There is no explanation for their lack of success in curbing the welfare state in USA?
What Percentage of Your Country Smokes Marijuana?
25 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, law and economics, liberalism, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA Tags: marijuana decriminalisation, meddlesome preferences, nanny state
What Percentage of Your Country Smokes Marijuana?
priceonomics.com/what-percentag… http://t.co/t5ybdqNv4X—
Priceonomics (@priceonomics) April 21, 2015
"You didn’t build that" – which of sport superstars, celebrities and top CEOs earn their pay more?
25 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, entrepreneurship, financial economics, industrial organisation, Marxist economics, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, rentseeking, sports economics, survivor principle Tags: CEO pay, Leftover Left, obama, superstar wages, superstars, top 1%
Defenders have also pointed to the pay of pro ballplayers or Hollywood stars, but they do not determine their own pay (as CEOs do) and are paid based on performance. Once they begin to fail, they are dumped. By contrast, CEO pay isn’t tied to performance in any meaningful way.
It’s a big concession to say that athletes and celebrities earn their pay but top CEOs don’t. Most of all, that concession changes the case against the top 1% from inequality to just desert – a big shift in theories of distributive justice. It’s also a big risk to base the argument for greater equality and a 80% top tax rate not only on the excesses of CEOs but on the very specific and testable hypothesis that these CEOs determine their own pay.
if we are to look at CEOs, top athletes and Hollywood celebrities, it is the athletes and celebrities who benefited the most from the windfall of been able to service huge markets through the global media market.
Figure 1: CEO pay and share market performance
Source: Economic Policy Institute.
CEOs actually have to run large complex companies to earn their pay, which is why their compensation tracks the share market relatively closely. Athletes and celebrities don’t do that what they do any better than in the past. They simply do it in front of a global media market. Since the late 1970s, the ratio of average pay of CEOs of large public companies to the average market value of those companies has stayed relatively constant: CEO pay grew hand in hand with corporations.
Steven Kaplan and Joshua Rauh make a number of basic points backed up by detailed evidence about CEO pay:
- While top CEO pay has increased, so has the pay of private company executives and hedge fund and private equity investors;
- ICT advances increase the pay of many – of professional athletes (technology increases their marginal product by allowing them to reach more consumers), Wall Street investors (technology allows them to acquire information and trade large amounts more easily), CEOs and technology entrepreneurs in the Forbes 400; and
- Technology allows top executives and financiers to manage larger organizations and asset pools – a loosening of social norms and a lack of independent control of CEO pacesetting does not explain similar increases in pay for private companies– technology explains it;
To put it simply:
If the reason for growth of incomes at the very top is, say, managerial power in publicly owned companies, then one would expect the increases in income at the top levels to be much larger for that group.
But the breadth of the occupations that have seen a rise in top income levels is much more consistent with the argument that the increase in “superstar” pay (or pay at the top) has been driven by the growth of information and communications technology, and the ways this technology allows individuals with particular skills that are in high demand to expand the scale of their performance.
As for the turnover argument, that underperforming athletes and celebrities are dropped, prior to the GFC, CEO turnover was already on the rise:
Turnover is 14.9% from 1992 to 2005, implying an average tenure as CEO of less than seven years. In the more recent period since 1998, total CEO turnover increases to 16.5%, implying an average tenure of just over six years.
Internal turnover is significantly related to three components of firm performance – performance relative to industry, industry performance relative to the overall market, and the performance of the overall stock market.
Only 21.3% of CEOs in 1992 remained in that role in 1999; only 16.35% of CEOS on the job in 2000 were there in 2007. In any given year, one out of six Fortune 500 CEOs loses their jobs, compared to one out of 10 in the 1970s.
Dirk Jenter and Fadi Kanaan in a study of of 3,365 CEO turnovers from 1993 to 2009 found that:
CEOs are significantly more likely to be dismissed from their jobs after bad industry and, to a lesser extent, after bad market performance. A decline in industry performance from the 90th to the 10thpercentile doubles the probability of a forced CEO turnover.
In another study, Kaplan found that average CEO pay increased substantially during the 1990s, but declined by more than 30% from peak levels reached around 2000.
In addition, private company executives have seen their pay increase by at least as much as public companies. Private company executives with fewer agency problems have increased by more than public company executives. To close with another quote from Kaplan:
The point of these comparisons is to confirm that while public company CEOs earn a great deal, they are not unique. Other groups with similar backgrounds–private company executives, corporate lawyers, hedge fund investors, private equity investors and others—have seen significant pay increases where there is a competitive market for talent and managerial power problems are absent.
Again, if one uses evidence of higher CEO pay as evidence of managerial power or capture, one must also explain why these professional groups have had a similar or even higher growth in pay. It seems more likely that a meaningful portion of the increase in CEO pay has been driven by market forces as well.
The Green vote drops 30% after going into government
25 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in politics - New Zealand, politics - USA Tags: Australia, Australian Greens, New Zealand Greens, Tasmania, Tasmanian Greens
The Australian Greens suffered dramatic drops in their vote when they got anywhere near the reins of power.
First consider the Tasmanian Greens. They were in a confidence and supply agreement in 1989 in the Tasmanian House of Assembly and then Cabinet ministers from 2010.
As Figure 1 shows, the Green primary vote dropped dramatically after each spell near power – from 21.6% to 13.8%.
Figure 1: Tasmanian Greens primary vote, House of Assembly
The Australian Greens suffered the same fate when they entered into a confidence and supply agreement after the 2011 Australian Federal Election. Figure 2 shows that their vote dropped by 1/3rd.
Figure 2: Australian Greens Senate primary vote
What lessons does this have for the New Zealand Greens and their ambitions for Cabinet portfolios after the 2017 election? Figure 3 shows of their part vote only got a comfortable distance from the 5% minimum threshold for list MPs after Labour lost power and popularity after the 2008 election.
Figure 3: New Zealand Greens party vote
In the 2005 election, the Green party vote was below 5% at the end of election night after rose above that after early and postal votes were count P.
Part of the boost in the vote of the Greens in the 2008 and 2011 New Zealand general elections can be explained by grumpy Labour voters going elsewhere while waiting the call home to a credible Labour government in waiting.
The Greens need to buy an insurance policy and win an electorate seat such as Wellington Central where their new leader James Shaw stood at the last election. The Labour Party came third in the party vote last time but won the seat comfortably because the Greens chose not to seek the electoral vote.
Tertiary education attainment of young adults in Australia, New Zealand, USA, UK and Canada, 2000 and 2011
24 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of education, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA Tags: Australia, British economy, Canada, College premium, educational attainment, graduate premium
Figure 1: tertiary educational attainment of adults aged 25 to 34 in Australia, New Zealand, USA, UK and Canada, 2000 and 2011
Source: OECD Factbook.
How fainting couch feminism threatens freedom
24 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in liberalism, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA Tags: feminism, free speech, meddlesome preferences, nanny state, political correctness
% of children living with 2 parents
23 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
% of children living with 2 parents
Israel 92%
Egypt 89
Turkey 88
Brazil 72
US 69
S Africa 36worldfamilymap.org/2014/e-ppendix… http://t.co/GveypeU6tK—
Conrad Hackett (@conradhackett) June 22, 2014
Who taxes average workers most out of Australia, New Zealand, the USA and UK?
23 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in fiscal policy, macroeconomics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, population economics, public economics Tags: Australia, British economy, New Zealand, taxation and the labour supply
Figure 1: Direct taxes on the average worker in Australia, New Zealand, USA and UK, 2001 – 2012
Source: OECD Factbook 2014
Taxes on the average worker measure the ratio between the amount of taxes paid by the worker and the employer on the country average wage and the corresponding total labour cost for the employer. This tax wedge measures the extent to which the tax system on labour income discourages employment.
The taxes included in the measure are personal income taxes, employees’ social security contributions and employers’ social security contributions. For the few countries that have them, it also includes payroll taxes. The amount of these taxes paid in relation to the employment of one average worker is expressed as a percentage of their labour cost (gross wage plus employers’ social security contributions and payroll tax).
An average worker is defined as somebody who earns the average income of full-time workers of the country concerned in Sectors B-N of the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC Rev. 4). The average worker is considered single without children, meaning that he or she does not receive any tax relief in respect of a spouse, unmarried partner or child.
The academic bias that dare not speak its name
23 Jun 2015 2 Comments
Academic libs in soc sci and humanities, cons in business and nursing, moderates in engineering and computer sci http://t.co/ixwbWb5M6X—
Whyvert (@whyvert) May 23, 2015
Many American families face negative affected income taxes rates
23 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of love and marriage, labour economics, politics - USA, public economics Tags: earned income tax credit, economics of families, family tax credits
Who pays income tax in the USA?
23 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in politics - USA, taxation Tags: top 1%
Child poverty rates in single parent and couple families, Anglo-Saxon countries
22 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in labour economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, population economics, poverty and inequality, welfare reform Tags: Australia, British economy, Canada, child poverty, economics of the family, family poverty, Ireland, single mothers, single parents
Figure 1: Child poverty rates by family type, Anglo-Saxon countries, 2010
Source: OECD Family Database; Poverty thresholds are set at 50% of the median income of the entire population.
The impact of top tax rates on the migration of superstars
22 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in human capital, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, public economics, sports economics Tags: British economy, CEO pay, Denmark, economics of migration, endogenous growth theory, Spain, superstar wages, taxation and entrepreneurship, taxation and superstars, taxation and the labour supply, Thomas Piketty, top 1%
Emmanuel Saez is leading a literature showing how sensitive migration decisions of superstars are to top marginal tax rates. Specifically, he and his co-authors studied Spain’s Beckham’s law.
Cristiano Ronaldo moved from Manchester United to Real Madrid in 2009 partly to avoid the announced 50% top marginal income tax in the UK to benefit from “Beckham Law” in Spain. Beckham’s Law was a preferential tax scheme of 24% on foreign residents in Spain. When David Beckham transferred to Real Madrid, the manager of Arsenal football club commented that the supremacy of British soccer was at risk unless the U.K.’s top marginal tax rate changed.
A number of EU member states offer substantially lower tax rates to immigrant football players, including Denmark (1991), Belgium (2002) and Spain (2004). Beckham’s law had a big impact in Spain:
…when Spain introduced the Beckham Law in 2004, the fraction of foreigners in the Spanish league immediately and sharply started to diverge from the fraction of foreigners in the comparable Italian league.
Moreover, exploiting the specific eligibility rules in the Beckham Law, we show that the extra influx of foreigners in Spain is driven entirely by players eligible for the scheme with no effect on ineligible players.

Suez also found evidence from tax reforms in all 14 countries that the location decisions of players are very responsive to tax rates. Suez in another paper with Thomas Piketty wants the top tax rate to be 80%. However, their work on taxation and the labour supply supports a much lower rate:
First, higher top tax rates may discourage work effort and business creation among the most talented – the so-called supply-side effect. In this scenario, lower top tax rates would lead to more economic activity by the rich and hence more economic growth. If all the correlation of top income shares and top tax rates documented on Figure 1 were due to such supply-side effects, the revenue-maximising top tax rate would be 57%.
Suez and Piketty then go on to argue that the pay of chief executives of public companies, a subset of the top 1% and top 0.1%, may not reflect their productivity but that is a much more complicated argument about agency costs and the separation of ownership and control which they make rather weakly.
Much of their other work on top incomes is about the emergence of a working rich whose top incomes are wages earned by holding superstar jobs in a global economy. It would be peculiar and perhaps overzealous to organise the entire taxation of high incomes around the correction of agency costs arising from the separation of ownership and control of some of the companies listed on the stock exchange.
Figure 1: Percentage of national income (including capital gains) received by top 1%, and each primary taxpayer occupation in top 1%, USA
Source: Jon Bakija, Adam Cole and Bradley T. Heim “Jobs and Income Growth of Top Earners and the Causes of Changing Income Inequality: Evidence from U.S. Tax Return Data”.
There is a long history showing how the labour supply of sports stars is highly sensitive to top marginal income tax rates. For a very long time, boxing was the only really big-money sport for athletes:
The 1950s was the era of the 90 percent top marginal tax rate, and by the end of that decade live gate receipts for top championship fights were supplemented by the proceeds from closed circuit telecasts to movie theatres.
A second fight in one tax year would yield very little additional income, hardly worth the risk of losing the title. And so, the three fights between Floyd Patterson and Ingemar Johansson stretched over three years (1959-1961); the two between Patterson and Sonny Liston over two years (1962-1963), as was also true for the two bouts between Liston and Cassius Clay (Muhammad Ali) (1964-1965).
Then, the Tax Reform Act of 1964 cut the top marginal tax rate to 70 percent effective in 1965. The result: two heavyweight title fights in 1965, and five in 1966. You can look it up.
Ufuk Akcigit, Salome Baslandze, and Stefanie Stantcheva found that the migration of superstar inventors is highly responsive to top marginal tax rates.
#Braindrain is real, even quantifiable — as per NBER paper 21024. Geniuses don't tolerate extra taxes easily. http://t.co/HVP8uEFAfz—
Amity Shlaes (@AmityShlaes) June 07, 2015
Ufuk Akcigit, Salome Baslandze, and Stefanie Stantcheva studied the international migration responses of superstar inventors to top income tax rates for the period 1977-2003 using data from the European and US Patent offices.
our results suggest that, given a ten percentage point decrease in top tax rates, the average country would be able to retain 1% more domestic superstar inventors and attract 38% more foreign superstar inventors.

Emmanuel Saez and co-authors also found that a preferential top tax scheme for high earning migrants in their first three years in Denmark was highly successful in attracting highly skilled labour to that country:
…the number of foreigners in Denmark paid above the eligibility threshold (that is the group affected by the tax scheme) doubles relative to the number of foreigners paid slightly below the threshold (those are comparison groups not affected by the tax scheme) after the scheme is introduced.
This effect builds up in the first five years of the scheme and remains stable afterwards. As a result, the fraction of foreigners in the top 0.5% of the earnings distribution is 7.5% in recent years compared to a 4% counterfactual absent the scheme.
This very large behavioural response implies that the resulting revenue-maximising tax rate for a scheme targeting highly paid foreigners is relatively small (about 35%). This corresponds roughly to the current tax rate on foreigners in Denmark under the scheme once we account for other relevant taxes (VAT and excises).

This blog post was motivated by a courageous tweet about Tony Atkinson saying that increases in the top tax rate have little effect on the supply of labour! Not so.
Auckland housing is more expensive than many big US cities
22 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, urban economics Tags: Auckland, land supply, land use planning, RMA, zoning
Rising mortgage rates to test U.S. housing market rebound on.wsj.com/1IsKVde http://t.co/vHDJAdM292—
Pedro da Costa (@pdacosta) June 22, 2015

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