Countries where you become a citizen just by being born there.
Interesting difference between old and new world! http://t.co/DzsH64SAqa—
Max Roser (@MaxCRoser) May 31, 2015
Countries where you become a citizen just by being born there
01 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, development economics, economics of media and culture, law and economics, politics Tags: citizenship
Dealing with the Spanish bureaucracy
28 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of bureaucracy, economics of regulation, industrial organisation, Public Choice, rentseeking, survivor principle Tags: cost of doing business, endogenous growth theory, Eurosclerosis, Spain
The different types of authoritarian personalities
28 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, Public Choice Tags: antiforeign bias, antimarket bias, economics of personality traits, expressive voting, Leftover Left, makework bias, political psychology, rational ignorance, rational irrationality
Tom Sargent keynote address Emergency Economic Summit for Greece (1 June 2015)
26 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, currency unions, Euro crisis, fiscal policy, macroeconomics, monetary economics Tags: EU, Euroland, Greece, sovereign borrowing, sovereign defaults, Thomas Sargent
HL Mencken on the Harmful Digital Communication Bill
26 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of crime, economics of media and culture, economics of regulation, law and economics, liberalism, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice Tags: chilling effect, disorderly conduct, free speech, infotopia, Internet trolls, meddlesome preferences, nanny state, offsetting behaviour, The fatal conceit, The pretence to knowledge, unintended consequences
Is investor state dispute settlement a form of overseas development assistance?
24 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, development economics, growth disasters, growth miracles, international economic law, international economics, law and economics, property rights, Public Choice, rentseeking, Richard Posner Tags: European Court of Justice, free trade agreements, International Court of Justice, international law, investor state dispute settlement, ODA, overseas development assistance, preferential trade agreements, regional trade agreements, WTO
Would objections to the Investor State Dispute Settlement provisions in the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership wilt away if the adjudicating body was the International Court of Justice? The left-wing opponents of investor state dispute settlement genuflect at the very mention of the International Court of Justice and international law generally (unless it is international economic law).

Disputes over the provisions of European union treaties are adjudicated by the European Court of Justice. The judgements of that court brought by individuals against member states so annoy the British that it is a leading reason for many British wanting to leave the European Union and replace the Human Rights Act 1998 with a British Bill Of Rights policed by British courts rather than by the European Court of Justice and European human rights law.
It is routine for any treaty to have some provision for arbitration of disputes. This includes trade and investment treaties.
The World Trade Organisation treaty includes a dispute settlement provision with arbitrators based in Geneva. Some of the more than 400 cases heard have been motivated by discrimination against imports on the basis of a breached environmental protection policies of the importing country.

A number of countries want to ban imports that are produced in ways that upset them. Others want to include labour and environmental standards in trade agreements to impose developed country standards on developing countries in what is a new form of colonialism.
I have previously said that investor State Dispute Settlement provisions have no place in trade and investment treaties between democracies. I must now admit there are good reasons to have arbitration clauses in treaties between democracies.
The puzzle is why refer these trade and investment disputes to a little-known arbitration body adjunct to the World Bank rather than the far more prestigious International Court of Justice.
Perhaps the reason is both sides want an arbitrator who is not too strong and not too credible. It would look very bad if the International Court of Justice was to rule against you.
William Landes and Richard Posner contended that judicial independence maximises the value of legislative deals with interest groups by enhancing the durability of those deals.
Why no International Court of Commercial Law? When deciding what type in judiciary to enforce international trade bargains, the signatories may prefer a less credible adjudication and enforcement mechanism in case they want to opt out of it or chip around the decision.
The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice is to settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by special agreement and matters specifically provided for in treaties and conventions in force.
UN member states are the parties to any litigation but that doesn’t stop them raising cases on behalf of individuals. That said, organizations, private enterprises, and individuals cannot have their cases taken to the International Court, such as to appeal a national supreme court’s ruling. Only the states can bring the cases and become the defendants of the cases.
The International Court of Justice is different from the European Court of Justice because individuals cannot easily bring complaints before it. One of the causes of action before the European Court of Adjusters is under European competition law over member states providing financial aid to industries.
Democratic countries with high levels of economic and social integration, such as the European union, do find it in advantage to set up a European wide Court to adjudicate disputes over rights under European law.
Why then would a democracy sign up to an investment protection treaty with a developing country? One reason is overseas development assistance.
Developing countries with corrupt and incompetent courts, politicians and bureaucracies sign international treaties as a way of assuring foreign investors and trading partners of some degree of security of their property rights and their ability to enforce contracts with suppliers and buyers.
By folding these assurances into trade treaties, the developing country has a stronger incentive to honour its promises. There will be domestic constituencies wanting to retain reciprocal export market access who will lobby for the honouring of the promises of legal protection to investors and businesses in their home country.
New Zealand signing up to the Trans-Pacific Partnership is an example of this form of overseas development assistance. Exporters and investors from the developing country who export and invest in New Zealand have another reason to support more secure property rights and better enforcement of contracts in their home country as a way of securing their treaty rights to export and invest in New Zealand.
The Left of the political spectrum should be keen on this form of overseas development considering their general belief in greatly increasing the amount spent on overseas development assistance. Rather than pay cash to the development country, the payment is in kind as reciprocal legal promises.
Trade treaties that include investor state dispute settlement are forms of governance assistance to developing countries. The reciprocal exchange of promises about investor protection and the enforcement of contracts and property rights improves the quality of governance in the developing country.
The countries most likely to be subject to investor state dispute settlement are those with weaker governance. Even in the European Union, the member states most likely to be sued are former communist countries. The most common course of action was the cancellation of a licence or permit.

Investor state dispute settlement clauses are no different from any other international treaty include environmental and human rights treaties. All these treaties require countries to give up part of their sovereignty.

Democracies give up their sovereignty in investor state dispute settlement in the hope that developing country partners to the treaty will improve the development potential of their country through better governance and more secure property rights.
That is an overseas development aid objective the Left of the political spectrum should support, but it does not. The Left of the political spectrum is happy to use trade agreements to impose developed country labour and environmental standards on poor countries desperate for access to rich country markets, but is not willing to give up anything in return.
Millennials’ Political Views Don’t Make Any Sense
22 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of information, economics of media and culture, income redistribution, politics - USA, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: antiforeign bias, antimarket bias, expressive voting, make-work bias, rational ignorance, rational irrationality, voter demographics
Millennial politics is simple, really. Young people support big government, unless it costs any more money. They’re for smaller government, unless budget cuts scratch a program they’ve heard of. They’d like Washington to fix everything, just so long as it doesn’t run anything.

Young people lean way left on issues like gay marriage, pot, and immigration. On abortion and gun control, they swim closer to the rest of the electorate.
But on economics, they’re all over the map. You get the sense, reading the Reason Foundation and Pew studies, that a savvy pollster could trick a young person into supporting basically any economic policy in the world with the right combination of triggers. Conservative and liberal partisans can cherry-pick this survey to paint Millennials as whatever ideology they want.

On spending:
Conservatives can say: 65 percent of Millennials would like to cut spending.
Liberals can say: 62 percent would like to spend more on infrastructure and jobs.On taxes:
Conservatives can say: 58 percent of Millennials want to cut taxes overall.
Liberals can say: 66 percent want to raise taxes on the wealthy.On government’s role in our lives:
Conservatives can say: 66 percent of Millennials say that “when something is funded by the government, it is usually inefficient and wasteful.”
Liberals can say: More than two-thirds think the government should guarantee food, shelter, and a living wage.On government size:
Conservatives can say: 57 percent want smaller government with fewer services (if you mention the magic word “taxes”).
Liberals can say: 54 percent want larger government with more services (if you don’t mention “taxes”).

via Millennials’ Political Views Don’t Make Any Sense – The Atlantic and This poll proves that millennials have totally incoherent political views – Vox.
The ancient Greek origins of ostracism
20 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, economic history, Public Choice Tags: Ancient Greece
But how could we pick just one? http://t.co/cHtz4wKcHc—
(@YALiberty) April 25, 2015
Fidel Castro developed a taste for luxury early
18 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, economics of bureaucracy, Marxist economics, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: bribery and corruption, Cuba, fall of communism, Fidel Castro
Fidel Castro, wearing 2 rolexes, lighting a cigar while visiting the USSR for the first time buff.ly/1GzeezX http://t.co/ig70RuEJjw—
Business Insider (@businessinsider) June 11, 2015
Longest-serving (non-hereditary) world leaders
18 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, economic history, Public Choice Tags: autocracy
Where would Sepp Blatter rank among the longest-serving (non-hereditary) world leaders? bit.ly/1Fe5qZs http://t.co/O1Nvv7ytsx—
Guardian Data (@GuardianData) May 29, 2015
Mises on the dangers of specialisation and economic analysis
17 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, Ludwig von Mises Tags: division of labour, methodology of economics, philosophy of economics, The fatal conceit, The pretence to knowledge
Would a referendum on euthanasia pass in New Zealand?
14 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, economics of crime, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice Tags: advance directives, Blackstone's ratio, Citizen initiated referendum, death with dignity, direct democracy, euthanasia, referendums, representative democracy, right to life, rule of law, William Blackstone
A New Zealand First MP along with his populist leader have proposed that the morally tricky question of euthanasia be addressed in New Zealand by a referendum rather than by a vote on a private member’s bill in Parliament.
Although about 80% of the public support euthanasia when asked about it in principle, when the 120 members in New Zealand Parliament elected by proportional representation are asked to vote on it in practice with procedures for safeguards, be last time this was tried in 2003 the Bill failed by three votes. The reason why it failed to pass was a substantial number of MPs who voted against the bill was reservations about abuse.
A badly drafted bill may offer insufficient assurances to some MPs about preventing abuse and ensuring people who are depressed are not offered options that are not in their best interests.
Others have moral or religious objections. The religious objections were summarised by Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, where he wrote that suicide was also a spiritual offence:
…in evading the prerogative of the Almighty, and rushing into his immediate presence uncalled for
If a referendum was to fail, that would make our morally timid MPs even more timid about ever passing a bill on euthanasia.

There is a considerable risk that a referendum on euthanasia will fail because people don’t know exactly what they are voting for. Because of that they will listen to those who opposed euthanasia who will point to the risk of abuse. A referendum strengthens the hands of those that oppose euthanasia. They can play to the lack of detail on what exactly is to be approved.
Many people have very strong views on exactly when and when not euthanasia is permissible because of their views about the sanctity of life and the risk of abuse. The recent High Court judgement on an unsuccessful application are an exception to the criminal law on assisted suicide said that:
The sanctity of human life principle underpins the criminal law relating to culpable homicide. It was said by Blackstone to be the first rule of English law.
When making an exception to the first rule of law, people want to know exactly what they are voting for and exactly what safeguards apply the proposed exceptions. A Referendum does not offer that indispensable option. Writing on a Bill on end of life choice is legally and morally tricky.
Many Bills have failed such as recently in the Scottish Parliament and in 2003 in the New Zealand Parliament because they were badly drafted and were considered by many to offer insufficient protection of the vulnerable against abuse and melancholy.
Even when courts rule favourably on the matter, such as in Canada with its recent Supreme Court decision under its Bill of Rights, that court suspended its judgement upholding the right to euthanasia for 12 month so that the Canadian Parliament could work out the ever so vital details by passing a Bill. As the Supreme Court of United Kingdom recently ruled:
… unless the court can be satisfied that any exception to the subsection can be operated in such a way as to generate an acceptably small risk that assistance will be afforded to those vulnerable to pressure to seek to commit suicide, it cannot conclude that the absolute prohibition in the subsection is disproportionate to its legitimate aim.
That is the essence of reservations about end of life choice. Blackstone’s ratio applies to standards of proof in criminal proceedings: it is better that 10 guilty go free than one innocent suffer.
Those with reservations about end of life choice have the same concerns that motivated Blackstone’s ratio. Their reservations are focused on few cases of abuse not justifying the benefits of going gently into that good night by making exceptions from an absolute prohibition under the criminal law against assisted suicide for the terminally ill despite they being of sound mind and independent judgement.

Mises on why economics analysis is so unpopular
14 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of bureaucracy, income redistribution, Ludwig von Mises, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: antiforeign bias, antimarket bias, expressive voting, green rent seeking, makework bias, NIMBYs, rational ignorance, rational irrationality

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