How did the Chinese billionaires make their money?
15 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, development economics, economic history, entrepreneurship, growth miracles, human capital, industrial organisation, labour economics Tags: billionaires, China, entrepreneurial alertness, superstars, top 1%
Which countries are the biggest exporters of their own citizens
13 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in human capital, labour economics, labour supply, population economics
More trigger warnings for fainting couch feminists
13 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in discrimination, economic history, gender, human capital, labour economics, labour supply Tags: gender wage gap
Harvard business School survey discovers that workers want more
12 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in human capital, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice, personnel economics, poverty and inequality, unions Tags: compensating differentials, union wage premium, unions

Mandatory severance pay by length of job tenure in the G7, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, Scandinavia, Greece and Spain
11 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in human capital, job search and matching, labour economics, labour supply, law and economics, managerial economics, organisational economics, personnel economics, property rights, unemployment Tags: employment law, employment protection laws, employment regulation, firm-specific human capital, job search, labour market regulation, severance pay
There are a wide differences across the OECD in mandatory severance pay in the event of a layoff.
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Source: Labor Market Regulation – Doing Business – World Bank Group.
Severance pay makes it more expensive to fire and therefore more expensive to hire. This means fewer job vacancies will be created but they will last longer.
The presence of mandatory severance pay could increase or reduce the unemployment rate but unemployment durations will increase because it takes longer to find a suitable job match among the fewer available vacancies.
Mandating severance pay does not make the job match inherently more profitable. It just redistributes some of the surplus from the job match to the end when it is terminated.
Employers and jobseekers may agree to severance pay where investments in firm specific and job specific human capital for the job is profitable.
Severance pay in these circumstances gives the employer and more reasons to invest in specific human capital. The promise to pay severance pay will make the employer hesitate to lay them off. The employer will instead retain them over a slack period or redeploy them within the company rather than pay them out. This pre-commitment encourages investment in firm specific and job specific human capital by both sides more secure, which makes the job match more profitable overall for both sides.
Of course, if it was possible to negotiate completely around severance pay mandated by law, there would be no effects on hiring, firing and unemployment durations. All it would mean is take-home pay would be less but in the event of a layoff, these employees would get that this wage reduction back as a lump sum.
Gender wage gap myths and realities
06 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in discrimination, gender, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA
Gender differences in PISA scores for science across the OECD
06 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in discrimination, economics of education, gender, human capital, labour economics Tags: PISA, reversing gender gap
Source: OECD Family Database – OECD.
Scandinavian girls are better than boys at maths: gender differences in PISA scores in maths across the OECD, 2012
05 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in discrimination, economics of education, human capital, labour economics, labour supply Tags: PISA, reversing gender gap
Source: OECD Family Database – OECD.
No asymmetric marriage premium in commuting: the family commuting gap for mothers and fathers travelling to and from work by school age of child in the UK, Germany, France and Italy
04 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in discrimination, economics of love and marriage, gender, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice, transport economics, urban economics Tags: asymmetric marriage premium, commuting times, gender wage gap, reversing gender gap
Few labour market statistics have any meaning unless broken down by gender. The compensating differentials that explain much of the family pay gap extend strongly to commuting times.
Source: OECD Family Database – OECD, Table LMF2.6.A.
Mothers commute a good 15 to 20 minutes less than fathers in the UK, Italy, Germany and France. Single women commute 5 to 10 minutes further than mothers. Single men and fathers commute much the same distance.
Change in teenage boys’ PISA reading score since 2000 across the OECD area
04 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in discrimination, economics of education, gender, human capital, labour economics Tags: PISA, reversing gender gap
Feminism vs. Truth on the gender pay gap
30 Jan 2016 Leave a comment
in discrimination, gender, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice Tags: gender wage gap
The only thing more expensive than going to uni is not going
29 Jan 2016 Leave a comment
in economic history, economics of education, human capital, labour economics
@greencatherine @cjsbishop zero US, UK & Swiss gender pay gaps for single women
22 Jan 2016 Leave a comment
in discrimination, economics of love and marriage, gender, human capital, labour economics, occupational choice, politics - New Zealand Tags: asymmetric marriage premium, family wage gap, gender wage gap
If victory is a zero gender wage gap, some countries have achieved it already for single female workers and long ago according to the data charted below is from the Luxembourg Income Study.

Source: IZA World of Labor – Equal pay legislation and the gender wage gap from the Luxembourg Income Study.
Discrimination cannot explain why the gender wage gap for single female is tiny relative to the family wage gap. As Solomon Polachek explains:
…the wage gap for married workers is between three and 30 times greater compared with single workers.
Employers cannot be to blame for the large difference between the single female worker gender wage gap and the family wage gap.
Aside from explaining why employers only discriminate against married women, you must explain how employers managed to find out which female applicants are married so they can discriminate against them.
Without that vital information on the marital status of female applicants and the presence and number of children as well is their spacing, the vast male chauvinistic conspiracy responsible for the glass ceiling and the sticky floors against promotion does not get off the ground.
How do employers actually pay married women less? Advertising jobs that pay women less has been unlawful for decades. Yet another hurdle to overcome for the vast male chauvinistic conspiracy.
Women move between the large number of jobs as do men accumulating human capital as they go? Somehow employers, including female owned firms, must sabotage the accumulation of human capital by married women as soon as they have children but without paying them lessen in their current jobs or advertising jobs that pay married women less.
The main drivers of the gender wage gap are unknown to employers such as:
- whether the would-be female recruit or employee is married,
- whether their partner is present,
- how many children they have,
- how many of children are under 12, and
- how many years are there between the births of their children.
These are the main drivers of the gender wage gap – all of which are factors totally unknown to employers and of no relevance to them in making a profit.
Most explanations of the gender wage gap centre around human capital. In anticipation of time outside of the workforce for motherhood, women self-selecting to occupations that penalise career interruptions less.
Women invest in human capital that is more general, human capital that is more mobile between jobs and into spells of part-time work. Women anticipate home time after they have children so they invest in human capital that depreciations at a slower rate during career interruptions. Women also invest less overall in new capital because they expect to spend less time in the labour market.
All of these investments are made by women themselves in anticipation of motherboard rather than employers somehow paying them less after they marry and have children.
The solution to closing the family wage gap requires radical biological changes in who has children. There are more radical changes required than this because mothers actually like babies and enjoy spending time with them rather than going to work.
Equally challenging is the required changes in the dating market. There is an average age difference between boyfriends and girlfriends and husbands and wives of 2 to 3 years. As the husband or boyfriend is a few years older, he has usually accumulated more human capital and is more likely to be at a critical career point for promotion.

Because the husband or boyfriend is 2 to 3 years older, it pays off well in terms of the father investing more in market-related human capital and the mother devoting more time to childcare.
Another major driver of the gender pay gap is the dating market as identified by Richard McKenzie. He pointed out that evolutionary psychology has found that in every culture one of the factors of influencing pairing off in the dating market is that the boyfriend or husband must have good prospects although this preference is weakening over this last century.
One of the reasons for the increase in single parents is that low-paid men are not as inviting prospects as long-term boyfriends or husbands is a few generations ago. There are too few good men.

University educated couples are not called power couples for nothing – their earning power is this stunning compared to going it on your own. The emergence of power couples means that less educated women may prefer to stay single and raise children on their own rather than marry what is left in the marriage pool.
Because of the requirement among women across all cultures that husbands to be must have good prospects, men have an extra incentive to invest in human capital and work harder and longer hours because of the gender specific payoff in the marriage market.
Men will also take more risks than women because risky jobs carry wage premiums. That risk premium is topped up in the mating market terms are marriage prospects because of the higher wages. Women get a wage premium for taking risky jobs but less of a payoff in the mating market for the higher wages. There is an evolutionary psychology explanation for the family wage gap.

All in all, a key requirement for the closing of the family wage gap and what little is left of the gender wage gap is women drop their standards in terms of who they choose as boyfriends and husbands. Not very likely.

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