16 Jul 2015
by Jim Rose
in economic growth, labour economics, labour supply, minimum wage, politics - New Zealand, poverty and inequality, unemployment, welfare reform
Tags: child poverty, family poverty, family tax credits, in-work tax credits, social insurance, welfare reform, welfare state

Figure 1: child poverty (%) in New Zealand (before and after housing costs), 1982 – 2013

Source: Bryan Perry, Household incomes in New Zealand: Trends in indicators of inequality and hardship 1982 to 2013. Ministry of Social Development (July 2014), Tables F.6 and F.7.
15 Jul 2015
by Jim Rose
in business cycles, currency unions, economic growth, Euro crisis, fiscal policy, job search and matching, labour economics, macroeconomics, unemployment
Tags: ageing society, demographic crisis, economic reform, employment law, employment regulation, Greece, labour market deregulation, Margaret Thatcher, pension reform, privatisation, Roger Douglas, social insurance, sovereign bailouts, sovereign defaults, welfare state
14 Jul 2015
by Jim Rose
in business cycles, currency unions, economic growth, economic history, Euro crisis, global financial crisis (GFC), great depression, great recession, job search and matching, labour economics, macroeconomics, unemployment
Tags: Greece
07 Jul 2015
by Jim Rose
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, development economics, economic growth, economic history, energy economics, environmental economics, growth disasters, growth miracles, health and safety, industrial organisation, international economics, labour economics, law and economics, liberalism, property rights, public economics
Tags: healthier is wealthier, Japan, Kuznets environmental curve, richer is greener, richer is safer
The Kuznets environmental curve describes an empirical regularity between environmental quality and economic growth. Outdoor water, air and other pollution first worse and then improves as a country first experiences economic growth and development.

While many pollutants exhibit this pattern in the Kuznets environmental curve, peak pollution levels occur at different income levels for different pollutants, countries and time periods. John Tierney explains:
In dozens of studies, researchers identified Kuznets curves for a variety of environmental problems.
There are exceptions to the trend, especially in countries with inept governments and poor systems of property rights, but in general, richer is eventually greener.
As incomes go up, people often focus first on cleaning up their drinking water, and then later on air pollutants like sulphur dioxide.
As their wealth grows, people consume more energy, but they move to more efficient and cleaner sources — from wood to coal and oil, and then to natural gas and nuclear power, progressively emitting less carbon per unit of energy.
When I was living in Japan in the mid 1990s, they just completed a period of rapid operation of the Kuznets environmental curve. I was told by my professors at Graduate School that in the 1960s, cities and prefectures welcomed polluting industries because of the better paid jobs they offered. At that time, shipping companies used like to go to Tokyo because the pollution in Tokyo Bay was so bad that it would clean all the barnacles off their ships. That made them sail faster.

Japanese incomes and wages doubled over the course of the 1960s. The Japanese voter was now prepared to support stricter pollution standards and environmental controls.
In the early 1970s, the ruling LDP stole the long-standing environmental policies of their opponents in a big crack down on pollution because the country could now afforded them.
Plenty of developing countries are democracies now. Their people could demand through the ballot box higher environmental standards and clean tap water but they don’t because of its cost to economic development.
The environmental movement lives in a state of denial regarding the relationship between economic growth and environmental quality.
06 Jul 2015
by Jim Rose
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, budget deficits, business cycles, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, currency unions, economic growth, economic history, Euro crisis, fiscal policy, fisheries economics, global financial crisis (GFC), international economics, macroeconomics, Public Choice, rentseeking
Tags: Euro sclerosis, Greece, insurance attacks, sovereign defaults, speculative attacks
The roots of Greece’s crisis are simple. Before Greece joined the Eurozone, investors treated it as a middle-income country with poor governance — which is to say, a credit risk.
After Greece joined the Eurozone, investors thought that Greece was no longer a credit risk — they figured, if push came to shove, other Eurozone members like Germany would bail Greece out. They were wrong.

Michael Dooley put forward a theory of speculative attacks on currencies as insurance attacks on currencies for emerging markets after the East Asian financial crisis:
First generation models of speculative attacks show that apparently random speculative attacks on policy regimes can be fully consistent with rational and well-informed speculative behaviour.
Unfortunately, models driven by a conflict between exchange rate policy and other macroeconomic objectives do not seem consistent with important empirical regularities surrounding recent crises in emerging markets. This has generated considerable interest in models that associate crises with self-fulfilling shifts in private expectations.
In this paper we develop a first generation model based on an alternative policy conflict. Credit constrained governments accumulate reserve assets in order to self-insure against shocks to national consumption. Governments also insure poorly regulated domestic financial markets.
Given this policy regime, a variety of internal and external shocks generate capital inflows to emerging markets followed by successful and anticipated speculative attacks.
We argue that a common external shock generated capital inflows to emerging markets in Asia and Latin America after 1989. Country specific factors determined the timing of speculative attacks. Lending policies of industrial country governments and international organizations account for contagion, that is, a bunching of attacks over time.
His model was not within the context of a currency union but his basic theory is correct.
There are speculative attacks on a currency or a bank run after foreign markets revises their estimates of the available central bank reserves and international lines of credit to bail out the banking systems and/or foreign debt.
Michael Dooley was dealing with the emerging economies of Southeast Asia and their official lines of credit that insure their foreign exchange liabilities and domestic banking system. Greece is about lines of credit for similar purposes to other European union member states.
via 12 charts and maps that explain the Greek crisis – Vox and The Most Important Graphs of 2011 – The Atlantic.
06 Jul 2015
by Jim Rose
in budget deficits, business cycles, currency unions, economic growth, Euro crisis, financial economics, fiscal policy, global financial crisis (GFC), macroeconomics
Tags: bank runs, banking panics, Eurosclerosis, Germany, Greece, sovereign defaults

Greece is a tiny part of the European economies so it doesn’t matter that much to the rest of the European Union what happens to Greece. The only people will notice the sovereign default of Greece once the breathless journalism has died down are Greeks themselves as they rebuild their banking and monetary system against a background of a government run by coffee shop Marxists.

06 Jul 2015
by Jim Rose
in budget deficits, business cycles, currency unions, economic growth, Euro crisis, fiscal policy, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, unemployment
Tags: Eurosclerosis, Greece
03 Jul 2015
by Jim Rose
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, currency unions, economic growth, economics of bureaucracy, economics of regulation, Euro crisis, health and safety, income redistribution, industrial organisation, labour economics, law and economics, minimum wage, occupational regulation, property rights, Public Choice, rentseeking, survivor principle, unions, welfare reform
Tags: cost of doing business, Eurosclerosis, Greece, Italy, PIGS, Portugal, Spain
Figure 1: Doing Business rankings, PIGS, 2014

Source: World Bank Doing Business 2015.
All in all, Italy and Greece are a dog of a place to enforce a contract. The long-suffering taxpayer is better off paying taxes in Greece than in Italy! Not surprisingly, trading across borders is the greatest strength in doing business in the PIGS. The European Union does have some benefits.
Figure 2: Doing Business rankings, Greece and Italy, 2014

Source: World Bank Doing Business 2015.
All in all, Italy and Greece are equally bad places to do business and Italy is much worse when it comes to taxes. About the only saving graces of Italy is the registration of property and the protection of minority interests in companies.
Figure 3: Doing Business rankings, Spain and Portugal, 2014

Source: World Bank Doing Business 2015.
Spain and in particular Portugal are much better places to do business than Italy and Greece.
29 Jun 2015
by Jim Rose
in business cycles, currency unions, economic growth, Euro crisis, fiscal policy, global financial crisis (GFC), international economic law, international economics, macroeconomics
Tags: game theory, Greece, Patrick Kehoe, sovereign default
20 Jun 2015
by Jim Rose
in economic growth, fiscal policy, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, politics - USA, public economics
Tags: endogenous growth theory, EU, Eurosclerosis, laffer curve, optimal tax theory, taxation and entrepreneurship, taxation and investment, taxation and the labour supply
13 Jun 2015
by Jim Rose
in budget deficits, currency unions, economic growth, Euro crisis, fiscal policy, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics
Tags: ageing society, early retirement, Eurosclerosis, Greece, labour force participation, old age pensions, older workers, social insurance, taxation and the labour supply, welfare state
A country that spends nearly a fifth of its GDP on old-age pensions with surprisingly few people over the age of 55 working should not be surprised when it finds itself in financial difficulty.
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