The British disease and the horrors of Thatchernomics past British retirees by as did pretty much the Global Financial Crisis. Slow and steady as she goes under every Prime Minister since 1977 has been year in year out result for the real disposable median incomes of British retired households. Despite it all, British retiree household incomes increased by 170% since the winter of discontent. The fastest growth in retiree incomes was under Tony Blair.
Source: Release Edition Reference Tables – ONS.
Notes:
1 Households are ranked by their equivalised disposable incomes, using the modified-OECD scale.
2 1994/95 represents the financial year ending 1995, and similarly through to 2014/15, which represents the financial year ending 2015.
3 Income figures have been deflated to 2014/15 prices using an implied deflator for the household sector.
It has been a much rockier ride for British households yet to retire. Once again, the only time a sustained real income increases for non-retired households was under Thatcher and Blair. Despite it all, household real incomes have doubled since the winter of discontent. The majority of that doubling was under the dead hand of Tony Blair. British Labour now spends a considerable amount of time repudiating that time of unusually rapid household income growth across all of British society.
Source: Release Edition Reference Tables – ONS.
Notes:
1 Households are ranked by their equivalised disposable incomes, using the modified-OECD scale.
2 1994/95 represents the financial year ending 1995, and similarly through to 2014/15, which represents the financial year ending 2015.
3 Income figures have been deflated to 2014/15 prices using an implied deflator for the household sector.
There was a step increase in the employment rate of single parents and in particular high school dropouts straight after the implementation of the 1996 US federal welfare reforms.
These single mothers who dropped out of high school were thought to be least employable and most at risk to the 1996 US welfare reform. There was a large increase in their employment and this massive improvement in their rates of employment is enduring to this day.
Zoe Williams is not grumbling about the failed states and predatory government responsible for the last pockets of extreme poverty, but about the inequality from economic progress under capitalism.
China and India escaped from extreme poverty by rejecting socialism.
Just released: new global poverty estimates from 1990-2015 using updated extreme poverty line http://t.co/LxD5q2n6Mg— Laurence Chandy (@laurencechandy) October 04, 2015
China and India received next to no overseas development assistance in their Great Escape from extreme poverty.
There’s been some clear-cut natural experiments such as between Chile and Venezuela and Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and just about any other developing country in terms of capitalism as the only path to prosperity.
Not all European welfare states are created equal. Denmark and Norway target a good two thirds or more of its public social benefits to the bottom to income quintiles. Sweden is not far behind as is Finland as targeted welfare states.
Germany by contrast spreads its largess from its welfare state almost identically across the entire income spectrum. France does not seem the see the poor as a priority for the welfare state with larges increasing with the richer you get. The British are a bit messy where they target a quarter of their welfare state to the poor but another 30% of public cash social benefits go to the working poor or whatever they may be called.
Australia does far better than any other country in targeting its welfare state to the bottom of the income distribution. Having an old age pension that is asset tested and income tested has a lot to do with that. New Zealand has an old age pension that is not income tested or asset tested. The USA has a contributory social insurance system that also ensures a considerable amount of its public social benefits are paid to the well off because they paid in Social Security taxes.
Rashbrooke then goes on to discuss how housing costs were not a main driver of the growing gap between the top 10% and the bottom 10% of the income distribution in New Zealand. My point is he is more concerned with the politics of envy than with building political support for action against poverty.
Rashbrooke showed that the main driver of poverty in New Zealand is rising housing costs. That is easy to redress but for the opposition of the left-wing parties to reforms to the Resource Management Act that will increase the supply of land and thereby drive down housing costs and rents.
Housing costs gobbled up much of the rising incomes of the poor for many years now in New Zealand as Rashbrooke showed today. The New Zealand Labor Party and New Zealand Greens are doing nothing about it. The regulatory constraints on the supply of land could be gone by lunchtime if the self-proclaimed champions of the poor and social justice supported the reform of the RMA.
The proposals of the New Zealand Labour Party and Greens for the government to build more houses is pointless unless there is more land is supplied. If there is no increase in land supply, all the building of more houses by government does is build the same houses of private developers would have built on the same fixed supply of land. There must be an increase in the supply of land to drive housing costs down for the poor.
According to the OECD, it is all about the ability to lower middle class and working class families to finance the human capital investments of their children. The OECD theory of inequality and lower growth is there is a financing constraint because of inequality that reduces economic growth because of less human capital accumulation by lower income families.
There are a few common patterns in economic growth. All high-income countries have near-universal K-12 public education to build up human capital, along with encouragement of higher education. All high-income countries have economies where most jobs are interrelated with private and public capital investment, thus leading to higher productivity and wages. All high-income economies are relatively open to foreign trade.
In addition, high-growth economies are societies that are willing to allow and even encourage a reasonable amount of disruption to existing patterns of jobs, consumption, and ownership. After all, economic growth means change.
One of the findings of the Coleman report in the 1960s, which is been pretty much backed up since then such as by top labour economists such as James Heckman, is family background is the key to skills development in children, not the quality of their schools or their access to finance for higher education.
Schools work with what families present to them in terms of innate ability, and personality traits such as to pay attention and work. There is not much difference between an average bad public school and an average good public school when it comes to getting on in life. Going to really bad public school is different from just going to an average bad public school in terms of the chaos imposes on a child’s education and upbringing. What matters is the home environment rather than the ability to access good schools and families of ordinary means to finance higher education for their teenagers.
Most of the skill gaps that are present at the age of 18 – skill gaps which substantially explain gaps in adult earnings and employment in all groups – are also present at the age of five (Cunha and Heckman 2007). There is much evidence to show that disadvantaged children have lower levels of soft skills (non-cognitive skills): motivation, persistence, self-discipline, the ability to work with others, the ability to defer gratification and plan ahead, etc. (Heckman 2008). Most of the skills that are acquired at school build on these soft skills that are moulded and reinforced within the family.
In 2002, with Pedro Carneiro, James Heckman showed that lack of access to credit is not a major constraint on the ability of young Americans to attend college. Short-term factors such as the ability to borrow to fund higher education has been found to be seriously wanting as an explanation for who and who does not go on to higher education.
Only a small percentage of young people are in any way constrained from going on to higher education because of the lack of money. This is not surprising in any society with student loans freely available at low or zero rates without any need to post collateral. Heavily subsidised tuition fees and cheap student loans have been around for several generations.
The biggest problem with the OECD hypothesis linking a lack of skill development within lower income and working class families is it is such an easy problem to solve for the ambitious politician of either the left or the right by throwing money at the problem. Schooling until the age of 16 has been free for a century and universities have been virtually free for at least two generations. Lack of access to a good education does not cut it as the explanation for large disparities in growth rates.
The OECD and more recently the IMF have placed a lot of weight in access to human capital as a driver of inequality because human capital accumulation is hypothesised to be a major driver of economic growth.
The evidence that human capital is a key contributor to higher economic growth is weakening rather than strengthening. If human capital accumulation is not a major driver of productivity growth and productivity disparities, the inequality and growth hypothesis of the OECD and the IMF based on access to finance for human capital accumulation does not get out of the gate. Moreover, as Aghion said:
Economists and others have proposed many channels through which education may affect growth–not merely the private returns to individuals’ greater human capital but also a variety of externalities.
For highly developed countries, the most frequently discussed externality is education investments’ fostering technological innovation, thereby making capital and labour more productive, generating income growth. Despite the enormous interest in the relationship between education and growth, the evidence is fragile at best.
The trend rate of productivity growth did not accelerate over the 20th century despite a massive rise in investments in human capital and R&D because of the rising cost of discovering and adapting new technological knowledge. The number of both R&D workers and highly educated workers increased many-fold over the 20th century in New Zealand and other OECD member countries including the global industrial leaders such as the USA, Japan and major EU member states.
Cross-country differences in total factor productivity are due to differences in the technologies that are actually used by a country and the degree in the efficiency with which these technologies are used. Differences in total factor productivity, rather than differences in the amount of human capital or physical capital per worker explain the majority of cross-country differences in per capita real incomes (Lucas 1990; Caselli 2005; Prescott 1998; Hall and Jones 1999; Jones and Romer 2010).
Differences in the skills of the individual worker or in the total stock of human capital of all workers in a country cannot explain cross national differences in value added per worker at the industry level.
The USA competes with Japan for productivity leadership in many manufacturing industries.
The Japanese services sector productivity can be as little as a one-third of that of the USA.
Japanese labour productivity is almost twice Germany’s in producing automobiles and is better that Germany by a large margin for many other manufactured goods.
The USA is uniformly more productive in services sector labour productivity. For example, British, French and German telecom workers were 38 to 56 per cent as productive as their American counter-parts.
The USA, Japan, France, the UK and Germany all have relatively well-educated, experienced and tested labour forces. For example, the 1993 McKinsey’s study inquired into the education and skills levels of Japanese and German steel workers. Comparably skilled German steel workers were half as productive as their Japanese counterparts (Prescott and Parente 2000, 2005).
The ability to finance human capital accumulation and go to good schools is a weak theory of inequality. Human capital accumulation itself is a weak theory of growth unless linked to sophisticated theories of the institutions fostering innovation and technology absorption which it now is.
Why Evolution is True is a blog written by Jerry Coyne, centered on evolution and biology but also dealing with diverse topics like politics, culture, and cats.
In Hume’s spirit, I will attempt to serve as an ambassador from my world of economics, and help in “finding topics of conversation fit for the entertainment of rational creatures.”
“We do not believe any group of men adequate enough or wise enough to operate without scrutiny or without criticism. We know that the only way to avoid error is to detect it, that the only way to detect it is to be free to inquire. We know that in secrecy error undetected will flourish and subvert”. - J Robert Oppenheimer.
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