Krugman explains why a broken window is a fiscal stimulus
27 Sep 2014 Leave a comment
HT: Robert P. Murphy
The broken window fallacy explained
27 Sep 2014 Leave a comment
in fiscal policy, macroeconomics Tags: broken window fallacy, crowding out, externalities, fiscal policy
Hayek Explains Why He Did Not Challenge Keynes’ General Theory
03 Sep 2014 Leave a comment
in Austrian economics, business cycles, F.A. Hayek, fiscal policy, great depression, macroeconomics Tags: FA Hayek, General Theory, Keynes
Stephen Williamson on Marginal Taxation
03 Aug 2014 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, fiscal policy, income redistribution, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, Public Choice Tags: envy, Stephen Williamson, taxation and entrepreneurship, taxation and human capital, taxation and investment, taxation and labour supply, top 1%
He says a lot. I’ll try to address piece by piece.
Next, some people have shown interest in this paper by Diamond and Saez. A key result that seemed to get these people excited is the calculation of a top optimal marginal tax rate (including all taxes) of 73%, relative to the current rate of 42.5%. There are two key assumptions that Diamond and Saez make to come up with the 73% optimal rate. First, we should not care about the welfare (at the margin) of the rich people. This argument is based solely on the notion that marginal utility of income is low for the top income-earners. Second, Diamond and Saez use a “behavioral elasticity” of tax revenue with respect to the tax rate of 0.25. To see how this matters, if you use their formula and an elasticity of one, you get an optimal top tax rate…
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Most fiscal stimulus arguments ignore basic facts
02 Aug 2014 Leave a comment
in budget deficits, fiscal policy, macroeconomics Tags: crowding out, fiscal deficits, John Cochrane, Ricardian equivalence
The
Keynesian analysis implicitly assumes that a fiscal deficit does not have any effects on other spending
01 Aug 2014 1 Comment
in budget deficits, fiscal policy, macroeconomics, Milton Friedman, monetarism Tags: budget deficits, fiscal policy, fiscal stimulus, Milton Friedman
The
Eugene Fama and the simulative effects of fiscal policy
31 Jul 2014 6 Comments
in budget deficits, fiscal policy, great depression, great recession, macroeconomics Tags: crowding out, Eugene Fama, fiscal policy, Treasury view of fiscal policy
Eugene Fama argues that government bailouts and stimulus plans seem attractive when there are idle resources – when there is unemployment such as in a recession or depression including in the 1930s.
Fama counters that:
1. Bailouts and stimulus plans must be financed.
2. If the financing takes the form of additional government debt, the added debt displaces other uses of the funds.
3. Thus, stimulus plans only enhance incomes when they move resources from less productive to more productive uses.
In the end, despite the existence of idle resources, bailouts and stimulus plans do not add to current resources in use. They just move resources from one use to another.
Fama noted that there was just one valid negative comment in response to this argument that appears to be valid which was made by Brad DeLong.
Fama thinks Delong’s point about involuntary inventory accumulation is consistent with Fama’s initial arguments about the need for the stimulus to work through moving resources to higher value uses.
For me, the notion that a fiscal stimulus is a negative productivity shock is a good starting point for analysis. The method of financing the stimulus is important too.
Economic agents know that a temporary expenditure program has no lasting effect on employment but has lasting effect on disposable income and taxes. Indeed, massive public interventions to maintain employment and investment during a financial crisis can, if they distort incentives enough, lead to a depression.
In Australia, there was a massive fiscal contraction from late 1930 onwards called the Premiers’ Plan. In 1931, unemployment rates was 25% or more.
- The Premiers’ Plan required the federal and state governments to cut spending by 20%, including cuts to wages and pensions and was to be accompanied by tax increases, reductions in interest on bank deposits and a 22.5% reduction in the interest the government paid on internal loans.
- The Premiers’ Plan was complementary to the Arbitration Court’s 10 per cent nominal wage cut in January 1931 and the devaluation of the Australian pound. Most countries had abandoned the gold standard by 1931 and 1932 and devalued by about 10% including the UK. These competitive devaluations were called currency wars. Most countries below started to recovery before they left the gold standard, a year or two before they left the cross of gold.
Maclaren (1936) dated the Australian economic recovery from the last months of 1932. It was to take another three years before unemployment rates fell below 10 per cent — the rate it had been during most of the 1920s.
The June 1931 Premiers’ Plan of fiscal consolidation had time by late 1932 to become credible and take hold given the usual leads and lag on fiscal policy. Unemployment data for the time show a rapid fall in the high twenties unemployment rate in 1932 to be below 10 per cent by 1937.
“Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon”
31 Jul 2014 Leave a comment
in budget deficits, fiscal policy, macroeconomics, monetarism, monetary economics Tags: Joan Robinson
Joan Robinson thought German hyperinflation was not caused by monetary policy!!
Almost, but not quite.
Back in the days when dinosaurs roamed the earth, and Cambridge economists kept guard at the Temple of Keynes, Milton Friedman’s focus on inflation as a monetary phenomenon was a revelation—and an excellent one. Next to Joan Robinson’s surreal claims that printing money was not responsible for the German hyperinflation, Friedman’s version of monetary economics provided a very healthy dose of sanity. And as central banks across the world learned from the mistakes of the 70s and brought inflation under control, it became clear that the monetary authority indeed had the power to contain the price level via control of the money supply.
But it’s important to know what this account leaves out: how, exactly, do prices adjust? And over what length of time does this happen?
The modern view, backed up by impressive (though not entirely conclusive) empirical evidence, is that most prices are…
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Calmfor’s Iron Law of Active Labour Market Policy.
31 Jul 2014 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, fiscal policy, job search and matching, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, welfare reform Tags: Active labour market programs, Lars Calmfors, welfare reform, work for the dole, workfare
Lars Calmfors is a Swedish economist whose main interest is labour makets.
His iron law of Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP) refers to a characteristic of make work schemes, like the WPA that operated in the United States in the 1930s.
The characteristic or problem with these schemes is that if people are attracted to these schemes by generous pay or conditions, their motive to search for regular work is necessarily reduced.
Assuming unemployment is anywhere near NAIRU, the effect of this reduced aggregate labour supply will be inflationary, which means that demand will have to be reduced, which in turn means that the jobs created by the make work scheme will be, at least to some extent, at the expense of regular jobs.
Alternatively, if people are coerced into joining make work schemes because of what might be called a “workfare” sanction, their job search efforts are not reduced, thus the jobs created by the make work scheme have a better chance of not being at the expense of normal jobs.
via RALPHONOMICS: Calmfor’s Iron Law of Active Labour Market Policy..
Utopia, you are standing in it! 
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