It takes three to have an externality.
Externalities: When Is a Potato Chip Not Just a Potato Chip?
24 Mar 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, industrial organisation, law and economics, property rights Tags: externalities
@mattyglesias on why greedy drug companies are heroes
20 Mar 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, health economics, law and economics, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, property rights Tags: avoiding difficult choices, drug lags, generic drugs, intellectual monopolies, invisible graveyard, patents and copyrights
The explosion of lead in the saddlebags of trade agreements @KennedyGraham @DavidShearerMP #TPPANoWay
16 Mar 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of bureaucracy, international economic law, international economics, law and economics, politics - New Zealand, property rights, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: crony capitalism, customs unions, free trade agreements, international investment law, investor state dispute settlement, preferential trading agreements
Solution aversion and the anti-science Left
11 Mar 2016 1 Comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of regulation, energy economics, environmental economics, global warming, health economics, law and economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, property rights, Public Choice Tags: antiscience left, climate alarmism, geo-engineering, GMOs, growth of knowledge, gun control, motivated reasoning, nuclear power, political persuasion, solar power, solution aversion, wind power
Climate science is the latest manifestation of solution aversion: denying a problem because it has a costly solution. The Right does this on climate science, the Left does it on gun control, GMOs, and plenty more. Cass Sunstein explains:
It is often said that people who don’t want to solve the problem of climate change reject the underlying science, and hence don’t think there’s any problem to solve.
But consider a different possibility: Because they reject the proposed solution, they dismiss the science. If this is right, our whole picture of the politics of climate change is off.
Some psychologists wasted grant money on lab experiments to show that people that think the solution to a problem is costly tend to rubbish every aspect of the argument. Any politician will tell you you do not concede anything. Sunstein again:
Campbell and Kay asked the participants whether they agreed with the IPCC. And in both, about 80 percent of Democrats did agree; the policy solutions made no difference.
Republicans, in contrast, were far more likely to agree with the IPCC when the proposed solution didn’t involve regulatory restrictions…
Here, then, is powerful evidence that many people (of course not all) who purport to be skeptical about climate science are motivated by their hostility to costly regulation.
The Left is equally prone to motivated readings. For example, it was found that those on the left are much more concerned about home invasions when gun control can reduce them rather than increase them.
The Left picks and chooses which scientific consensus as it accepts. The overwhelming consensus among researchers is biotech crops are safe for humans and the environment. This is a conclusion that is rejected by the very environmentalist organisations that loudly insist on the policy relevance of the scientific consensus on global warming.
Previously the precautionary principle was used to introduce doubt when there was no doubt. But when climate science turned in their favour, environmentalists wanted public policy to be based on the latest science.
The Right is welcoming of the science of nuclear energy or geo-engineering. The Left rejects it point-blank. Their refusal to consider nuclear energy as a solution to global warming is a classic example of solution aversion. Let he who is without sin cast the first stone.
Monopolies and patents can breed deadweight loss and market inefficiencies
11 Mar 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, law and economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, property rights Tags: intellectual monopolies, patents and copyright
Negative Externalities and the Coase Theorem
06 Mar 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, history of economic thought, law and economics, property rights Tags: Coase theorem
Save Our Parks! How to Keep National Parks Open
25 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, environmental economics, law and economics, property rights, resource economics Tags: contracting-out, free market environmentalism, national parks, privatisation
Mandatory layoff notice by length of job tenure in the G7, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, Scandinavia, Greece and Spain
12 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in labour economics, law and economics, property rights, unemployment Tags: employment law, employment protection laws, employment regulation, mandatory notice, severance pay
Mandatory notice periods for layoffs put the very survival of troubled the business at risk. By having to give long periods of notice, a firm experiencing a downturn is less able to adjust quickly and more likely simply to go out of business because it cannot meet its larger payroll.
Source: Labor Market Regulation – Doing Business – World Bank Group.
Mandatory severance pay by length of job tenure in the G7, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, Scandinavia, Greece and Spain
11 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in human capital, job search and matching, labour economics, labour supply, law and economics, managerial economics, organisational economics, personnel economics, property rights, unemployment Tags: employment law, employment protection laws, employment regulation, firm-specific human capital, job search, labour market regulation, severance pay
There are a wide differences across the OECD in mandatory severance pay in the event of a layoff.
Source: Labor Market Regulation – Doing Business – World Bank Group.
Severance pay makes it more expensive to fire and therefore more expensive to hire. This means fewer job vacancies will be created but they will last longer.
The presence of mandatory severance pay could increase or reduce the unemployment rate but unemployment durations will increase because it takes longer to find a suitable job match among the fewer available vacancies.
Mandating severance pay does not make the job match inherently more profitable. It just redistributes some of the surplus from the job match to the end when it is terminated.
Employers and jobseekers may agree to severance pay where investments in firm specific and job specific human capital for the job is profitable.
Severance pay in these circumstances gives the employer and more reasons to invest in specific human capital. The promise to pay severance pay will make the employer hesitate to lay them off. The employer will instead retain them over a slack period or redeploy them within the company rather than pay them out. This pre-commitment encourages investment in firm specific and job specific human capital by both sides more secure, which makes the job match more profitable overall for both sides.
Of course, if it was possible to negotiate completely around severance pay mandated by law, there would be no effects on hiring, firing and unemployment durations. All it would mean is take-home pay would be less but in the event of a layoff, these employees would get that this wage reduction back as a lump sum.
Official and legal fees of starting a new business in OECD countries, World Bank Doing Business rankings, 2016
11 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in industrial organisation, law and economics, property rights Tags: doing business
In some countries, the official and legal fees of setting up a business are trivial but in other countries they start to mount up.
Source: Data from the Doing Business Project – World Bank Group.
Paid-in minimum capital (% of income per capita) required to start a business in OECD countries
10 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of bureaucracy, economics of regulation, law and economics, property rights, Public Choice Tags: doing business
The most mystifying bureaucratic rule I have come across is in Western Europe. A number of these countries require entrepreneurs deposit a minimum sum of money in a bank or before a notary up to a month before registration and 3 months after incorporation. If they cannot do this, they cannot start their business lawfully.
Source: Historical Data – Doing Business- World Bank Group.
I am mystified as to what this regulation is designed to do other than make it difficult to start a new business. It is a private commercial matter as to whether trade credit is extended to new businesses. That indeed is one of the challenges facing every entrepreneur: discovering who are reliable business partners or not.
One of the functions of banks is to issue letters of credit. These vouch for the financial strength of a customer when seeking new business or export markets.
Ease of doing business in Europe, World Bank Doing Business 2016 rankings
10 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, industrial organisation, law and economics, property rights Tags: doing business, EU, Europe
For a rich country, Luxembourg is a pretty crappy place to do business – worse than Greece. Mostly due to terrible rankings for the Luxembourg legal system. Italy is not much better.
Source: Ranking of economies – Doing Business – World Bank Group.
Software piracy by country
08 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, economics of media and culture, law and economics, property rights Tags: intellectual property, patents and copyrights, software piracy
@jacindaardern wrong to say Australia is last place to follow in race relations
07 Feb 2016 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, discrimination, economic history, law and economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, property rights, Public Choice Tags: Aboriginal land rights, Maori economic development, native title, racial discrimination
From 1965 onwards, 1/3rd of terrestrial Australia – 2.5 million sq kms of land – was returned to indigenous owners, with half of that since the Native Title decision in 1993. Tasmania pioneered aboriginal land rights with the Cape Barron Island Act 1912.
Source: Jon Altman, The political ecology and political economy of the Indigenous land titling ‘revolution’ in Australia, March 2014 Māori Law Review.
New Zealand extinguished native title twice in its history with the 2nd of these takings of Māori land by the last Labour government with the foreshore and seabed legislation. In her op-ed today, has Jacinda Ardern forgotten why the Māori party came into being?
Unlike New Zealand, Australia welcomed migrants from a wide range of ethnicities after the Second World War. It abolished the White Australia policy in the 1960s along with any discrimination in its Constitution against aboriginals.
Australia takes 8 times as many refugees as New Zealand on a per capita basis.
Sweden – the OECD's highest per capita recipient of asylum seekers bit.ly/1vfFEUh http://t.co/y6DmdJjAsE—
Guardian Data (@GuardianData) December 02, 2014
This redress of indigenous grievances was done out of the generosity of the Australian heart. Aboriginals are a tiny minority in Australia with little independent political pull.
Utopia, you are standing in it! 
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