26 Jul 2015
by Jim Rose
in constitutional political economy, economic history, economics of media and culture, health economics, politics - USA, Public Choice
Tags: abortion, constitutional law, expressive voting, median voter, rational ignorance, rational irrationality, social change
On abortion, the USA is split on pro-life versus pro-choice. State legislatures pass laws safe in the knowledge that they will be struck down the next day. they were playing to a grandstand made up of values voters.

When the supreme court became a little vague on some procedural aspects of abortion law in the early 1990s, the state legislatures started showing much more restraint because the median voter would be annoyed.
Where Roe v. Wade to fall, some states would permit abortion, some would not. The Center for Reproductive Rights predicts that 21 states are likely to outlaw abortion immediately where Roe v. Wade to fall. This assessment is based not only on current law, but on the political makeup of the state legislatures. On the other hand, abortion is likely to remain legal in many states, according to these groups.
25 Jul 2015
by Jim Rose
in international economic law, international economics, International law, politics - Australia, politics - USA
Tags: Australia, British politics, economics of immigration, EU, illegal immigration, Mexico, North Korea, Spain
25 Jul 2015
by Jim Rose
in economic history, gender, labour economics, labour supply, politics - USA
Tags: ageing society, British economy, demographic crisis, economics of retirement, effective retirement ages, female labour force participation, female labour supply, France, Germany, male labour force participation, male labour supply, old age pensions, older workers, retirement ages, social insurance, Social Security, welfare state
Figure 1 shows a divergence from a common starting point in 1974 effective retirement ages. The French in particular were the first to put their feet up and start retiring by the age of 60 by the early 1990. There was also a sharp increase in the average effective retirement age for men in the UK over a short decade. After that, British retirement ages for men started to climb again in the late 1990s. Figure 1 also shows that the gentle taper in the effective retirement age for American men stopped at the 1980s and started to climb again in the 2000s. The German data is too short to be of much use because of German unification. France only recently stopped seeing its effective retirement age fall and it is slightly increased recently – see figure 1
Figure 1: average effective retirement age for men, USA, UK, France and Germany, 1970 – 2012, (five-year average)

Source: OECD Pensions at a Glance.
Figure 2 shows similar results for British and American women as for men in the same country shown in figure 1 . That is, falling effective retirement ages for both British and American women in the 1970s and 1980s followed by a slow climb again towards the end of 1990s. French effective retirement ages for women followed the same pattern as for French retirement ages for men – a long fall to below the age of 60 with a slight increase recently. The German retirement data suggest that effective retirement ages for German women is increasing.
Figure 2: average effective retirement age for women, USA, UK, France and Germany 1970 – 2012, (five-year average)

Source: OECD Pensions at a Glance.
25 Jul 2015
by Jim Rose
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economic history, economics of bureaucracy, economics of education, economics of regulation, economics of religion, energy economics, environmental economics, income redistribution, industrial organisation, international economics, Murray Rothbard, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, Public Choice, rentseeking, survivor principle
Tags: antiforeign bias, antimarket bias, Catholic social thought, climate alarmism, expressive voting, global warming, makework bias, Pope Francis, rational ignorance, rational irrationality, voter demographics
24 Jul 2015
by Jim Rose
in business cycles, econometerics, economic growth, economic history, job search and matching, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice, unemployment, unions, welfare reform
Tags: antimarket bias, Don Brash, economic reform, expressive voting, Homer Simpson, Leftover Left, lost decades, makework bias, neoliberalism, rational ignorance, rational irrationality, Sir Roger Douglas, Twitter left
Today, Closing The Gap – The Income Inequality Project boldly claimed today that there was next to no unemployment in New Zealand prior to the onset of the curse of neoliberalism.

There is an Internet on computers now where it is easy to find data showing that the unemployment rate was rising rapidly in New Zealand in the 1970s and in double digits by the end of the 1980s – see figure 1.
Figure 1: harmonised unemployment rates, Australia and New Zealand, 1956-2014

Source: OECD StatExtract.
Figure 1 shows unemployment was rising rapidly in the 1970s and wasn’t much different by the end of the 1970s to the unemployment rates recorded after about 2000 in New Zealand.

One of the reasons that Sir Roger Douglas wrote There’s Got To Be A Better Way was the rapidly rising unemployment in New Zealand and the stagnant economic growth in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

New Zealand was one of the most regulated economies, so much so that Prime Minister David Lange said:
We ended up being run very similarly to a Polish shipyard.
As for those jobs on the railways, the then Reserve Bank Governor Don Brash said in 1996:
Railways cut its freight rates by 50 percent in real terms between 1983 and 1990, reduced its staff by 60 percent, and made an operating profit in 1989/90, the first for six years.
24 Jul 2015
by Jim Rose
in business cycles, health and safety, human capital, labour economics, occupational choice, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, poverty and inequality, welfare reform
Tags: adverse selection, disability insurance, moral hazard, social insurance, welfare state
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