Fast food pay gains outpacing the rest of the workforce blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015… | http://t.co/XNT3Jl0ifn—
Charts and Maps (@ChartsandMaps) April 07, 2015
Lenin Square, Uzbekistan, 1966-1972
02 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
Lenin Square, Uzbekistan, 1966-1972 http://t.co/e0Ao3ynKFn—
Classic Pics (@classicepics) June 01, 2015
Why is the Australian top 0.1% far less greedy than the UK, US and Canadian top 0.1%?
26 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economic history, entrepreneurship, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, Marxist economics, occupational choice, politics - Australia, politics - USA, poverty and inequality Tags: Australia, British economy, Canada, Leftover Left, top 0.1%, top 1%
Figure 1: top 0.1% share of gross income, Australia, UK, USA and Canada since 1946
Source: Chartbook of Economic Inequality.
The top 0.1% in Australia is earning not much more than it did in 1946. For most of the post-war period, the Australian top 0.1% earned less than what it earned in 1946. The only spike in the earnings of the Australian top 0.1% occurred after the top tax rate of 66% was reduced to 49% in 1986.
There were major cuts in the top tax rates in Australia,the USA and UK in the early 1980s. Figure 1 shows that these top tax rate cuts were matched with a spike in the earnings of the top 0.1% subsequent to those large tax cuts.
"You didn’t build that" – which of sport superstars, celebrities and top CEOs earn their pay more?
25 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, entrepreneurship, financial economics, industrial organisation, Marxist economics, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, rentseeking, sports economics, survivor principle Tags: CEO pay, Leftover Left, obama, superstar wages, superstars, top 1%
Defenders have also pointed to the pay of pro ballplayers or Hollywood stars, but they do not determine their own pay (as CEOs do) and are paid based on performance. Once they begin to fail, they are dumped. By contrast, CEO pay isn’t tied to performance in any meaningful way.
It’s a big concession to say that athletes and celebrities earn their pay but top CEOs don’t. Most of all, that concession changes the case against the top 1% from inequality to just desert – a big shift in theories of distributive justice. It’s also a big risk to base the argument for greater equality and a 80% top tax rate not only on the excesses of CEOs but on the very specific and testable hypothesis that these CEOs determine their own pay.
if we are to look at CEOs, top athletes and Hollywood celebrities, it is the athletes and celebrities who benefited the most from the windfall of been able to service huge markets through the global media market.
Figure 1: CEO pay and share market performance
Source: Economic Policy Institute.
CEOs actually have to run large complex companies to earn their pay, which is why their compensation tracks the share market relatively closely. Athletes and celebrities don’t do that what they do any better than in the past. They simply do it in front of a global media market. Since the late 1970s, the ratio of average pay of CEOs of large public companies to the average market value of those companies has stayed relatively constant: CEO pay grew hand in hand with corporations.
Steven Kaplan and Joshua Rauh make a number of basic points backed up by detailed evidence about CEO pay:
- While top CEO pay has increased, so has the pay of private company executives and hedge fund and private equity investors;
- ICT advances increase the pay of many – of professional athletes (technology increases their marginal product by allowing them to reach more consumers), Wall Street investors (technology allows them to acquire information and trade large amounts more easily), CEOs and technology entrepreneurs in the Forbes 400; and
- Technology allows top executives and financiers to manage larger organizations and asset pools – a loosening of social norms and a lack of independent control of CEO pacesetting does not explain similar increases in pay for private companies– technology explains it;
To put it simply:
If the reason for growth of incomes at the very top is, say, managerial power in publicly owned companies, then one would expect the increases in income at the top levels to be much larger for that group.
But the breadth of the occupations that have seen a rise in top income levels is much more consistent with the argument that the increase in “superstar” pay (or pay at the top) has been driven by the growth of information and communications technology, and the ways this technology allows individuals with particular skills that are in high demand to expand the scale of their performance.
As for the turnover argument, that underperforming athletes and celebrities are dropped, prior to the GFC, CEO turnover was already on the rise:
Turnover is 14.9% from 1992 to 2005, implying an average tenure as CEO of less than seven years. In the more recent period since 1998, total CEO turnover increases to 16.5%, implying an average tenure of just over six years.
Internal turnover is significantly related to three components of firm performance – performance relative to industry, industry performance relative to the overall market, and the performance of the overall stock market.
Only 21.3% of CEOs in 1992 remained in that role in 1999; only 16.35% of CEOS on the job in 2000 were there in 2007. In any given year, one out of six Fortune 500 CEOs loses their jobs, compared to one out of 10 in the 1970s.
Dirk Jenter and Fadi Kanaan in a study of of 3,365 CEO turnovers from 1993 to 2009 found that:
CEOs are significantly more likely to be dismissed from their jobs after bad industry and, to a lesser extent, after bad market performance. A decline in industry performance from the 90th to the 10thpercentile doubles the probability of a forced CEO turnover.
In another study, Kaplan found that average CEO pay increased substantially during the 1990s, but declined by more than 30% from peak levels reached around 2000.
In addition, private company executives have seen their pay increase by at least as much as public companies. Private company executives with fewer agency problems have increased by more than public company executives. To close with another quote from Kaplan:
The point of these comparisons is to confirm that while public company CEOs earn a great deal, they are not unique. Other groups with similar backgrounds–private company executives, corporate lawyers, hedge fund investors, private equity investors and others—have seen significant pay increases where there is a competitive market for talent and managerial power problems are absent.
Again, if one uses evidence of higher CEO pay as evidence of managerial power or capture, one must also explain why these professional groups have had a similar or even higher growth in pay. It seems more likely that a meaningful portion of the increase in CEO pay has been driven by market forces as well.
Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union today, 1941
22 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
Under the codename Operation "Barbarossa," Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. http://t.co/9KhhHtujri—
History (@HistoryTime_) June 22, 2015
Checkpoint Charlie was dismantled today 1990
22 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economic history, Marxist economics Tags: Berlin wall, collapse of communism
On 22 June 1990, 'Checkpoint Charlie', the famous crossing between East-West Berlin, was dismantled. #OTD http://t.co/XGLZiilBxr—
History Facts 247 (@historyfacts247) June 22, 2015
Fidel Castro developed a taste for luxury early
18 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, economics of bureaucracy, Marxist economics, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: bribery and corruption, Cuba, fall of communism, Fidel Castro
Fidel Castro, wearing 2 rolexes, lighting a cigar while visiting the USSR for the first time buff.ly/1GzeezX http://t.co/ig70RuEJjw—
Business Insider (@businessinsider) June 11, 2015
My one blog on Russell Brand
24 May 2015 Leave a comment
Via @PrivateEyeNews http://t.co/w3IMNRViJJ—
Emily Gray (@missemilygray) May 15, 2015
Is Marxism hate speech? Is it safe to be allowed on campus?
13 May 2015 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, economic history, laws of war, liberalism, Marxist economics, Public Choice, rentseeking, war and peace Tags: campus speech codes, hate speech, Leftover Left, Marxism, trigger warnings

















The tired Marxism of @chrishipkins MP. Is government provision cheaper because they don’t have to make a profit?
05 May 2015 1 Comment
in Austrian economics, entrepreneurship, Marxist economics, politics - New Zealand Tags: schools, state owned enterprises

At least one Labour MP must have watched the other channel when the Berlin Wall fell. How else could Chris Hipkins, MP ever think that government provision is cheaper because they don’t have to make a profit? OK, he was a teenager when the Berlin Wall fell, but even teenagers watch the headline news or pick up the gist of the headlines from friends.
The tidiest of all Marxist arguments, the saddest of all Marxist arguments is government operation of businesses is cheaper because they don’t have to make a profit. At least we were spared the cliché “people not profits”.
Leaving to one side that government school buildings are built by private contractors to the Ministry of Education, let’s focus on whether government businesses will be cheaper because they don’t have to make a profit.
No cheap shots about how the portfolio of state owned enterprises are worth $30 billion returned a profit of $20 million to New Zealand taxpayers last year or of the inherent flaws of government ownership:
On the free market, in short, the consumer is king, and any business firm that wants to make profits and avoid losses tries its best to serve the consumer as efficiently and at as low a cost as possible.
In a government operation, in contrast, everything changes. Inherent in all government operation is a grave and fatal split between service and payment, between the providing of a service and the payment for receiving it.
The government bureau does not get its income as does the private firm, from serving the consumer well or from consumer purchases of its products exceeding its costs of operation.
No, the government bureau acquires its income from mulcting the long-suffering taxpayer. Its operations therefore become inefficient, and costs zoom, since government bureaus need not worry about losses or bankruptcy; they can make up their losses by additional extractions from the public till.
The accounting profit or loss of any firm combines two rather different concepts of profit:
- normal profit – the interest paid to those who lend capital to the form either as a loan or as equity; and
- economic profit – the earnings that result from risk taking and entrepreneurship.
Normal profit is simply at the cost of raising capital from investors. This capital can be borrowed in the form of a loan or can be equity.
Chris Hipkins, MP concedes a need to borrow capital when he talks about government typically having lower costs to access capital in the screenshot above. Both private and public builders of schools will have to pay to access capital.
Economic profit is a far more complicated concept frequently misunderstood, especially by Marxists, the Left over Left and, of course, professional media commentators. As Mises explains:
If all people were to anticipate correctly the future state of the market, the entrepreneurs would neither earn any profits nor suffer any losses. They would have to buy the complementary factors of production at prices which would, already at the instant of the purchase, fully reflect the future prices of the products. No room would be left either for profit or for loss.
What makes profit emerge is the fact that the entrepreneur who judges the future prices of the products more correctly than other people do buys some or all of the factors of production at prices which, seen from the point of view of the future state of the market, are too low. Thus the total costs of production — including interest on the capital invested — lag behind the prices which the entrepreneur receives for the product. This difference is entrepreneurial profit.
Profits arise from the dynamism of the market and the ability of superior entrepreneur’s to anticipate the future better than others for which there is always only a temporary profit:
Profits are never normal. They appear only where there is a maladjustment, a divergence between actual production and production as it should be in order to utilize the available material and mental resources for the best possible satisfaction of the wishes of the public. They are the prize of those who remove this maladjustment; they disappear as soon as the maladjustment is entirely removed.
Frank Knight in Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (1921) distinguished between interest on capital that is lend as either a loan or equity – long-run normal profits – and the short-run profits and losses earned by superior, or suffered by inferior entrepreneurs , respectively. This entrepreneurial superiority or inferiority flows from the ability to forecast the uncertain future. Those entrepreneurs “with superior knowledge and superior foresight,” wrote Frank Fetter, “are merchants, buying when they can in a cheaper and selling in a dearer capitalisation market, acting as the equalizers of rates and prices.”
Knight argued that entrepreneurs earn profits as a return for putting up with uncertainty and anticipating uncertainty faster than the rest. Many businesses are unprofitable because of rising costs or falling sales that were not anticipated. The Knightian concept is of the profit-seeking entrepreneur investing resources under uncertainty about market demand and costs in the future.
Alchian (1950) illustrated the unreliability of cost estimation with the range of bids made in government tendering processes. When contractors bid for the same project, these entrepreneurs routinely disagree over its likely cost by margins of 20 percent. These tenderers are predicting their own costs, about which they are knowledgeable, and they have an incentive to be truthful to win the initial tender.
Profits and losses, by rewarding and penalising the entrepreneurs who are not the quickest, ensures that only what consumers want is bought to the market as Henry Hazlett explains:
In a free economy, in which wages, costs, and prices are left to the free play of the competitive market, the prospect of profits decides what articles will be made, and in what quantities—and what articles will not be made at all.
If there is no profit in making an article, it is a sign that the labour and capital devoted to its production are misdirected: the value of the resources that must be used up in making the article is greater than the value of the article itself.
Profits arise as the reward for superior foresight into the future and innovation. Both of these concepts are not associated with government run businesses as Alfred Marshall explained:
A government could print a good edition of Shakespeare’s works, but it could not get them written.
As for Hipkins’ argument that governments can borrow at a cheaper rate than private firms, Bailey and Jensen (1972) said:
…we argue that efficient allocation of risk bearing is usually more difficult for government projects than it is for private ones. Therefore, if anything, the allowance for risk should be greater for government projects than it is for otherwise comparable private ones…
We find no support for the arguments in favor of using the government bond rate or any other such universally low rate for discounting costs and benefits of public projects.
We concur in Hirshleifer’s conclusion that a public project with given attributes (in terms of dispersion of possible future outcomes and of the covariance of these outcomes with those for existing portfolios) should he discounted with at least as high a rate as a similar private project.
This “same rate” should include the appropriate allowances for taxes and other distortions in private markets (as outlined by Harberger) as well as the appropriate allowances for risk, which we have outlined above.
Moreover, if private markets in risk are as “imperfect” as many have claimed, that merely tends to increase the rate that should be used, because the government is even less able to distribute risks than are these markets.
What type of car did Lenin Drive?
01 May 2015 Leave a comment
in Marxist economics Tags: Lenin, May Day, ruling elite



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