Equally, a reminder that winning 51% of Labour members not the same as winning Britain: https://t.co/rxFqhyucst pic.twitter.com/Ry2pHu5oyE
— Stephen Bush (@stephenkb) August 27, 2015
Inside the mindset of Jeremy Corbyn’s supporters
27 Aug 2015 1 Comment
in economics of media and culture, Public Choice Tags: British politics, voter demographics
The ups and downs of the Greek economy
25 Aug 2015 1 Comment
in budget deficits, business cycles, currency unions, economic history, Euro crisis, fiscal policy, macroeconomics, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: Eurosclerosis, Greece, sovereign debt crisis, sovereign defaults
@ObsoleteDogma @rodrikdani http://t.co/xKx43wjWHy—
David Andolfatto (@dandolfa) June 30, 2015
The Bootleggers and Baptists alliance between big tobacco and anti-smoking lobbyists on e-cigarettes
25 Aug 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, economics of regulation, health economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: bootleggers and baptists, economics of smoking, meddlesome preferences, nanny state, pressure groups, special interests
@jeremycorbyn in a nutshell #torysforcorbyn
24 Aug 2015 1 Comment
in Marxist economics, Public Choice, war and peace Tags: British politics, Leftover Left
Communism fell today
24 Aug 2015 Leave a comment
in economic history, Marxist economics, Public Choice Tags: fall of communism, Russia
@comcom Commerce Commission understands neither creative destruction nor the scourge of lower prices
24 Aug 2015 2 Comments
in applied price theory, economic history, economics of bureaucracy, history of economic thought, industrial organisation, Joseph Schumpeter, Public Choice, rentseeking, Ronald Coase, survivor principle Tags: antitrust law, competition as a discovery procedure, competition law, competition law enforcement, creative destruction, Harold Demsetz, special interests, The meaning of competition
In its 2014 Consumer Issues report, released under the Official Information Act, the New Zealand Commerce Commission said:
We are seeing signs that NFC transaction systems are replacing the current eftpos payment system with its lower fee structure.
This could result in a transaction fee structure monopoly, and increased charges to consumers as traders pass on their increased transaction costs through surcharges or increased prices.
The Commerce Commission seems rather concerned that one form of supply will be displaced by another at a lower price. This is the scourge of lower prices – a major preoccupation of competition authorities. They are yet to accept that lower prices should be always lawful under competition law.

The distribution of firm sizes reflects the rise and fall of firms in a competitive struggle to survive with competition between firms of different sizes sifting out the more efficient firm sizes (Stigler 1958, 1987; Demsetz 1973, 1976; Peltzman 1977; Jovanovic 1982; Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994b). Business vitality and capacity for growth and innovation are only weakly related to cost conditions and often depends on many factors that are subtle and difficult to observe (Stigler 1958, 1987).

The New Zealand Commerce Commission, the competition law enforcement authority, seems to have an infuriatingly simple and out-dated understanding of the meaning of competition. Joseph Schumpeter and Ronald Coase would be turning in their graves.

The efficient firm sizes are the sizes that survived in competition against other sizes. To survive, a firm must rise above all of problems it faces such as employee relations, skills development, innovation, changing regulations, unstable markets, access to finance and new entry. This is the decisive (and Darwinian) meaning of efficiency from the standpoint of the individual firm (Stigler 1958). One method of organisation supplants another when it can supply at a lower price (Marshall 1920, Stigler 1958).

What is even more distressing is the Commerce Commission is applying their archaic concept of competition to an industry subject to rapid innovation. Regulating innovation through competition law is never a good idea. The more efficient sized firms are the firm sizes that are expanding their market shares in the face of competition; the less efficient sized firms are those that are losing market share (Stigler 1958, 1987; Alchian 1950; Demsetz 1973, 1976).
https://twitter.com/balajis/status/465585152584716289
If the firm size distribution in an industry is relatively stable for a time, the firms are their current sizes because there are no more gains from further changes in size in light their underlying demand and cost conditions (Stigler 1983; Alchian 1950; Demsetz 1973, 1976).

Temporary monopoly and rapidly changing market shares with the occasional dominant firm are all characteristics of the early stages of any new or innovating industry. The deadweight social losses from the enforcement of competition law are at their greatest in industries undergoing rapid innovation because of the possibility of error is at its height. Optimum firm sizes continually change over time because of shifts in input and output prices and technological progress (Stigler 1958, 1983).
The Netflix Effect (via @Mark_J_Perry) http://t.co/LkDjfarRZa—
Michael Hendrix (@michael_hendrix) August 11, 2015
If large firm size is better at serving consumers, the large firms start to grow and smaller firms will die or be absorbed until the untapped gains from growth in firm size are exhausted. Firms increase in size and decrease in number when this adaptation becomes necessary to survive. If a smaller firm size is now better, smaller firms will multiply and the larger firms will decline in size because they are under-cut on price and quality.

The life cycle of many industries starts with a burst of new entrants with similar products. These new or upgraded products often use ideas that cross-fertilise. In time, there is an industry shakeout where a few leapfrog the rest with cost savings and design breakthroughs to yield the mature product (Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994a; Boldrin and Levine 2008, 2013). Fast-seconds and practical minded latecomers often imitate and successfully commercialise ideas seeded by the market pioneers using prior ideas as knowledge spillovers. Their large market shares are their prizes for winning the latest product races, not the basis of their initial victories.

New entrants regard a large firm size as a premature risk rather than an advantage of incumbency they should mimic as soon as they can. New firms set-up on a scale that is well below the minimum efficient production scale for their industry (Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta 2009). New entrants choose to start so small to test the waters regarding their true productivity and the market’s acceptance of their products and to minimise losses in the event of failure (Jovanovic 1982; Ericson and Pakes 1995; Dhawan 2001; Audretsch, Prince and Thurik 1998; Audretsch and Mahmood 1994).

Competition law can subvert competition by stymieing the introduction of new goods and the temporary monopoly often necessary to recoup their invention costs and induce innovation. The puzzlingly large productivity differences across firms even in narrowly defined industries producing standard products lead to doubts about the efficiency of some firms, often the smaller firms in an industry. Some firms produce half as much output from the same measured inputs as their market rivals and still survive in competition (Syverson 2011). This diversity reflects inter-firm differences in managerial ability, organisational practices, choice of technology, the age of the business and its capital, location, workforce skills, intangible assets and changes in demand and productivity that are idiosyncratic to each individual firm (Stigler 1958, 1976, 1987; De Alessi 1983).
Technological progress comes from innovations that are the result of profit orientated research and development in the course of market competition. The two main inputs into innovation are the private expenditures of prospective innovators on R&D workers and equipment and the publicly available stock of knowledge on which they hope to build (Aghion and Howitt 2008). Any profits of successful innovators last until others innovate to supersede previous innovations (Aghion and Howitt 2008).

Harold Demsetz argued that competition does not take place upon a single margin, such as price competition. Competition instead has several dimensions often inversely correlated with each other. Because of this, a competition law disparaging one form of competition will result in more of another. There are trade-offs between innovation and current price competition. Manne and Wright noted in the paper, Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust that:
Both product and business innovations involve novel practices, and such practices generally result in monopoly explanations from the economics profession followed by hostility from the courts (though sometimes in reverse order) and then a subsequent, more nuanced economic understanding of the business practice usually recognizing its pro-competitive virtues.
A competition law enforcement authority should never pretend to know which trade-off between innovation and price competition and between competition and temporary monopoly are optimal. Every competition authority should simplify the regulatory environment by simply saying lower prices are per always lawful. The New Zealand Commerce Commission should do this but it has not.

I have not even touched on the use of competition law to subvert competition such is the pursuit of Microsoft and Google by its business rivals through competition law.

The easiest way to tell if a merger is pro-competition is if the remaining firms in the market oppose it. If it was anti-competitive, they could match the higher prices of the merged firm. The reason they oppose the merger is the merged firm will start undercutting them on price. When was the last time a competitor complained about their rivals putting their prices up? Either they hold their prices and take their business or follow their pricing lead: can’t lose.
@GreenpeaceNZ @NZGreens environmentalism is not face of the future
24 Aug 2015 Leave a comment
in economic history, environmental economics, global warming, Public Choice Tags: air pollution, climate alarmism, global warming, The Great Escape, voter demographics, water pollution
The next Australian election will be much more competitive than I thought
23 Aug 2015 Leave a comment
in politics - Australia, Public Choice Tags: 2016 Australian federal election
Any new strategy after Feb's "Good govt starts today" yet to pay dividends for LNP #auspoI #ipsos http://t.co/cnbksuQAvL—
Danny Rose (@_DannyRose) August 16, 2015
How big is Uber
23 Aug 2015 Leave a comment
CHART: How Big is Uber vs. Legacy Taxis? VERY, VERY BIG nationalpost.com/m/wp/blog.html… http://t.co/gz0vXPZDip—
Mark J. Perry (@Mark_J_Perry) August 22, 2015
via Summer of Uber: Everything you need to know about the upstart ride-sharing service.
Who profits from #climatechange alarmism #COP21 and #roadtoparis
23 Aug 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, environmental economics, environmentalism, global warming, labour economics, occupational choice, personnel economics, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: bribery and corruption, conjecture and refutation, consultants, green hypocrisy, green rent seeking, Left-wing hypocrisy, public intellectuals
https://twitter.com/RogerAPielkeSr/status/627888796562927616/photo/1
A schematic of climate system from nap.edu/openbook.php?r… Changes are much more than changes in CO2 concentrations http://t.co/g8gs44UnN8—
Roger A. Pielke Sr (@RogerAPielkeSr) August 05, 2015
Bryan Caplan on why H.L. Mencken was right
22 Aug 2015 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, economics of information, Public Choice Tags: Bryan Caplan, H.L Mencken, rational ignorance, rational irrationality, voter demographics



Why some billionaires are bad for growth, and others aren’t
22 Aug 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, economics of bureaucracy, economics of regulation, financial economics, income redistribution, industrial organisation, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, Public Choice, rentseeking, survivor principle Tags: Australia, billionaires, Russia, top 0.1%, top 1%
…Bagchi and Svejnar carefully went through the lists of all the Forbes billionaires, and divided them into those who had acquired their wealth due to political connections, and those who had not. This is kind of a slippery slope — almost all billionaires have probably benefited from government connections at one time or another.
But the researchers used a very conservative standard for classifying people as politically connected, only assigning billionaires to this group when it was clear that their wealth was a product of government connections. Just benefiting from a government that was pro-business, like those in Singapore and Hong Kong, wasn’t enough.
Rather, the researchers were looking for a situation like Indonesia under Suharto, where political connections were usually needed to secure import licenses, or Russia in the mid-1990s, when some state employees made fortunes overnight as the state privatized assets.
…The negative effects of wealth inequality are largely being driven by politically connected wealth inequality. That seems to be the primary channel that drives this relationship…
a 3.72 percent increase in the level of wealth inequality would cost a country about half a percent of real GDP per capita growth. That’s a big impact, given that average GDP growth is in the neighbourhood of two percent per year
@guardianeco slimes New Zealand’s record on #climatechange @NZGreens @GreenpeaceNZ
22 Aug 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of information, energy economics, environmental economics, global warming, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice Tags: Australia, climate alarmism, global warming, Left-wing hypocrisy, The Guardian
https://twitter.com/guardianeco/status/634681114527797248
Excellent wrap up of carbon pricing globally, found here: worldbank.org/en/news/featur… #renewables http://t.co/Hocf9Z5cEC—
Danny Rose (@_DannyRose) August 19, 2015
Carbon pricing expanded in the last 21 months. New report shows where & how:
wrld.bg/R0EuZ http://t.co/VB69szI1je—
World Bank (@WorldBank) August 19, 2015
A carbon price gives investors a clearer view of the future risks of high-carbon assets: wrld.bg/R0GLE http://t.co/GuNnzlMMlZ—
World Bank (@WorldBank) August 21, 2015
What Can We Learn From National Primary Polling?
22 Aug 2015 Leave a comment
in politics - USA, Public Choice Tags: 2016 presidential election, expressive voting, opinion polling, rational ignorance, rational rationality, voter demographics
The 2012 race was even crazier. GOP voters flirted seriously with nearly every other candidate before finally settling on Romney.

via What Can We Learn From National Primary Polling? Virtually Nothing. – Reason.com.
@nzlabour @NZGreens There just isn’t no missing million out there hanging out for that hard-left clarion call @rsalmond
22 Aug 2015 1 Comment
in applied price theory, constitutional political economy, economics of information, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice Tags: British Labour Party, British politics, economics of advertising, Eric Crampton, expressive voting, false consciousness, Leftover Left, median voter theorem, New Zealand Greens, New Zealand Labour Party, rational ignorance, rational rationality
Rob Salmond has written a great blog this week on the ideological spectrum of New Zealand voters based on the New Zealand Election Study.

In the course of his blog he drove a tremendously big stake through the heart of the old left fantasy that if Labour or Greens goes left, a large block of voters not voting for them now or not voting at all (the missing million voters) will shake lose its false consciousness and follow you:
But “pulling the centre back towards the left” is massively, massively hard.
You win those people over by being relevant to them as they are, not by telling them they’re worldview needs a rethink. It is just basic psychology. Tell people they were right all along; they like you. Tell people they were wrong all along; they don’t.
And if you win a majority of centrists, you win. The New Zealand Election Study series records six MMP elections in New Zealand – the three where Labour did best among centrists were the three Labour won.
That’s another message from the academic study I quoted above – in Germany, Sweden, and the UK, the elections where the left did best among centrists were the elections where they took power. As their popularity among centrists declined, so did their seat share.
What is more disturbing for the old left fantasy of the missing million is voting for the Labour Party or Greens is correlated with ignorance rather than knowledge.
Furthermore, the more people know about economics, the less likely they are to vote for the left as Eric Crampton explains:
When they get to the polls, the ignorant are significantly more likely to support the Labour Party (4% increase in predicted probability for a standard deviation increase in ignorance) and significantly less likely to support the Green party (1% decrease in predicted probability) and United Future (0.5% decrease in predicted probability).
Understanding economics strongly predicted supporting National in 2005, which comes as little surprise: the National Party leader was former Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. A standard deviation increase in our “economic thinking” index correlates with a 5.7% increased probability of voting National, a 1.5% decreased probability of voting NZ First, and a slight decrease in the probability of voting United Future and Maori.
To make matters worse, Crampton found that joining political organisations does little to cure ignorance of politics or otherwise lead to a political awakening. Sometimes active political affiliation reduces ignorance, other times such organisational membership intensifies ignorance.
via Salmond on the centre | Kiwiblog and StephenFranks.co.nz » Blog Archive » Why the left wants everyone to vote.

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