There is plenty of evidence of downward nominal wage flexibility

Elsby, Shin and Solon (2016) have published a paper throwing a spanner in the works for business cycle theories premised on downward wage rigidity:

We devote particular attention to the hypothesis that downward nominal wage rigidity plays an important role in cyclical employment and unemployment fluctuations. We conclude that downward wage rigidity may be less binding and have lesser allocative consequences than is often supposed.

Keynesian macroeconomics is premised on downward wage rigidity. There is mass unemployment during recessions because employers are unwilling or unable to cut wages.

Elsby, Shin and Solon (2016) found that a non-trivial fraction of workers report nominal wage reductions: at least 10% of hourly workers and 20% of non-hourly workers. This fraction of workers whose nominal wage has been cut has been increasing since 1980 as shown in the chart below. The remaining workers either experienced a nominal wage freeze or a nominal wage increase in that year.

Source: Wage Adjustment in the Great Recession and Other Downturns: Evidence from the United States and Great Britain: Journal of Labor Economics: Vol 34, No S1.

What can wages and employment tell us about the UK’s productivity puzzle?” by Richard Blundell, Claire Crawford and Wenchao Jin found that in the recent British recession, 12% of employees in the same job as 12 months ago experienced wage freezes and 21% of workers in the same job as 12 months ago experienced wage cuts.

These results from the USA and UK come as no surprise to me because I have been on a collective employment agreement where after a restructuring, my pay was cut. The alternative was to leave and not receive a redundancy payment.

Chris Pissarides(2009), The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: Is Wage Stickiness the Answer?, Econometrica argued the wage stickiness is not the answer to explaining unemployment since wages in new job matches are highly flexible:

1. wages of job changers are always substantially more procyclical than the wages of job stayers.

2. the wages of job stayers, and even of those who remain in the same job with the same employer are still mildly procyclical.

3. there is more procyclicality in the wages of stayers in Europe than in the United States.

4. The procyclicality of job stayers’ wages is sometimes due to bonuses, and overtime pay but it still reflects a rise in the hourly cost of labor
to the firm in cyclical peaks

I have been on several individual and collective agreements that grandfathered pay and conditions for existing workers and paid recruits less. I have lost count of the number of retirement pension scheme closed to new employees since I first encountered this cost saving practice at my first lecture at University.

My commercial law lecturer was explaining that he was lecturing part-time. His main job dealing with the litigation that might arise out of closing of the University retirement pension scheme. Some top-class academics had to retire earlier than they planned because of this closure to avoid a reduction in their pensions.

Most of my friends in the private sector are on bonus schemes were the great majority of the bonus is based on company profitability. Indeed, I know one company where everyone from the CEO down loses their bonus if there is a fatal workplace accident.

How can downward wage rigidity be a scientific hypothesis if the extensive international evidence of widespread nominal wage cuts wage cuts since the 1980s and 40%+ of the workforce on performance bonuses is not enough to refute it?

The same edition of the Journal of Labour Economics had a paper by Edward Lazear about how workplace effort varies with the business cycle and employment conditions:

…it seems that employers push their employees harder during recessions as they cut back the work force and ask each of the remaining workers to cover the tasks previously performed by the now-laid-off workers.

A number of models of long-term contracting in the labour market suggest that the level of employee effort expected varies with peak loads and general labour market conditions. That is understood from the start and is not is regarded as some form of opportunism by the employer after the contract is signed.

Likewise, employers do not lay off workers as soon as they become unprofitable in a downturn. If they did so, they would write off valuable firm specific human capital that might become profitable soon once the market recovers.

It is much easier to explain mass unemployment during a recessionas a a burst of layoffs at the beginning of the recession followed by the time it takes the unemployed to find suitable new vacancies and for employers to find it profitable to create such vacancies.

Some of these unemployed will simply wait for conditions to improve their existing industrial occupation so as to preserve their specialised human capital. These unemployed can be characterised as waiting unemployment or rest unemployment.

Other jobseekers will search further afield in new industries and occupations. These unemployed either have human capital that more general and mobile across many industries or have decided to scrap their industry specific and occupation specific human capital and try something else. The downturn in their current industry or occupation may be of sufficient duration that they regard waiting is a poor investment.

The economic concept of unemployment was rather primitive until Hutt write his hard to read theory of idle resources in 1939, Stigler’s paper in 1962 and the Phelps book in 1970.

I found Lucas and Prescott’s islands model to be an excellent explanation of unemployment. Lucas and Prescott’s economy is composed of a large number of scattered islands. Each of these islands is a one local labour market.

Workers in each of these islands have no precise knowledge of what wages will prevail in the economy outside of their own local labour market. Workers either remain on their island or leave it for what they expect to be a more alluring job further afield. Some workers are unemployed crossing between the islands, but they are nevertheless engaging in optimizing behaviour because they are looking for a better job than they have now.

Alchian (1969) lists three ways to adjust to unanticipated demand fluctuations:
• output adjustments;
• wage and price adjustments; and
• Inventories and queues (including reservations).

Alchian (1969) suggests that there is no reason for wage and price changes to be used regardless of the relative cost of these other options:
• The cost of output adjustment stems from the fact that marginal costs rise with output;
• The cost of price adjustment arises because uncertain prices and wages induce costly search by buyers and sellers seeking the best offer; and
• The third method of adjustment has holding and queuing costs.

There is a tendency for unpredicted price and wage changes to induce costly additional search. Long-term contracts including implicit contracts arise to share risks and curb opportunism over sunken investments in relationship-specific capital. These factors lead to queues, unemployment, spare capacity, layoffs, shortages, inventories and non-price rationing in conjunction with wage stability.

New Zealand inflation rate adjusted for CPI measurement bias since 1970

1% to 1.5% is the usual estimate of bias in the consumer price index because of the introduction of new groups and quality upgrades in existing goods. I have adjusted the consumer price index inflation rate back to 1970 in New Zealand by 1.5% to see how long ago prices became stable. I know this is a  rough adjustment, but it is still informative. If anything, the bias in the consumer price index from new goods and product upgrades is increasing rather than decreasing.

image

Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand.

Prices have been stable or falling in New Zealand’s for at least three years now once bias in the consumer price index is taken into account. Despite this deflation, the economy seems to be getting along pretty well. There is also a long period of  more or less stable prices in the 1990s once bias is taken into account in the measurement of consumer prices by the Statistics New Zealand.

Long-term unemployment rates across the OECD

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Data extracted on 08 Jan 2016 21:44 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat

The average age of managers as a cause of the 1970s productivity slowdown

Jim Feyrer put forward a clever hypothesis about the sudden decline in the average quality of managers as a major contributor to the 1970s productivity slowdown. His hypothesis is a good contribution to real business cycle theory because what could be more random a shock than a demographic shock arising from the baby boom.

Feyrer’s hypothesis builds on Robert Lucas’s theory of the entrepreneur and the optimal size of the firm. The better entrepreneurs can manage larger spans of control.

Specifically, these more talented entrepreneurs can spread their skills and vision over a larger workforce thereby raising its productivity and that of the firm. Better quality managers are better trainers, better leaders, better problem solvers and better at recruiting and retaining staff.

If managerial skill and talent accumulates with experience, an influx of young workers into the workforce with the influx of the baby boomers into the workforce will lower the average quality of entrepreneurs. This will show up empirically as a decrease in the average age of managers and with that their experience and skills.

With the average age of the labour force lower during the influx of the baby boomers, more marginal managers have to be promoted into managerial positions to supervise younger employees. Lower managerial quality will lower the productivity of the workforce as a whole.

If managerial talent and skill is to have any meaning, a more talented manager should be able to extract greater productivity from the same quality labour force. Lazear points out that

Supervision and management are fundamental in personnel economics and in the theory of the firm… Boss effects are large and significant. Most important, bosses vary substantially in their quality. A very good boss increases the output of the supervised team over that supervised by a very bad boss by about as much as adding one member to the team.

The influx of less able managers in the 1970s, as shown by a five-year reduction in the median age of US managers in the chart below, accounted for 20% of the observed productivity slowdown and resurgence in the 1970s and 1980s according to Feyrer. To fill vacancies, employers had to drop their hiring standards for managers.


Source: Jim Feyrer The US Productivity Slowdown, the Baby Boom, and Management Quality, Journal of Population Economics (2011) and Bureau of Labor Statistics Employed persons by detailed occupation and age (2013).

When the median age of managers rose in the 1990s, and along with it the average of quality of management, this productivity slowdown was reversed. Both the increase in the decrease in the age of managers are random productivity shocks in the tradition of real business cycle theory.

The average age of the US manager was 38 in 1980 and 39 in 1990. There is no US managerial occupation with an average age of less than 40 in 2013. The fifth managerial occupation with the lowest managing age is food service managers. The highest outside of agriculture is chief executives,


Source: Bureau of Labour Statistics Employed persons by detailed occupation and age (2013).

One of the mocking tones directed at real business cycle theory is it was supposed to require a regular forgetting of technologies so that productivity fell and then the loss technologies were remembered a few years later to have a business cycle.

That forgetting and remembering is what happened with the average age of managers and labour productivity in the 1970s. Management quickly lost five years of experience then slowly regained it with matching productivity swings and roundabouts.

Feyrer is another addition to a long line showing that business cycles can arise from the sum of random shocks, rather than one big shock, as Prescott suggested in 1986:

Another Summers question is, Where are the technology shocks? Apparently, he wants some identifiable shock to account for each of the half dozen postwar recessions. But our finding is not that infrequent large shocks produce fluctuations; it is, rather, that small shocks do, every period.

The modern macroeconomics of the Global Financial Crisis

https://twitter.com/JimRose69872629/status/671926029057785856

French, German, Italian and British equilibrium unemployment rates, 1968 – 2017

Unlike the USA, the German, Italian, British and French equilibrium unemployment rates all show fluctuations that reflect changes in their underlying economic circumstances and labour market reforms. The case of the British, the rise of the British disease and Thatchernomics. The case of German, its equilibrium unemployment rate rose after German unification and then fell after the labour market reforms of 2002 to 2005.

image

Source: OECD Economic Outlook November 2015 Data extracted on 10 Nov 2015 07:07 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat.

Why is the US equilibrium unemployment rate so stable as compared to Canada and the UK?

The equilibrium unemployment rate in the USA has been dead flat at a little under 6% as far back as the OECD Economic Outlook November 2015 can estimate. The Canadian and British equilibrium unemployment rates have gone up and down to the point of near doubling at times. Institutions cannot be so stable in the USA and so unstable Canada and Britain in terms of the incentives to post vacancies, for search for work in the same in different industries and occupations and revise asking wages. We’re talking about a 35 year stretch macroeconomic and labour market policy in the USA.

Source: OECD Economic Outlook November 2015 Data extracted on 10 Nov 2015 07:07 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat.

Furthermore, there is a large literature in the early 1970s and late 1990s arguing that the US equilibrium unemployment rate dropped as low as 4%.

Source: Robert Shimer, Why is the U.S. Unemployment Rate So Much Lower? (1999).

More correctly, for the early 1970s literature, the equilibrium unemployment rate had risen to 4% after being at an equilibrium rate of about 3%. Something doesn’t add up.

Source: Robert Shimer, Why is the U.S. Unemployment Rate So Much Lower? (1999).

This estimate of an unchanging US equilibrium unemployment rate doesn’t add up even more when you consider the discussions after the Great Recession about how the extensions to unemployment insurance from a time limit of 26 weeks to 99 weeks would increase the equilibrium unemployment rate. Something really doesn’t add up for the US equilibrium unemployment rate to be so stable and the British and Canadian equilibrium unemployment rates to be so volatile.

Source: Robert Barro: The Folly of Subsidizing Unemployment – WSJ.

Which investments work best when markets decline?

US interest rates since 1871

Compliance by the Fed with the Taylor rule

George Stigler and the role of scientists in public policy

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Milton Friedman would replace the Fed with a computer

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The dangerous left-wing bias of economists strikes again

The left-wing bias of economists must be taken into account in public policy-making. Any suggestions to regulate the economy, spend our way out of a recession, increase the top tax rate and so on must be discounted for that well-known but little publicised political bias.

Source: Economists Aren’t As Nonpartisan As We Think | FiveThirtyEight

As is not well-known enough, Cardiff and Klein (2005) used voter registration data to rank disciplines at Californian Ivy League universities by Democrat to Republican ratios. Economics is the most conservative social science, with a Democrat to Republican ratio of a mere 2.8 to 1. This can be contrasted with sociology (44 to 1), political science (6.5 to 1) and anthropology (10.5 to 1). 40% of Americans are Democrats, 32% are independents with the balance Republicans.

Zubin Jelveh, Bruce Kogut, and Suresh Naidu confirmed that bias: that the typical economist is a moderate Democrat. They found a 60–40 liberal conservative bias

Jelveh, Kogut, and Naidu also reminded, as many have before them that economics is the most politically diverse of academic professions. Sociology is a notorious left-wing echo chamber as an example. Their most likely view of Jeremy Corbyn is he is a bit of a Tory. Oddly enough, sociologists are the first to point the finger at economists for political bias.

Jelveh, Kogut, and Naidu correlated political donations of more than $200 in the Federal Elections Commission database with the language used in 18,000 journal articles back to the 1970s.

More interestingly, they correlated political bias with the estimates of quantitative effects such as the top tax rate and its impact on labour supply and investment:

We found a (significant) correlation when we compared the ideologies of authors with the numerical results in their papers. That means that a left-leaning economist is more likely to report numerical results aligned with liberal ideology (and the same is true for right-leaning economists and conservative ideology)… liberals think the fiscal multiplier is high, meaning the government can improve economic growth by increasing spending, while conservatives believe the multiplier is close to zero or negative.

They are not suggesting a rigging of the results. Economists tend to sort into the fields that suit their ideologies:

It’s more likely that these correlations are driven by research areas and the methodologies employed by economists of differing political stripe. Economics involves both methodological and normative judgments, and it is difficult to imagine that any social science could completely erase correlations between these two… macroeconomists and financial economists are more right-leaning on average while labour economists tend to be left-leaning. Economists at business schools, no matter their specialty, lean conservative. Apparently, there is “political sorting” in the academic labour market.

Before you start writing out the indictment that economic policy and the global financial crisis is the product of a vast left-wing conspiracy within the economics profession you should remember the wise words of George Stigler.

Stigler argued that ideas about economic reform needed to wait for a market. He contended that economists exert a minor and scarcely detectable independent influence on the societies in which they live. As is well known, Stigler in the 1970s toasted Milton Friedman at a dinner in his honour by saying:

Milton, if you hadn’t been born, it wouldn’t have made any difference.

Stigler said that if Richard Cobden had spoken only Yiddish, and with a stammer, and Robert Peel had been a narrow, stupid man, England would have still have repealed the Corn Laws in the 1840s. England would still have moved towards free trade in grain as its agricultural classes declined and its manufacturing and commercial classes grew in the 1840s onwards because of the industrial revolution.

As Stigler noted, when their day comes, economists seem to be the leaders of public opinion. But when the views of economists are not so congenial to the current requirements of special interest groups, these economists are left to be the writers of letters to the editor in provincial newspapers. These days, they would run an angry blog.

Alan Blinder and Fed Speak

When President Clinton appointed Alan Blinder to be deputy chair of the Fed, his big hope was to find out what Alan Greenspan really thought rather than the public facade of gobbledygook. The term Fedspeak (also known as Greenspeak) is what Alan Blinder called "a turgid dialect of English" used by Federal Reserve Board chairmen in making wordy, vague, and ambiguous statements. Greenspan described it this way:

To Blinder’s astonishment, Alan Greenspan spoke just the same as he did at monetary policy meetings of the Fed as he did in public! Blinder never disagreed fundamentally with Greenspan about monetary policy.

The Fed Rate since 1955

Source: Don’t Worry Too Much About A Fed Interest Rate Hike | FiveThirtyEight

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