@ChrisHipkins @jacindaardern New Zealand graduate premium @dbseymour
17 Feb 2016 3 Comments
in applied price theory, economics of education, human capital, income redistribution, politics - New Zealand, poverty and inequality, rentseeking
How conceited students are to complain about a $20,000 student loan when they got $1/2 million coming down the pipe. 
Source: A Degree is a smart investment | Universities New Zealand – Te Pōkai Tara.
Self-appointed social justice warriors in the New Zealand Labour Party and New Zealand Greens pander to this middle class greed. They should be ashamed of themselves.
26% of eligible students do not take out a student loan so they would really get a leg up from the abolition of tuition fees.
The median repayment time for those who left study in 2011 and remained in New Zealand was 5.8 years.
Here’s where Republicans and Democrats differ on the role of government
08 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in defence economics, economics of bureaucracy, economics of education, economics of information, economics of media and culture, economics of regulation, energy economics, entrepreneurship, environmental economics, income redistribution, politics - USA, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: 2016 presidential election Republican Party, Democratic Party, votor demographics
A bizarre Finnish amateur racing car practice for redistributing winning
06 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of media and culture, fiscal policy, income redistribution, labour economics, labour supply, law and economics, poverty and inequality, property rights, public economics, rentseeking Tags: basic income, car racing, Finland, guaranteed minimum income, negative income tax
@NZGreens gain the most from an independent costings unit @JulieAnneGenter
01 Feb 2016 1 Comment
in applied welfare economics, constitutional political economy, economics of regulation, income redistribution, politics - New Zealand, public economics

I am sure there will be lots of squabbling over parameters and assumptions of any tax, spending or regulation proposal submitted to the independent costings unit proposed recently by the New Zealand Greens.
The bigger problem is static and dynamic scoring. There is some history of doing this for taxes but little for spending and that is before you consider externalities. Imagine the squabbling over roading proposals and their externalities. The practical hurdles to dynamic scoring are:
- Economists do not know how to accurately measure the growth effects of most policies
- Dynamic scoring relies on less-than-accurate, theory-based macro models
- The macro models undergirding dynamic scoring have numerous controversial and unproven built-in assumptions
- The assumptions embedded in the macro models are not always carefully empirically based
- Macro models exclude theoretically and empirically supported evidence of supply-side effects of public investment
- Macro models exclude evidence-based effects of economic inequality
- Macro models exclude evidence-based effects of numerous policies
- Macro models provide different estimates of growth impacts of policy depending on guesses of how the policy may be finance
Against that is dynamic scoring removes the bias against pro-growth policies in current budgetary scoring:
[A] theoretical advantage of accurate dynamic scoring is that it is not biased against pro-growth policies compared to the current conventional scoring method. By ignoring macroeconomic effects, the conventional method overstates the true budgetary cost of pro-growth policies, such as infrastructure investments, and understates the cost of anti-growth policies.
The bigger problem is something I learnt when costing a tax proposal for an election campaign. There was an error because I did the costing on a spreadsheet while I had a bad head cold.
The advantage of the error was the policy, as a result of this minor error in the tabulations attracted considerable attention from the major parties.
I was advised by a very wise head that this tabulation error in the dynamic scoring was not so bad a problem. This was because the tabulation error gave our side a chance to have a go at them again in the media. The policy announcement stayed in the new cycles for longer than otherwise and attracted attention from the big parties.
If a policy is too good, too perfect, the other parties will kill it with silence. You get only one bite in the news cycle and that is it.
If your policy announcement is killed by silence, at least you are guaranteed a chance to go at it again when the proposed independent costings unit a week or so later in the election campaign. You might disagree of those costings just to attract attention in the next new cycle.
Given the size, ambition and nebulous externality content of Green party proposals, they will benefit considerably from getting another go by questioning the Parliamentary budget office costings. That guarantees at least two new cycles to every one of their budgetary and regulatory announcements. No wonder they have proposed this independent costings unit.
If the New Zealand Greens do not like the costing from their proposed independent costings unit, they can just rage against neoliberalism and the conservative bias of economists. They cannot lose in terms of another bite of the 24-hour news cycle.
As a starter to feigning disagreement with any independent costings of their tax, spending and regulation proposals, Milton Friedman argued that people agree on most social objectives, but they differ often on the predicted outcomes of different policies and institutions. This leads us to Robert and Zeckhauser’s taxonomy of disagreement:
Positive disagreements can be over questions of:
1. Scope: what elements of the world one is trying to understand?
2. Model: what mechanisms explain the behaviour of the world?
3. Estimate: what estimates of the model’s parameters are thought to obtain in particular contexts?
Values disagreements can be over questions of:
1. Standing: who counts?
2. Criteria: what counts?
3. Weights: how much different individuals and criteria count?
Any positive analysis tends to include elements of scope, model, and estimation, though often these elements intertwine; they frequently feature in debates in an implicit or undifferentiated manner. Likewise, normative analysis will also include elements of standing, criteria, and weights, whether or not these distinctions are recognised. There is a rich harvest for nit-picking to keep the story going.
@BernieSanders proud of @AndrewLittleMP @grantrobertson1 @bryce_edwards
31 Jan 2016 1 Comment
in applied price theory, economics of education, income redistribution, politics - New Zealand, public economics, rentseeking
Whose voting base has succumbed to unthinking populists?
31 Dec 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of education, economics of information, economics of media and culture, income redistribution, international economics, Marxist economics, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: 2016 presidential election
HL Mencken on the @realDonaldTrump & @BernieSanders
13 Dec 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of bureaucracy, economics of media and culture, economics of regulation, income redistribution, Marxist economics, politics - USA, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: 2016 presidential election, expressive voting, left-wing populists, Leftover Left, rational ignorance, rational irrationality, right-wing populists
Corruption vs. Human Development
09 Dec 2015 Leave a comment
in development economics, economic history, economics of bureaucracy, economics of crime, economics of regulation, growth disasters, growth miracles, income redistribution, industrial organisation, law and economics, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: bribery and corruption, capitalism and freedom, rent seeking, rule of law, The Great Fact
Corruption vs. Human Development (HDI) http://t.co/WNlSMYzdWD—
Max Roser (@MaxCRoser) August 08, 2015
Why propaganda?
21 Nov 2015 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, economics of media and culture, income redistribution, Marxist economics, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: economics of advertising, expressive voting, rational ignorance, rational irrationality
Why are so many Silicon Valley start-up founders libertarian Democrats?
03 Nov 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of media and culture, entrepreneurship, income redistribution, industrial organisation, politics - USA, Public Choice, rentseeking, survivor principle Tags: creative destruction, entrepreneurial alertness, expressive voting, rational ignorance, Silicon Valley, start-ups, voter demographics
@NaomiAKlein agrees with #MiltonFriedman on Mancur Olson’s theory of how nations escape institutional sclerosis
25 Oct 2015 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, development economics, economic history, economics of bureaucracy, income redistribution, Marxist economics, Milton Friedman, Public Choice, rentseeking, technological progress Tags: expressive voting, interest groups, Leftover Left, logic of collective action, Mancur Olson, Naomi Klein, pressure groups, rational ignorance, rational irrationality, rise and decline of nations, Twitter left

Source: quoted by Naomi Klein in “The Shock Doctrine”.
LA premiere tonight @NaomiAKlein @avilewis @mrdannyglover in person Q&A 7.30pm sundancecinemas.com http://t.co/wRkPFbnUHu—
Changes Everything (@thischanges) October 16, 2015
1. There will be no countries that attain symmetrical organization of all groups with a common interest and thereby attain optimal outcomes through comprehensive bargaining.
2. Stable societies with unchanged boundaries tend to accumulate more collusions and organizations for collective action over time.
3. Members of “small” groups have disproportionate organizational power for collective action, and this disproportion diminishes but does not disappear over time in stable societies.
4. On balance, special-interest organizations and collusions reduce efficiency and aggregate income in the societies in which they operate and make political life more divisive.
5. Encompassing organizations have some incentive to make the society in which they operate more prosperous, and an incentive to redistribute income to their members with as little excess burden as possible, and to cease such redistribution unless the amount redistributed is substantial in relation to the social cost of the redistribution.
6. Distributional coalitions make decisions more slowly than the individuals and firms of which they are comprised, tend to have crowded agendas and bargaining tables, and more often fix prices than quantities.
7. Distributional coalitions slow down a society’s capacity to adopt new technologies and to reallocate resources in response to changing conditions, and thereby to reduce the rate of economic growth.
8. Distributional coalitions, once big enough to succeed, are exclusive, and seek to limit the diversity of incomes and values of their membership.
9. The accumulation of distributional coalitions increases the complexity of regulation, the role of government, and the complexity of understandings, and changes the direction of social evolution.
Source: Obituary: Professor Mancur Olson | Obituaries | News | The Independent
Angus Deaton on slow growth as a force for distributional conflict
25 Oct 2015 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, development economics, growth disasters, growth miracles, income redistribution, liberalism, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: Angus Deaton, The Great Enrichment, The Great Escape, The Great Fact
New Zealand low pay incidence one of lowest in OECD @greencatherine @MaxRashbrooke @nzlabour @dpfdpf
22 Oct 2015 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, income redistribution, politics - New Zealand
Low Pay Britain? More employees in UK are low paid than in most countries in OECD and Europe resolutionfoundation.org/?post_type=cpt… http://t.co/t2wQQfbRav—
ResolutionFoundation (@resfoundation) October 05, 2015

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