HT: Lorenzo Michael Warby.
Most of the gender pay gap explained by age, marriage, hours worked
05 Nov 2015 Leave a comment
in discrimination, economics of love and marriage, gender, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice, politics - USA Tags: asymmetric marriage premium, compensating differentials, female labour force participation, gender wage gap, marital labour supply
The demise of the Green Book and the decline of racism in America
04 Nov 2015 1 Comment
in applied price theory, constitutional political economy, discrimination, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, liberalism, politics - USA, Public Choice, rentseeking
The Green Book was an indispensable survival guide to black Americans traveling in America in the Jim Crow Era if they wish to “sidestep humiliation (or worse) on the journeys”. As Richard Epstein noted when reflecting on the 50th anniversary of the 1964 Civil Rights Bill:
Title II was passed when memories were still fresh of the many indignities that had been inflicted on African American citizens on a routine basis. It took little imagination to understand that something was deeply wrong with a nation in which it was difficult, if not impossible, for African American citizens to secure food, transportation, and lodging when traveling from place to place in large sections of the country. In some instances, no such facilities were available, and in other cases they were only available on limited and unequal terms.
The Green Guide lists the types of businesses by name and address in the southern states that were known to welcome black patrons.

The Green Book spoke in code about how to avoid “embarrassing situations”. This was code for “the violence and discrimination inflicted by bigots”. The diffusion of the car into the black middle class was a godsend to escape racism.

The founding publisher was a US postal worker who with typical entrepreneurial flair initially published the Green Book from his apartment in Virginia starting in the late 1930s. To find businesses that welcomed black patrons, Victor Green tapped into his network of fellow mailmen. His book covered the entire 50 states, parts of Canada and even extended to Europe in later editions.

The Green Book stopped publishing a mere two years after the passage of a major civil rights bill in 1964 and the voting rights bill of 1965. These two bills strengthened voter rights and outlawed discrimination by businesses and employers.

By 1966, just two years after the passage of the civil rights bill, the market collapsed for information on businesses that welcomed black patrons in America. This was because so many businesses now welcome black patronage in every part of the southern states and elsewhere in America that a special booklet no longer had buyers. At the height of its popularity, the Green Book sold 15,000 copies per year.

Yes, there were law reforms but the closing of the Green Book is a sign of surprisingly rapid social change given the dogged resistance of the Democratic Party led southern states to all previous attempts at racial integration.
As an example of this tenacious resistance to civil rights legislation, Texas divided itself into 252 counties and delegated considerable responsibility to them. Local sheriffs in southern states would campaign on slogans such as “the man who can take care of situations that may arise”.
Control of the police and local courts was central to the enforcement of racial segregation in the southern states of America. This was backed up by the monopoly that the Democratic Party had over local and state offices.
To register to vote in Texas, for example, a black voter had to register with the local voter registration board in one of the 252 counties. Assuming you could find a member – they came in late, took long lunches and went home early – they would fail the applicant on the literacy test or some other criteria.
Can you pass a literacy test given to Black voters in the 1960's http://t.co/mtOIr7XE50—
History In Pictures (@historyepics) August 28, 2015
The aggrieved black would be voter would then have to take is local voter registration board all the way to the Supreme Court to overturn that decision. The members of the local voter registration board would refuse to follow the orders of the US District Court orders. The criminal contempt citation would be appealed all the way to the Supreme Court.
Once the criminal contempt citation is upheld by the Supreme Court, the voter registration board resigned so the litigation would have to start all over again against the new board members. This was because the state of Texas could not be named as a co-defendant under the 1957 civil rights law – the first past 100 years by Congress.
Such was the hostile legal environment, the lawlessness, the FBI had an eight part go to strategy in case a local sheriff arrested FBI agents in southern states when they are enforcing civil rights law. Black civil rights leaders in the USA were keen gun owners and owned a lot of them for home defence and they used them.
Plenty of school busing orders by courts were appealed for years and years and were resisted at every turn in both northern and southern states. One or two states closed their entire school systems and threatened to transfer the assets to private hands to prevent racial integration.
James Heckman was one of the first economist to note the rapid social change in the southern states of America over the course of the 60s. Heckman spent two years as a teenager in the late 1950s in racist Southern States of America and returned in 1963 and in 1970. His parents were received a delegation of neighbours upon their arrival to explain Southern ways.
Civil disobedience at its best, 1950s http://t.co/WzszCj1zBf—
Historical Pics (@VeryOldPics) September 20, 2015
There was organised segregation in 1963 when Heckman visited again as a college student. His 1963 visit with a college roommate from Nigeria was monitored by the local sheriff. In Birmingham, they stayed at the black YMCA. The people at the YMCA were frightened to death because Heckman and his Nigerian friend were breaking the local Jim Crow laws. Shops closed in New Orleans to avoid serving them.
In 1970, Heckman re-visited New Orleans as an academic, going back to the same places as in 1963. They were completely integrated, totally changed. This rapid social change fascinated him.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 broke the control of segregationists over their political and legal institutions. The racial segregation collapsed because it could no longer rely on Jim Crow laws and the private violence and boycotts through the White Citizens Councils which police turned a blind eye too when they were not actively involved.
Unlike the Ku Klux Klan, the White Citizens’ Councils met openly and was seen as “pursuing the agenda of the Klan with the demeanour of the Rotary Club” by “unleashing a wave of economic reprisals against anyone, Black or white, seen as a threat to the status quo”. In Mississippi, the State Sovereignty Commission funded the Citizens’ Councils.

The 1957 and, particular, the 1964 civil rights laws overthrew racial segregation because more Black Americans could vote in the Southern States in state and local elections. Politicians soon courted those votes and there was a political realignment and a social revolution. The lawlessness that back-up most of segregation quickly came to an end because its victims could now vote. Richard Epstein explains:
With Jim Crow in the South this set of insidious practices was not accomplished by explicit laws mandating racial segregation. Rather, those inflexible social and economic patterns were supported by four interlocking strategies. First, illicit control of the electoral franchise, which in turn translated into control of the police and the courts. Second, corrupt use over the infrastructure translated into an ability to deny water and electrical hook-ups to firms that did not toe the segregationist line. Third, private violence to which southern police forces turned a blind eye when they did not actively support it. Fourth, social ostracism to those who spoke up against the system. Sensible people either left, stayed away or remained silent.
LBJ was behind the first civil rights bill of the 20th century. This was the 1957 civil rights bill. LBJ’s astute understanding of public choice processes was central to how he crafted the 1957 bill.
Then Senator Johnson could see that his fellow Southern Democrats would not live with racial integration at the social level. But he knew from his dealings with the Southern Democrats that in their heart of hearts that they could not ultimately deny that people have a right to vote. LBJ knew that if Black Americans in the Southern States could secure the right to vote, all the other rights they sought would soon follow and would be protected by law. He was right.
The Voting Right Act had a huge impact on many southern states. For example, black voter registration rates in Mississippi increased from a mere 6.7 percent in 1965 to 59.8 percent in 1967, according to the US Commission for Civil Rights. For a state that’s historically around 40 percent black, this represented a massive shift in politics — a change that much of the predominantly white leadership at the time feared but would have to accept due to the Voting Rights Act.

Timur Kuran in “Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revolutions,” suggested that political revolutions and large shifts in political and social opinion will catch us by surprise again and again because of people’s readiness to conceal their true political preferences proclivities under perceived social pressure.
Kuran begins with a simple, even mundane point: social pressures can make people say that they want and believe something that they really don’t want or believe… The result of social pressures is to produce what Kuran calls “preference falsification,” a phenomenon that occurs when you make an inaccurate public statement about your actual preferences (or beliefs). Falsified preferences might be described more simply, of course, as lies; but they are a distinctive, and distinctly interesting, kind of lies, with particular social implications… People joined organizations they abhorred, followed orders they considered nonsensical, cheered speakers they despised and ostracized dissidents they greatly admired.
Those ready to oppose racism or who were lukewarm about it, kept their opposition private until a coincidence of factors gave them the courage to bring their views into the open. In switching sides, they encouraged other hidden opponents to switch. Fear changes sides. Genuine supporters of the old older falsify their publically professed preferences, pretending that they support the new order. These are late-switchers. Do not trust them. These opportunists will just as easily switch back.
Plenty of people have had personal experiences of this in the 1980s and the 1990s when there was rapid change in social and political attitudes about racism, sexism and gay rights. A few people had to stand up for what was right and a surprisingly large number quickly joined their side.
Once Blacks in the southern states started voting for the local sheriff and judges and for state-wide officials, the local legal infrastructure helped the market work rather than frustrated it. As Richard Epstein noted when writing a freedom of association but his remarks equally apply to the market process:
The practice of freedom of association cannot survive in a society that has corrupt electoral institutions, corrupt provision of public services, corrupt use of public force, and unrestrained use of private violence. The hard question in these settings is to ask exactly what legal changes should be made. In one sense, the thought that some non-discrimination principle could gain hold through legislation seems laughable. Indeed, it was only because federal legislation could work, with much huffing and puffing, to override state legislation that the local monopoly was broken… The competitive market works well when supported by well-ordered public institutions.
The rapid demise of the Green Book is a testament to the shallowness of racism in America apart from a hard-core full of hatred of whatever comes along. Certainly, the collapse in the market for a specialised information on businesses willing to accept black patch and suggests that many southern businesses opened their doors to black customers once it was physically safe to do so. The Civil Rights Bill of 1964 bought an end to lawlessness in the South principally because black people could now vote. Epstein again:
At its best, and in its original form, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 sought to break the control of the local segregationist forces over their political institutions. First on the list was Title I, which attacked exclusion from voting.
Is the living wage a form of indirect sex discrimination?
03 Nov 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, discrimination, gender, labour economics, Marxist economics, minimum wage, politics - New Zealand Tags: expressive voting, living wage, offsetting behaviour, rational irrationality, The fatal conceit, unintended consequences
The living wage will certainly be to the profit of incumbent workers at the time of the wage increase but that is provided that their employer stays in business. The introduction of a living wage will result in indirect sex discrimination because of the higher job turnover rates of women. Women also have shorter average job tenures than men in any particular job.

Source: Worker turnover rate in New Zealand by sex – Figure.NZ.
Any benefit premised on not quitting jobs discriminates against women because of their higher job quit rates. More women than men will have to quit living wage jobs because of motherhood and other changes in their personal circumstances. Isn’t that discrimination?
One in six workers change their jobs every year. That job turnover rate is higher among the workers with less human capital simply because both sides of the job match have less reasons to continue. A job quit or job layoff for a less skilled worker does not result as much of a loss of job specific and firm specific human capital than would be the case if the worker was more skilled with more firm-specific human capital.

One of the iconic empirical facts of the labour market is job turnover rates are higher and job layoff rates are higher for less skilled workers. As workers acquire more job specific human capital, they are more reluctant to quit and their employer hesitate before laying them off. This is because of the firm specific human capital which both invested would have to be written off.
Women quit jobs more often than men, work part-time or switch between part-time and full-time work more often than men and enter and re-enter to the workforce because of motherhood and maternity leave. Women also tend to invest in more generalised, more mobile human capital. Women anticipate a more intermittent labour force participation and more spells of part-time work. As such, women have less reasons to invest in specific human capital if they anticipate leaving because of motherhood and either changing jobs more often are working part-time. If you are changing jobs more often, such as women do, investing in more general human capital and less in specific capital increases options when searching for vacancies.
Any benefit of the living wage will erode faster for women because they quit jobs at a higher rate than men. Is this indirect sex discrimination? This higher job turnover rate is driven by human capital investment strategies and career plans. The living wage, which privileges the incumbent workers at the time the living wage increases implemented, discriminates against female workers because they change jobs more often or are likely to quit sooner after the living wage was initially implemented.

The particular form of indirect sex discrimination at hand arises from the Golden Handcuffs effect of the living wage. Closer Together Whakatata Mai – reducing inequalities explain the Golden Handcuffs effect this way:
You may have noticed in the article it is actually the SAME people being paid the living wage (“all of them have stayed on as staff”). This is how labour markets can work if employers make different choices. If you look at the Living Wage employers – they haven’t hired a whole new set of people – they have invested in the people they already have. The world has not ended and many more people are happy and businesses and organisations are doing just fine.
Even the proponents of the living wage admit that a living wage increase will segment the labour market and create insiders and outsiders with the insiders paid more than what used to be called the reserve army in the unemployed by the same crowd of activists. A reduction in job turnover will increase unemployment durations because there are fewer vacancies posted every period.
Hopefully all the existing employees of the living wage employer are capable of the requisite up skilling they need to match their new productivity targets. Not everyone did well at school. One of the reasons workers on low wages are on those low wages because they perhaps didn’t do as well at school as activists who appointed themselves to speak for them. A harsh reality of life is 50% of the population have below-average IQs.
This up skilling answer to the cost to employers of a living wage increase is a variation of the standard policy response in a labour market crisis. That standard labour market policy response in crisis is send them on a course. Sending them on a course as a response to a crisis makes you look like you care and by the time they graduate the problem will probably have fixed itself. Most problems do. I found this bureaucratic response to labour market crises to repeat itself over and over again while working in the bureaucracy.
The reason was sending them on a course was so popular with geeks as yourself sitting at your desk as a policy analysis, minister or political activist all did well at university. You assume others will do well through further education and training including those who have neither the ability or aptitude to succeed in education. People don’t go on from high school to higher education for a range of reasons that include a lack of motivation to study or a simple lack of ability no matter how hard they try.
The living wage hypothesis about reduced turnover, up-skilling and greater motivation is a small example of the American company that decided to pay a minimum wage of $70,000 a year. Those workers who cannot earn as much of this elsewhere would never quit. Some of his better employers quit because they resented being paid the same as less productive employees. Hopefully, the minority shareholder suing his brother who is the CEO for offering that above market wage doesn’t end up bankrupting the company. As such, the incumbent workers’ fortunes are unusually closely tied to their existing employer if they are paying above the going rate in their industry and occupation.
I suppose you could hold on like grim death but women tend to have more reasons to move on than men if only because of pregnancy and motherhood. These golden handcuffs are of less value to them than to men. Younger workers are also less advantaged because many young New Zealanders take a overseas working holiday of several years, if not more. If they have a living wage job now that have to give up that advantage.
Workers who lack the labour productivity to earn a wage equivalent of the living wage elsewhere will never quit a living wage job, and will have a much reduced incentive to up-skill or seek promotion. There will be less internal reward for undertaking additional training or job responsibilities among low skilled is because the living wage will mean they will not get a wage rise. That wage rise is gobbled up by the living wage increase if you’re already a low-paid worker.
Naturally, as vacancies arise, recruits will be drawn from a much higher quality recruitment attracted by the higher wage at the living wage employer. The less skilled workers who don’t currently work for the living wage employer will miss out completely.
@EconomicPolicy showed gender pay equality when arguing the opposite @CHSommers @Mark_J_Perry
02 Nov 2015 2 Comments
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, discrimination, gender, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice, politics - USA Tags: asymmetric marriage premium, compensating differentials, gender wage gap, marital division of labour, power couples, top 1%, top incomes, Twitter left, union power, union wage premium
The Economic Policy Institute were good enough to dig out unit record data on the unadjusted US gender wage gap by percentiles. In attempting to show there was a persistent gender pay gap, the impeccably left-wing Economic Policy Institute showed that the unadjusted gender pay gap has all but disappeared in the USA.
There is next to no gender wage gap even in unadjusted terms towards the bottom of the labour market. This is despite all the protestations of the Left of an inherent inequality of bargaining power between the bosses and workers.
The low paid are supposed to be powerless unless unionised. Declining unionisation is a leading explanation on the Left of the rising income shares of the top 10%, top 1% in the top 0.1%.

If that inherent inequality of bargaining power trundled out at every opportunity by the Twitter Left explains anything in the labour market, this inequality of bargaining power should be operating with greatest strength at the bottom of the labour market.
Clearly the inherent inequality of bargaining power between the bosses and workers is not doing its job regarding the gender wage gap. The gender wage gap in the USA increases as you move up the income ladder rather than the other way around.
The explanation of the Economic Policy Institute for greater gender pay equality at the bottom is the minimum wage and male wage stagnation:
It is interesting to note that the wage gap between genders is smaller at the 10th percentile than at the 95th. At the 10th percentile, women earn 91 percent of men’s wages while women make only 79 percent of men’s wages at the 95th percentile.
The minimum wage is partially responsible for this greater equality among the lowest earners—it sets a wage floor that applies to everyone, which means that people near the bottom of the distribution are likely to make more equal wages. Also, low-wage workers are disproportionately women, which means that the minimum wage particularly bolsters women’s wages.
…Although women have seen modest wage gains in the last several decades, the main reason the gender wage gap has slowly narrowed is that the vast majority of men’s wages have stagnated or declined.
It is a bit rich for the Economic Policy Institute to praise the minimum wage as a force for increasing incomes after spending so much of its time saying how the minimum wage has fallen way behind wages growth in general.
The gender gap lingers at the top of the labour market despite the quite substantial wage gains for women as compared to men over the past 15 years. The Economic Policy Institute dismissed the substantial gains as modest despite their own documenting of them.
It is even richer for the Economic Policy Institute to start extending the male wage stagnation hypothesis to the top 20% and top 10%.
The top of the income distribution has not been known previously known as victims of wage stagnation.
The gender wage gap remains stubbornly high at the top end of the US labour market at 20% for the last few decades. The gender wage is so large and has stayed large at the top half of the labour market for the past few decades because of compensating differentials. Women on higher incomes are balancing families and careers in choosing the occupations that best suits each individual woman, their talents and educational choices.
Source: OECD Employment Database.
Studies of top earning professionals show that they make quite deliberate choices between family and career. The better explanation of why so many women are in a particular occupation is job sorting: that particular job has flexible hours and the skills do not depreciate as fast for workers who take time off, working part-time or returning from time out of the workforce. Low job turnover workers will be employed by firms that invest more in training and job specific human capital.
- Higher job turnover workers, such as women with children, will tend to move into jobs that have less investment in specialised human capital, and where their human capital depreciates at a slower pace.
- Women, including low paid women, select careers in jobs that match best in terms of work life balance and allows them to enter and leave the workforce with minimum penalty and loss of skills through depreciation and obsolescence.
This is the choice hypothesis of the gender wage gap. Women choose to educate for occupations where human capital depreciates at a slower pace. This gender wage gap for professionals can be explained by the marriage market combined with assortative mating:
- Graduates are likely to marry each other and form power couples; and
- There tends to be an age gap between men and women in long-term relationships and marriages of two years.
This two-year age gap means that the husband has two additional years of work experience and career advancement. This is likely to translate into higher pay and more immediate promotional prospects. Maximising household income would imply that the member of the household with a higher income, and greater immediate promotional prospects stay in the workforce.
This is consistent with the choice hypothesis and equalising differentials as the explanation for the gender wage gap. As Solomon Polachek explains:
At least in the past, getting married and having children meant one thing for men and another thing for women. Because women typically bear the brunt of child-rearing, married men with children work more over their lives than married women. This division of labour is exacerbated by the extent to which married women are, on average, younger and less educated than their husbands.
This pattern of earnings behaviour and human capital and career investment will persist until women start pairing off with men who are the same age or younger than them.
In low-paying jobs, there is little in the way of trade-offs other than full-time or part-time work. Low-paid jobs do not involve choosing majors at university, choosing careers, industries and employers that call for long hours and uninterrupted careers or not so long hours, fewer human capital and promotional penalties for time off and more work-life balance. The choice hypothesis is the far better explanation for the persistence of the unadjusted gender wage gap in the USA as Polachek explains:
The gender wage gap for never marrieds is a mere 2.8%, compared with over 20% for marrieds. The gender wage gap for young workers is less than 5%, but about 25% for 55–64-year-old men and women.
If gender discrimination were the issue, one would need to explain why businesses pay single men and single women comparable salaries. The same applies to young men and young women. One would need to explain why businesses discriminate against older women, but not against younger women. If corporations discriminate by gender, why are these employers paying any groups of men and women roughly equal pay?
Why is there no discrimination against young single women, but large amounts of discrimination against older married women? … Each type of possible discrimination is inconsistent with negligible wage differences among single and younger employees compared with the large gap among married men and women (especially those with children, and even more so for those who space children widely apart)
The main drivers of the gender wage gap are unknown to employers such as whether the would-be recruit or employer is married, their partner is present, how many children they have, how many of these children are under 12, and how many years are there between the births of their children.
Graduate premium by subject major
28 Oct 2015 Leave a comment
in discrimination, economics of education, gender, human capital, labour economics, occupational choice Tags: College premium, graduate premium, skill premium
Skill premium: The payoff of a university education depends on what you study – not where. econ.st/1H9cDfZ http://t.co/ZAqqvrecBm—
Max Roser (@MaxCRoser) June 16, 2015
No gender equality down under – Australian gender pay gap at 10th, 50th and 90th percentile since 1975
27 Oct 2015 Leave a comment
in discrimination, economic history, gender, human capital, labour economics, occupational choice, politics - Australia Tags: Australia, gender wage gap
A rising majority of university students around the world are women
26 Oct 2015 Leave a comment
in development economics, discrimination, economic history, economics of education, gender, growth disasters, growth miracles, human capital, labour economics Tags: College premium, compensating differentials, education premium, graduate premium, marriage and divorce, reversing gender gap
A rising majority of university students around the world are women (HT @cblatts) http://t.co/6loTmSgrk9—
William Easterly (@bill_easterly) June 15, 2015
Tertiary educational attainment by age and gender, USA, UK, Canada and Australia, 2013
25 Oct 2015 Leave a comment
in discrimination, economics of education, gender, human capital, labour economics, occupational choice, politics - Australia, politics - USA Tags: Australia, British economy, Canada, reversing gender gap
There are marked differences in progress in tertiary educational attainment between countries and across the generations. For example, while a few more American women have tertiary degrees as compared to their mothers, there’s been no change for American men for a generation.
Source: Indicators of Gender Equality in Education – OECD.
Canada is firing ahead in both tertiary educational attainment and reversing the gender gap in education for good. Two thirds of prime age Canadian women have a tertiary degree as compared to half of their mothers.
The number of British women with tertiary degrees is also much higher than their mothers. British men are trying their best to keep up.
South Korean gender pay gap for the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile since 1985
24 Oct 2015 Leave a comment
in development economics, discrimination, economic history, economics of education, gender, growth miracles, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice Tags: asymmetric marriage premium, compensating differentials, gender wage gap, marital division of labour, South Korea
The Japanese gender pay gap at the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile since 1975
23 Oct 2015 Leave a comment
in discrimination, economic history, gender, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice Tags: compensating differentials, gender wage gap, Japan
The unadjusted gender pay gap is still large in Japan but is declining slowly.
Keep calm and carry on – the British gender pay gaps at the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles
23 Oct 2015 Leave a comment
in discrimination, gender, human capital, labour economics, occupational choice, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, population economics Tags: gender wage gap
Unlike New Zealand or the USA, there is been steady progress up and down the entire British labour market in closing the gender pay gap.
Source: OECD Employment Database.
The reverse gender gap in black education
22 Oct 2015 Leave a comment
in discrimination, economics of education, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice, poverty and inequality, welfare reform Tags: reversing gender gap
US gender wage gap at 10th, 50th and 90th percentile
21 Oct 2015 2 Comments
in discrimination, economic history, gender, politics - USA
In common with New Zealand, the most persistent gender pay gap is at the top end of the labour market. There is more gender equality among the lowest paid female workers than the highest-paid female workers. The gender pay gap for the top 10% of female workers has been static for 20 years. Gender pay gaps for female workers at the median weekly earnings for a full-time worker and at the bottom have been still closing albeit slowly over that same 20 years.

Source: OECD Employment Database.
NZ gender pay gap has closed – at the bottom anyway @YWCAAuckland @SFWU @JanLogie @FairnessNZ @ncwnz
21 Oct 2015 2 Comments
in discrimination, economics of education, gender, human capital, labour supply, politics - New Zealand Tags: Claudia Goldin, gender wage gap, pay equity, Solomon Polachek
Good on you @janlogie, @TraceyMartinMP and Louisa Wall, the next 3 MPs to pledge support at equalpay.org.nz http://t.co/D2rh75VjZx—
SFWU (@SFWU) September 07, 2015
The Auckland YMCA has made some strong claims about the persistence of gender wage gap saying that it is stubbornly stuck at 14% (when measured against average earnings).

Source: The gender pay gap needs to start closing.
It is not usual to measure the gender wage gap against average earnings. Median earnings preferably on an hourly basis is the normal measure. Moreover, more long-term data is readily available on the Internet about median earnings rather than average earnings.
For example, as the chart below shows the unadjusted gender wage gap in New Zealand is a little bit less than the 14% claimed by Auckland YMCA when measured against median earnings and has been slowly tapering down for 15 years.

Source: Statistics New Zealand New Zealand Income Survey.
My larger claim is the gender pay gap has been in a long-term decline for generations. More importantly, the gender will pay gap is disappeared at the bottom of the labour market. For the past 5 to 10 years, the unadjusted gender wage gap rounds down to zero at the bottom of the pay structure for full-time employees.

Source: OECD Employment Database.
The gender wage gap remains stubbornly high at the high end of the wage market at 15-20% because of compensating differentials. Women are balancing families and careers in choosing the occupations that best suits each individual woman.
How big is the wage gap in your country? bit.ly/18o8icV #IWD2015 http://t.co/XTdntCRfDQ—
(@OECD) March 08, 2015
Studies of top earning professionals show that they make quite deliberate choices between family and career. The better explanation of why so many women are in a particular occupation is job sorting: that particular job has flexible hours and the skills do not depreciate as fast for workers who take time off, working part-time or returning from time out of the workforce. Low job turnover workers will be employed by firms that invest more in training and job specific human capital.
- Higher job turnover workers, such as women with children, will tend to move into jobs that have less investment in specialised human capital, and where their human capital depreciates at a slower pace.
- Women, including low paid women, select careers in jobs that match best in terms of work life balance and allows them to enter and leave the workforce with minimum penalty and loss of skills through depreciation and obsolescence.
This is the choice hypothesis of the gender wage gap. Women choose to educate for occupations where human capital depreciates at a slower pace. This gender wage gap for professionals can be explained by the marriage market combined with assortative mating:
- Graduates are likely to marry each other and form power couples; and
-
There tends to be an age gap between men and women in long-term relationships and marriages of two years.
This two-year age gap means that the husband has two additional years of work experience and career advancement. This is likely to translate into higher pay and more immediate promotional prospects. Maximising household income would imply that the member of the household with a higher income, and greater immediate promotional prospects stay in the workforce. This is entirely consistent with the choice hypothesis and equalising differentials as the explanation for the gender wage gap. As Solomon Polachek explains:
At least in the past, getting married and having children meant one thing for men and another thing for women. Because women typically bear the brunt of child-rearing, married men with children work more over their lives than married women. This division of labour is exacerbated by the extent to which married women are, on average, younger and less educated than their husbands.
This pattern of earnings behaviour and human capital and career investment will persist until women start pairing off with men who are the same age or younger than them.
Claudia Goldin did a great study of Harvard MBAs using online surveys of their careers. She found that three proximate factors accounted for the large and rising gender gap in earnings:
- differences in training prior to MBA graduation,
- differences in career interruptions, and
- differences in weekly hours.
The greater career discontinuity and shorter work hours for female MBAs are largely associated with motherhood. There are some jobs that are severely penalise any time out of the workforce. A 2014 Harvard Business School study found that 28 percent of recent female alumni took off more than six months to care for children; only 2 percent of men did.

Claudia Goldin has described pharmacy is the most family friendly occupation. She compares it to law. In law, if you work long hours, you are on partnership track and win the top clients. In pharmacy, the only advantage of working longer hours as you earn more money that week. Also, pharmacists are completely interchangeable. Do you care which pharmacist fills out your prescription at your local pharmacy or even know which one fills it out? Lawyers are not interchangeable: they cannot just handover a case. Detailed briefings would be required. You expect your lawyer to show up in court or at meetings on time anywhere without fail.
Claudia Goldin found one counterfactual that cancels out the gender wage gap amongst MBA professionals: hubby earns less! Female MBAs who’ve have a partner who earn less than them earn as much as the average MBA professional on an hourly basis but work a few less hours per week.
The gender wage gap is persisted in high-paying jobs because career women have so many options. They can mix and match career and motherhood in fine detail.
In low-paying jobs, there is little in the way of trade-offs other than full-time or part-time work. Low-paid jobs do not involve choosing majors at university, choosing careers, industries and employers that call for long hours and uninterrupted careers or not so long hours, fewer human capital and promotional penalties for time off and more work-life balance.
The choice hypothesis is the far better explanation for the persistence of the unadjusted gender wage gap in New Zealand, which is small by international standards. As Polachek explains:
The gender wage gap for never marrieds is a mere 2.8%, compared with over 20% for marrieds. The gender wage gap for young workers is less than 5%, but about 25% for 55–64-year-old men and women.
If gender discrimination were the issue, one would need to explain why businesses pay single men and single women comparable salaries. The same applies to young men and young women. One would need to explain why businesses discriminate against older women, but not against younger women. If corporations discriminate by gender, why are these employers paying any groups of men and women roughly equal pay?
Why is there no discrimination against young single women, but large amounts of discrimination against older married women? … Each type of possible discrimination is inconsistent with negligible wage differences among single and younger employees compared with the large gap among married men and women (especially those with children, and even more so for those who space children widely apart)
The main drivers of the gender wage gap are unknown to employers such as whether the would-be recruit or employer is married, their partner is present, how many children they have, how many of these children are under 12, and how many years are there between the births of their children.
In countries such as Sweden, the gender wage gap is no better than the OECD average, despite generous maternity and paternity leave. The reason is obvious. You do not close the gender wage gap for professional women by paying them to stay out of the workforce for a year or more perhaps several times over at critical junctures early in their careers.
Long parental leave in Sweden is responsible for a thick Swedish glass ceiling because of lower levels of human capital investment among women and employers’ responses by placing fewer women in fast-track career. Extensive parental leave makes holding a job easier and more family-friendly, it may not be as effective as some might think in eradicating the gender gap for professional women.



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