Emotional/behavioural problems in children
in NZ
By sex & deprivation quintile, 2013/14, %https://t.co/La0JIOTkol pic.twitter.com/P5pPligq5k— Figure.NZ (@FigureNZ) December 2, 2015
The gender employment gap across the OECD
04 Dec 2015 Leave a comment
in discrimination, gender, labour economics, labour supply
The gender employment gap is much smaller in Scandinavian. The reason is their taxes are high but then are paid back through churning. A considerable amount of those taxes fund employment contingent payments for child care and elder care.

Source: Closing the Gender Gap: Act Now – © OECD 2012.
Richard Rogerson found in Taxation and market work: is Scandinavia an outlier? that how the government spends tax revenues imply different rates of labour supply with regard to tax rate increases.
Rogerson considered that differences in the composition of government spending can potentially account for the high rate of labour supply in Sweden and elsewhere in Scandinavia. Examining the conditions on which how tax revenue is returned to Swedes as income transfers or other conditional payments is central to understanding the labour supply effects of taxes:
- If higher taxes fund disability payments which may only be received when not in work, the effect on hours worked is greater relative to a lump-sum transfer with no conditions; and
- If higher taxes subsidise day care for individuals who work, then the effect on hours of work will be less than under the lump-sum transfer with no conditions.
A much higher rate of government employment and greater expenditures on child care and elderly care explain the high rates of Swedish labour supply. Swedes are taxed heavily, but key parts of this tax revenue are then given back to them conditionally if they keep working.
Net childcare cost in % of average wage for a dual earner family
04 Dec 2015 Leave a comment
in discrimination, economics of love and marriage, gender, labour economics, labour supply

Closing the Gender Gap: Act Now -OECD 2012.
Note: Net childcare costs among couple families where one adult earns 100% of the average wage and the other earns 50% of the average wage.
The gender pay gap for mothers, selected OECD countries
04 Dec 2015 Leave a comment
in discrimination, gender, labour economics
I can only speculate for the reasons why Italy has the smallest gender pay gap when there are children. One possibility is low fertility rates. Another is that Italian mothers either work full-time or don’t work at all.

Closing the Gender Gap: Act Now – © OECD 2012: OECD Secretariat estimates based on EUSILC (2008), HILDA (2009), CPS (2008), SLID (2008), KLIPS (2007), JHPS (2009), CASEN (2009) and ENIGH (2010) (Annex III.A3).
As for the remaining countries, having children increases the gender wage gap. This increase in the gender wage gap cannot be attributed to employer bias. They don’t know whether the female applicant has children. It is unlawful to ask.
The number of children and the spacing between their births has been a major driver of the gender wage gap for decades. These long-standing findings have been devastating to the notion that there is discrimination against women on the demand side of the labour market. Employer discrimination is unimportant to the gender wage gap as Polachek explains:
The gender wage gap for never marrieds is a mere 2.8%, compared with over 20% for marrieds. The gender wage gap for young workers is less than 5%, but about 25% for 55–64-year-old men and women.
If gender discrimination were the issue, one would need to explain why businesses pay single men and single women comparable salaries. The same applies to young men and young women. One would need to explain why businesses discriminate against older women, but not against younger women. If corporations discriminate by gender, why are these employers paying any groups of men and women roughly equal pay?
Why is there no discrimination against young single women, but large amounts of discrimination against older married women? …Each type of possible discrimination is inconsistent with negligible wage differences among single and younger employees compared with the large gap among married men and women (especially those with children, and even more so for those who space children widely apart).
The main drivers of the gender wage gap are unknown to employers such as whether the would-be recruit or employer is married, the father is present to help with childcare, how many children they have, how many of these children are under 12, and how many years between the births of their children. These are the main drivers of the gender wage gap.
All of these factors that drive much of the gender wage gap are totally unknown to employers and of no relevance to making a profit. Furthermore, it is costly to discover this information about family composition as well as illegal. Where is the profit in that information? Searching for information only sacrifices more profit. That is not a good business survival strategy: searching for irrelevant information.
Gender wage gap at age 40-44, selected OECD countries
04 Dec 2015 Leave a comment
in discrimination, gender, labour economics
Trade union membership, USA, UK, Australia & New Zealand since 1960 @FairnessNZ
04 Dec 2015 2 Comments
in labour economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, unions Tags: union membership, union power
Union membership was in a long-term decline in New Zealand before the passage of the hated Employment Contracts Act in 1991. If anything, union membership stopped falling after the passage of that law.
Source: OECD Stat.
As for the other countries, steady decline in membership has been the trend since 1980. The already low level of union membership in the USA has been in a steady decline since at least 1960.
Gender pay gap at age 25-29, OECD countries @GreenCatherine
03 Dec 2015 Leave a comment
in discrimination, gender, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA Tags: compensating differentials, gender wage gap, labour demographics
The gender pay gap in New Zealand rounds down to zero for women in their mid-20s!
The role of the six-day working week in Japanese sexism and the gender wage gap
02 Dec 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, discrimination, economic history, economics, economics of love and marriage, gender, human capital, labour economics, occupational choice, personnel economics Tags: asymmetric marriage premium, compensating differentials, entrepreneurial alertness, gender wage gap, marital division of labour
When I was studying in Japan, they were at the end of phasing out working on Saturdays. The staff at my university work on Saturday mornings for four hours and then went home.
The Japanese working week was reduced by law from 48 to 44 hours per week in 1988 and to 40 hours per week from 1993 (Prescott 1999; Hayashi and Prescott 2002). The Japanese stopped routinely working on Saturdays over the 1990s. The number of national holidays was increased by three and an extra day of annual leave was also prescribed by law.
While feuding with strangers on an unrelated matter about the gender wage gap, it somehow occurred to me that the six-day working week might have something to do with what is on the face of a large amount of sexism in Japan and a large gender wage gap.
That feud with strangers was about unconscious bias as a driver of the gender wage gap in New Zealand. The gender wage gap Japan is attributed to conscious prejudice.

Source: OECD Stat.
In the above chart I have plotted the average weekly hours worked of Japanese workers and the Japanese gender wage gap. Two things can be noticed from the above chart:
- there is a sharp reduction in the number of hours worked per week by Japanese workers when they stopped working on Saturdays; and
- the gender wage gap started declining after the introduction of a five-day working week in Japan.
In a country where it is standard to work six days a week, the price of motherhood would be much higher than in other countries industrialised countries that phased out the 48-hour week decades previous. The asymmetric marriage premium would also be much higher if one partner to the marriage worked a six-day week while the other looked after the children.
Other drivers of the gender wage gap that arise from human capital specialisation and depreciation and from the differences of a few years in the marrying ages of men and women would be intensified if people worked another day per week. The payoff from a marital division of labour and human capital specialisation where one worked long hours and the other focused on investing in human capital that allow them to care for the children and move in and out of the workforce with less human capital depreciation would be much larger.
Much is made of the distinctiveness of Japanese culture and its sexism. In my time in Japan, the thing I notice most distinctively about Japanese culture was its extraordinary pragmatism and willingness to change rapidly. The Japanese economic miracle was founded on rapid industrialisation, innovation and repeated renewal of human capital. That requires an entrepreneurial spirit and open-mindedness.
Cultural and preference based explanations of the gender wage Including that in Japan underrate the rapid social change in the role of women in the 20th century in all countries in all cultures. As Gary Becker explains:
… major economic and technological changes frequently trump culture in the sense that they induce enormous changes not only in behaviour but also in beliefs. A clear illustration of this is the huge effects of technological change and economic development on behaviour and beliefs regarding many aspects of the family.
Attitudes and behaviour regarding family size, marriage and divorce, care of elderly parents, premarital sex, men and women living together and having children without being married, and gays and lesbians have all undergone profound changes during the past 50 years. Invariably, when countries with very different cultures experienced significant economic growth, women’s education increased greatly, and the number of children in a typical family plummeted from three or more to often much less than two.
A good explanation of this rapid social change is in Timur Kuran’s “Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revolutions” and “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989“.
Kuran suggests that political revolutions and large shifts in political opinion will catch us by surprise again and again because of people’s readiness to conceal their true political preferences under perceived social pressure:
People who come to dislike their government are apt to hide their desire for change as long as the opposition seems weak. Because of the preference falsification, a government that appears unshakeable might see its support crumble following a slight surge in the opposition’s apparent size, caused by events insignificant in and of themselves.
Kuran argues that everyone has a different revolutionary threshold where they reveal their true beliefs, but even one individual shift to opposition leads to many others to come forward and defy the existing order. Small concessions embolden the ground-swell of revolution.
Those ready to oppose social intolerance or who are lukewarm in their intolerance keep their views private until a coincidence of factors gives them the courage to bring their views into the open. They find others share their views and there is a revolutionary bandwagon effect.
Plenty of people have had personal experiences of this in the 1980s and the 1990s when there were rapid changes in social and political attitudes about racism, sexism and gay rights. This includes Japan.
In the case of the Japanese gender wage gap, the move from a six-day to a five-day working week radically changed the asymmetric marriage premium and the payoff from investing in both specialised human capital and in human capital that depreciates quickly when away from work.
This large shift in incentives to work and invest in human capital would embolden a change in social attitudes. This is because the previous views were no longer profitable and many would gain from the change. Others who prefer just to go along with crowd would quickly follow them in to stay in tune with whatever is now popular.
Much of Japanese sexism may be the preference falsification that was low-cost when there was a six-day working week. The move to a five-day working week greatly increased the cost of that sexism and the profits from finding new ways of organising the workplace that better matched motherhood and career in Japan.
Undervalued workers are an untapped business opportunity for more alert entrepreneurs to hire these undervalued workers. In the case of Japan, with a five-day working week, hiring women for jobs that involved considerable investment in firm-specific human capital became more profitable. Previously under a six-day working week it was more profitable to invest in men because they undertook few childcare responsibilities. Under a five-day working week, that payoff matrix favours women more than in the past.
Gender pay gap for 30 to 34-year-olds, selected OECD countries
02 Dec 2015 Leave a comment
in discrimination, gender, labour economics Tags: compensating differentials, gender wage gap
New Zealand is top of the world, as usual, in closing the gender wage gap.

Does plastic surgery pay?
02 Dec 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, human capital, labour economics, occupational choice

Minimum wage as % of median and the gender wage gap at the bottom of the New Zealand labour market
30 Nov 2015 1 Comment
in discrimination, gender, minimum wage, politics - New Zealand
The minimum wage was pretty stable as a percentage of the median wage in New Zealand until recently. Nonetheless, the gender wage gap narrowed at the bottom of the labour market rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s.

Source: OECD Employment Database and Data extracted on 30 Nov 2015 04:03 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat.
In common with the USA, that narrowing of the gender wage gap stopped in the early 2000s after the minimum wage started increasing as a percentage of the median wage.
Again, that is contrary to the idea that the minimum wage is a failsafe that narrows the gender wage gap at the bottom. This failsafe is said to be the leading reason why the gender wage gap is much smaller at the bottom of the labour market than higher-up such as the median and in particular at the top.
The minimum wage as % of the median wage and the gender wage gap at the bottom of the U.S. labour market
30 Nov 2015 1 Comment
in discrimination, gender, labour economics, minimum wage, politics - USA
When feuding with strangers on Twitter about the gender wage gap, a common explanation for the much smaller gender wage gap at the bottom of the labour market is the power is the minimum wage to uplift women’s wages and with it narrow the gender wage gap at the bottom of the labour market.
Below I have plotted the minimum wage as a percentage of the median wage for the USA along with the gender wage gap for the bottom 10% of the U.S. labour market. Both are expressed as percentages of the median wage.

Source: OECD Employment Database and Data extracted on 30 Nov 2015 04:03 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat.
From what I can make of the above chart, the gender wage gap at the bottom of the labour market was closing rapidly when the minimum wage was falling as a percentage of the median wage. That gender wage gap then stabilised when the minimum wage stabilised as a percentage of the median. The gender wage gap increased when the minimum wage increased as a percentage of the median wage for full-time employees.
Should not this relationship between the minimum wage and the gender wage gap be the other way around if the minimum wage is a force for closing the gender wage gap at the bottom of the labour market?
Unconscious bias and the gender wage gap
30 Nov 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, discrimination, gender, labour economics, managerial economics, occupational choice, organisational economics, personnel economics Tags: gender wage gap, preference formation, unconscious bias
Gender wage gaps and the role of unconscious bias
28 Nov 2015 9 Comments
in discrimination, entrepreneurship, gender, labour economics, occupational choice, politics - New Zealand, survivor principle Tags: compensating differentials, employer discrimination, entrepreneurial alertness, gender wage gap, market selection, The meaning of competition
Geoff Simmons’ Friday Whiteboard podcast last night on the 12% gender wage gap was a good summary of the proximate drivers such as occupational segregation and part-time work. I have a few quibbles with his stress on unconscious bias as the driver of the gender wage gap.
The first of these quibbles is the gender wage gap is tiny at the bottom and even the middle of the labour market but is so high and so stable for so long at the top-end. Why does unconscious bias increase with the wages on offer? Better paid professional women have far more options to look around for the best paid job and turned down inferior officers.

Source: OECD Employment Database.
My second quibble is the New Zealand gender wage gap is trivial for women under the age of 45 but suddenly there is a burst of unconscious bias until they retire. This is odd because mature age workers have had plenty of time to accumulate human capital, search around for the best job offer and will have a job and therefore can turn down inferior offers. These women are not new starters on the unemployment benefit desperate for employment.

Source: New Zealand Income Survey 2014 via Human Rights Commission: Tracking Equality at Work.
My final quibble is the gender wage gap for part-time workers is reversed. No one takes this higher pay per hour as evidence that there is no unconscious bias against women who work part-time. If the gender pay gap was in the opposite direction, of course, that pay gap would be conclusive evidence of unconscious bias against women in part-time jobs. But as the gap is as it is in favour of women not against them, the usual adjustments for skills, age and experience become convenient truths.

Source: Statistics New Zealand, New Zealand Income Survey, June quarter 2015.
Is what’s left of the unconscious bias hypothesis that we chauvinistic men, bastards all, have an unconscious bias against women who work full-time, who are over the age of 45 or earn a lot of money making us jealous?

The unconscious bias hypothesis for the residual in the gender wage gap has come to the fore because earlier hypotheses of deliberate discrimination against women fell by the wayside as explanations for the gender wage gap.

Complicating things is the unconscious bias hypothesis must explain why the unconscious bias is so much stronger at the top end of the labour market against women who have plenty of options to fight back including found in their own companies to hire women underpaid elsewhere.
As is well known, sex and race discrimination by employers as a profit opportunity for other less prejudiced employers including unconsciously prejudiced employers to hire the undervalued workers.
The process whereby the market bids up the wages of women undervalued by unconsciously biased employers can be itself be thoroughly unconscious as Armen Alchian explained in 1950. Alchian pointed out the evolutionary struggle for survival in the face of market competition ensured that only the profit maximising firms survived:
- Realised profits, not maximum profits, are the marks of success and viability in any market. It does not matter through what process of reasoning or motivation that business success is achieved.
- Realised profit is the criterion by which the market process selects survivors.
- Positive profits accrue to those who are better than their competitors, even if the participants are ignorant, intelligent, skilful, etc. These lesser rivals will exhaust their retained earnings and fail to attract further investor support.
- As in a race, the prize goes to the relatively fastest ‘even if all the competitors loaf.’
- The firms which quickly imitate more successful firms increase their chances of survival. The firms that fail to adapt, or do so slowly, risk a greater likelihood of failure.
- The relatively fastest in this evolutionary process of learning, adaptation and imitation will, in fact, be the profit maximisers and market selection will lead to the survival only of these profit maximising firms.
These surviving firms may not know why they are successful, but they have survived and will keep surviving until overtaken by a better rival. All business needs to know is a practice is successful. The reason for its success is less important.
In the case of unconscious bias against women, those employers who are less unconsciously biased than the rest will grow at the expense of less enlightened albeit unconsciously less enlightened rivals. Undervaluing workers for any reason is a business opportunity. The market processes will reduce this undervaluation. All that is required is that some employers be less unconsciously biased than others.

One method of organising production will supplant another when it can supply at a lower price (Marshall 1920, Stigler 1958). Gary Becker (1962) argued that firms cannot survive for long in the market with inferior product and production methods regardless of what their motives are. They will not cover their costs.
The more efficient sized firms are the firm sizes that are currently expanding their market shares in the face of competition; the less efficient sized firms are those that are currently losing market share (Stigler 1958; Alchian 1950; Demsetz 1973, 1976). Business vitality and capacity for growth and innovation are only weakly related to cost conditions and often depends on many factors that are subtle and difficult to observe (Stigler 1958, 1987). In the case of unconsciously biased employers, they are less likely to survive.

What is even more peculiar is this unconscious bias exists at the end of the market where there is the greatest incentive to invest in ascertaining the quality of recruits if Edward Lazear’s pioneering work on the personnel economics of hiring standards is to believed:
Screening is more profitable when the stakes are higher: The purpose of screening is to avoid the unprofitable candidates. Therefore, the greater the downside risk from hiring the wrong person, the more value there is to screening. Similarly, the longer that a new candidate can be expected to stay with the employer, the more valuable will be the screen. Firms that intend to hire employees for the long term thus tend to invest more in careful screening before committing to a new hire.
The higher the wage of recruit, the more important they are to the success of the firm. That gives the entrepreneur more reasons to sort and screen from better quality recruits. The higher paid is the recruit, the greater the returns to the applicant from signalling their quality:
Signalling is helpful when employers do not have enough information about job applicants to assess their potential accurately enough. It is useful when differences in talent among potential employees matter a lot to productivity. When differences in talent do not make much difference to productivity, signalling will not be very useful.
These ideas suggest when we should expect to see employment practices consistent with signalling. First, signalling should be more important in jobs where skills are most important. Such jobs tend to be those that are at high levels of the hierarchy, in research and development, and in knowledge work. They also correspond well to professional service firms, such as consulting, accounting, law firms, and investment banks. In such professions, even small differences in talent can lead to large differences in effectiveness on the job, so sorting for talent is very important. For this reason, such firms tend to screen very carefully at recruiting, and usually have promotion systems that correspond well to our probation story above, at least in the first few years on the job.
The presence of more unconscious bias at the top of the labour market than at the middle and the bottom doesn’t have as many legs as suggested by Geoff Simmons in his Friday podcast. The higher is the wage, the greater is investment by both sides to the recruitment equation in an unbiased consideration of the job application. This runs against the notion that the gender gap at the top end of the labour market is due to unconscious bias.
A far better explanation is compensating differentials. Women at the top are trading off wages from work-life balance and more time with their children. They can do so because they are well-paid.

Whatever the hypothesis about compensating differentials is, that hypothesis has nothing to do with unconscious bias by employers. Alison Booth and Jan van Ours were almost annoyed to find that British women are actually quite satisfied with part-time work:
Women present a puzzle. Hours satisfaction and job satisfaction indicate that women prefer part-time jobs irrespective of whether these are small or large but their life satisfaction is virtually unaffected by hours of work.
I will close with a quote from Amy Wax on the impractical nature of doing anything about unconscious bias:
Demonstrating racial bias is no easy matter because there is often no straightforward way to detect discrimination of any kind, let alone discrimination that is hidden from those doing the deciding. As anyone who has ever tried a job-discrimination case knows, showing that an organization is systematically skewed against members of one group requires a benchmark for how each worker would be treated if race or sex never entered the equation. This in turn depends on defining the standards actually used to judge performance, a task that often requires meticulous data collection and abstruse statistical analysis.
Assuming everyone is biased makes the job easy: The problem of demonstrating actual discrimination goes away and claims of discrimination become irrefutable. Anything short of straight group representation — equal outcomes rather than equal opportunity — is “proof” that the process is unfair.
Advocates want to have it both ways. On the one hand, any steps taken against discrimination are by definition insufficient, because good intentions and traditional checks on workplace prejudice can never eliminate unconscious bias. On the other, researchers and “diversity experts” purport to know what’s needed and do not hesitate to recommend more expensive and strenuous measures to purge pervasive racism. There is no more evidence that such efforts dispel supposed unconscious racism than that such racism affects decisions in the first place.


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