands and small states.
Oxfam manages to have the blinding hypocrisy of opposing the Transpacific Partnership on national sovereignty grounds and at the same time call for international treaties to bully small countries about their tax policies, which overrides their economic sovereignty.
The sovereign rights of developing countries to find their own way does not extend to undermining the tax bases of the rich countries struggling to finance their welfare states.
The Pacific Islands, the once were heroes of the recent Paris climate talks, turn into pariahs once they start looking out for themselves and setting up offshore financial centres and tax havens.
Developing countries are free to impoverish themselves by embracing socialism, but if they decide to attract investment and jobs through low tax rates and offshore financial centres, a new form of colonialism is embraced by the Twitter Left.

Source: Oxfam.
The Cook Islands is one such tax haven. The Cook Islands is self-governing in free association with New Zealand. New Zealand is responsible for its defence and foreign affairs but it has full internal sovereignty.
18 Jan 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, David Friedman, industrial organisation, law and economics, property rights Tags: incentive incompatibility, public goods
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