
Employment losses after financial crises
11 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in Euro crisis, global financial crisis (GFC), great recession, macroeconomics Tags: financial crise will s, The shape of recovery
The Obama recovery
08 Jun 2014 1 Comment
in great recession, macroeconomics Tags: recoveries from recessions, The Great Recession
Edward C Prescott – Restoring U.S. Prosperity – Brazil, 10 May 2014
27 May 2014 Leave a comment
in Edward Prescott, great recession, macroeconomics Tags: Edward Prescott, great recession
A Great Recession or a permanent move to a lower U.S. growth path?
16 May 2014 Leave a comment
in economic growth, great recession Tags: Obamanomics, trend growth rate of the USA

Philadelphia Fed President Charles Plosser made this nice graph on official views of potential GDP and trends in actual GDP.
The path to higher U.S. prosperity
12 May 2014 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, economic growth, Edward Prescott, great recession, labour economics, macroeconomics Tags: capital taxation, Edward Prescott, retirement savings, tax reform
Suppose the USA:
- Had mandatory savings for retirement
- Eliminated capital income taxes
- Broadened tax base and lowered the marginal tax rate
- Phased in reforms so all birth-year cohorts are made better off
- Left welfare programs and local public good shares the same
- Savings not part of taxable income, saving withdrawals part of taxable income – with these changes U.S. income tax would be a consumption tax
US Detrended GDP per Capita
Source: Edward Prescott and Ellen McGrattan 2013.
A Great Recession or dropping to a lower long-term growth path
03 May 2014 Leave a comment
in great recession, macroeconomics Tags: Edward Prescott, great recession, Robert Lucas
Ed Prescott and Robert Lucas are several of many who use variations of the chart below to show that the USA has moved to a lower long-term growth path.

Source: House of Debt
The chart below for output per working age American (ages 15 to 64) is just as depressing.

Source: Edward Prescott
At least Spain with its 25% unemployment rate is doing a little worse.

Source: Edward Prescott
Uncertainty and Ambiguity in American Fiscal and Monetary Policies – Tom Sargent
16 Apr 2014 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, global financial crisis (GFC), great recession, macroeconomics
Macroeconomic forecasting has had a turbulent history
16 Apr 2014 Leave a comment
in global financial crisis (GFC), great recession, macroeconomics, Milton Friedman Tags: data mining, Edward Leamer, forecasting, lags on monetary policy
Most early discussions argued against econometric forecasting in principle:
- Forecasting was not properly grounded in statistical theory,
- It presupposed that causation implies predictability, and
- The forecasts themselves were invalidated by the reactions of economic agents to them.
A long tradition argued that social relationships were too complex, too multifarious and too infected with capricious human choices to generate enduring, stable relationships that could be estimated.
These objections came before Hayek’s point that much of all social knowledge is not capable of summation in statistics or even language.

The limitations of forecasting are well-known. Forecasts are conditional on a number of variables; there are important unresolved analytical differences about the operation of the economy; and large uncertainties about the size and timing of responses to macroeconomic changes. Shocks to the output, prices, employment and other variables are partly permanent and partly transitory.
At the practical level, forecasting requires that there are regularities on which to base models, such regularities are informative about the future and these regularities are encapsulated in the selected forecasting model.
We have very little reliable information about the distribution of shocks or about how the distributions change over time. Forecast errors arise from changes in the parameters in the model, mis-specification of the model, estimation uncertainty, mis-measurement of the initial conditions and error accumulation.
In the 1980s, data mining and publications bias were so strong and statistical inferences were so fragile that Ed Leamer’s 1983 Let’s Take the Con out of Econometrics paper made up-and-coming applied economists despair for their professional field and for their own careers:
The econometric art as it is practiced at the computer terminal involves fitting many, perhaps thousands, of statistical models. One or several that the researcher finds pleasing are selected for reporting purposes.
This search for a model is often well intentioned, but there can be no doubt that such a specification search invalidates the traditional theories of inference….
[A]ll the concepts of traditional theory…utterly lose their meaning by the time an applied researcher pulls from the bramble of computer output the one thorn of a model he likes best, the one he chooses to portray as a rose.
… This is a sad and decidedly unscientific state of affairs we find ourselves in.
Hardly anyone takes data analyses seriously.
Or perhaps more accurately, hardly anyone takes anyone else’s data analyses seriously.
Like elaborately plumed birds who have long since lost the ability to procreate but not the desire, we preen and strut and display our t-values [which measure statistical significance].
Leamer still doubts the progress towards techniques that separate sturdy from fragile inferences. Economists by and large simply do not want to hear that they cannot make major conclusions from the data sets. But not that they really do, but that is for a forthcoming post.
Before the great moderation spread wide, Brunner and Meltzer found that in the 1970s and 1980s, the 95% confidence intervals on next year’s forecasts for Gross Domestic Product and the Consumer Price Index are such that government and private forecasters in the USA and Europe could not distinguish between a recession and a boom, nor say whether inflation will be zero or ten per cent.
A review this week by Ahir and Lounganishows found that recent forecasting by the private and public sector has not improved:
none of the 62 recessions in 2008–09 was predicted as the previous year was drawing to a close.
Figure 1. Number of recessions predicted by September of the previous year

Source: Ahir and Loungani 2014, “There will be growth in the spring”: How well do economists predict turning points?” http://www.voxeu.org/
A policy-maker who adjusts policy based on forecasts for the following year has little reason to be confident that he has changed policy in the right direction.
While at graduate school, I wrote what was published as Official Economic Forecasting Errors in Australia 1983-96.
Australian Treasury forecasting errors were so large relative to the mean annual rate of change in real GDP and the inflation rate that, on average, forecasters could not distinguish slow growth from a deep recession or stable prices from moderate inflation.
The biography of Paul Keating by Edwards suggested that the Government of the day was well aware of the poor value of forecasts. So much so that forecasts may not have actually played a significant role in monetary policy making in Australia in the late 1980s onwards. John Stone said this to Keating when he assumed office as Treasurer in 1983:
As you know, we (and I in particular) have never had much faith in forecasting.
Not infrequently, our forecasts turn out to be seriously wrong.
… We simply do the best we can, in as professional manner as we can — and, if it is any consolation, no one seems to be able to do any better, at least in the long haul.
We always emphasize the uncertainties that attach to the forecasts — but we cannot ensure that such qualifications are heeded and plainly they often are not
To cast my results in Milton Friedman’s nomenclature for monetary lags, the recognition lag on a forecasting based monetary policy appears to be infinite because forecasters do not know if there will be a recession or 10% inflation afoot when their monetary policy changes take hold in 18 to 24 months.
Was the global economic crisis unforeseen?
15 Apr 2014 Leave a comment
in global financial crisis (GFC), great recession Tags: Kareken and Wallace model of deposit insurance, Ross Levine, Too big to fail
Plenty of people warned of dark days ahead. An essay anyone can read with profit is Ross Levine’s "An Autopsy of the U.S. Financial System: Accident, Suicide, or Negligent Homicide?"
The paper studies five important policies:
- Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) policies toward credit rating agencies,
- Federal Reserve policies concerning bank capital and credit default swaps,
- SEC and Federal Reserve policies about over-the-counter derivatives,
- SEC policies toward the consolidated supervision of major investment banks, and government policies toward Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Levine concludes that
- The evidence is inconsistent with the view that the collapse of the financial system was caused only by the popping of the housing bubble ("accident") and the herding behaviour of financiers rushing to create and market increasingly complex and questionable financial products ("suicide").
- Rather, the evidence indicates that senior policymakers repeatedly designed, implemented, and maintained policies that destabilized the global financial system in the decade before the crisis.
- Moreover, although the major regulatory agencies were aware of the growing fragility of the financial system due to their policies, they chose not to modify those policies, suggesting that "negligent homicide" contributed to the financial system’s collapse
- Although influential policymakers presumed that international capital flows, euphoric traders, and insufficient regulatory power caused the crisis, the paper shows that these factors played only a partial role.
- Current reforms represent only a partial and incomplete step in establishing a stable and well-functioning financial system.
- Since systemic institutional failures helped cause the crisis, systemic institutional reforms must be a part of a comprehensively effective response.
The most interesting morsels are:
- The New York Times warned in 1999 that Fannie Mae was taking on so much risk that an economic downturn could trigger a “rescue similar to that of the savings and loan industry in the 1980s,” and again emphasized this point in 2003; and
- Alan Greenspan testified before the Senate Banking Committee in 2004 that the increasingly large and risky GSE portfolios could have enormously adverse ramifications! A rare occasion on which Greenspan did not talk in riddles.

Stern and Feldman’s Too Big to Fail in 2004 used insights gleaned from the formal economic literature to frame warnings in 2004 about the time bomb for a financial crisis set by current regulations and government promises.
The prediction of the Kareken and Wallace moral hazard model of deposit insurance is if a government sets up deposit insurance and doesn’t regulate bank portfolios to prevent them from taking too much risk, the government is setting the stage for a financial crisis. If financial intermediaries do not bear the full consequences of their actions (because they are insured) then profit maximising portfolios will be too risky. The Kareken-Wallace model makes you very cautious about lender-of-last-resort facilities and very sensitive to the risk-taking activities of banks.
Tom Sargent said that Jose Scheinkman made a list of the ten academic papers that the Reagan administration should have looked at. Number one on his list was Kareken and Wallace.
The idea that deposit insurance leads to more financial crises even troubled FDR before he signed the 1934 U.S. bill to introduce deposit insurance.
Robert Lucas and Edward Prescott discuss the future of economic growth, 2014
10 Apr 2014 Leave a comment
in economic growth, great recession, macroeconomics Tags: Edward Prescott, Robert E. Lucas
On 21 March, Robert E. Lucas Jr., and Edward C. Prescott participated in a roundtable on “The Wealth of Nations in the 21st Century” in Barcelona.
via Chong-En Bai, Robert Lucas, Edward Prescott discuss economic growth in Barcelona – Barcelona GSE.
Why do recessions cheer the Left up?
05 Apr 2014 Leave a comment
in global financial crisis (GFC), great recession, politics
Why is it that the further to the Left that people go, the more cheerful they seem to be in recessions and economic crises? They are miserable when times are good.

The Left supported the discretionary fiscal, monetary and regulatory policies that caused the recession and then supported crisis management policies that deepen the recession. The Left always wants to tax and regulate their way out of every recession.
Most crisis management policies distort the incentives to hire and invest and reduce competition and efficiency. While different sorts of shocks lead to ordinary downturns, it is overreactions by governments to stem the crisis that prolong and deepen economic downturns, turning them into depressions.
One in three EU unemployed are Spanish because of employment protection laws. Cahuc et al. 2012 estimated that Spanish unemployment would be 45% lower if Spain adopted the less strict French laws! Differences in their employment protection laws accounted for nearly half of the dramatic rise in Spanish unemployment since 2007. Who is for and against these terrible laws?
Lee Ohanian: The Economic Crisis: A Comparison Across Time and Countries
01 Apr 2014 Leave a comment
in global financial crisis (GFC), great recession, labour economics
“The Recession of 2007–?” by Robert E. Lucas
31 Mar 2014 1 Comment
in global financial crisis (GFC), great recession
Robert Lucas in this speech noted that the implicit assumption is that the US economy will get back to old trend growth rate and the only question is how long it will take
Lucas asked whether this is really the case? He noted that:
- We know that European economies have larger government role and 20-30% lower income level than the US; and
- Is it possible that by imitating European policies on labor markets, welfare, and taxes U.S. has chosen a new, lower GDP trend?
If so, Lucas said that it may be that the weak recovery the USA has had so far is all the recovery it will get.
Ed Prescott also considers that tax rates are being increased in the USA. These increases lower amount of capital a firm chooses to have. The reason for low investment is not problem of getting loans – it is expected future high tax rates in the USA.
Ed Prescott also considers that investment suddenly became depressed beginning early in 2008 – because of a policy regime change. Business owners feared higher tax rates with the regime change and rationally cut investment, rationally cut employment ad rationally took more cash out of business.
How to Restore US Prosperity – Prof. Edward C. Prescott
29 Mar 2014 Leave a comment
in global financial crisis (GFC), great recession, labour economics, regulation
Euro Crisis: Sources and Its Global Implications – Tom Sargent updated
28 Mar 2014 Leave a comment
in Euro crisis, global financial crisis (GFC), great recession Tags: Tom Sargent
Sargent said: “A government can be said to be ambiguous when decision makers can’t yet agree what to do and decide to postpone making a decision.” He also raised questions over whether a country should join a currency union, whether it should pay its debts, and whether the central government in a federal system should pay the debts of subordinate government.


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