Mises on why economics analysis is so unpopular
14 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of bureaucracy, income redistribution, Ludwig von Mises, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: antiforeign bias, antimarket bias, expressive voting, green rent seeking, makework bias, NIMBYs, rational ignorance, rational irrationality
Corporate welfare in New Zealand – 2015 budget update
09 Jun 2015 2 Comments
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, economics of bureaucracy, industrial organisation, politics - New Zealand, rentseeking, survivor principle Tags: corporate welfare
I have updated my 2014 report on corporate welfare for the 2015 budget. My report was published today by the Taxpayers’ Union.
My key finding was that corporate welfare increased in the 7th budget of the National Party-led Government from $1.178 billion in its 2014 budget to $1.344 billion in the 2015 budget – see figure 1 and table 1.
Figure 1: Corporate welfare, Budgets 2008/09 to 2015/16

Source: New Zealand budget papers, various years.
Table 1: Corporate welfare in Budgets 2008/09 to 2015/16, $million
| 08/09 | 09/10 | 10/11 | 11/12 | 12/13 | 13/14 | 14/15 | 15/16 | |
| Arts, Culture & Heritage |
3 |
11 |
19 |
10 |
29 |
4 |
4 |
42 |
| Commerce and Consumer Affairs |
6 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
7 |
7 |
6 |
7 |
| Communications |
0 |
25 |
39 |
150 |
178 |
205 |
215 |
190 |
| Economic Development |
372 |
419 |
446 |
379 |
332 |
284 |
280 |
297 |
| Finance |
16 |
44 |
3 |
108 |
15 |
210 |
0 |
0 |
| Primary Industries |
700 |
0.3 |
14 |
0.0 |
43 |
65 |
77 |
180 |
| Science and Innovation |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
112 |
219 |
269 |
| Tourism |
76 |
94 |
119 |
113 |
98 |
124 |
124 |
121 |
| Transport |
578 |
530 |
376 |
510 |
680 |
119 |
255 |
239 |
| Total $million |
1,751 |
1,134 |
1,022 |
1,277 |
1,382 |
1,130 |
1,178 |
1,344 |
Source: New Zealand budget papers, various years.
Corporate welfare has ranged between about $1 billion and $1.4 billion per year in each of the seven budgets presented by the current National-led Government – see Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 2: Corporate welfare, Budgets 08/09 to 15/16 by Vote

Source: New Zealand budget papers, various years; note: Vote Commerce and Consumer Affairs omitted in all years from Figure 2.
The predominant recipient of corporate welfare in this year’s budget, and all of those since 2008 is KiwiRail. Vote Transport accounts for a third of all corporate welfare – see Figures 3 and 4. Vote Economic Development is the next largest source of corporate welfare and accounts for 28% of the total since 2008 – see Figures 3 and 4.
Figure 3: Distribution of total corporate welfare across votes, 2008/09 to 2015/16

Source: New Zealand budget papers, various years.
Figure 4: State-owned enterprise welfare, Vote Transport and Vote Finance (KiwiRail), Budgets 08/09 to 15/16

Source: New Zealand budget papers, various years.
$280 – $450 million in corporate welfare has been under the patronage of the Minister for Economic Development over the last eight budgets – see Figure 5. In this year’s budget, corporate welfare under the Minister’s hand has increased slightly from $280 million to $297 million.
Figure 5: Corporate welfare, Vote Economic Development, Budgets 2008/09 to 2015/16

Source: New Zealand budget papers, various years.
Up until the 2013/14 budget, science and innovation spending was targeted at research that would not find private sponsors because it could not capture the returns from their discoveries – see Figure 6. Figure 6 shows that there is being rapid growth within Vote Science and Innovation of various forms of start-up and commercialisation grants in recent budgets.
Figure 6: Corporate welfare, Vote Science and Innovation, Budgets 08/09 to 15/16

Source: New Zealand budget papers, various years.
Figure 7 shows that the Government is getting back into the business of subsidising agriculture. The Primary Growth Partnership (PGP) is an R&D grants programme for the primary industry sector. There are 18 PGP programmes underway with a funding commitment from government and from industry combining to $708 million by 2017.
Figure 7: Farm welfare, Vote Primary Industries, Budgets 08/09 to 15/16

Source: New Zealand budget papers, various years.
Figure 8 shows that the National Party-led government is a major investor in ultrafast broadband – going where private entrepreneurs fear to tread.
Figure 8: Corporate welfare, Vote Communications, Budgets 08/09 to 15/16

Source: New Zealand budget papers, various years.
The corporate welfare in the Budget 2015 adds about six percentage points to the company tax rate. Should these corporate indulgences should continue or should the company tax rate drop six percentage points?
If that six percentage points on top of the company tax rate was renamed a business subsidies levy, how many businesses would want to pay it rather than developing their own business under much lower company tax rate?
Public confidence in the police in America
14 May 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of bureaucracy, economics of crime, politics - USA Tags: crime and punishment, law and order, police, voter demographics
Science is often flawed. Here is how.
14 May 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of bureaucracy, organisational economics, personnel economics Tags: data mining, philosophy of science, publish or perish
The primary school teachers union has done very well in New Zealand in recent times
12 May 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of bureaucracy, economics of education, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice, Public Choice, rentseeking, unions Tags: public sector wage premium, union power, union wage premium
Murphy’s Law of Economic Policy
26 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economic history, economics of bureaucracy, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: Alan Blinder, evidence-based policy, expressive politics, free trade, protectionism, rational ignorance, rational irrationality, rent seeking
Greg Mankiw on one of the few things economists agree on: free trade. That's the problem. nyti.ms/1GrLisQ http://t.co/WrLuP3oBSW—
The Upshot (@UpshotNYT) April 25, 2015
The comparative institutional analysis of stereotypes
21 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, discrimination, economics of bureaucracy, entrepreneurship, gender, industrial organisation, labour economics, Public Choice, survivor principle Tags: labour market discrimination, markets selection, signaling and screening, stereotypes, The meaning of competition
Gordon Tullock explains his theory of popular revolutions and palace coups
01 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of bureaucracy, Gordon Tullock, income redistribution, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: Arab Spring, autocracy, military coups, palace coups, popular revolutions
[I]n most revolutions, the people who overthrow the existing government were high officials in that government before the revolution.
If they were deeply depressed by the nature of the previous government’s policies, it seems unlikely that they could have given enough cooperation in those policies to have risen to high rank. People who hold high, but not supreme, rank in a despotism are less likely to be unhappy with the policy of that despotism than are people who are outside the government.
Thus, if we believed in the public good motivation of revolutions, we would anticipate that these high officials would be less likely than outsiders to attempt to overthrow the government.
From the private benefit theory of revolutions, however, the contrary deduction would be drawn. The largest profits from revolution are apt to come to those people who are (a) most likely to end up at the head of the government, and (b) most likely to be successful in overthrow of the existing government. They have the highest present discounted gain from the revolution and lowest present discounted cost.
Thus, from the private goods theory of revolution, we would anticipate senior officials who have a particularly good chance of success in overthrowing the government and a fair certainty of being at high rank in the new government, if they are successful, to be the most common type of revolutionaries.


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