The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order, ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention.
It comes from an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.
To widen the market and to narrow the competition is always the interest of sellers
14 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in Adam Smith, economics of regulation, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: competition and monopoly, The wealth of nations
The market process picks unusual winners
10 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, international economics, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: picking winners
What World Bank consultant would risk his fee and return business on advising Egypt to specialise in the export of toilets to Italy? But Egypt’s largest single manufacturing export is toilets to Italy where it captured 93% of the market.
Kenya has a booming export business in cut flowers for men to buy for their wives. Kenya has 40% of the European markets for cut flowers. Nigeria has 84% of the Norwegian market for floating docks. The Philippines has 71% of the global market for electronic integrated circuits.
What development expert would have picked these winners? They’re far too far away from the conventional wisdom and the safe bets that are behind picking winners in government circles.
Picking winners by governments requires heroic assumptions not only about the information politicians and bureaucrats have about the present and their ability to predict the future, but also about their motivations and their ability to resist capture by special interests. The Economist explains:
None of these studies addresses a deeper problem with the way industrial policy tends to develop over time.
Earlier efforts have tended to degenerate into rent-seeking, lobbying and cosy deals between incumbent firms and bureaucrats, stifling innovation and the process of creative destruction.
The problem, of course, is that … industrial policy requires disinterested, benevolent policymakers who can do it well. Unfortunately, they do not yet have a recipe for how such policymakers can be created.
Policy is made by real people with political and personal motivations. What they come up with is unlikely to be as well designed as the ones in the models.
Housing price booms and the restrictiveness of land-use regulation in the USA
09 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, rentseeking, urban economics Tags: housing prices, land use regulation
The picture tells a 1000 words.
Rent-seeking
06 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in Adam Smith, rentseeking Tags: The wealth of nations
The bounty to the white-herring fishery is a tonnage bounty; and is proportioned to the burden of the ship, not to her diligence or success in the fishery; and it has, I am afraid, been too common for vessels to fit out for the sole purpose of catching, not the fish, but the bounty.
The Samaritan’s public choice dilemma
02 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in income redistribution, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: The Samaritan's dilemma
HT: The Town Crier
Sam Peltzman and the great restraint in the growth of government, 1980-2007
01 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, Gary Becker, income redistribution, Public Choice, rentseeking, Sam Peltzman Tags: growth in government, The Great Restraint
From 1950 to 1980 the size of government doubled in the developed world and then stopped dead in 1980. This great restraint on the growth of government happened everywhere. It was not just Thatcher’s Britain or Reagan’s America. It was everywhere, in France and Germany, and even in Scandinavia.
Peltzman’s data below has government spending double between 1950 and 1980, and then nothing much happened in between 1980 and 2007 – the size of government is pretty flat as a share of GDP for 27 years.
Source: Sam Peltzman, The Socialist Revival? (2012).
There is a noticeable reduction in the size of government spending in Scandinavia. Reagan and Thatcher had nothing on those Social Democrats in Scandinavia when it comes to cutting the size of government.
Governments everywhere hit a brick wall in terms of their ability to raise further tax revenues. Political parties of the Left and Right recognised this new reality.
Government spending grew in many countries in the 20th century because of demographic shifts, more efficient taxes, more efficient spending, a shift in the political power from those taxed to those subsidised, shifts in political power among taxed groups, and shifts in political power among subsidised groups.
The median voter in all countries was alive to the power of incentives and to not killing the goose that laid the golden egg.
After 1980, the taxed, regulated and subsidised groups had an increased incentive to converge on new lower cost modes of redistribution.
More efficient taxes, more efficient spending, more efficient regulation and a more efficient state sector reduced the burden of taxes on the taxed groups.
Most subsidised groups benefited as well because their needs were met in ways that provoked less political opposition.
Gary Becker made this warning about the political repercussions of tax reform and economic reform in general for the size of government:
…the greater efficiency of a VAT and its ease of collection is a two-edged sword.
On the one hand, it would raise a given amount of tax revenue efficiently and cheaply.
Since economists usually evaluate different types of taxes by their efficiency and ease of collecting a given amount of tax revenue, economists typically like value added taxes.
The error in this method of evaluating taxes is that it does not consider the political economy determinants of the level of taxes.
From this political economy perspective, the value added tax does not look so attractive, at least to those of us who worry that governments would spend and tax at higher levels than is economically and socially desirable.
Reforms ensued after 1980 led by parties on the Left and Right, with some members of existing political groupings benefiting from joining new political coalitions.
The deadweight losses of taxes, transfers and regulation limit inefficient policies and the sustainability of redistribution.
Peltzman likes to note that at the start of the 20th century, the United States government was about 8% of GDP. The two largest programs were education and highways. The post office was as big as the military.
Government is about five times that now with defence, health, education and income security accounting for 70% of this total. Peltzman makes the very interesting point that:
There is no new program in the political horizon that seems capable of attaining anything like the size of any of these four.
For the time being the future government rest on the extent of existing mega programs.
Health and income security account for 55% of total government spending in the OECD. It is in these two programs where the future of the growth of government lie.
The pressure for that growth in government will come from the elderly. Governments will have to choose between high taxes on the young to fund these programs for the elderly or find other options.
Foreigners Are Our Friends | Bryan Caplan | Learn Liberty – YouTube
23 May 2014 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, economic growth, economics, international economics, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: anti-foreign bias, Bryan Caplan, free trade, protectionism
Corporate welfare and middle-class welfare defined
20 May 2014 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, industrial organisation, Public Choice, rentseeking, survivor principle Tags: corporate welfare, farm welfare, middle-class welfare
The term corporate welfare was coined by Ralph Nader in 1956. Corporate welfare is subsidies, tax breaks, or other favourable treatment for business and implies that business are much less needy of such treatment than the poor.
The Right talks of the deserving and undeserving poor. The Left countered with payments to business.
Supporters of corporate welfare often justify them as remedying some sort of purported market failure.
Businesses, big and small, see market failure everywhere under balance sheets that are in the red.
The notion behind corporate welfare is profits should be private while losses should be a reason for a taxpayer bailout.
Both direct and indirect subsidies to businesses are classified as corporate welfare. The reason is businesses as supposed to make a profit or go out of business.
If a business is losing money, they should try better or do something different or just go out of business.
Losses are not a reason for a taxpayer bailout. No business project should be premised on government subsidies.
The purpose of the capital market is to direct investment to projects that have a future and take support away from failing projects.
The capital market is picking winners and losers every day because that’s its job. That’s what it’s good at.
The participants in the capital market who are not good at picking winners and avoiding losers will themselves will go soon out of business.
Corporate welfare is increasingly used interchangeably with crony capitalism.
A kissing cousin of corporate welfare is farm welfare. These are the countless subsidies that farmers get in Europe and America, and in the past, in New Zealand.
Middle-class welfare is cash payments by the government to the non-poor. These payments to the middle-class can be for having children such as in Working for Families, for early-childhood education or for childcare. Middle-class welfare also can be tax breaks and subsidies for retirement savings of the nonpoor.
It is pointless to tax the middle-class and then give them their money pretty much straight back as a cash payment for a particular purpose be it child care or for their retirement. Middle-class welfare covers at least in part expenses the middle-class could have covered themselves but for the taxes.
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