Fast food pay gains outpacing the rest of the workforce blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015… | http://t.co/XNT3Jl0ifn—
Charts and Maps (@ChartsandMaps) April 07, 2015
Doing business in the PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain) – World Bank rankings
03 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, currency unions, economic growth, economics of bureaucracy, economics of regulation, Euro crisis, health and safety, income redistribution, industrial organisation, labour economics, law and economics, minimum wage, occupational regulation, property rights, Public Choice, rentseeking, survivor principle, unions, welfare reform Tags: cost of doing business, Eurosclerosis, Greece, Italy, PIGS, Portugal, Spain
Figure 1: Doing Business rankings, PIGS, 2014
Source: World Bank Doing Business 2015.
All in all, Italy and Greece are a dog of a place to enforce a contract. The long-suffering taxpayer is better off paying taxes in Greece than in Italy! Not surprisingly, trading across borders is the greatest strength in doing business in the PIGS. The European Union does have some benefits.
Figure 2: Doing Business rankings, Greece and Italy, 2014
Source: World Bank Doing Business 2015.
All in all, Italy and Greece are equally bad places to do business and Italy is much worse when it comes to taxes. About the only saving graces of Italy is the registration of property and the protection of minority interests in companies.
Figure 3: Doing Business rankings, Spain and Portugal, 2014
Source: World Bank Doing Business 2015.
Spain and in particular Portugal are much better places to do business than Italy and Greece.
More minimum wage job replacement units spotted
26 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in industrial organisation, labour economics, labour supply, minimum wage, survivor principle, unions Tags: antimarket bias, creative destruction, expressive voting, technological unemployment
The costs of teacher tenure in the USA
18 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of education, labour economics, labour supply, law and economics, managerial economics, occupational choice, organisational economics, personnel economics, rentseeking, unions Tags: employment protection laws
How to argue against employment protection laws while arguing for additional employment regulation
17 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in human capital, job search and matching, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, minimum wage, unions Tags: climate law, efficiency wage, employment at will, employment protection law, fixed costs of employment, fixed costs of working, flexible working hours, living wage, paid leave, Richard Ebstein
The Centre for American Progress recently published an excellent survey of the costs to employers of hiring and training new recruits. As the paper notes:
it is costly to replace workers because of the productivity losses when someone leaves a job, the costs of hiring and training a new employee, and the slower productivity until the new employee gets up to speed in their new job.
Our analysis reviews 30 case studies in 11 research papers published between 1992 and 2007 that provide estimates of the cost of turnover, finding that businesses spend about one-fifth of an employee’s annual salary to replace that worker.
The purpose of the research published by the Centre for American Progress was to argue there were large costs to employers from replacing even low paid workers and there are a workplace policies such as paid family leave and workplace flexibility will reduce these job turnover costs to employers.
Similar arguments are used to justify a living wage on efficiency grade wage grounds. A living wage would reduce job turnover and therefore the costs to employers of job turnover in the jobs.
The research published by the Centre for American Progress also illustrates the bargaining power of workers. Employers who failed to treat workers fairly and pay them the going wage risk an increase in job quit rates. These large costs of job turnover have been carefully documented by the Centre for American Progress.
Beyond jobs data: Industries w/ better pay have lower worker turnover rates equitablegrowth.org/news/looking-b… http://t.co/gug33EbYy3—
Equitable Growth (@equitablegrowth) July 03, 2015
Employers incur fixed costs of employment when they recruit and train new employees. These recruits must be expected to stay long enough to work sufficient hours for the firm to expect to recover these investments (Oi (1962, 1983a, 1990), Idson and Oi (1999), Hutchens (2010), Hutchens and Grace-Martin (2006)).
These costs are fixed costs because they do not vary with how many hours the employee works or with how long an employee stays with their employer. These fixed employment costs must be recouped over the expected job tenure of the employee with the firm. Employers will not hire an additional worker unless they anticipate recovering the costs of doing do including fixed employment costs and other overheads.
Central to arguments such as by Richard Epstein for employment at will is the threat of the employee to quit imposes a real cost on employers which the employer will seek to avoid by treating their employees well.
The best way to prevent exploitation of workers is to make hiring and firing easy, facilitate new entry by firms into all markets and promote full employment – a worker with other available job opportunities is difficult to exploit.
With large fixed costs of recruitment and training, employers cannot afford to behave whimsically if they wish to survive in competition with the rival firms with more competitive wage and employment policies.
By the same token, the large fixed costs of employment documented by the Centre for American Progress illustrate the large investments employers must risk to recruit a new employee.
If this large investment in recruitment doesn’t turn out well, but is difficult to get out of because of strict employment laws, employers will be more reluctant in the first instance to risk this investment because they are risking several months wages in fixed costs of employment. As Richard Epstein explained:
A second great advantage of the at-will system is that it supplies an informal method of bonding that keeps both sides in line.
The employer who tries to take advantage of the employee by altering working conditions for the worse will be met by the threat to quit, for now the deal is worth less to the employee than the wage received.
So long as markets are competitive the switching costs will be relatively low – lower in fact than they are in a highly regulated world where employers have to think twice before taking on a worker whom they may be unable to fire if things do not work out.
Yet on the other side, the employee who takes it easy on the job is faced with dismissal because he is no longer worth his wages.
But even here management will hesitate to dismiss for good reasons. One is the very substantial costs of recruiting and training a replacement who might or might not turn out to be better than the worker who was dismissed. The second is that unjust dismissals could induce other workers to leave while the going is good, thereby compounding the problem of recruitment and retention.
The Centre for American Progress was good enough to document the very substantial costs of recruiting and training a replacement employee. As the Centre for American Progress explained in their paper, employers have every reason to protect their investments in training and recruitment by minimising job turnover costs.
Milton Friedman on the essence of the Age of the Worker
13 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, economic growth, economic history, health and safety, income redistribution, industrial organisation, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, Milton Friedman, occupational choice, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, Public Choice, rentseeking, unions Tags: competition and monopoly, The Great Enrichment, union power, union wage premium
Union membership varies by a lot more than do wages between countries
13 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in labour economics, politics - Australia, politics - USA, unions Tags: trade union density, union power, union wage premium
Union membership
Finland 69%
Sweden 68
Canada 27
UK 26
Japan 19
Australia 19
Germany 18
US 11
Korea 10
Turkey 5 http://t.co/03cRHnbLlH—
Conrad Hackett (@conradhackett) March 28, 2015
Why no (top 1% driven) middle class wage stagnation in (non-unionised) technologically progressive industries?
11 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
.@CEAChair: Higher productivity needed for increases in income on.wsj.com/1E4jGDQ @MarkMuro1 Agreed. Proof here http://t.co/oZ76aeQdiq—
Jonathan T. Rothwell (@jtrothwell) March 11, 2015
Wages & productivity are growing together in high R&D-STEM industries brook.gs/1D5Pqxc @CEAChair @MarkMuro1 http://t.co/fe5MDomJqE—
Jonathan T. Rothwell (@jtrothwell) March 11, 2015
Why did the top 1% only pick on men when they increased inequality over recent decades?
06 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in discrimination, gender, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, unions Tags: gender wage gap, middle class stagnation, reversing gender gap, superstar wages, superstars, top 1%, wage stagnation
Gender pay gap in corporate America twitter.com/BuzzFeedAndrew… http://t.co/AOFxcUQ8Rk—
Charts and Maps (@ChartsandMaps) April 12, 2015
French, German, Italian and British trade union densities, 1960 – 2013
04 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economic history, labour economics, unions Tags: British economy, France, Germany, Italy, trade union density, union power
Figure 1: French, German, Italian and British trade union densities, 1960 – 2013
Source: OECD Stat Extract
Unions have been on the way out for a long time
03 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economic history, labour economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, unions Tags: the withering away of the proletariat, union power, union wage premium
The economics of low wages: When what comes down doesn’t go up econ.st/1zlP1G0 http://t.co/AujgeDIAUX—
The Economist (@EconEconomics) May 02, 2015
Many unions have exemptions from local minimum wage laws they helped pass
31 May 2015 Leave a comment
in income redistribution, labour economics, minimum wage, politics - USA, Public Choice, rentseeking, unions Tags: bootleggers and baptists, cartels, rent seeking, union power, union wage premium
The Problem With Unions
26 May 2015 Leave a comment
in labour economics, unions Tags: union membership, union power, union wage premium, voter demographics
As wages go nowhere, labor unions are increasingly making sense to American workers read.bi/1WzeXX4 http://t.co/sbxQzcuUkC—
BI Markets (@themoneygame) August 17, 2015
From a macro-level by Richard Posner:
Current union hostility to immigrant workers is consistent with the unions’ former hostility to blacks and women–which is to say, to workers willing to work for a wage below the union wage. And by raising labor costs, unions accelerate the substitution of capital for labor, further depressing the demand for labor and hence average wages. Union workers, in effect, exploit nonunion workers, as well as reducing the overall efficiency of the economy. The United Auto Workers has done its part to place the Detroit auto industry on the road to ruin.
From a micro-level by Pajamas Media:
One afternoon I was helping oversee the plant while upper management was off site. The workers brought an RV into the loading yard with a female “entertainer” who danced for them and then “entertained” them in the RV. With no other management around, I went…
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