Does labor market regulation really protect the interests of workers?
29 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of media and culture, economics of regulation, industrial organisation, labour economics, occupational regulation Tags: employment law, employment protection laws, employment regulation
“Bourgeois Equality” lecture
28 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, development economics, economic history, economics, economics of regulation, entrepreneurship, growth disasters, growth miracles, history of economic thought, industrial organisation, poverty and inequality, survivor principle Tags: Deirdre McCloskey, industrial revolution, The Great Enrichment
The cost of regulation in the USA
27 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, economic growth, economic history, economics of regulation, macroeconomics, politics - USA Tags: cost of economic regulation, endogenous growth theory
Why Private Investment Works & Govt. Investment Doesn’t
27 Apr 2016 1 Comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economic history, economics of media and culture, economics of regulation, industrial organisation, survivor principle Tags: industry policy, picking winners, The fatal conceit, The pretence to knowledge
What 3 skills do public policy analysts need?
27 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, business cycles, economics of bureaucracy, economics of regulation, fiscal policy, macroeconomics, monetary economics Tags: anti-market bias, antiforeign bias, expressive voting, lags on monetary policy, makework bias, rational rationality, tax incidence, The fatal conceit, The pretense to knowledge
I used to argue that the quality of public policy making would double if public policy analysts remembered the first 6 weeks of microeconomics 101 but on reflection more than that is required.
Could we economists today ever show such self-restraint about our own expert recommendations? https://t.co/2UE12JuIgn—
William Easterly (@bill_easterly) November 24, 2015
I picked up my initial insight out when working as a graduate economist in the Australian Department of Finance. That was a few years ago.
I am now concluded that policy analysts also need to know the basics of the economics of tax incidence. Who pays the tax depends on the elasticities of supply and demand rather than who writes the check to the taxman.
The number of times that I have read media and public policy analysis saying who pays the tax is the writer of the cheque to the taxman is beyond counting.
There is also what to do about unemployment and inflation. Do not just do something, sit there might be good advice on most occasions. As Tim Kehoe and Gonzalo Fernandez de Cordoba explain in the context of first do no harm:
Looking at the historical evidence, Kehoe and Prescott conclude that bad government policies are responsible for causing great depressions.
In particular, they hypothesize that, while different sorts of shocks can lead to ordinary business cycle downturns, overreaction by the government can prolong and deepen the downturn, turning it into a depression.
A Mall divided by different city minimum wage laws @SueMoroney @GreenCatherine
26 Apr 2016 1 Comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, economics of regulation, labour economics, minimum wage, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, Robert E. Lucas Tags: Alan Manning, city minimum wage laws, living wage, monopsony
The Westfield Valley Fair Mall is half in San Jose city and half in Santa Clara city. In 2012, San Jose raised its minimum wage from $8 to $10 per hour.
National Public Radio in 2014 had a brilliant broadcast on the implications of this new city minimum wage law on the Westfield Valley Fair Mall. As the broadcast said:
This change created two economic worlds within a single, large building. Employees doing more or less the same work, just steps away from each other, started making different wages.
The radio show discussed what happened on the $8 side of the Mall and then on the $10 side through interviews with employers and workers.
On the then $8 per hour minimum wage side of the Mall, employers quickly noticed that many of their employees quit to jobs elsewhere in the same Mall. These same employees found that the quality of job applicants also fell away seriously. There were noticeable differences in the personalities traits and dress standards presented by the $8 an hour job applicants and $10 an hour job applicants.
As is to be expected because information about job opportunities is costly, some of the minimum wage employees did not know that other parts of the Mall paid more.
(This change in job turnover rates and applicant pool quality subsequent to the minimum wage increase in San Jose has implications for the inequality of bargaining power between workers and employers. Minimum wage workers do keep an eye on competing opportunities and take them up when better options arise – JR aside).
Since 2012, the minimum wage rates in the Mall have changed again: Santa Clara’s minimum wage initially increased to $9 an hour – the state-wide minimum wage, which had increased from $8 per hour; San Jose’s $10.15 per hour.
Those city minimum wages were increased further this year to $11 in Santa Clara city and $10.30 in San Jose city respectively by the respective city councils.
The state-wide minimum wage in California is to increase to $15 per hour by 2020 under a law just passed. California’s current $10-per-hour minimum wage is already among the highest in the country — only Washington, DC, has a higher minimum wage at $10.50 per hour.
Getting back to what was said in the National Public Radio broadcast, the show then moved on to the Gap Store, which straddled the two city boundaries.
Source: Episode 562: A Mall Divided : Planet Money : NPR.
The Gap Store had the option of keeping a record of how much time employees spent in each city within its store and pay accordingly under each city law. The Gap raised everybody’s wage to $10.
There was then a fascinating interview with a Pretzels store owner. The question she asked herself every time she bought anything was how many pretzels se had to sell to cover the cost. She quickly concluded that she could not sell enough additional pretzels to cover the wage rise.
There is another Pretzels store just around the corner from her in the same mall but in the other city so she could not raise her prices by that much. She had a picture of that day’s menu and price list of the competing Pretzels store on her smart phone.
She instead took a cut in her profit. This flowed back to her employers because they received an annual bonus based on 15% of each year’s profit. They did not like that reduction in their bonus.
In a delicious irony, this same entrepreneur owned another Pretzels store in a different part of the Mall but which was in the other city subject to the lower minimum wage law. She owned two of the three pretzels stores in that Mall.
She solved the problem in staff morale by rotating her staff in alternate weeks between her two stores in the same Mall but different cities and paying them accordingly.
In my opinion, this NPR story is pretty much a vindication of standard microeconomics of minimum wage laws. Minimum wage workers are alert to their opportunities and take the best ones available to them but this is not perfect because of cost of information. As Manning observed in his superb book Monopsony in Motion:
That important frictions exist in the labor market seems undeniable: people go to the pub to celebrate when they get a job rather than greeting the news with the shrug of the shoulders that we might expect if labor markets were frictionless.
And people go to the pub to drown their sorrows when they lose their job rather than picking up another one straight away. The importance of frictions has been recognized since at least the work of Stigler (1961, 1962).
As George Stigler argued, information is costly to obtain in the labour market and this leads to price and wage dispersion with this variance related to the cost of searching for information. He concluded that the one-price (one-wage) market will occur only where the cost of information about the prices (wages) offered by buyers and sellers is zero.
Finally, minimum wages rises threaten the profitability of businesses and therefore their survival. That puts low-pay jobs at risk. As Bhaskar, Manning and To (2002) explain in their survey paper on monopsony:
Notice also that because a binding minimum wage reduces employers’ profits when there is free entry into and exit out of the labor market, some employers will be forced to exit. Employer exit has a negative effect on total employment through the loss of exiting employer payrolls.
That is, although establishments that remain after the imposition of a minimum wage increase their employment, some employers are forced out of business.
Thus, minimum wages have two opposing effects: the employment-increasing “oligopsony” effect and the employment-reducing “exit” effect. The overall effect of a minimum wage depends on which effect dominates.
An increase in the family tax credit puts no jobs at risk and is a superior alternative to minimum wage laws. Minimum wage increases throw some low page workers onto the social scrapheap.
Some look upon these large minimum state and city wage increases as worthwhile policy experiments. As Dube said:
… 30 to 40 percent of the California workforce will get a raise … This will be a big experiment. It’s far outside of our evidence base… If you’re risk-averse, this would not be the scale at which to try things.
On the other hand, if you think that wages are really low and they’ve been low for a really long time and we can afford to take some risks, doing things at this scale will get us more evidence.
“Big experiments” to use Dube’s words such as these with state and city minimum wages laws are wrong as Robert Lucas explained in 1988:
I want to understand the connection between in the money supply and economic depressions.
One way to demonstrate that I understand this connection–I think the only really convincing way–would be for me to engineer a depression in the United States by manipulating the U.S. money supply.
I think I know how to do this, though I’m not absolutely sure, but a real virtue of the democratic system is that we do not look kindly on people who want to use our lives as a laboratory. So I will try to make my depression somewhere else.
Environmentalists are the biggest science deniers of all #EarthDay
24 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, energy economics, environmental economics, global warming, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: antimarket bias, antiscience left, green rent seeking, Greenpeace, nuclear power, pessimism bias, rational irrationality, wind power
Why Do Black Markets for Marijuana Still Exist in Colorado? @PeterDunneMP
24 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, economics of regulation, health economics, politics - USA Tags: black markets, economics of prohibition, marijuana decriminalisation, tax evasion
Why Is Marijuana Legal in Some States and Not Others?
24 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, economics of crime, economics of regulation, health economics, law and economics Tags: federalism, war on drugs
#MorganFoundation errors about @nzinitiative’s Health of the State – part 2
23 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of media and culture, economics of regulation, health economics, politics - New Zealand Tags: anti-market bias, do gooders, meddlesome preferences, Morgan Foundation, nanny state, political psychology, rational rationality
E-cigarettes as a way of reducing obesity?
23 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, health economics Tags: E-cigarettes, economics of obesity, economics of smoking, expressive voting, meddlesome preferences, nanny state, rational irrationality
One of the many interesting things that Maori Party MP Marama Fox said at a panel discussion for the launch of the New Zealand Initiative’s Health of the State report was that the Maori women she knew who smoked did so out of stress relief.
It is also well known that there is a weight gain after stopping smoking. If people cannot smoke because of higher taxes but still need to have an outlet for their stress, they look elsewhere and seek comfort in food.
Source: Weight Gain After Quitting Smoking – Quit Smoking Community.
This is before you consider the general pleasure seeking aspect of smoking. Some people find smoking pleasurable; I find it disgusting.
This suggests to me that the restrictions on E-cigarettes are the worst of both worlds. If people are going to smoke, you may as well let them have access to a technology that is safer.

Instead, the do-gooders prefer to put an extra bullet in the chamber as smokers play Russian roulette.
#MorganFoundation errors about @nzinitiative’s Health of the State – part 1
22 Apr 2016 3 Comments
in economics of information, economics of regulation, health economics, law and economics, politics - New Zealand Tags: Aaron Director, alcohol regulation, economics of obesity, economics of prohibition, economics of smoking, meddlesome preferences, Morgan Foundation, nanny state
The Greens have joined that Morgan Foundation in playing the man rather than the ball on the recently published report of the New Zealand Initiative on sin taxes. Green Party health spokesperson Kevin Hague said:
The New Zealand Initiative cares more about junk-food barons’ bottom lines than it cares about Kiwis who are getting sick and dying because of obesity-related illnesses
The Morgan Foundation was just as keen to argue that their opponents on sin taxes are both ignorant and steeped in moral turpitude as a way of avoiding substantive argument:
The New Zealand Initiative are not interested in reducing obesity, or preventing the looming diabetes crisis where 1 in 3 Kiwis will have the disease. They make no attempt to understand the causes, and don’t propose any way to deal with these issues…
Is there no room for honest disagreement and different views on the ability of further government intervention to be a net benefit? As Aaron Director said:
Laissez-faire is no more than a slogan in defence of the proposition that every extension of state activity should be examined under the presumption of error.
One of the specific claims by the Morgan Foundation that seems to be in error is:
In fact, the report seems devoid of any research outside a narrow economic focus. The food industry has funded an enormous amount of psychological research on how to influence people to eat more junk food through packaging, advertising, product placement etc, much of which is publicly available, but which the New Zealand Institute has roundly ignored. Ironic, given that they funded by the same organisations that funded this psychological research.
The Food industry’s own research shows our choices are hugely influenced by the environment that surrounds us, but the New Zealand Institute conveniently prefers to cling to the oversimplification that we are all rational economic units – known as homo economicus.
The report of the New Zealand Initiative has a nice discussion of the limitations of rationality which did not weigh as heavily as it should in the critique by the Morgan Foundation part of which is in the snapshot below:
Source: Jenesa Jeram, The Health of the State, The New Zealand Initiative ( April 2016, p.10).
Why environmentalists are adverse to real solutions #earthday
22 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of media and culture, economics of regulation, energy economics, entrepreneurship, environmental economics, environmentalism, global warming, politics - USA Tags: anti-market bias, Earth Day, expressive voting, rational ignorance, rational rationality
Source: Quotation of the day for Earth Day on the ‘science of economics versus the religion of environmentalism’ … – AEI | Carpe Diem Blog » AEIdeas from Steven E. Landsburg’s book “The Armchair Economist: Economics and Everyday Life,” in his chapter titled “Why I Am Not an Environmentalist: The Science of Economics versus the Religion of Ecology“.
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