
Robert Lucas on income redistribution and economic growth
05 Nov 2015 Leave a comment
in development economics, growth disasters, growth miracles, macroeconomics, Robert E. Lucas Tags: capitalism and freedom, industrial revolution, The Great Enrichment, The Great Escape, The Great Fact
Robert Lucas on the irrelevance of income redistribution to the Great Enrichment
15 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
The most important aspect of monetary strategy is timing
28 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in business cycles, economic growth, economics of information, macroeconomics, Milton Friedman, monetarism, monetary economics, Robert E. Lucas Tags: Keynesian macroeconomics, lags on monetary policy, monetary policy
The simplest statement to make about the lags in monetary policy is they are long and variable. This simple statement is also the key insight to understanding the actual implementation of monetary policy. Hence, how many months or years in advance must a central bank forecast to achieve its monetary goals? In 1994, the Economist said:
But [central banks] cannot afford to wait until inflation is actually rising before they act. Monetary policy does not change the speed of the economy instantly: it can take 18 months or more for a rise in interest rates to have its full impact on inflation. The target of policy ought therefore to be future not current inflation, in order to prevent a surge in 1996. The earlier interest rates are raised, the better the chances of engineering a smooth slowdown to a sustainable rate of growth before slack in the economy is exhausted.
Economists differ about the length of those lags. Uncertainty about the average length of those lags and the variability of those lags makes discretion most difficult. Activist policy can improve welfare only if the information about economic structure and economists’ ability to forecast is sufficiently accurate.

Friedman is the most famous and persuasive critic of Keynesianism on the grounds of lags. He has two main arguments: first, that there are “long and variable lags” between the identification of a problem and the effects of the designed remedy; second, that activist policy often itself becomes a source of instability since policy itself becomes a variable that the market must guess.
Friedman’s critique does not depend on the quantity theory of money. Keynesian policies do not necessarily follow even if the Keynesian theory of the business cycle were conclusively proved.
It must also be demonstrated that the government has the ability and willingness of the government to act as the theory prescribes. We are therefore further assuming that central banks have the incentive to stabilise the economy. If the government lacks the information required to stabilise the economy, issues of public choice incentives become fully redundant. Incentives to pursue an objective do not matter if the objective itself is unattainable.
Competing visions of central banking
25 Mar 2015 1 Comment
in business cycles, economic growth, inflation targeting, macroeconomics, Milton Friedman, monetarism, monetary economics, Robert E. Lucas Tags: Keynesian macroeconomics, monetary policy

The competing visions of central banks over monetary policy have been defined by Franco Modiglani and Milton Friedman respectively. Modiglani considers the Keynesian vision of macroeconomic policy to be:
a market economy is subject to fluctuations which need to be corrected, can be corrected, and therefore should be corrected.
The Keynesian claim implies that central banks have sufficient knowledge of the structure of the economy to be able to choose the policy mix appropriate to a given set of circumstances. It is possible to target unemployment, interest rates and inflation in such a way that they can be maintained (and hence made predictable) by constant adjustment of policy instruments to new shocks.
The Keynesian approach assumes that the economy can slip into recessions for all sorts of reasons (Barro 1989). Business fluctuations result from shocks to aggregate demand. The principal source of these shocks are expectations induced shifts in investment demand. The role of the central bank is to make prompt, frequent policy responses to counteract this instability.
The task of government is to discover the particular monetary and fiscal polices which can eliminate shocks emanating from the private sector. A key finding of recent macroeconomic research is that anticipated monetary policy has very different effects to unanticipated monetary policy.
The Keynesian vision thus presuppose that government can foresee shocks which are invisible to the private sector but at the same time it is unable to reveal this advance information in a credible way and hence defusing the shock because it is no longer unanticipated. In addition, the counter cyclical monetary policies of governments must themselves be unforeseeable by private agents, but at the same time systematically related to the state of the economy (Lucas and Sargent 1979)
Of course, the Keynesian view of central banking is also premised on a goodwill theory of government. Governments pursue policies that are in the public interest. That is a public interest that is well-defined and is free of conflicts over income distribution, electoral success and power the could lead policy-makers to pursue goals other than full employment, stable prices and efficiency. Thus, if the latest forecast is a recession, additional stimulus is the usual prescription. However, since most Keynesian economists accept the permanent income and natural rate hypotheses, more stimulus implies less later at some unknown time.
Friedman’s vision of central banking is far more circumspect:
The central problem is not designing a highly sensitive [monetary] instrument that offsets instability introduced by other factors[in the economy], but preventing monetary arrangements becoming a primary source of instability (Milton Friedman 1959).
Friedman considers that a key element in the case for policy discretion is whether the sufficient information is available that can be used to reduce variability and assist the economy’s adjustment the unforeseen. A well intentioned policy-maker will destabilise if he is mislead by incomplete or incorrect information.

From the monetarist standpoint, price stability can be approximately attained under a well chosen and predictable monetary policy rule. Under this view, the unemployment and interest rates are unpredictable and can manipulated only at a prohibitive cost. The Keynesian and monetarist views are mutually incompatible and lead to very different policy recommendations (Lucas 1981).
Robert Lucas interview in Brazil, 2nd November 2012
24 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, business cycles, comparative institutional analysis, development economics, economic growth, global financial crisis (GFC), great recession, growth disasters, growth miracles, inflation targeting, macroeconomics, monetarism, Robert E. Lucas Tags: Robert E. Lucas
Paul Samuelson and Robert Lucas both agree that economists have solved the problem of economic depressions
24 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
in business cycles, fiscal policy, great depression, great recession, history of economic thought, macroeconomics, monetary economics, Robert E. Lucas Tags: Paul Samuelson, prosperity and depression, The fatal conceit, The pretence to knowledge
Robert Lucas and where have all the small entrepreneurs gone?
18 Dec 2014 1 Comment
in applied welfare economics, economics of regulation, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, Robert E. Lucas, survivor principle, theory of the firm Tags: entrepreneurship, firm entry, firm exit, occupational choice
Robert Lucas predicted the decline in the number of small business people and small firms in 1978. The number of small firms will fall and the number of large firms will rise with increases in real wages (Lucas 1978; Poschke 2013; Gollin 2008; Eeckhout and Jovanovic 2012).
Lucas closed his 1978 discussion of the size distribution of firms, and how firms are getting larger an average over the course of the 20th century, with a discussion of a lovely restaurant he visited on the Canadian border. He predicted that in couple of decades time, these type of restaurants will be fewer.
Nations that are more productive over time and have higher wages because they have accumulated more capital per worker.
One consequence of more capital per worker is real wages increase at a faster rate than profits (Gollin 2008; Eeckhout and Jovanovic 2012). For example, the rate of return on capital was stable over the 20th century while real wages increased many fold (Jones and Romer 2010). This relationship turns out to be crucial in terms of occupational choice and the decision to become an entrepreneur – a small business owner
Higher wages reduces the supply of entrepreneurs and increases the average size of firms because entrepreneurship becomes a less attractive occupational choice (Lucas 1978; Gollin 2008; Eeckhout and Jovanovic 2012).
For example, in the mid-20th century, many graduates who were not teachers were self-employed professionals. With an expanding division of labour because of economic growth, many well-paid jobs and new occupations emerged for talented people in white-collar employment.
OECD countries richer than New Zealand should have less self-employment and more firms that are large because paid employment is an increasingly better-rewarded career option for their high skilled workers.
The U.S. had the second lowest share of self-employed workers (7 per cent) in the OECD in 2010 – the latest data – which is less than half the rate of New Zealand self-employment (16.5 per cent) in 2011 (OECD 2013). The Australian self-employment rate was 11.6 per cent in 2010 (OECD 2013).
A companion reason for larger average firm sizes in countries richer than New Zealand is more capital-intensive production can prosper in larger corporate hierarchies than can labour-intensive production (Lucas 1978; Becker and Murphy 1992; Poschke 2011; Eeckhout and Jovanovic 2012).
The more able entrepreneurs can run larger firms with bigger spans of control in richer countries because their employees can profitably use more capital per worker with less supervision. The diseconomies of scale to management and entrepreneurship should rise at a faster rate in less technological advanced countries such as New Zealand because they are more labour intensive economies (Lucas 1978; Becker and Murphy 1992; Poschke 2011; Eeckhout and Jovanovic 2012).
Importantly, the more able entrepreneurs benefit most from introducing frontier technologies because they can deal more easily with their increased complexity and more uncertain prospects (Poschke 2011; Lazear 2005; Shultz 1975; 1980). Growing technological complexity reduces the supply of entrepreneurs because it takes longer to acquire the necessary balance of skills and experience needed to lead a firm (Lazear 2005; Otani 1996).
The more marginal entrepreneurs will switch to be employees as technology advances so the average size of firms will increase. The entrepreneurs that remain in business will be the most able, more skilled and more experienced entrepreneurs and will be more capable of running larger firms that pioneer complex, frontier technologies (Poschke 2011; Lazear 2005, Otani 1996; Lucas 1978).
Countries more technologically advanced than New Zealand will have both larger firms and less self-employment because of growing technological complexity.
The greater is the exposure to foreign competition, the smaller is the fraction of self-employed and small firms in a country (Melitz 2003; Díez and Ozdagli 2012). More foreign competition increases wages because of lower prices, which makes self-employment less lucrative. More exporting favours larger firms both because of the fixed costs of entering export markets and because the stiffer competition will weed-out the lower ability entrepreneurs who run the smaller firms (Melitz 2003; Díez and Ozdagli 2012).
Other factors can countermand the effects that occupational choice, frontier technologies, exporting and capital intensity have to increase the average size of firms as real wages rise.
For example, tax and regulatory policies reduce the average size of firms in many EU member states to levels that are similar to New Zealand. The EU is less likely to have large firms in its labour intensive sectors. Employment protection laws, product market and land use regulation and in particular, high taxes stifled the growth of labour intensive services sectors in the continental EU (Bertrand and Kramatz 2002; Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn 2009; Rogerson 2008).
EU firms are are more capital intensive with fewer employees than otherwise because labour is so expensive to hire in the EU. Small and medium sized firms can struggle to grow in much of the EU because of regulatory burdens that phase in with firm size (Garicano, Lelarge and Van Reenen 2012; Hobijn and Sahin 2013; Rubini, Desmet, Piguillem and Crespo 2012). Average firm sizes are 40% smaller in Spain and Italy than in Germany. Obstacles to firm growth originate in product, labour, technology and financial and the binding constraints differ from one EU member state to another (Rubini, Desmet, Piguillem and Crespo 2012).
Average firm sizes in the USA and UK may be larger because of fewer tax and regulatory policies that limit business growth. Bartelsman, Scarpetta and Schivardi (2005) found that new entrants in the U.S. started on a smaller scale than in Europe but grew at a much higher rate. This willingness to experiment on a smaller scale was worth the risk because the payoff was much larger in terms of growth in the more flexible U.S. markets.
In summary, many factors drive the size distribution of firms countries including taxation and regulation. Underlying this, nonetheless, is Lucas’s point from 1978 that rising real wages makes starting a small business a less inviting occupation choice.
Robert Lucas on Depression era policies and current financial crisis
14 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in global financial crisis (GFC), great depression, great recession, macroeconomics, Robert E. Lucas Tags: great depression, great recession, Robert Lucas
Ideas and Growth Lecture with Nobel Laureate Robert E. Lucas Jr
12 Dec 2014 1 Comment
in economic growth, fiscal policy, macroeconomics, Robert E. Lucas Tags: ideas and growth, Robert E. Lucas
Recessions as reorganisations
12 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in business cycles, F.A. Hayek, history of economic thought, job search and matching, macroeconomics, Robert E. Lucas, unemployment Tags: FA Hayek, recessions, recoveries, Robert Lucas

Most models of the shape of recoveries draw on a learning process. A long tradition in business cycle theory holds that limited knowledge of relative price changes can temporarily disrupt labour demand and supply because of errors in wage and price perceptions (Alchian 1969; Sargent 2007; Hellwig 2008).
Pricing, investment and production plans are made on the basis of incomplete and conflicting knowledge of constantly changing aggregate, industry and local conditions. Firms and workers will over- or under-supply when they misperceive wages and prices.
With imprecise information, it takes time for employers and workers to sort out temporary from permanent shifts in demand and supply, inflation-driven changes from real changes in prices and input costs, and general changes from the local changes that may be more important to particular firms. As Hayek explained in his Nobel prize lecture:
The true, though untestable, explanation of extensive unemployment ascribes it to a discrepancy between the distribution of labour (and the other factors of production) between industries (and localities) and the distribution of demand among their products.
This discrepancy is caused by a distortion of the system of relative prices and wages. And it can be corrected only by a change in these relations, that is, by the establishment in each sector of the economy of those prices and wages at which supply will equal demand.
Recoveries are shaped by the speed of entrepreneurial learning about the new labour and product market conditions, the relative cost of adjusting capital and labour rapidly or slowly and the costs and benefits of labour market search. This new learning is necessary because the old constellation of prices and wages is no longer valid.
It was a misdirection of resources brought about by the initial inflationary firm, as Hayek explained in a visit to Australia in 1950:
During a process of expansion the direction of demand is to some extent necessarily different from what it will be after expansion has stopped.
Labour will be attracted to the particular occupations on which the extra expenditure is made in the first instance.
So long as expansion lasts, demand there will always run a step ahead of the consequential rises in demand elsewhere.
And in so far as this temporary stimulus to demand in particular sectors leads to a movement of labour, it may well become the cause of unemployment as soon as the expansion comes to an end…
If the real cause of unemployment is that the distribution of labour does not correspond with the distribution of demand, the only way to create stable conditions of high employment which is not dependent on continued inflation (or physical controls), is to bring about a distribution of labour which matches the manner in which a stable money income will be spent.
This depends of course not only on whether during the process of adaptation the distribution of demand is approximately what it will remain, but ‘also on whether conditions in general are conducive to easy and rapid movements of labour.
In a recession, employers and workers do not immediately know that demand has fallen elsewhere as well as in their own local markets and recognise the need to adjust to their poorer prospects everywhere, and it is not known how long the drop in demand will last (Alchian and Allen 1973).
The cost of learning about available opportunities restricts the speed of a recovery. Workers and entrepreneurs must gather information on the new state of demand and the location and nature of new opportunities. This information is costly and is quickly made obsolete by further changes, and the cost of acquiring information is more costly the faster the information is sought to be acquired (Alchian 1969; Alchian and Allen 1967).

The process of recovering from a recession would be a faster process if the new constellation of wages and prices that are the best alternative uses of resources was known immediately and was credible to firms and workers (Alchian and Allen 1973).
Workers and employers must first have sufficient time to discover what new knowledge they now need to know to serve their interests well, leave enough room for the unforeseeable and keep their knowledge fresh in ever-changing markets.
New wage levels must be created by workers and employers testing and retesting in the labour market the new relative scarcities of labour. Imbalances between the allocation of labour supply and demand to different firms and sectors and the new level and pattern of consumer demand are gradually remedied by changes in relative prices and wages, layoffs, business closures and job search.

Prices are a signal wrapped in an incentive. Growing demand induces higher employment and rising wages. Wages stagnate, and there are layoffs where there is an excess supply.
These changes give the unemployed an incentive to move to new uses and entrepreneurs to profitably hire the unemployed. The ensuing reorganisations are time-consuming and information-intensive because a job seeker and an employer with an apt vacancy take time to find each other.
Prices and wages must change sufficiently for firms to profitably create new jobs. New jobs require time to plan and build new job capital. This is the human, physical and organisational capital underlying a new job. There are also job creation costs when reopening existing positions that were mothballed during the downturn.
How is this to be done? Hayek explained again in 1950 in his speech in Australia:
Full employment policies as at present practised attempt the quick and easy way of giving men employment where they happen to be, while the real problem is to bring about a distribution of labour which makes continuous high employment without artificial stimulus possible.
What this distribution is we can never know beforehand. The only way to find out is to let the unhampered market act under conditions which will bring about a stable equilibrium between demand and supply.






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