Saving Ocean Fisheries with Property Rights
17 May 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, economics of regulation, environmental economics, fisheries economics, industrial organisation, international economics, law and economics, privatisation, property rights Tags: common property, economics of fisheries, individual transferable quotas, tragedy of the commons
Songs that sound the same: “Do Ya Think I’m Sexy” and “Taj Mahal”
15 May 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of media and culture, Music, property rights Tags: patents and copyrights
Songs that sound the same? “My Sweet Lord” and “He’s So Fine”
14 May 2016 Leave a comment
in economics, economics of media and culture, Music, property rights Tags: patents and copyrights
Trekonomics: The Final Frontier (w/ Manu Saadia)
09 May 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, Austrian economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, development economics, economics of regulation, environmental economics, history of economic thought, industrial organisation, international economics, law and economics, property rights Tags: star trek
The Coase Theorem
08 May 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, Austrian economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of regulation, environmental economics, history of economic thought, industrial organisation, law and economics, property rights, Ronald Coase Tags: Coase theorem
Recycling Dumpster Diving: A "Victimless" Crime?
06 May 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, economics of crime, environmental economics, law and economics, property rights Tags: recycling

“Each week my family separates our recyclables from our regular trash. The former are put in our blue bin and are placed out on the curb for pickup on Wednesday mornings.
Last Tuesday night, I walked to Westwood Village to attend a dinner when I saw two individuals diving into all of my neighbours’ recycling bins (which were on the street curb) to extract the recyclables.
These "entrepreneurs" had a large truck filled with plastic bottles and aluminium cans that they were clearly loading up to take to a place to collect the recyclables fees. Is this a crime?
I view it as an economic crime for the following reason. The only reason this "trash treasure" was easy to access in the blue bins on the street was because the well meaning law abiding citizens wasted their time sorting their trash and kindly placing it outside.
Our tax dollars goes to the unionized guys who drive the recyclable trucks to pick this stuff up. If there is nothing to pick up, because the pirates have stolen the treasure, then recyclable trucks are losing $ as they are bringing in no revenue. So, this operating profit loss is just a transfer from the city to the pirates. My tax dollars and my time are being used to transfer $ to pirates.
The environment is no cleaner and is likely to dirtier because of the duplication of transportation (the recycling truck and the dirty private pirate trucks). I saw the same thing in Berkeley. What is to be done? A green cop shooting tranquilizer darts?”
Source: Environmental and Urban Economics: Recycling Dumpster Diving: A "Victimless" Crime?
Water Policies for People, by David Zetland
18 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in economics, economics of regulation, environmental economics, industrial organisation, law and economics, privatisation, property rights, survivor principle Tags: Economics of water
The scale of the #Panamapapers leak
16 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, law and economics, property rights, public economics Tags: conspiracy theories, tax havens
Forever Contemporary – The Economics of Ronald Coase | Free book from Institute of Economic Affairs
11 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in history of economic thought, industrial organisation, law and economics, property rights, Ronald Coase, theory of the firm
Summary:
- R. H. Coase (1910–2013), a leading modern figure in the classical liberal tradition, was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1991 for his analysis of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the functioning of the economy.
- Before Coase’s work in the 1930s, there was no real understanding of the relation between the theory of the firm and the theory of markets. Coase showed that the size and structure of firms, and the location of the border between internal exchange within the firm and external exchange through markets, are systematically related to the costs of transactions.
- These transaction costs, which Coase termed ‘costs of using the price mechanism’, include search and information costs (those involved in finding business partners, rather than having to produce your own inputs), bargaining costs (which rise sharply with the number of contractual partners) and enforcement costs (which, in the absence of a strong and effective legal framework, depend largely on trust in partners). When these costs alter dramatically, for example, as a result of introducing innovative technology, we can expect substantial alterations in firm and market structures.
- Coase was a pioneer in the modern analysis of environmental issues. He showed that, with clear property rights and low transactions costs, private solutions to many environmental problems can be achieved without government regulation. Such solutions were logically independent of the initial distribution of property rights. This is highly relevant to a number of modern economic problems which the government currently handles badly, such as land-use planning.
- His work has had a profound effect on later generations of economists, several of whom themselves won Nobel Prizes. His work on environmental issues, for example, influenced another Nobel Prizewinner in Elinor Ostrom, whose work focused on how common pool resources could be used effectively with minimal government intervention. This is especially relevant to debates about environmental and ecological degradation in forestry, fishing and game animal resources – perhaps particularly in developing economies.
- Similarly his work on the firm led to the development of the ‘New Industrial Economics’, now associated with Oliver Williamson, which has changed our understanding of issues of economic governance. This is relevant to current concerns over corporate social responsibility.
- Coase’s editorship of the Journal of Law and Economics over many years did much to stimulate economic analysis of legal institutions, an innovation which has had a major influence on public policy, particularly in the US. It has fed, for instance, into recommendations for accident compensation.
- Coase’s insights have challenged economists’ assumptions about the nature of public goods, which he demonstrated could often be provided more effectively by various forms of private initiative. He also illuminated such varied topics as the allocation of spectrum bandwith, the regulation of financial institutions and water resource management.
- Methodologically, Coase was opposed to ‘blackboard economics’ which relied on theory or econometric analysis at the expense of more practical investigation. He favoured careful examination of case studies and the history of industries when analysing economic policy issues.
- His work retains considerable significance in the twenty-first century. Coase’s analysis of China’s economic advance, published shortly before his death, sheds light on its future prospects, while his transaction cost approach can be argued to explain the new phenomenon of the ‘sharing’ economy which is reshaping businesses and employment. Furthermore his work should continue to be at the forefront of debates surrounding regulation, broadcasting and the environment. If policymakers and the economists who advise them ignore Coase, they are in danger of perpetuating policies which may work ‘in theory’ but do not work effectively in practice.
Source: Forever Contemporary – The Economics of Ronald Coase | Institute of Economic Affairs
@JulieAnneGenter tax havens underwrite The Great Escape from extreme poverty in developing countries
08 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, constitutional political economy, development economics, economic history, economics of bureaucracy, economics of crime, growth disasters, growth miracles, International law, law and economics, property rights, rentseeking
Tax havens and offshore financial centres are vital to the economic development of poor countries. There are plenty of countries, poor countries, where the ability to move funds offshore is fundamental to successful investment. That is missed in the reporting of the Panama Papers:
Consider the big names that have shown up so far on the list. With the notable exception of Iceland, these are not countries I would describe as “capitalist”: Russia, Pakistan, Iraq, Ukraine, Egypt. They’re countries where kleptocratic government officials amass money not through commerce, but through quasi-legal extortion, or siphoning off the till. This is an activity that has gone on long before capitalism, and probably before there was money.
Tax havens and offshore financial centres offer a way in which entrepreneurs can make an honest investment, secure a return and put it aside safely from the reach of the minister’s cousin who wants to muscle in once the business succeeded.
A major problem in poor countries is short time horizons for investment. Entrepreneurs must make their money quickly.
Many years ago there is a survey of entrepreneurs in Russia and Poland. It was in the early 1990s. Each was asked whether an investment project that doubled their money in two years was worth the risk. The Russian entrepreneurs mostly said no, the Polish entrepreneur said yes.
So insecure are the returns from investment in Russia at that time that the phenomenal returns were required before an investment was made. They would only invest if they could double the money in two years.
Many years ago, Mancur Olson wrote an insightful book about prosperity and dictatorships. He introduced the concept of rights intensive production.

As countries become more and more developed, investment horizons lengthen and depends more and more upon the enforcement of contract and property rights in a tolerably honest way.
Instead of being the first entrepreneur to introduce the most basic technologies and profit handsomely, entrepreneurs are introducing a product upgrade or new product that is a minor improvement on current offerings. Such investments will take time to pay off.
In many developing countries, China as an example, property rights are insecure. One way to secure your investment is to take the proceeds offshore to a tax haven. If everything goes wrong, at least you got some nest egg overseas.
As many developing countries have corrupt politicians and dishonest courts, the way to secure gains from honest investments is to move some of the profits offshore. That is why tax havens are essential to poor countries growing richer.
One of the sources of Hong Kong prosperity was investors would deal with a Hong Kong-based company with the requisite political and economic links to China. They could enforce their contracts in China against their Hong Kong assets because the contract was based in Hong Kong under British law.
If the local legal system is inadequate, entrepreneurs well look overseas for mechanisms to force contracts and secure their returns on investments against confiscation.
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