Doug Allen on same-sex divorce
30 Aug 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of love and marriage, law and economics Tags: child poverty, Doug Allen, family poverty, same-sex divorce, same-sex marriage, The fatal conceit, unintended consequences
Doug Allen argues that marriage is an institution designed and evolved to regulate incentive problems that arise between a man and a woman over the life cycle of procreation.
The real problem with same-sex marriage is same-sex divorce according to Allen. Marriage includes a set of exit provisions in terms of the possible grounds for divorce, rules for splitting property, alimony and child support rules, and custody rules. Allen also argues that:
- Many institutional rules within marriage are designed to restrict males from exploiting the specific investments women must make upfront in child bearing;
- Since same-sex marriages are not based as often on procreation, these restrictions are likely to be objected to and challenged in courts and legislatures;
- To the extent divorce laws are changed, they may hurt heterosexual marriages, and women in particular; and
- Given that same-sex relationships are often made up of two financially independent individuals, there will be litigation and political pressures for even easier divorce laws since the problem of financial dependency will be reduced.
Alterations in divorce laws to deal with issues of same-sex divorce necessarily apply to heterosexuals, and these new laws may not be optimal for heterosexuals, making marriage a more fragile institution for them. The actual outcomes of no-fault divorce laws, as an example, could hardly have been more different than what was expected and intended. The most obvious outcome was large increases in divorce rates.
No fault divorce laws influenced the rate at which women entered the workforce, the amount of hours worked in a week, the incidence of spousal abuse, the feminisation of poverty, and the age at which people married. No-fault divorce influenced a series of other laws related to spousal and child support, child custody, joint parenting, and the definition of marital property.
Marriage may provide a poor match for the incentive problems that arise in the relationships of gay and lesbian couples. Doug Allen is also of the view that putting all three relationships under the same law could lead to a sub-optimal law for all three types of marriages.
Allen in summary argues that marriage is an economically efficient institution moulded around the long-term interdependencies of child-rearing heterosexuals. He argues that homosexuals wishing to marry would be better served by a separate, gay-specific form of marriage.
I forgot to mention the second wives clubs which lobby for limits the length of time of alimony to the first wife. The British 2nd Wives club in their legal advice page starts with these points:
- Do you need to disclose your income or assets to an ex-wife?
- Should your income be taken into account when assessing child maintenance?
- Should child maintenance change when you and your husband have children of your own?
2nd wives clubs are natural allies for higher income gay divorcees wanting to pay less alimony. Nothing I have sent here is an argument against same-sex marriage willing as long as you are willing to live with the fact that it may have a few unintended consequences.
The gender commuting gap between mothers and fathers
28 Aug 2016 Leave a comment
in discrimination, economics of love and marriage, gender, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice, poverty and inequality, transport economics Tags: asymmetric marriage premium, commuting times, compensating differentials, female labour force participation, gender gap, gender wage gap
The first three bars in each cluster of bars are for men. in almost all countries mothers with dependent children spend less time commuting than childless women. This might suggest that working mothers have found workplaces closer to home than women without children. The gender gap in commuting where it is present in the country is larger than the gap between mothers and other women in their commuting time.
Source: OECD Family Database – OECD, Table LMF2.6.A.
Late switchers alert – when did Obama start supporting gay marriage
28 Aug 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of love and marriage, politics - USA, Public Choice
Time spent in paid and unpaid work across the OECD by gender
30 Jul 2016 1 Comment
in economics of love and marriage, gender, labour economics, labour supply Tags: asymmetric marriage premium, female labour force participation, household production, marital division of labour
Trailer for ‘Loving’ — true story of an interracial marriage that caused them to be sentenced to prison in Virginia in 1958
13 Jul 2016 Leave a comment
in economics, economics of love and marriage, law and economics, movies Tags: racial discrimination
Child poverty in single parent and two-parent households in New Zealand
06 Jul 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of love and marriage, labour economics, labour supply, poverty and inequality, welfare reform Tags: child poverty, family poverty, single mothers, single parents
Looks like the greed of the top 1% was targeted exclusively as single parents since the 1980s. Child poverty in two-parent families has not risen much at all. These households often have jobs and will presumably be under the jackboot of neoliberalism stripping away their bargaining power through the decimation of unions and the introduction of the Employment Contracts Act. Despite these horrors, family poverty did not increase much if there are two parents in the house.
Source: Bryan Perry, Household Incomes in New Zealand: trends in indicators of inequality and hardship 1982 to 2014 – Ministry of Social Development, Wellington (August 2015), Table H.4.
Bryan Caplan argues that there is an undeserving poor if they fail to follow the following reasonable steps to avoid poverty and hardship:
- Work full-time, even if the best job you can find isn’t fun;
- Spend your money on food and shelter before cigarettes and cable TV; and
- Use contraception if you can’t afford a child.
The rise and rise of power couples in the USA
30 Jun 2016 Leave a comment
in economic history, economics of love and marriage, labour economics
.@nzteu is right, student loans entrench inequality
29 Jun 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of education, economics of love and marriage, human capital, labour economics, occupational choice, poverty and inequality Tags: power couples, student loans
Those of European ethnicity had a median net worth of $114,000, compared with $23,000 for Māori , $12,000 for Pasifika and $33,000 for Asians according to the latest Statistics New Zealand data just released.
The Tertiary Education Union made great play about how much of the low net worth of young people and others is due to student loans
Young people (aged 15–24) had the lowest individual median net worth of any age group – just $1,000. The most common debt for young people is education loans.
The union then goes on to say that
Median education loan liabilities are only one-tenth of Pākehā people’s median assets, but they are a quarter of Māori people’s assets and over a third of Pacific people’s assets (table 7.01).
The data shows that the households with the smallest median net worth have the largest median education loans (table 2.02). These loans make up nearly a quarter of their total debt (table 2.03).
Over a third of households within the poorest quintile of net worth have education loans, whereas less than a tenth of households in the wealthiest quintile have education debt (table 2.04).
In a nutshell, not enough people are going to university because of the prospect of repaying student loans and more would go if it were cheaper and that would reducing inequality. The explosion in tertiary educational attendance over the last generation, an increase of about 150% for the adult population aged 25 to 64 was not good enough to reduce inequality.
Free tuition at University is a hand-out to those already had a good start in life. It will be paid for by those who will never go because they do not have an above average IQ.
How much more will you earn by going to university? It depends hugely on which country you're from http://t.co/7RMnUTM8nj—
paulkirby (@paul1kirby) September 11, 2015
Low-cost student loans were supposed to be away to reduce inequality. Instead, they give a flying start to those of already above-average talents. If social justice is to mean anything, it does not involve giving freebies to those who already have a head start in life.
The average student loan debt is about $14,000 while the lifetime earnings premium from university education is about $1/2 million in New Zealand.
Source: Statistics New Zealand, Household net worth statistics: Year ended 30 June 2015.
Lowering university tuition fees and easing the terms of student loans simply means that those who do well at university will not have to pay back as much to the government. People who succeed at university already have above average IQs so they already had a good head start in life.
Charles Murray points out that succeeded at college requires an IQ of at least 115 but 84% of the population don’t have this:
Historically, an IQ of 115 or higher was deemed to make someone “prime college material.” That range comprises about 16 per cent of the population. Since 28 per cent of all adults have BAs, the IQ required to get a degree these days is obviously a lot lower than 115.
Cheaper higher education does not help the not so smart secure a qualification they lack the innate talent to earn with decent marks and increases the chance of smart men and women marrying. This increases the inequality between power couples and the rest.
Utopia, you are standing in it! 
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