Low pay across the OECD
18 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in minimum wage, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, poverty and inequality, unions, welfare reform Tags: living wage, low pay, minimum wage
Puerto Rico’s economy can’t handle the federal minimum wage
11 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, Federalism, income redistribution, labour economics, labour supply, minimum wage, politics - USA, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: federalism, living wage, Puerto Rico, sovereign default
Puerto Rico's economy can't handle the federal minimum wage. bit.ly/1IEJIEi http://t.co/D3mzOmlnJa—
Manhattan Institute (@ManhattanInst) July 07, 2015
Fabian Society and Church of England caught out as hypocrites on London Living Wage of £18,000
06 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in income redistribution, industrial organisation, labour economics, minimum wage, poverty and inequality, Public Choice, rentseeking, survivor principle Tags: British economy, British politics, Church of England, expressive voting, Fabian Society, hard budget constraints, Left-wing hypocrisy, living wage, market selection
Doing business in the PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain) – World Bank rankings
03 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, currency unions, economic growth, economics of bureaucracy, economics of regulation, Euro crisis, health and safety, income redistribution, industrial organisation, labour economics, law and economics, minimum wage, occupational regulation, property rights, Public Choice, rentseeking, survivor principle, unions, welfare reform Tags: cost of doing business, Eurosclerosis, Greece, Italy, PIGS, Portugal, Spain
Figure 1: Doing Business rankings, PIGS, 2014
Source: World Bank Doing Business 2015.
All in all, Italy and Greece are a dog of a place to enforce a contract. The long-suffering taxpayer is better off paying taxes in Greece than in Italy! Not surprisingly, trading across borders is the greatest strength in doing business in the PIGS. The European Union does have some benefits.
Figure 2: Doing Business rankings, Greece and Italy, 2014
Source: World Bank Doing Business 2015.
All in all, Italy and Greece are equally bad places to do business and Italy is much worse when it comes to taxes. About the only saving graces of Italy is the registration of property and the protection of minority interests in companies.
Figure 3: Doing Business rankings, Spain and Portugal, 2014
Source: World Bank Doing Business 2015.
Spain and in particular Portugal are much better places to do business than Italy and Greece.
What are alternatives to the minimum wage?
30 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in labour economics, minimum wage, poverty and inequality, public economics Tags: earned income tax credit, family tax benefits, working for families
What are alternatives to the minimum wage, and how do they effect workers and taxpayers? buff.ly/1c4BYhd http://t.co/hf67ujjvOK—
MRUniversity (@MRevUniversity) May 20, 2015
More minimum wage job replacement units spotted
26 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in industrial organisation, labour economics, labour supply, minimum wage, survivor principle, unions Tags: antimarket bias, creative destruction, expressive voting, technological unemployment
Should it be illegal for workers to accept a sub-minimum wage job?
22 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, labour economics, law and economics, minimum wage Tags: Coase theorem, minimum wage
@Luke1732Mullen @ritholtz @TBPInvictus @futurepundit @workingwa @CafeHayek http://t.co/n3l26QPPd4—
Mark J. Perry (@Mark_J_Perry) May 24, 2015
Trends in the real minimum wage, PPP, Australia, New Zealand, USA and UK since 2000
18 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economic history, labour economics, minimum wage, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA Tags: Australia, British economy
Figure 1: real minimum wage, 2013 constant prices, purchasing power parity, US$, Australia, New Zealand, USA and UK
Source: OECD StatExtract.
How to argue against employment protection laws while arguing for additional employment regulation
17 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in human capital, job search and matching, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, minimum wage, unions Tags: climate law, efficiency wage, employment at will, employment protection law, fixed costs of employment, fixed costs of working, flexible working hours, living wage, paid leave, Richard Ebstein
The Centre for American Progress recently published an excellent survey of the costs to employers of hiring and training new recruits. As the paper notes:
it is costly to replace workers because of the productivity losses when someone leaves a job, the costs of hiring and training a new employee, and the slower productivity until the new employee gets up to speed in their new job.
Our analysis reviews 30 case studies in 11 research papers published between 1992 and 2007 that provide estimates of the cost of turnover, finding that businesses spend about one-fifth of an employee’s annual salary to replace that worker.
The purpose of the research published by the Centre for American Progress was to argue there were large costs to employers from replacing even low paid workers and there are a workplace policies such as paid family leave and workplace flexibility will reduce these job turnover costs to employers.
Similar arguments are used to justify a living wage on efficiency grade wage grounds. A living wage would reduce job turnover and therefore the costs to employers of job turnover in the jobs.
The research published by the Centre for American Progress also illustrates the bargaining power of workers. Employers who failed to treat workers fairly and pay them the going wage risk an increase in job quit rates. These large costs of job turnover have been carefully documented by the Centre for American Progress.
Beyond jobs data: Industries w/ better pay have lower worker turnover rates equitablegrowth.org/news/looking-b… http://t.co/gug33EbYy3—
Equitable Growth (@equitablegrowth) July 03, 2015
Employers incur fixed costs of employment when they recruit and train new employees. These recruits must be expected to stay long enough to work sufficient hours for the firm to expect to recover these investments (Oi (1962, 1983a, 1990), Idson and Oi (1999), Hutchens (2010), Hutchens and Grace-Martin (2006)).
These costs are fixed costs because they do not vary with how many hours the employee works or with how long an employee stays with their employer. These fixed employment costs must be recouped over the expected job tenure of the employee with the firm. Employers will not hire an additional worker unless they anticipate recovering the costs of doing do including fixed employment costs and other overheads.
Central to arguments such as by Richard Epstein for employment at will is the threat of the employee to quit imposes a real cost on employers which the employer will seek to avoid by treating their employees well.
The best way to prevent exploitation of workers is to make hiring and firing easy, facilitate new entry by firms into all markets and promote full employment – a worker with other available job opportunities is difficult to exploit.
With large fixed costs of recruitment and training, employers cannot afford to behave whimsically if they wish to survive in competition with the rival firms with more competitive wage and employment policies.
By the same token, the large fixed costs of employment documented by the Centre for American Progress illustrate the large investments employers must risk to recruit a new employee.
If this large investment in recruitment doesn’t turn out well, but is difficult to get out of because of strict employment laws, employers will be more reluctant in the first instance to risk this investment because they are risking several months wages in fixed costs of employment. As Richard Epstein explained:
A second great advantage of the at-will system is that it supplies an informal method of bonding that keeps both sides in line.
The employer who tries to take advantage of the employee by altering working conditions for the worse will be met by the threat to quit, for now the deal is worth less to the employee than the wage received.
So long as markets are competitive the switching costs will be relatively low – lower in fact than they are in a highly regulated world where employers have to think twice before taking on a worker whom they may be unable to fire if things do not work out.
Yet on the other side, the employee who takes it easy on the job is faced with dismissal because he is no longer worth his wages.
But even here management will hesitate to dismiss for good reasons. One is the very substantial costs of recruiting and training a replacement who might or might not turn out to be better than the worker who was dismissed. The second is that unjust dismissals could induce other workers to leave while the going is good, thereby compounding the problem of recruitment and retention.
The Centre for American Progress was good enough to document the very substantial costs of recruiting and training a replacement employee. As the Centre for American Progress explained in their paper, employers have every reason to protect their investments in training and recruitment by minimising job turnover costs.
If You’re A Keynesian Then You Must Believe The Minimum Wage Increases Unemployment
14 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in business cycles, fiscal policy, labour economics, macroeconomics, minimum wage Tags: Bryan Caplan, economic fallacies, involuntary unemployment, Keynesian macroeconomics, methodology of economics, wage rigidity
Via If You’re A Keynesian Then You Must Believe The Minimum Wage Increases Unemployment and The Myopic Empiricism of the Minimum Wage, Bryan Caplan | EconLog | Library of Economics and Liberty.
In which Anglo-Saxon country is full-time work not enough to escape family poverty on the minimum wage?
07 Jun 2015 1 Comment
in labour economics, minimum wage, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, population economics, poverty and inequality, welfare reform Tags: earned income tax credit, poverty traps, single parents, taxation and the labour supply, welfare state
Figure 1: Weekly working hours needed at minimum-wage to move above a 50% relative poverty line after taxes, mandatory social or private contributions payable by workers, and family benefits for lone parent with two children, Anglo-Saxon countries, 2013
Which Anglo-Saxon country has the largest after-tax pay increase after a minimum wage increase?
06 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in labour economics, minimum wage, welfare reform Tags: poverty traps, single parents, taxation and the labour supply, welfare reform, welfare state
Figure 1: Net gain after income taxes, Social Security contributions and benefit reductions after a 5% minimum wage increase for a lone parent family
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