just brilliant: hype cycle for development ideas by @dalgoso http://t.co/UQX3tRHOBJ—
Laurence Chandy (@laurencechandy) January 03, 2014
Where does democracy figure in the cycle of development thinking?
13 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, development economics, growth disasters, growth miracles Tags: capitalism and freedom, democracy and freedom, IMF, ODA, rule of law, UN, World Bank
Capitalism and freedom is noticeably missing from this survey of UN effectiveness
09 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, development economics, growth disasters, growth miracles, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: capitalism and freedom, overseas development assistance, UN
perceptions of the UN's impact from the development community http://t.co/k8XYisxGaK—
Laurence Chandy (@laurencechandy) October 07, 2014
It is not enough to say that the status quo is imperfect. It is important to offer alternatives.
04 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
Earth Hour celebrates ignorance, poverty and backwardness
29 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, development economics, economics of media and culture, environmentalism, growth disasters, growth miracles, liberalism, Marxist economics, technological progress Tags: Earth Hour
Great Quote on Earth Hour, which Celebrates Ignorance, Poverty and Backwardness #HAH2015 aei.org/publication/ea… http://t.co/775bQhpiBs—
Mark J. Perry (@Mark_J_Perry) March 28, 2015
No one says this about economists
27 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, Austrian economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, F.A. Hayek, liberalism, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: evidence-based policy, offsetting behaviour, science and public policy, The fatal conceit, The pretence to knowledge, unintended consequences
Scientists dream about what could be.
Economists remind you of price tags and unintended consequences
The North–South theory of product life cycles
23 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, law and economics, managerial economics, organisational economics, property rights, survivor principle, theory of the firm Tags: entrepreneurial alertness, foreign direct investment, incomplete contracts, incomplete property rights, North-South product life cycle, product life cycles
Forecasts of the offshoring of service jobs, as an example, can be constituted into a theory of North-South product cycles. The North-South theory of the life cycle of products starts with their research and development and refinement by entrepreneurs in the advanced countries (the North) with some exporting (Grossman and Helpmann 1991a, 1991b). These innovations require resources to be invested with uncertain prospects of success. Entrepreneurs in the North compete to discover new technology-intensive products using the ample supply of R&D workers and human capital-rich workers in the industrialised countries (Grossman and Helpmann 1991a, 1991b).

As a new product matures and its production becomes more standardised, the bulk of its production can migrate to the less developed countries (the South) to take advantage of lower production costs, and these countries will become net exporters. In the South, entrepreneurs focus more on imitation. They invest resources in importing and learning the production processes developed and proven to be a success in the North (Grossman and Helpmann 1991a, 1991b).
The shifting of production of standardised products to lower-wage foreign locations will frequently be within the originating company via a foreign affiliate, because of uncertainties about property rights and contract enforcement institutions in the host countries, and only later to independent foreign firms (Antràs 2005). Within corporate hierarchies, the high-skilled managers in the developed countries will specialise in problem-solving and non-routine tasks. They will interact with middle managers and production workers in developing countries who perform the routine tasks (Antràs et al. 2006, 2008).
Contracts are typically incomplete either because they are difficult to write and/or because the court cannot enforce them. The World Trade Organization (2005, 2008) concluded that, for example, the location of offshored services depends on:
- labour costs,
- trade costs,
- the quality of institutions, particularly the legal framework,
- the tax and investment regime,
- the quality of infrastructure, particularly telecommunications, and
- skills, particularly language and computer skills.
Risks in contract negotiation and enforcement will influence which types of production is outsourced. Roughly one-third of world trade is infra-firm, and this intra-firm trade is concentrated in the capital-intensive industries because of the costs and risks of investing in contracting with arm’s-length suppliers (Antràs 2003). Considerations about R&D incentives, the availability of human capital and the quality of contract enforcement institutions weigh heavily on the development of new products and their initial and later locations of different stages of production.
Products are initially developed in the highly industrialised countries because their sophisticated legal systems allow contracts to be enforced. Even then, in industrialised countries, the difficulties of writing and enforcing complicated contracts over the quality of new products early in the product life cycle encourages firms to make those products internally within the firm. Early in the product life cycle, if sub-contractors were used for key imports, there would have to be continual renegotiation of contracts contracts to incorporate new innovations and learning by doing. As Antras says:
Global production networks necessarily entail intensive contracting between parties located in different countries and thus subject to distinct legal systems0
As the new product standardises, and product quality in consequence becomes easier to measure and contract over, initially the innovating firm will sub-contract within the industrialised country but in time will import from developing countries. In the first instance, these imports may be from affiliates established in the developing country to ensure greater control of product quality through direct ownership of the factory. As Antras says:
Firms contemplating doing business in a country with weak contracting institutions might decide to do so within firm boundaries to have more control.
The size and shape of the firm is a direct response to mitigate the costs of contracting over quality that is hard to measure and which is constantly changing early in the product cycle. By assigning ownership rights to the party undertaking the more important investment in quality early in the product life cycle, entrepreneurs and innovators can minimise the losses caused by lack of enforceable contracts over quality when quality is changing rapidly as the firm moves through the product life cycle.
Boeing blamed the delays on the delivery of the Dreamliner on an unwillingness of sub-contractors to stand by their contractual obligations. In response, Boeing acquired some of the key sub-contractors to ensure that they delivered as promised. This is a classic operation of the theory of the firm where the entrepreneur brings within the firm what is too expensive to transact on the market because of difficulties in measuring quality and defining and enforcing property rights over what has been contracted.
Sales to locations with weak contractual enforcement are more likely to be cash in advance
22 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, development economics, law and economics, property rights

In another triumphant British Justice, trade credit is much more likely in common law countries and in countries with honest courts.
Sorry @WJRosenbergCTU the class war has been based on a measurement error! The real class enemy is the RMA and restricted land supply – updated again
21 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, Marxist economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, poverty and inequality, urban economics Tags: Class war, Generation Rent, housing affordability, housing prices, land use regulation, RMA, Thomas Picketty, top 1%, wage stagnation
The other day, I replied to a rant by Bill Rosenberg about the decline in labour share of national income and its implications for income inequality and the great wage stagnation. The labour share of national income has dropped by at least 5% in most countries including New Zealand.

New data from the USA has found that the entire declining the value of the share of labour of national income is due to home ownership:
…the net capital share has increased since 1948, but when disaggregated this increase comes entirely from the housing sector: the contribution to net capital income from all other sectors has been zero or slightly negative, as the fall and rise have offset each other.
The capital share is rising because of the increased value of housing in countries with widespread home ownership. The concentration of capital ownership and wealth in the top 1% was a misplaced concern based on measurement error.
https://twitter.com/EconBizFin/status/581047721836060672
Piketty assumed the returns to capital were increasing across the entire economy. Rognlie found the trend to be almost entirely isolated to the housing sector. His 23 page long conference paper at the Brookings Institution started as a comment on a blog post on Marginal Revolution.

When Rognlie adjusted for the rapid depreciation inherent to investments in capital such as computer software, most of the rest of the increase in the capital share in recent decades in the USA and six other countries has came in housing.

A single sector such as housing is not the force that is shaping past and future of inequality as Piketty and others such as Bill Rosenberg in New Zealand have assumed. They attributed a growing share of income going to capital across the board as Tyler Cowan explains.
In the simplest version of the Piketty model, wealth grows more quickly than does the economy as a whole and thus the picture changes. The relative losers are no longer low earners but rather anyone who is not a capitalist. Any disparity is due not to their shortcomings in labour markets but rather to their lack of a high initial endowment.
The main driver of inequality is the tendency of returns on capital to exceed the rate of economic growth and company shares, businesses and other capital are owned by a narrow section of the community, and in particular by the top 1% of income earners. Trends in housing prices and the comings and goings of intangible capital is not part of that story.

Investment and depreciation of software and other intellectual property is not well handed, or even well measured in current national accounting systems as Edward Prescott has shown in a long research programme dating back 10 years. Intangible capital produced and owned by businesses is known to be big part of all investment in the economy but nearly all of it is recorded as an expense and therefore most is not part of GDP as currently measured.
Source: Edward C. Prescott and Ellen R. McGrattan (2014)
Prescott estimated the value of intangible capital to be equal to about 60% of that of tangible capital in the US economy. Incorrect treatment of investment in intangible capital seriously underestimates investment, output, fluctuations in labour productivity and movements in the capital shares. The graph above shows that the recently introduced intellectual property classification in the US national accounts is both large and volatile relative to equipment and structures investments over the last 40 years. The graph below shows that including intangible capital completely changes the predictions of real business cycle models about trend US labour productivity in the 1990s.
Labor Productivity, for the Model, With and Without Intangible Investment (Real, Detrended) 1990-2003

Source: McGrattan and Prescott, 2005, “Expensed and Sweat Equity,” Research Department Working Paper 636, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
This depreciation adjustment for software investment is important because you can’t eat depreciation, as a shrewd observer noted. The rapid depreciation of software is depreciation – it cannot be redistributed from the top 1% to the downtrodden workers as some sort of income. Others have also earlier argued that Piketty’s claims rest on the recent increase in the price of housing.

The main reason for increases in the price of housing in New Zealand and elsewhere is restrictions on the supply of land by local councils. They are the real class enemy.
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The metropolitan urban limit in Auckland increases land prices by 9 fold just inside that limit. As Tim Taylor said today:
The rise in capital income as a result of a long-term rise in land and housing prices across the high-income countries is a phenomenon that isn’t easily crammed into the usual disputes over whether capital owners are exploiting wage-earners.
The role of the housing sector and restrictions on land supply driving up housing prices in recent decades in shaping the future of inequality is perhaps underplayed given the many discussions of Generation Rent.

Housing affordability is a real crisis in New Zealand and many other countries with the younger generation no longer able to buy a house. They are condemned to decades of renting a house. They may never be able to afford a house on one income and perhaps two ordinary comes.
The future of inequality is between those who can and cannot afford a dream and a right for their parents and grandparents, which was to buy a house and pay the mortgage off within a couple of decades.

Young people used to buy a house shortly after leaving university and paid it off by their middle age when I was in my 20s and 30s. Back then, which was not all that long ago, ordinary workers could aspire to take out a mortgage and buy a house in the suburbs.

Unless there is a major deregulation of the supply of land in the big cities, home ownership for most in the community will really be a dream, rather than a dream of aspiration achieved by most by their 30s, if not often earlier through working and saving. The grandchildren of the baby boomers will become and perhaps already are Generation Rent.
Deirdre McCloskey on corruption and economic development
13 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, development economics, economic history, economics of crime, growth disasters, growth miracles, law and economics, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: corruption, Deirdre McCloskey, The Industrial Revolution
Do Paul Samuelson’s criticisms of behavioural economics make him a double secret Austrian economist?
13 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, Austrian economics, behavioural economics, comparative institutional analysis, entrepreneurship, industrial organisation, survivor principle Tags: efficient markets hypothesis, entrepreneurial alertness, Paul Samuelson
via Samuelson vs. Friedman, David Henderson | EconLog | Library of Economics and Liberty and An Interview With Paul Samuelson, Part One — The Atlantic.
The weight of science in contentious social issues
07 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, Public Choice Tags: evidence-based policy, expressive voting, rational ignorance, rational irrationality, science and public policy


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