Source: CARPE DIEM: Masonomics: “Markets Fail. Use Markets.”.
Arnold Kling describes “Masonomics”
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in applied price theory, Austrian economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, history of economic thought
What the @SDG2030 should be @oxfamnz @HelenClarkUNDP
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in constitutional political economy, development economics, growth miracles
The pros and cons of America’s primary electoral system
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in constitutional political economy, politics - USA
@LordAshcroft on @UKIP and the 2015 election
07 Jan 2016 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, Public Choice
Lord Ashcroft has written a fascinating review of the unexpected 2015 general election result in the UK based on his polling and focus group work. I will start my summary of it with UKIP because that party is the most interesting way to illustrate his analytical approach.
UKIP increased its vote from 3% in 2010 British general election to 12% in 2015. UKIP won 1 seat and came second in 120.
UKIP was initially seen as a threat to the Tory party. What will make the Tory party rather conflicted in winning those votes back is as many Tory voters vote UKIP as Tory voters vote for the Liberal Democrats. The Tories cannot win both blocs back.
UKIP voters have more of an attitude rather than a series of policies despite their preoccupation with immigration as Ashcroft explains:
It was true that those who were drawn to the party were more preoccupied than most with immigration, and would complain about issues such as Britain’s contribution to the EU or the international aid budget.
But their overarching view was that Britain was changing for the worse. They were pessimistic, even fearful, and did not think mainstream politicians were willing or able to keep their promises or change things for the better.
Surprisingly, European Union membership is not a top three priority for most UKIP voters. They are grumpy about the country they grew up in fading into their past to be replaced by political correctness and identity politics.
Not surprisingly UKIP voters are attracted to it because the party would ‘say things that need to be said but others are scared to say’. Nigel Farage was regarded by UKIP voters as entertaining and straight talking but a little too interested in the limelight.
Ashcroft has as fascinating way of cutting past social acceptability bias in responses of focus groups by asking them to think about a political party or leader as a car or house. In the case of UKIP, this is what they thought:
If UKIP were a house, it would have ‘a wrought-iron fence all round to keep everyone out’. The ageing residents would spend their time ‘talking about how things were in their day’ and would not get on with their neighbours ‘because they are a different colour’. The timer on the stereo would be set to play the national anthem every day at noon.
Surprisingly few UKIP voters have illusions about the competence or good sense of UKIP. They were voting for UKIP as a protest. They are voting UKIP because they wanted to give it a voice which they can build on and become more competent and sensible.
Source: FLOWCHART: Should You Vote Ukip?
Whose voting base has succumbed to unthinking populists?
31 Dec 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of education, economics of information, economics of media and culture, income redistribution, international economics, Marxist economics, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: 2016 presidential election
Singapore Spring
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in applied price theory, constitutional political economy, development economics, economic history, growth miracles, Public Choice Tags: Asian Tigers, Singapore
Places in the world where governments have lost control
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in constitutional political economy, Public Choice Tags: anarchy, lawless regio lawless regionn, no-go areas
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in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, liberalism Tags: ancient Greeks, Diogenes, growth of government, philosophy of economics, size of government, The fatal conceit, The pretence to knowledge
Why John Rawls rejected utilitarianism behind the veil of ignorance
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in applied welfare economics, constitutional political economy, Rawls and Nozick
Milton Friedman explains the public choice error
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in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of bureaucracy, Milton Friedman, Public Choice Tags: grass is greener fallacy, public choice error, The fatal conceit, The pretense to knowledge, unintended consequences
Who was the first President of the United States?
05 Dec 2015 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, politics - USA, Public Choice Tags: American history, constitutional law
Utopia, you are standing in it! 
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