@BarackObama nails safe spaces on campuses
09 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in economics, economics of education, economics of media and culture, liberalism, Public Choice
Financial market wrongdoing: Fines vs reputational sanctions
30 Mar 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, economics of education, entrepreneurship, financial economics, industrial organisation, law and economics, survivor principle Tags: crime and punishment, signalling
1-Year Impacts of Charter Schools on Math & English Scores @GreenCatherine @DBSeymour
29 Mar 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of education, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA Tags: charter schools, School choice, school vouchers
Cost of High School Interventions and Effects on Graduation @ChrisHipkins @DBSeymour
29 Mar 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of education, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA Tags: charter schools, School choice, school vouchers
@suemoroney the Maori economy is not $39 billion, it is much more @Maori_Party
26 Mar 2016 Leave a comment
in economic history, economics of education, human capital, labour economics, politics - New Zealand Tags: Maori economic development
Much of the non-European human capital in New Zealand is Maori and it far exceeded $39 billion 20 years ago or more. Attempts to quantify the Maori economy by counting up the value of Maori institutions and businesses distracts from the main priority for Maori economic development which is education, education, education.
Source: Lˆe Thi. Vˆan Tr`ınh, Estimating the monetary value of the stock of human capital for New Zealand, University of Canterbury PhD thesis (September 2006), Table 4.6: Aggregate human capital stock by ethnicity.
Human capital = 70% NZ’s wealth @WJRosenbergCTU @EricCrampton
24 Mar 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of education, human capital
The US gender wage gap by level of education
20 Mar 2016 Leave a comment
in discrimination, economics of education, gender, human capital, labour economics Tags: gender wage gap
The rising marriage premium for power couples
19 Mar 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of education, economics of love and marriage, economics of marriage, labour economics, population economics, poverty and inequality

Source: Four Forces Watch | askblog.
Pizza and Conversation with James Heckman
19 Mar 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, economics, economics of education, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, poverty and inequality Tags: James Heckman
The value of New Zealand owner occupied homes, net capital stock and human capital stock since 1987
17 Mar 2016 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, economic history, economics of education, entrepreneurship, human capital, labour economics, politics - New Zealand, poverty and inequality, urban economics Tags: household wealth, housing prices, pessimism bias, top 1%
Tring Le found that the human capital stock was consistently 2.6 times the value of the physical capital stock of New Zealand.
I decided to apply that ratio to the net capital stock of New Zealand estimates of Statistics New Zealand back to 1987 to see what we get. It is pretty standard for the value of human capital to be two to two and one-half times the value of physical capital.
Source: National Accounts (Industry Benchmarks): Year ended March 2013 and Lˆe Thi. Vˆan Tr`ınh, Estimating the monetary value of the stock of human capital for New Zealand, University of Canterbury PhD thesis (September 2006), Table 4.8: Human and physical capital stocks.
All the above chart says it is most wealth in New Zealand is held by ordinary people either as their human capital or the value of their homes.
An Economic Approach to School Integration: Public Choice with Tie-ins
12 Mar 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, constitutional political economy, discrimination, economics of education, economics of media and culture, rentseeking
Thomas Borcherding “An Economic Approach to School Integration: Public Choice with Tie-ins.” Public Choice, 1977, argues that a reason for racial or ethnic discrimination in the public sector is politics encourages the coercive transfer of income from the racial, religious or ethnic group to those with more political influence.
Race can be used as a means of organizing coalitions to lobby for fiscal and economic discrimination in favour of even a previously unprejudiced group.
Preferences of each group to locate in a common geography and the severe control over entry or exit from the group that such things as skin colour, language, caste, and religious dogma impose make the organization of racial or ethnic coalitions by political entrepreneurs fairly cheap and minimises free riding and defection.
Prejudice may reinforce the solidarity of each group and help to monitor via custom, mores, and folkways the behavior of those that would attempt to bring persons of other groups into the former coalition. Further, prejudice may also serve as a device to rationalize exploitation of another group by fiscal or other means.

Borcherding argues that integration, racial balancing, quotas, and busing of school children take on a new logic when income transfers can be tied to fairly immutable characteristics such as race.
Mixing of children by race reduces the ability of a white dominated school board to differentially favour its own partisans’ children and to discriminate against those of blacks.
This paper anticipated Becker’s point that the competition among pressure groups for political influence for looks for lower cost ways of redistributing wealth so as to as much as possible limits the largess as much as possible to the pressure groups that lobby for it and their allies.





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