Time I want back on my deathbed: listening to social credit and other monetary cranks

I lost a good 15 minutes of my life that I will not get back on my deathbed listening to some monetary cranks at a Meet the Candidates forum last night for the New Zealand general election.

Monetary cranks advocate boundless inflation and credit expansion as the patent medicine for all our economic ills:

those who have Found the Light about Money take up their pens and write, with a conviction, a persistence and a devotion otherwise only found among the disciples of a new religion.

It is easy to scoff at these productions: it is not so easy always to see exactly where they go wrong. It is natural that practical bankers, vaguely conscious that the projects of monetary cranks are dangerous to society, should cling in self-defence to the solid rock, or what they believe to be so, of tradition and accepted practice. But it is not open to the detached student of economics to take refuge from dangerous innovation in blind conservatism.

D.H. Robertson (1928)

Listening to these monetary cranks in the audience last night rates with the worst movies I have ever ever seen for time I want back my deathbed. I think the worst movie I have ever seen was Absolute Beginners starring David Bowie. After that it, might be Last Tango in Paris.

These particular monetary cranks  with their obsessions about factional reserve banking are from the social credit party in New Zealand. They are followers of Major C.H. Douglas, whom Keynes referred to as a:

private, perhaps, but not a major in the brave army of heretics

Social credit  and other monetary cranks believe that all the world’s problems will be sold if the reserve bank prints money and they seem to think that was really easy because there is a fractional reserve banking system.

No one in the room who knew better wanted to lose more time that they wanted back on their deathbed explaining why printing money doesn’t make you richer. The “money is wealth” error is the  defining affliction of the monetary  crank.

The good economist will know that money creation is no short-cut to wealth. Only the production of valued goods and services in a market which reflects the consumer’s  willingness to pay can relieve poverty and promote prosperity. A people are prosperous to the extent they possess goods and services, not money. All the money in the world—paper or metallic—will still leave one starving if goods and services are not available.

Obviously, none of them were persuaded by the quantity theory of money: if you increase the supply of money without a matching increase in the rate of real growth in the production of goods and services, you’ll have more money chasing the same amount of goods so prices will go up. It’s called inflation. Printing money creates inflation.

There is a school of thought in economic school, the Austrian school of economics, does get excited about fractional reserve banking. The reason it does is to explain how fractional reserve banking creates inflation and promotes the business cycle.

A cycle of booms and busts is not looked upon as a good thing by the Austrian school of economics.

The Austrian school wants to get rid of fractional reserve banking as a way of reducing inflation and reducing the possibility of a loose monetary policy causing booms and busts in the economy.

These monetary cranks from social credit  party honestly believed that printing more money will make you wealthier. Thankfully no one asked them to explain their position.

A few supporters of the monetary cranks in the audience asked other members of their views on the ideas of these monetary cranks. Sensibly, they all gave short answers that did not provoke them further and waste more of their precious life listening to them talk  nonsense.

If printing money was a winner,  as with any populist policy that has a half a chance of working, the parties of the centre-left and centre right would be all over it like flies to s…

Milton Friedman’s analysis of the Japanese recession of the 1990s

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Henry Simons on John Keynes

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Murray Rothbard explains Keynesian macroeconomics

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Recall and waiting unemployment

Time use surveys in a range of countries show that the unemployed spend maybe a few hours per week looking for a new job. Krueger and Mueller (2008) found that:

…average search time is highest in the U.S.A., at 32.3 minutes per day, closely followed by Canada.

Europeans search much less, but there is considerable variation across countries.

In France the unemployed search around 21 minutes a day compared with 3 minutes in Finland

A small amount of job search per week is rational for many of the unemployed because a major form of job search doesn’t involve any job search any time soon. Instead, they are waiting for a call.

Also, Anglo-Saxon labour market are  much more dynamic with many more vacancies opening every month  as compared with the Eurosclerosis dual labour markets. In the European Union’s dual labour markets, it is not rational to search for vacancies that will never be there.

Job searches is an entrepreneurial venture that can involve a considerable amount of biding your time. Job seekers must choose between wider job search that may involve switching to a new industry or new occupation and investing in availability for suitable vacancies in their local labour markets or a recall to employment by old employers.

A spell of unemployment followed by a rehire by an old employer is known as recall unemployment or a temporary layoff.

Demand is less stable and more seasonal in industries such as construction, manufacturing and agriculture. When demand rebounds, recalling an old employee is a faster and cheaper hiring process than screening unfamiliar applicants of uncertain quality and training recruits.

Recall is not certain. Temporary layoffs will forecast their chances of recall and review these forecasts as they discover more about the length of drop in local labour demand and the general state of the rest of the labour market.  the majority of unemployed who  regard themselves as temporary layoffs are indeed recalled  to their old job by their old employer after most downturns.

Better prospects of recall by old employers will reduce the intensity of job searches of temporary layoffs and increase their asking wages for other jobs. Workers with considerable industry and firm-specific human capital are likely to risk waiting longer for recall. Workers will search more intensively for other jobs as their forecasts of their chances of recall to old jobs become less encouraging.

There are more temporary layoffs in milder recessions because the lull in demand is expected to be short and there are fewer business closures. The higher levels of recall unemployment will reduce downward pressure on asking wages and slow the filling of vacancies because many well qualified job applicants are waiting for recall to their old jobs rather than applying more widely for new jobs.

Dixon and Crichton (2006) found that 58% of New Zealand benefit-to-work transitions involved starting with a new employer, 30% continued with an employer for whom they worked part-time in the benefit spell and 12% returned to an employer they had worked for in the past 2 years. The prospect of a recall by an old employer has been important for unemployed workers in countries such as the US, Canada, Demark, Sweden, Austria and Norway.

In the context of work-for-the-dole schemes and activation programmes that involve intensive monitoring of job search by the unemployed on unemployment benefits, requiring  workers who are temporarily laid off to search for jobs is in many ways counter-productive.

Developing a screening mechanism to find these temporary layoffs and distinguishing them from permanent layoffs would be quite challenging. Countries which have unemployment insurance premiums spend a lot of try trying to adjust those premiums for temporary layoffs. This is so employers and employees do not take advantage of unemployment insurance to have a week or two off work in slack periods at the expense of the unemployment insurance system and top up their wages in the interim.

A cousin of recall unemployment is  rest unemployment or waiting unemployment – job seekers who are waiting for conditions in a depressed sector to improve (Hamilton 1988; Alvarez and Shimer 2008).

Some job seekers may wait for local labour market conditions to improve, rather than search for jobs in other industries and new occupations. A job seeker’s old industry may offer better wage and job finding prospects than other industries If the  newly unemployed worker waits a while. 

Rest unemployment or waiting unemployment strives to salvage as much of the occupation and industry-specific human capital  of the  newly unemployed worker as possible.

A significant share of job seekers have been found to be waiting for local labour market conditions to improve rather than searching further afield  in different industries or new occupations (Alvarez and Shimer 2008).

Again, rest unemployment or waiting unemployment is a type of job search that cannot be well handled by work-for-the-dole schemes and intensive monitoring of the job search of unemployed workers.

Job finding rates under work for the dole when there is involuntary unemployment

Jeff Borland is a critic of work for the dole. He points out that they do not improve the job finding rates of participants and in fact reduce the amount of job search because work for the Dole participants are busy undertaking work for the dole requirements:

The main reason is that participation in the program diverts participants from job seeking activity towards Work for the Dole activity. Research on similar programs internationally has come up with comparable findings.

This made me wonder. If unemployment is caused by deficient aggregate demand, and otherwise is involuntary, how can work for the dole increase unemployment or reduce the rate at which people exit unemployment?

‘Involuntary’ unemployment occurs when all those willing and able to work at the given real wage but no job is available, i.e. the economy is below full employment. A worker is ‘involuntary’ unemployment if he or she would accept a job at the given real wage. Keynesians believe money wages are slow to adjust (e.g. due to money illusion, fixed contracts or because employers and employees want long run money wage stability), and so the real wage may no adjust to clear the labour market: there can be ‘involuntary’ unemployment.

Under the deficient aggregate demand theory of unemployment, people have no control over why they are unemployed – that’s why their unemployment is involuntary.

Sticky wages are no less sticky when work for the dole is introduced and people search more intensively for jobs. Deficient demand unemployment is no less deficient when there is an increase in job search intensity.

Work for the dole must be carefully defined, of course, to differentiate it from the failed active labour market programs of the past that attempted to improve the employability of the unemployed. By work for the dole, I simply mean mandatory work requirements simply make it more of an ordeal to be on unemployment and thereby encourage people to find a job.

Mandatory work requirements simply tax leisure. By taxing leisure,  mandatory work requirements  change the work leisure trade-off between unemployment and seeking a job with greater zeal and a lower asking wage more attractive option. More applicants asking for lower wages will mean employers can fill jobs faster and at lower wages, which means our create more jobs in the first place.

The probability of finding a job for an unemployed worker depends on how hard this individual searches and how many jobs are available: Chance of Finding Job = Search Effort x Job Availability

Both the search effort of the unemployed and job creation decisions by employers are potentially affected by unemployment benefit generosity and mandatory work for welfare benefits requirements.

Modern theory of the labour market, based on Mortensen and Pissarides provides that more generous unemployment benefits put upward pressure on wages the unemployed seek. If wages go up, holding worker productivity constant, the amount left to cover the cost of job creation by firms declines, leading to a decline in job creation.

Everything else equal under the labour macroeconomics workhorse search and matching model of the labour market, reducing the rewards of being unemployed exerts downward pressure on the equilibrium wage. This fall in asking wages increases the profits employers receive from filled jobs, leading to more vacancy creation. More vacancies imply a higher finding rate for workers, which leads to less unemployment.  The vacancy creation decision is based on comparing the cost of creating a job to the profits the firm expects to obtain from hiring the worker.

When unemployment benefits are less generous or more onerous work requirements are attached, some of the unemployed will become less choosey about the jobs they seek in the wages they will accept.  a number of people at the margin between working or not. An example is commuting distance  to jobs. A number of people turn down a job  because is just that little too far to commute. A small change in the cost of  accepting that job would have resulted in them moving from being unemployed to fully employed.

Unemployment is easy to explain in modern labour macroeconomics: it takes time for a job seeker to find a suitable job with a firm that wishes to hire him or her; it takes time for a firm to fill a vacancy. Search is required on both sides of the labour market  –  there are always would-be workers searching for jobs, and firms searching for workers to fill vacancies.

In a recession, a large number of jobs are destroyed at the same time. It takes time for these unemployed workers to be reallocated new jobs.  It takes time for firms to find where it is profitable to create new jobs and find workers suitable to fill these new jobs.

Recessions are reorganisations. Unemployed workers look for jobs, and firms open vacancies to maximize their profits. Matching  unemployed workers with  new firms firms is a time-consuming and costly process.

The contribution of the random fortunes of large firms to business cycle volatility, or how a single, small, dirty pipe threatened to bring a nation to its knees

One contaminated pipe at a milk processing factory of New Zealand’s largest company, Fonterra, New Zealand’s largest company (7% of GDP) and largest exporter caused such a loss of brand-name value of the company that the New Zealand Treasury revised down its GDP forecasts for the year.

It is a little bit scary to wonder what kind of nation we live in when a single, small, dirty pipe threatens to bring the nation to its knees. That indeed was the fear when, over the weekend, Fonterra announced the contamination of a small amount of whey powder from a Waikato processing plant – Bank of New Zealand

This growth forecast revision after the milk contamination scandal, but turn out to be false reading, is a good example of how the random fortunes of individual large companies can have economy-wide implications and can even lead to recessions.

Figure 1: Sector’s concentration (Herfindahl Index) and sector’s contribution to aggregate volatility

Source:  (Gabaix 2011).

There is growing evidence that idiosyncratic shocks to the fortunes of the 100 largest firms arising from changes in demand and cost conditions in their local and export markets combine to contribute about one-third of up-swings and downswings in U.S. output and employment (Gabaix 2011).

In an economy dominated by a few large firms, idiosyncratic shocks to large firms do not cancel out. The ups and downs in the individual fortunes of very large firms combine with firm-to-firm linkages to travel far beyond the firm and sector of origin (Gabaix 2011). These effects are likely to be stronger outside of the USA because it has a more diversified economy than most countries (Gabaix 2011).

Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010) found that having fewer and less diversified firms and exports dominated by large firms helps to explain why small, more open economies such as New Zealand are more volatile. Fonterra accounts for 7 per cent of GDP and 20 per cent of overall exports. Drought is important to the New Zealand business cycle and agricultural exports (Buckle, Kim, Kirkham, McLellan and Sharma 2007).

As another example of the importance of a few large firms, Samsung and Hyundai account for 35 per cent of Korean exports and 22 per cent of Korean GDP.It would not be a good idea for the chief executives of those two Korean businesses to travel in the same car and have an accident.

Finland was monikered the one-firm economy because Nokia was responsible for 1/5th of Finnish economic growth, exports and company tax revenues for two decades. Nokia shares initially fell by 90 per cent in 2007 when Apple leap-frogged it with an iPhone that resembled a PC. The loss of one product development race imperilled the foundation of one-fifth of Finnish economic growth.

The literature on the contribution of large firms to business cycle volatility is a good examples of how the real business cycle theory is alive and well and is a progressive research programme.

The shape of recoveries from recessions

Milton Friedman (1993) proposed a model of the depth of recessions and steepness of recoveries built on two empirical regularities:

  • output is on average below a ceiling defined by supply capacity and tends back to this ceiling; and
  • large contractions are followed by large expansions and mild contractions are followed by mild expansions.

The strength of a recovery should be positively correlated with depth of the recession but there should be no correlation between expansions and recessions (Friedman 1993; Alchian 1969).

The figure below illustrates Friedman’s model, which likens the time path of output to a string on the underside of an upward sloping board that is plucked downward at random intervals to various extents into busts that are followed by booms.

Source: Garrison (1996).

The upward sloping board plotted as a thick line in the figure represents a ceiling on feasible output and employment in a given year that is set by resource and technology availabilities. The upward slope of this board accounts for trend real GDP growth over time due to technological progress and other factors.

The business cycle starts with a bust caused by an adverse policy or other shock and is then followed by a boom as the market self-adjusts and the policy errors are reversed. Without the initial adverse policy or other shock, there would neither be a bust nor a boom.

The correlation between busts and booms arises from the monetary contraction that caused the bust eventually inducing an offsetting correction in monetary policy.

The monetary contraction that pushed or plucked output below the upward sloping ceiling is later followed by a monetary expansion that offset the earlier contraction. With the amplitude of monetary expansions correlated to offset the prior contractions, GDP growth will have similar plucks or falls and rebounds to the upward sloping output ceiling because of the link albeit with a lag between monetary growth and output fluctuations. The increases and decreases in monetary growth are independent policy choices with unique causes.

The associated upward and downward movements in GDP growth are not correlated with each other but should be correlated with the prior fluctuations in monetary growth. There would not be a bust and later boom if there is no monetary contraction to start the cycle. This is why Friedman (1993) proposed that the depths of busts are unrelated to the duration and strength of prior economic booms.

The leads and lags on monetary policy are long and variable

Many Keynesians, Friedman notes, advocate “leaning against the wind.” By this they mean, in some sense, that the monetary (and fiscal) authorities should try to balance out the private sector’s excesses rather than passively hope that it adjusts on its own.

There are large uncertainties about the size and timing of responses to changes in monetary policy. There is a close and regular relationship between the quantity of money and nominal income and prices over the years. However, the same relation is much looser from month to month, quarter to quarter and even year to year.

Monetary policy changes take time to affect the economy and this time delay is itself highly variable. The lags on monetary policy are three in all:

  1. The lag between the need for action and the recognition of this need (the recognition lag)

  2. The lag between recognition and the taking of action (the legislation lag)

  3. the lag between action and its effects (the implementation lag)

These delays mean that is it difficult to ascertain whether the effects of monetary policy changes in the recent past have finished taking effect. Secondly, it is difficult to ascertain when proposed changes in monetary policy will take effect. Thirdly, feedbacks must be assessed. The magnitude of the monetary adjustment necessary to deal with the problem at hand is thus never obvious. It is common for a central bank to act incrementally. The central bank makes small adjustments to monetary conditions over time as more information is available on the state of the economy and forecasts are updated.

The existence of lags may mean that by the time policy has its full effect, the problem with which it was meant to deal may have disappeared.

Milton Friedman (1959) tested the Fed’s success at leaning “against the wind” by checking whether the rate of money growth has truly been lower during expansions and higher during contractions. He admits that this method of grading he Fed’s performance is open to criticism, but he decided to go ahead and see what turns up.  Friedman found that Fed has – for the periods surveyed – been unsuccessful.

By this criterion, for eight peacetime reference cycles from March 1919 to April 1958. Actual policy was in the ‘right’ direction in 155 months, in the ‘wrong’ direction in 226 months; so actual policy was ‘better’ than the [constant 4% rate of money growth] rule in 41% of the months.

Nor is the objection that the inter-war period biased his study is good since Friedman found that:

For the period after World War II alone, the results were only slightly more favourable to actual policy according to this criterion: policy was in the ‘right’ direction in 71 months, in the ‘wrong’ direct in 79 months, so actual policy was better than the rule in 47% of the months.

One of the best ways to parry a metaphor is with another metaphor. Keynesians have a host of metaphors in their rhetorical arsenal; one frequently voiced is that a wise government should “lean against the wind” when choosing policy. Friedman counters:

We seldom know which way the economic wind is blowing until several months after the event, yet to be effective, we need to know which way the wind is going to be blowing when the measures we take now will be effective, itself a variable date that may be a half year or a year or two from now. Leaning today against next year’s wind is hardly an easy task in the present state of meteorology.

Friedman’s remarks, as even his strong critics admit, are mighty and strike at the heart of any activist stabilisation policy. By meeting Keynesians on their own theoretical turf and scrutinising their practice, Friedman manages to produce objections that both Keynesians and non-Keynesians must take seriously. A key part of any response to Friedman rests on the ability of forecasters to do their jobs with tolerable accuracy.

Keynesian policies do not necessarily follow even if the Keynesian theory of the business cycle were conclusively proved. It must also be demonstrated that the government has the ability and willingness of the government to act as the theory prescribes. Friedman’s critique does not depend on the quantity theory of money.

Wrong from the start – Joseph Stiglitz

A man of his times, back in 1996, smoking Joe Stiglitz used to be an admirer of the Japanese banking system because of its long-range thinking and lending

Cooperative behaviour between firms and their banks was also evident in the operations of capital markets.

In Japan each firm had a long-standing relationship with a single bank, and that bank played a large role in the affairs of the firm.

Japanese banks, unlike American banks, are allowed to own shares in the firms to which they lend, and when their client firms are in trouble, they step in. (The fact that the bank owns shares in the firm means that there is a greater coincidence of interest than there would be if the bank were simply a creditor; see Stiglitz 1985.)

This pattern of active involvement between lenders and borrowers is seen in other countries of East Asia and was actively encouraged by governments.

That  praise of the Japanese banking system in 1996 did not stop him criticising the Japanese Zombie banks in 2009. Shame, Stiglitz, shame.

Note: A zombie bank is a bank with an economic net worth of less than zero but continues to operate because its ability to repay its debts is shored up by implicit or explicit government credit support.

Keynesian macroeconomics as a form of juvenile real business cycle theory (RBC)

Keynesian macroeconomics postulated that the economy slips into recessions for all sorts of reasons such as shifts and turns in the animal spirits and a loss of consumer confidence leading to a fall in autonomous investment and autonomous consumption. A collapse in autonomous investment and autonomous consumption is the Keynesian explanation for the great depression.

Both Keynesian macroeconomics and real business cycle theories, at least at the outset couldn’t explain why there were recessions. Both attributed to them to causes they were yet to explain. Keynesian macroeconomics  could not explain what drove the waves of optimism and pessimism that  either sharply increased or reduced investment.

Real business cycle theorists attributed recessions and booms to productivity drops in productivity surges, which initially were not explained in themselves. This theory sees productivity shocks as the cause of economic fluctuations. For example, if productivity falls, current returns to working and investing decline, so workers and firms choose to work and invest less and take more leisure. Real business-cycle theory views a recession as the optimal response by households and firms to a shift in productivity.

At least Prescott and other real business cycle theorists accepted that they must eventually unpack productivity drops and name causes that can be explored further and perhaps found persuasive or perhaps wanting.

Keynesian macroeconomics was quite happy to live with the waves of optimism and pessimism of the animal spirits that drove investors to push the economy into recessions. In his General Theory of Employment Interest and Money) Keynes puts it this way,

Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as the result of animal spirits – a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities.

A far better explanation of the animal spirits is there is a productivity drop in one sector of the economy that leads that sector to reduce its demand for inputs supplied by the rest of the economy. This reduction in demand spreads across the economy. The slowdown in the economy is attributed to this  reduction in demand, rather than the forces behind it,  which is a fall in productivity in one sector of the economy.

Long and Plosser in 1983  wrote a famous article where they were able to generate business cycles in an economy  with rational expectations, complete current information, stable preferences,  no technical change,  no long-lived commodities, no frictions and adjustments cost,  no government, no money  and no serial dependence in the stochastic elements of the environment.

In response to a productivity disturbance in one sector this economy,  consumers will smooth a change in their consumption possibilities and production possibilities over a number of  quarters  by saving  and dissaving and varying the amount of time they devote to work and leisure and they will invest more or less in light of the changing situation.

This  consumption smoothing  is enough to generate a slowdown in the economy from changes in one sector. Laid-off workers in the sector subject to a disturbance will take time to find jobs in other sectors of the economy and  will be unemployed in this interim period of job search. Other workers who were previously employed in the sector subject to the productivity decline might wait for prospects to improve in that sector rather than search for a job in another occupation or location.

As research progressed, real business cycles were  viewed as recurrent fluctuations in an economy’s incomes, products, and factor inputs—especially labour—due to changes in technology, tax rates and government spending, tastes, government regulation, terms of trade, and energy prices. In his Nobel lecture Ed Prescott explained that:

We learned that business cycle fluctuations are the optimal response to real shocks.

The cost of a bad shock cannot be avoided, and policies that attempt to do so will be counterproductive, particularly if they reduce production efficiency.

During the 1981 and current oil crises, I was pleased that policies were not instituted that adversely affected the economy by reducing production efficiency. This is in sharp contrast to the oil crisis in 1974 when, rather than letting the economy respond optimally to a bad shock so as to minimize its cost, policies were instituted that adversely affected production efficiency and depressed the economy much more than it would otherwise have been.

By the time Keynesian macroeconomics papered over the flaws mighty exposed by the 1970s stagflation, it rebranded itself New Keynesian macroeconomics. This is no more than becoming monetarist macroeconomists without having to admit all of your previous criticisms of Friedman were wrong.

At bottom, Keynesian macroeconomics makes an unjustified assumption that technological progress unfolds at a relatively smooth rate, and changes in government regulation, terms of trade, and energy prices were not important sources of economic fluctuations. As for tax rates and government spending, Keynesian macroeconomists saw these is a solution to recessions rather than their cause.

In time, real business cycles theory and Schumpeterian theories of business cycles will merge. new inventions and processes that are, by the nature of research and development, stochastically discovered. Part of this randomness in discovery will be that the emergence from time to time of great interventions –  general purpose technologies -that result in economy wide changes and a wave of secondary inventions and the retraining of the workforce and reallocation of many workers into new sectors of the economy. These great inventions can be anything from electricity to information and computer technology and the Internet

If there is such a thing as a liquidity trap, bring it on!

In the Keynesian pipedream, in a liquidity trap, there is perfect substitutability of money and bonds at a zero short-term nominal interest rate. This renders monetary policy ineffective.

Keynesians claim that the demand for money may be so persistently high that the rate of interest could not fall low enough to stimulate investment sufficiently to raise the economy out of the depression. Allan Meltzer explains:

A liquidity trap means that increases in money by the central bank (monetary base) cannot affect output, prices, interest rates or other variables. Changes in the money stock are entirely matched by changes in the demand to hold money.

With a liquidity trap, the public simply hoards the money the central bank creates rather than attempting to run down additions to their cash balances with increased consumer expenditure. This limitless accumulation of money by the public is not a real world phenomenon. The public will not forever accumulate money.

Auerbach and Obstfeld noted in "The Case for Open-Market Purchases in a Liquidity Trap" that to the extent that long-term interest rates are positive short-term interest rates are expected to be positive in the future, trading money for interest-bearing public debt through open market operations reduces future debt-service requirements.

  • A massive monetary expansion during a liquidity trap should improve social welfare by reducing the taxes required in the future to service the now much smaller national debt!!!!
  • A quantitative easing during a liquidity trap is, in effect, as good as or even better than a lump sum tax.

Central banks perhaps should contrive liquidity traps because they can then buy back the public debt because of the unlimited demand for money.

The logic of the liquidity trap is people will without limit give up bonds for non-interest bearing cash. If monetary policy is impotent near the zero bound, the central bank should buy trillions of dollars of federal bonds and payoff the public debt. This is a logical implication of liquidity traps for an optimal fiscal policy!!!! Is my reasoning wrong?

In addition to D.H. Robertson, Jacob Viner, Milton Friedman, Philip Cagan, Don Patinkin, Auerbach and Obstfeld, Robert H. Lucas, Greg Mankiw, and Bernanke and Blinder as sceptics about a liquidity trap, Keynes wrote in 1936:

Whilst the limiting case might become practically important in future, I know of no example of it hitherto. Indeed, owing to the unwillingness of most monetary authorities to deal boldly in debts of long term, there has not been much opportunity for a test.

Meltzer, who wrote A History of the Federal Reserve, Vol. 1: 1913-1951 points to several periods when interest rates were at or close to zero:

“In 1954, interest rates were 0.5 percent or below, and we had no problem recovering,” he says. “In 1948 to 1949, we had zero interest rates. Also in 1937 to 1938. We had no problem recovering.”

The Pigou effect states that when there is deflation of prices, employment (and output) will be increased due to an increase in wealth (and thus consumption). The deflation increases the value of cash balances and therefore the wealth of consumers. They spend some of this additional wealth.

After reading the annual reports of the Fed in the 1920s and 1930s, Milton Friedman noticed the following pattern:

In the years of prosperity, monetary policy is a potent weapon, the skilful handling of which deserves the credit for the favourable course of events; in years of adversity, other forces are the important sources of economic change, monetary policy had little leeway, and only the skilful handling of the exceedingly limited powers available prevented conditions from being even worse

Is unemployment voluntary or involuntary?

Robert Lucas in a famous 1978 paper argued that all unemployment was voluntary because involuntary unemployment was a meaningless concept. He said as follows:

The worker who loses a good job in prosperous time does not volunteer to be in this situation: he has suffered a capital loss. Similarly, the firm which loses an experienced employee in depressed times suffers an undesirable capital loss.

Nevertheless the unemployed worker at any time can always find some job at once, and a firm can always fill a vacancy instantaneously. That neither typically does so by choice is not difficult to understand given the quality of the jobs and the employees which are easiest to find.

Thus there is an involuntary element in all unemployment, in the sense that no one chooses bad luck over good; there is also a voluntary element in all unemployment, in the sense that however miserable one’s current work options, one can always choose to accept them.

I agree that we all make choices subject to constraints. To say that a choice is involuntary because it is constrained by a scarcity of job-opportunities information is to say that choices are involuntary because there is scarcity.

Alchian said there are always plenty of jobs because to suppose the contrary suggests that scarcity has been abolished. Lucas elaborated further in 1987 in Models of Business Cycles:

A theory that does deal successfully with unemployment needs to address two quite distinct problems.

One is the fact that job separations tend to take the form of unilateral decisions – a worker quits, or is laid off or fired – in which negotiations over wage rates play no explicit role.

The second is that workers who lose jobs, for whatever reason, typically pass through a period of unemployment instead of taking temporary work on the ‘spot’ labour market jobs that are readily available in any economy.

Of these, the second seems to me much the more important: it does not ‘explain’ why someone is unemployed to explain why he does not have a job with company X. After all, most employed people do not have jobs with company X either.

To explain why people allocate time to a particular activity – like unemployment – we need to know why they prefer it to all other available activities: to say that I am allergic to strawberries does not ‘explain’ why I drink coffee. Neither of these puzzles is easy to understand within a Walrasian framework, and it would be good to understand both of them better, but I suggest we begin by focusing on the second of the two.

Another way to understand unemployment is to use a device at the start of Alan Manning’s book on labour market monopsony:

What happens if an employer cuts the wage it pays its workers by one cent? Much of labour economics is built on the assumption that all existing workers immediately leave the firm as that is the implication of the assumption of perfect competition in the labour market.

In such a situation an employer faces a market wage for each type of labour determined by forces beyond its control at which any number of these workers can be hired but any attempt to pay a lower wage will result in the complete inability to hire any of them at all

Suppose workers offered to work for 1 cent. Would employers accept? Many do because they have intern and work experience programmes for students, but is this result of general application?

Understanding the reallocation of labour at the end of the recession requires careful attention to the 1980s writing of Alchian on the theory of the firm. Alchian and Woodward’s 1987 ‘Reflections on a theory of the firm’ says:

… the notion of a quickly equilibrating market price is baffling save in a very few markets. Imagine an employer and an employee. Will they renegotiate price every hour, or with every perceived change in circumstances?

If the employee is a waiter in a restaurant, would the waiter’s wage be renegotiated with every new customer? Would it be renegotiated to zero when no customers are present, and then back to a high level that would extract the entire customer value when a queue appears?

… But what is the right interval for renegotiation or change in price? The usual answer ‘as soon as demand or supply changes’ is uninformative.

Alchian and Woodward then go on to a long discussion of the role of protecting composite quasi-rents from dependent resources as the decider of the timing of wage and price revisions.

Alchian and Woodward explain unemployment as a side-effect of the purpose of wage and price rigidity, which is the prevention of hold-ups over dependent assets. They note that unemployment cannot be understood until an adequate theory of the firm explains the type of contracts the members of a firm make with one another.

My interpretation is the majority of employment relationships are capital intensive long-term contracts. Employers spend a lot of time searching and screening applicants to find those that will stay longer. In less skilled jobs, and in spot market jobs, employers will hire the best applicant quickly because job turnover costs are low. Back to Manning again:

That important frictions exist in the labour market seems undeniable: people go to the pub to celebrate when they get a job rather than greeting the news with the shrug of the shoulders that we might expect if labour markets were frictionless. And people go to the pub to drown their sorrows when they lose their job rather than picking up another one straight away. The importance of frictions has been recognized since at least the work of Stigler (1961, 1962).

Whatever may be among these frictions, wage rigidity is not one of them. Wages are flexible for job stayers and certainly new starters.

See What can wages and employment tell us about the UK’s productivity puzzle? by Richard Blundell, Claire Crawford and Wenchao Jin showing that in the recent UK recession 12% of employees in the same job as 12 months ago experienced wage freezes and 21% of workers in the same job as 12 months ago experienced wage cuts. Their data covered 80% of workers in the New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset.

Larger firms lay off workers; smaller firms tended to reduce wages. This British data showing widespread wage cuts dates back to the 1980s. Recent Irish data also shows extensive wage cuts among job stayers.

See too Chris Pissarides (2009), The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: Is Wage Stickiness the Answer? arguing the wage stickiness is not the answer since wages in new job matches are highly flexible:

  1. wages of job changers are always substantially more procyclical than the wages of job stayers.
  2. the wages of job stayers, and even of those who remain in the same job with the same employer are still mildly procyclical.
  3. there is more procyclicality in the wages of stayers in Europe than in the United States.
  4. The procyclicality of job stayers’ wages is sometimes due to bonuses, and overtime pay but it still reflects a rise in the hourly cost of labour to the firm in cyclical peaks

How do existing firms who will not cut wages survive in competition with new firms who can start workers on lower wages? Industries with many short term jobs and seasonal jobs would suffer less from wage inflexibility.

Robert Barro (1977) pointed out that wage rigidity matters little because workers can, for example, agree in advance that they will work harder when there is more work to do—that is, when the demand for a firm’s product is high—and work less hard when there is little work. Stickiness of nominal wage rates does not necessarily cause errors in the determination of labour and production.

The ability to make long-term wage contracts and include clauses that guard against opportunistic wage cuts should make the parties better off. Workers will not sign these contracts if they are against their interests. Employers do not offer these contracts, and offer more flexible wage packages, will undercut employers who are more rigid. Furthermore many workers are on performance pay that link there must wages to the profitability of the company.

How can downward wage rigidity be a scientific hypothesis if extensive international evidence of widespread wage cuts since the 1980s and 30%+ of the workforce on performance bonuses is not enough to refute it?

Alchian and Kessel in “The Meaning and Validity of the Inflation-Induced Lag of Wages Behind Prices,” Amer. Econ. Rev. 50 [March 1960]:43-66) tested the hypothesis that workers suffered from money illusion by comparing the rates of return to firms in capital intensive industries with those of labour intensive industries. Labour intensive industries were not more profitable than capital intensive industries. Employers in labour intensive industries should profit from the misperceptions of workers about wages and future prices, but they did not.  Alchian and Kessel found little evidence of a lag between wage and price changes.

In Canadian industries in the 1960s and 1970s, wage indexation ranged from zero to nearly 100%. Industries with little indexation should show substantial responses of real wage rates, employment and output to nominal shocks. Industries with lots of indexation would be affected little by nominal disturbances. Monetary shocks had positive effects but an industry’s response to these shocks bore no relation to the amount of indexation in the industry. Shaghil Ahmed (1987) found that those industries with lots of indexation were as likely as those with little indexation to respond to shocks.

If the signing of new wage contracts was important to wage rigidity, there should be unusual behaviour of employment and real wage rates just after these signings, but the results are mixed. Olivei and Tenreyro (2010) used the tendency of contracts to be signed at the start of years to show that monetary policy had significant effects in January but little effect in December because the effects were quickly undone.

Alchian (1969) lists three ways to adjust to unanticipated demand fluctuations:
• output adjustments;
• wage and price adjustments; and
• Inventories and queues (including reservations).

Alchian (1969) suggests that there is no reason for wage and price changes to be used regardless of the relative cost of these other options:
• The cost of output adjustment stems from the fact that marginal costs rise with output;
• The cost of price adjustment arises because uncertain prices and wages induce costly search by buyers and sellers seeking the best offer; and
• The third method of adjustment has holding and queuing costs.

There is a tendency for unpredicted price and wage changes to induce costly additional search. Long-term contracts including implicit contracts arise to share risks and curb opportunism over relationship-specific capital. These factors lead to queues, unemployment, spare capacity, layoffs, shortages, inventories and non-price rationing in conjunction with wage stability.

The Schumpeterian view of business cycles

David Andolfatto argues for the Schumpeterian view of economic development where the distinction between growth and business cycles is artificial. Everyone agrees that long-run growth is the product of technological advancement. The Keynesian school views trend growth as being stable with new technologies unfolding at a smooth rate.

In the Schumpeterian view, there is no reason to believe that the process of technological advancement is smooth. It is more reasonable to suppose that new technologies appear in clusters.

There will be incremental innovations, and from time to time, grand innovations that transformed the entire economy. These grand innovations require the economy to slow down while it invests in a whole range of secondary innovations to make the most of these great new technologies. Writing workable software for new computers is an example.

These technology shocks may cause fluctuations in the growth rate through what Schumpeter called a process of creative destruction. Innovations cluster in specific industries and this generates the boom. When the cluster of innovation comes to an end in a particular sector, there is a generally increased risk of failure as old and new firms and entrepreneurs and investors adapt themselves to the new situation.

If business cycles come from innovation, they are an essential feature of economic development. They cannot be eliminated without harming innovation so we should not be too quick to smooth out the business cycle.

Technological advancements that ultimately lead to higher productivity may, in the short run, induce cyclical adjustments as the economy restructures: resources flow out from declining sectors to the expanding sectors, and people retrain and learn the next technologies and invest in the secondary innovations to make, for example, new computers to be of practical application. The first innovators will find the job a difficult one, later innovators will find things very easy, and the last to adopt the innovation will find not much to do. Faster or slower adoption of new technologies will have important implications for production, investment and consumption.

Diffusionrates

There is no guarantee that all new technologies will work out as planned. What may have looked promising may turn out to be a disappointment.

This leads to the role in news on the business cycle. Obviously, people form expectations about future technologies and invest and consume in the expectation of better or worse times ahead. They will adjust investor and consumer expectations as new information of varying and conflicting quality becomes available about technological prospects and the success of technological developments to date.

Output and employment will go up and down on the basis of these shifting expectations. These shifts in expectations are perfectly rational and are made on the basis of new information about the prospects and performance of new and existing technologies. Of course, some of these forecasts will turn out to be a disappointment and there will be a slowdown in the economy as people regroup.

The problem is not a lack of accurate forecasting by both the old and new firms. If technologies come in clusters, and are clustered in industries, there will be an above and below average number of forecasting errors with resulting consequences for business failures and new investment.

The productivity slowdown in the 1970s is attributed by some to a doubling of technology adoption costs because of the ICT revolution. This doubling in the cost of adopting new technologies was not measured as investment in the national accounts when constructing GDP data.

Boyan Jovanovic argues that the share market crash in the early 1970s may have been driven by an expectation by investors that a lot of existing capital had become obsolete because of the ICT revolution. investors wrote down the value of the companies with the soon-to-be obsolete capital and the stock-market incumbents of the day which were not ready to implement it.  Product-market entry of new firms and new capital takes time, and their stock-market entry takes even longer. In the meantime, the stock market declines.

Why do people assume the trend growth is stable? Economic growth is no more than a random collection of innovations that are adopted across the economy each year.

Does a fiscal stimulus stimulate?

 

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