Percentage of people around the world who own smartphones, via @conradhackett. Note #China. http://t.co/wAOmIklVbW—
Legatum Institute (@LegatumInst) May 30, 2015
Extreme poverty is not the same thing as digital poverty
01 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
John Oliver’s 3-minute explanation of Greece’s crisis
30 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in currency unions, Euro crisis, fiscal policy Tags: Euroland, Greece, sovereign defaults
The Puerto Rican sovereign default explained
30 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economic growth, fiscal policy, international economic law, politics - USA, population economics Tags: ageing society, economics of immigration, Puerto Rica, sovereign defaults
Puerto Rico's debt is nearly half that of California for a population one-tenth the size on.wsj.com/1Kj5XPZ http://t.co/nM2aM8kWtP—
Nick Timiraos (@NickTimiraos) June 29, 2015
Gambling for Redemption and Self-fulfilling Debt Crises in the Eurozone
29 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in business cycles, currency unions, economic growth, Euro crisis, fiscal policy, global financial crisis (GFC), international economic law, international economics, macroeconomics Tags: game theory, Greece, Patrick Kehoe, sovereign default
Child poverty across Europe
28 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in Euro crisis, poverty and inequality Tags: child poverty, EU, Eurosclerosis, family poverty
Spain's lost decade: one in three Spanish kids live in poverty or at risk of social exclusion: gu.com/p/42yx7/tw http://t.co/qg8PDla19z—
Guardian Data (@GuardianData) October 28, 2014
ATM line inside the Greek Parliament
28 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in currency unions, Euro crisis Tags: bank panics, bank runs, Greece, sovereign defaults
ATM line inside the Greek Parliament –> Περισσότεροι βουλευτές στο ΑΤΜ παρά στη συνεδρίαση protothema.gr/politics/artic… http://t.co/JeusE2pgUu—
Fabrizio Goria (@FGoria) June 27, 2015
Tom Sargent keynote address Emergency Economic Summit for Greece (1 June 2015)
26 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, currency unions, Euro crisis, fiscal policy, macroeconomics, monetary economics Tags: EU, Euroland, Greece, sovereign borrowing, sovereign defaults, Thomas Sargent
Who taxes average workers most out of Australia, New Zealand, the USA and UK?
23 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in fiscal policy, macroeconomics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, population economics, public economics Tags: Australia, British economy, New Zealand, taxation and the labour supply
Figure 1: Direct taxes on the average worker in Australia, New Zealand, USA and UK, 2001 – 2012
Source: OECD Factbook 2014
Taxes on the average worker measure the ratio between the amount of taxes paid by the worker and the employer on the country average wage and the corresponding total labour cost for the employer. This tax wedge measures the extent to which the tax system on labour income discourages employment.
The taxes included in the measure are personal income taxes, employees’ social security contributions and employers’ social security contributions. For the few countries that have them, it also includes payroll taxes. The amount of these taxes paid in relation to the employment of one average worker is expressed as a percentage of their labour cost (gross wage plus employers’ social security contributions and payroll tax).
An average worker is defined as somebody who earns the average income of full-time workers of the country concerned in Sectors B-N of the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC Rev. 4). The average worker is considered single without children, meaning that he or she does not receive any tax relief in respect of a spouse, unmarried partner or child.
Who is where on the Laffer curve?
20 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economic growth, fiscal policy, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, politics - USA, public economics Tags: endogenous growth theory, EU, Eurosclerosis, laffer curve, optimal tax theory, taxation and entrepreneurship, taxation and investment, taxation and the labour supply
@asymmetricinfo paper:"How Far Are We From The Slippery Slope? The Laffer Curve Revisited" bit.ly/1HMhmqu http://t.co/D9IffNhd92—
Old Whig (@aClassicLiberal) April 20, 2015
The U.S. bailout barometer.
19 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in business cycles, financial economics, monetary economics, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: bailouts, deposit insurance, implicit guarantees, lender of last resort
Peter Garber on what is an asset price bubble
18 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in entrepreneurship, financial economics, macroeconomics Tags: asset price bubbles, entrepreneurial alertness, The fatal conceit
Who are the members of Euroland?
17 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in currency unions, Euro crisis, macroeconomics Tags: Euroland, European Union
Since today is Europe Day, a look at which countries have and haven't adopted the Euro brilliantmaps.com/eurozone2015/ http://t.co/N8tGhBe8eN—
Brilliant Maps (@BrilliantMaps) May 09, 2015
How great was the Great Depression unemployment? The official and Darby estimates of US unemployment in the 1930s
17 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in business cycles, economic history, great depression, labour economics, macroeconomics, unemployment Tags: Euro sclerosis, measurement error, Michael Darby
The graph below shows two different series for unemployment in the 1930s in the USA: the official BLS level by Lebergott; and a data series constructed famously by Michael Darby.
Figure 1: US unemployment rate, 1929 – 40: Darby and Lebergott estimates
Source: Robert Margot (1993).
Darby includes workers in the emergency government labour force as employed – the most important being the Civil Works Administration (CWA) and the Works Progress Administration (WPA). Once these workfare programs are accounted for, the level of U.S. unemployment fell from 22.9% in 1932 to 9.1% in 1937, a reduction of 13.8%.
For 1934-1941, the corrected unemployment levels are reduced by two to three-and-a half million people and the unemployment rates by 4 to 7 percentage points after 1933.
Not surprisingly, Darby titled his 1976 Journal of Political Economy article Three-and-a-Half Million U.S. Employees Have Been Mislaid: Or, an Explanation of Unemployment, 1934-1941. The corrected data by Darby shows stronger movement toward the natural unemployment rate after 1933.
From about 1935, the unemployment rate in the Great Depression in the USA is not much different from what it is in Europe in recent decades under Eurosclerosis.
In the 1930s in the USA, many unemployed were employed by the Civil Works Administration and the Works Progress administration. In contemporary Europe, the unemployed are simply paid not to work under their welfare state arrangements.
How to argue against employment protection laws while arguing for additional employment regulation
17 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in human capital, job search and matching, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, minimum wage, unions Tags: climate law, efficiency wage, employment at will, employment protection law, fixed costs of employment, fixed costs of working, flexible working hours, living wage, paid leave, Richard Ebstein
The Centre for American Progress recently published an excellent survey of the costs to employers of hiring and training new recruits. As the paper notes:
it is costly to replace workers because of the productivity losses when someone leaves a job, the costs of hiring and training a new employee, and the slower productivity until the new employee gets up to speed in their new job.
Our analysis reviews 30 case studies in 11 research papers published between 1992 and 2007 that provide estimates of the cost of turnover, finding that businesses spend about one-fifth of an employee’s annual salary to replace that worker.
The purpose of the research published by the Centre for American Progress was to argue there were large costs to employers from replacing even low paid workers and there are a workplace policies such as paid family leave and workplace flexibility will reduce these job turnover costs to employers.
Similar arguments are used to justify a living wage on efficiency grade wage grounds. A living wage would reduce job turnover and therefore the costs to employers of job turnover in the jobs.
The research published by the Centre for American Progress also illustrates the bargaining power of workers. Employers who failed to treat workers fairly and pay them the going wage risk an increase in job quit rates. These large costs of job turnover have been carefully documented by the Centre for American Progress.
Beyond jobs data: Industries w/ better pay have lower worker turnover rates equitablegrowth.org/news/looking-b… http://t.co/gug33EbYy3—
Equitable Growth (@equitablegrowth) July 03, 2015
Employers incur fixed costs of employment when they recruit and train new employees. These recruits must be expected to stay long enough to work sufficient hours for the firm to expect to recover these investments (Oi (1962, 1983a, 1990), Idson and Oi (1999), Hutchens (2010), Hutchens and Grace-Martin (2006)).
These costs are fixed costs because they do not vary with how many hours the employee works or with how long an employee stays with their employer. These fixed employment costs must be recouped over the expected job tenure of the employee with the firm. Employers will not hire an additional worker unless they anticipate recovering the costs of doing do including fixed employment costs and other overheads.
Central to arguments such as by Richard Epstein for employment at will is the threat of the employee to quit imposes a real cost on employers which the employer will seek to avoid by treating their employees well.
The best way to prevent exploitation of workers is to make hiring and firing easy, facilitate new entry by firms into all markets and promote full employment – a worker with other available job opportunities is difficult to exploit.
With large fixed costs of recruitment and training, employers cannot afford to behave whimsically if they wish to survive in competition with the rival firms with more competitive wage and employment policies.
By the same token, the large fixed costs of employment documented by the Centre for American Progress illustrate the large investments employers must risk to recruit a new employee.
If this large investment in recruitment doesn’t turn out well, but is difficult to get out of because of strict employment laws, employers will be more reluctant in the first instance to risk this investment because they are risking several months wages in fixed costs of employment. As Richard Epstein explained:
A second great advantage of the at-will system is that it supplies an informal method of bonding that keeps both sides in line.
The employer who tries to take advantage of the employee by altering working conditions for the worse will be met by the threat to quit, for now the deal is worth less to the employee than the wage received.
So long as markets are competitive the switching costs will be relatively low – lower in fact than they are in a highly regulated world where employers have to think twice before taking on a worker whom they may be unable to fire if things do not work out.
Yet on the other side, the employee who takes it easy on the job is faced with dismissal because he is no longer worth his wages.
But even here management will hesitate to dismiss for good reasons. One is the very substantial costs of recruiting and training a replacement who might or might not turn out to be better than the worker who was dismissed. The second is that unjust dismissals could induce other workers to leave while the going is good, thereby compounding the problem of recruitment and retention.
The Centre for American Progress was good enough to document the very substantial costs of recruiting and training a replacement employee. As the Centre for American Progress explained in their paper, employers have every reason to protect their investments in training and recruitment by minimising job turnover costs.
If You’re A Keynesian Then You Must Believe The Minimum Wage Increases Unemployment
14 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in business cycles, fiscal policy, labour economics, macroeconomics, minimum wage Tags: Bryan Caplan, economic fallacies, involuntary unemployment, Keynesian macroeconomics, methodology of economics, wage rigidity
Via If You’re A Keynesian Then You Must Believe The Minimum Wage Increases Unemployment and The Myopic Empiricism of the Minimum Wage, Bryan Caplan | EconLog | Library of Economics and Liberty.


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