
Eugene Fama and the simulative effects of fiscal policy
31 Jul 2014 6 Comments
in budget deficits, fiscal policy, great depression, great recession, macroeconomics Tags: crowding out, Eugene Fama, fiscal policy, Treasury view of fiscal policy

Eugene Fama argues that government bailouts and stimulus plans seem attractive when there are idle resources – when there is unemployment such as in a recession or depression including in the 1930s.
Fama counters that:
1. Bailouts and stimulus plans must be financed.
2. If the financing takes the form of additional government debt, the added debt displaces other uses of the funds.
3. Thus, stimulus plans only enhance incomes when they move resources from less productive to more productive uses.
In the end, despite the existence of idle resources, bailouts and stimulus plans do not add to current resources in use. They just move resources from one use to another.

Fama noted that there was just one valid negative comment in response to this argument that appears to be valid which was made by Brad DeLong.
Fama thinks Delong’s point about involuntary inventory accumulation is consistent with Fama’s initial arguments about the need for the stimulus to work through moving resources to higher value uses.
For me, the notion that a fiscal stimulus is a negative productivity shock is a good starting point for analysis. The method of financing the stimulus is important too.
Economic agents know that a temporary expenditure program has no lasting effect on employment but has lasting effect on disposable income and taxes. Indeed, massive public interventions to maintain employment and investment during a financial crisis can, if they distort incentives enough, lead to a depression.
In Australia, there was a massive fiscal contraction from late 1930 onwards called the Premiers’ Plan. In 1931, unemployment rates was 25% or more.
- The Premiers’ Plan required the federal and state governments to cut spending by 20%, including cuts to wages and pensions and was to be accompanied by tax increases, reductions in interest on bank deposits and a 22.5% reduction in the interest the government paid on internal loans.
- The Premiers’ Plan was complementary to the Arbitration Court’s 10 per cent nominal wage cut in January 1931 and the devaluation of the Australian pound. Most countries had abandoned the gold standard by 1931 and 1932 and devalued by about 10% including the UK. These competitive devaluations were called currency wars. Most countries below started to recovery before they left the gold standard, a year or two before they left the cross of gold.
Maclaren (1936) dated the Australian economic recovery from the last months of 1932. It was to take another three years before unemployment rates fell below 10 per cent — the rate it had been during most of the 1920s.
The June 1931 Premiers’ Plan of fiscal consolidation had time by late 1932 to become credible and take hold given the usual leads and lag on fiscal policy. Unemployment data for the time show a rapid fall in the high twenties unemployment rate in 1932 to be below 10 per cent by 1937.
Groundhog Day for economic forecasters – The Grumpy Economist
13 Jul 2014 Leave a comment
in economic growth, great recession Tags: forecasting errors, John Cochrane
Robert Lucas explained his support for U.S. monetary policy in 2008 as follows
10 Jul 2014 Leave a comment
in global financial crisis (GFC), great recession, macroeconomics, Robert E. Lucas Tags: fiscal policy, GFC, monetary policy, Robert Lucas

- There are many ways to stimulate spending, but monetary policy was the most helpful counter-recession action because it was fast and flexible.
- There is no other way that so much cash could have been put into the system as fast, and if necessary it can be taken out just as quickly. The cash comes in the form of loans.
- There is no new government enterprises, no government equity positions in private enterprises, no price fixing or other controls on the operation of individual businesses, and no government role in the allocation of capital across different activities. These were important virtues.
Did “Cash for Clunkers” work?
07 Jul 2014 Leave a comment
in great recession, macroeconomics Tags: cash for clunkers, intertemporal consumption smoothing, permanent income hypothesis
Actual and potential GDP in the USA
26 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
Crony capitalism flashback – who voted against the TARP in 2008?
20 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in financial economics, global financial crisis (GFC), great recession, macroeconomics, rentseeking Tags: crony capitalism, TARP
The US House of Representatives initially voted down the TARP in a grand coalition of right-wing republicans and left-wing democrats, voting 205–228. The right-wing republicans opposed the bailout because capitalism is a profit AND loss system. Democrats voted 140–95 in favour of the Bill while Republicans voted 133–65 against it.

The chart above shows that the degree of risk in commercial loans made by TARP recipients appears to have increased. This is no surprise. In the 1960s, Sam Peltzman published a paper in in the 1960s showing that when deposit insurance was introduced in the USA in the 1930s, the banks halve their capital ratios. They did not need to have as much capital as before to back their lending. The chart below shows that the TARP really didn’t do much for economic policy uncertainty.

In an open letter sent to Congress, over 100 university economists described three fatal pitfalls in the TARP:
1) Its fairness. The plan is a subsidy to investors at taxpayers’ expense. Investors who took risks to earn profits must also bear the losses. The government can ensure a well-functioning financial industry without bailing out particular investors and institutions whose choices proved unwise.
2) Its ambiguity. Neither the mission of the new agency nor its oversight is clear. If taxpayers are to buy illiquid and opaque assets from troubled sellers, the terms, timing and methods of such purchases must be crystal clear ahead of time and carefully monitored afterwards.
3) Its long-term effects. If the plan is enacted, its effects will be with us for a generation. For all their recent troubles, America’s dynamic and innovative private capital markets have brought the nation unparalleled prosperity. Fundamentally weakening those markets in order to calm short-run disruptions is will short-sighted.
A recent IMF study of 42 systemic banking crises showed that in 32 cases, there was government financial intervention.
Of these 32 cases where the government recapitalised the banking system, only seven included a programme of purchase of bad assets/loans (like the one proposed by the US Treasury). These countries were Mexico, Japan, Bolivia, Czech Republic, Jamaica, Malaysia, and Paraguay.
The Government purchase of bad assets was the exception rather than the rule in banking crises and rightly so. The TARP mostly benefited bank shareholders. A case of privatising the gains and socialising the losses from banking was passed on the votes of Congressional Democrats.
To avert a financial panic, central banks should lend early and freely to solvent banks against good collateral but at penal rates
19 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in financial economics, global financial crisis (GFC), great recession, macroeconomics, monetary economics, Thomas M. Humphrey Tags: lender of last resort, Thomas Humphrey, Walter Bagehot

First. That these loans should only be made at a very high rate of interest. This will operate as a heavy fine on unreasonable timidity, and will prevent the greatest number of applications by persons who do not require it. The rate should be raised early in the panic, so that the fine may be paid early; that no one may borrow out of idle precaution without paying well for it; that the Banking reserve may be protected as far as possible.
Secondly. That at this rate these advances should be made on all good banking securities, and as largely as the public ask for them. The reason is plain. The object is to stay alarm, and nothing therefore should be done to cause alarm. But the way to cause alarm is to refuse some one who has good security to offer… No advances indeed need be made by which the Bank will ultimately lose. The amount of bad business in commercial countries is an infinitesimally small fraction of the whole business…
The great majority, the majority to be protected, are the ‘sound’ people, the people who have good security to offer. If it is known that the Bank of England is freely advancing on what in ordinary times is reckoned a good security—on what is then commonly pledged and easily convertible—the alarm of the solvent merchants and bankers will be stayed. But if securities, really good and usually convertible, are refused by the Bank, the alarm will not abate, the other loans made will fail in obtaining their end, and the panic will become worse and worse.
Walter Bagehot Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (1873).
The classical theory of the lender of last resort stressed
(1) protecting the aggregate money stock, not individual institutions,
(2) letting insolvent institutions fail,
(3) accommodating sound but temporarily illiquid institutions only,
(4) charging penalty rates,
(5) requiring good collateral, and
(6) preannouncing these conditions in advance of crises so as to remove uncertainty.
Did anyone follow these rules in the global financial crisis? The Fed violated the classical model in at least seven ways:
- Emphasis on Credit (Loans) as Opposed to Money
- Taking Junk Collateral
- Charging Subsidy Rates
- Rescuing Insolvent Firms Too Big and Interconnected to Fail
- Extension of Loan Repayment Deadlines
- No Pre-announced Commitment
- No Clear Exit Strategy
…{the Fed’s} policies are hardly benign, and that extension of central bank assistance to insolvent too-big-to-fail firms at below-market rates on junk-bond collateral may, besides the uncertainty, inefficiency, and moral hazard it generates, bring losses to the Fed and the taxpayer, all without compensating benefits. Worse still, it is a probable prelude to a severe inflation and to future crises dwarfing the current one.
2014 Homer Jones Memorial Lecture – Robert E. Lucas Jr.
18 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
The first part of his lecture discusses how the Fed can influence inflation and financial stability.
Central banks can control inflation. Can central banks maintain economic stability’s financial stability? This is still an open question as to whether central banks can do that. The quantity theory of money makes certain sharp predictions about monetary neutrality which are well borne out by the cross country evidence.
In the second part of this lecture, Lucas discusses how central banks around the world have used inflation targeting to keep inflation under control.
What is the Fed to do with the stable relationship between money and prices? Inflation targeting is superior to a fixed growth monetary supply growth rule. This always pushes policy in the direction of the inflation rate you want. Central banks around the world have succeeded in keeping inflation low by explicitly or implicitly targeting the inflation rate.
In the last part of his lecture, Lucas discusses financial crises. he agrees with Gary Gordon’s analysis that 2008 financial crisis was a run on Repo. A run on liquid assets accepted as money because they can be so quickly changed into money. The effective money supply shrank drastically when there was a run on these liquid assets.
Lucas favoured the Diamond and Dybvig of bank runs as panics. The logic of that model applies to the Repo markets now was well as to the banking system. How to extend Glass–Steagall Act type regulation of bank portfolios to the Repo market is a question for future research.
Inflation targeting is working well but the lender of last resort function is yet to be fully understood.
Note: The Diamond-Dybvig view is that bank runs are inherent to the liquidity transformation carried out by banks. A bank transforms illiquid assets into liquid liabilities, subject to withdrawal.
Because of this maturity mismatch, if depositors suspect that others will run on the bank, it is optimal for each depositor to run to the bank to withdraw his or her deposit before the assets are exhausted. The bank run is not driven by some decline in the fundamentals of the bank. Depositors are spooked for some reason, panic, and attempt to withdraw their funds before others get in first. In this case, the provision of deposit insurance and lender of last resort facilities reassures depositors and stems the bank run
In the Kareken and Wallace model of bank runs, deposit insurance is problematic because of the incentives it gives to deposit taking institutions that are insured to take much greater risks. When there is deposit insurance, depositors don’t care about the greater risk in the portfolios of their banks. The greater risk taking leads to higher returns at no extra cost because if these risky investments do fail, the deposit insurance covers their losses
It is therefore necessary to regulate the portfolio of insured banks to ensure that they do not do this. That is the great dilemma for banking regulation because quasi-banks and other liquidity transformation intermediaries such as a Repo market spring up just outside the regulatory net.
The U.S. Economic Growth Gap Revisited
18 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in economic growth, great recession, macroeconomics Tags: The Great Recession

Robert Lucas has asked:
Is it possible that by imitating European policies on labor markets, welfare, and taxes that the U.S. has chosen a new, lower GDP trend?
If so, it may be that the weak recovery we have had so far is all the recovery we will get.







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