How to beat the share market
15 Aug 2014 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, financial economics, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: insider trading, official corruption
Become a United States senator. Their share portfolios out-perform the best of the best hedge fund managers, and the best hedge fund manager was paid 3 1/2 billion dollars last year; to get on the list for the top hedge fund manager, you make at least $300 million a year. Good things that politicians know how to outperform them on their modest salaries and busy schedules of public engagements and parliamentary sittings.
Using the financial disclosures of politicians, "Abnormal Returns From the Common Stock Investments of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives," built model portfolios and charted their performance. They found that House members outperform the market by 6 percentage points. Senators do even better, the authors say, citing their own earlier research from 2004.
Senate portfolios "show some of the highest excess returns ever recorded over a long period of time, significantly outperforming even hedge fund managers," with gains that are "both economically large and statistically significant."
These results suggest that congressmen and senators have access to non-public information on particular businesses, industries or the economy as a whole and invest on the basis that information. The good returns of Senators and Congressmen last far too long to be no more than luck.
Unfettered power loses its shine when it must be shared with your opponents for more than a brief time
05 Aug 2014 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, Federalism, James Buchanan, Public Choice Tags: democracy, Leftover Left, rotation of power, separation of powers
The rotation of power is common in democracies, and the worst rise to the top, so it is wise to design constitutional safeguards to minimise the damage done when those crazies to the right or left of you get their chance in office, as they will.
Too many policies and ideas of the Left assume that they are the face of the future, rather than just another political party that will hold power as often as not.
Privatisation and deregulation is a lot slower in a federal system with an effective upper house elected by proportional representation. Regulatory powers and public asset ownership is spread over different levels of federations, with different parties always in power at various levels at the same time, all worried about losing office by going to far away from what the majority wants.
The will of the people is constantly tested and measured in a federal system with elections at one level or another every year or so contested on a mix of local and national issues. Any failings of privatisation or deregulation in pioneering jurisdictions would quickly become apparent and would not be copied by the rest of the country. These errors could be undone where they originated by incoming progressive governments.
The Left may want to protect the rights of the unpopular and the unpleasant, and to want constitutional safeguards to slow an impassioned majority down is, in part, because they could be next if they lose the next election to the latest right-wing populist.
In a unitary unicameral parliament, those crazies to the right or left of you are tempered by an occasional general election only every 3 to 5 years. Little wonder that UK Labor reconsidered devolution, an assembly for London, and regional government after 15 years of Maggie Thatcher, good and hard, with her unfettered right to ask the house of commons to make or unmake any law whatsoever.
Developing positive alternatives on the Left includes what to do about the rotation of power and fettered versus unfettered parliamentary and executive power. The failure of the Left to develop its own constitutional political economy is a major strategic shortcoming. Frequenting wine bars, cafes and blogs muttering to each other ‘our day will come, our day will come’ is not enough.
State power was something that the classical liberals feared, and the problem of constitutional design is insuring that such power would be effectively limited.
Sovereignty must be split among several levels of collective authority; federalism was designed to allow for a decentralization of coercive state power.
At each level of authority, separate functional branches of government were deliberately placed in continued tension, one with the other. The legislative branch is further restricted by the establishment of two strong houses, each of which organised on a separate principle of representation
Stephen Williamson on Marginal Taxation
03 Aug 2014 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, fiscal policy, income redistribution, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, Public Choice Tags: envy, Stephen Williamson, taxation and entrepreneurship, taxation and human capital, taxation and investment, taxation and labour supply, top 1%
He says a lot. I’ll try to address piece by piece.
Next, some people have shown interest in this paper by Diamond and Saez. A key result that seemed to get these people excited is the calculation of a top optimal marginal tax rate (including all taxes) of 73%, relative to the current rate of 42.5%. There are two key assumptions that Diamond and Saez make to come up with the 73% optimal rate. First, we should not care about the welfare (at the margin) of the rich people. This argument is based solely on the notion that marginal utility of income is low for the top income-earners. Second, Diamond and Saez use a “behavioral elasticity” of tax revenue with respect to the tax rate of 0.25. To see how this matters, if you use their formula and an elasticity of one, you get an optimal top tax rate…
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