
NZ taxpayers made a $20 million profit on its $30 billion state owned enterprises portfolio!
11 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of bureaucracy, industrial organisation, politics - New Zealand, privatisation Tags: privatisation, state owned enterprises
KiwiRail is such a dog that the Treasury reports on the rate of return to the taxpayer on the state owned enterprises portfolio by excluding KiwiRail from its calculations of rates of return.

The Treasury doesn’t do similar adjustments for state owned enterprises that are performing unusually well, so total shareholder return figures should be reported without this KiwiRail exception. If you buy a dog, you should own up to the fleas it spreads to the rest of your portfolio.
Trying to pretend that KiwiRail is just not there, or survives on the largess of someone other than the one and only New Zealand taxpayer, does no one any favours. This KiwiRail exception will have to apply for at least 10 years to the annual commercial portfolio report of the Treasury. I want to know the total shareholder return, including KiwiRail every year without exception or special pleading.

That total shareholder return of -8.2% in 2012 is worthy of comment too:
The portfolio generated a net loss after tax of $1.8 billion driven by a restructuring of KiwiRail’s balance sheet and reductions in bottom line results for Meridian and Solid Energy, affected by hydrology and coal market deterioration respectively.
It’s time for the government to wash its hands of Solid Energy and let it go bankrupt – updated
11 Mar 2015 1 Comment
in economics of bureaucracy, politics - New Zealand, survivor principle Tags: corporate welfare
Government owned mining company Solid Energy lost $182 million last year. It is already received nearly $200 million in corporate welfare in bailouts from the New Zealand taxpayer. It’s time to call a halt.

The Christchurch-based coalminer is negotiating with banks in a bid to reduce its $320 million debt. In 2013, its annual revenue dropped by a third to $631 million.
Solid Energy invested heavily on a strategy that energy prices were going to go up and up. That investment strategy was against the market sentiment of that time, much less afterwards and the collapse of oil prices.

While Prime Minister John Key said on March 2 that it was not the Government’s preferred option to put more taxpayer cash into Solid Energy, Minister of Finance Bill English flatly ruled out cash, loans or guarantees. I hope Bill English wins that political struggle at the Cabinet table for the sake of the long-suffering New Zealand taxpayer.

What is worse, the government has indemnified the directors of Solid Energy against unspecified liabilities thus giving them an open-ended cheque-book, from what I can see, to trade while insolvent:
State Owned Enterprises Minister Todd McClay confirmed last month that the Crown has offered an indemnity to the board of Solid Energy last year, but would not comment on what it was.
Asked if directors had raised concerns with him that they might be trading while insolvent, English said: “Any director of a company like this has that question uppermost in their mind. They need to be sure all the time that they’re not trading while insolvent.”
Directors’ duties regarding trading while insolvent is the last line of defence against financial irresponsibility. There are both civil liability and criminal penalties for trading while insolvent under company law.
Solid Energy has already been a black hole for nearly $200 million in taxpayers’ money as well as considerable bank write-offs of loans.
The company appeared before the Finance and Expenditure Select Committee of Parliament this morning. It told MPs the company was solvent and marginally cash positive, but looking at another significant loss this year.
It should be a matter of policy that the government, any government, should not indemnify directors of any company, be they government owned or not, for breaches of directors’ duties. It’s a matter of the rule of law and of governments not privileging itself in the marketplace at the expense of the taxpayer.
What is the point of having a State Owned Enterprises Act and setting up these businesses as companies with a duty to be as successful as a company not owned by the government if they don’t have to obey the most fundamental safeguards in company law when push comes to shove?
If these indemnities have indeed been issued by the government for breaches of directors’ duties regarding insolvency, and it seems as though they have been, what is the Crown liability to creditors if Solid Energy is indeed trading while insolvent? These indemnities may allow the creditors to pierce the corporate veil and sue the New Zealand government.
In the revenge of directors duties, the directors of banks and any other creditor will have a director’s duty to sue the New Zealand government for all it can get as a result of these indemnities.
At a minimum, the New Zealand government will have to settle out of court or go all the way to the Supreme Court because hundreds of millions of dollars are involved from the bank write-offs, past and present.
Naturally, the ideological blinkers of the opposition party in New Zealand prevents it from saying the obvious, which is calling for the Solid Energy to be put in receivership. The Labour Party spokesman on state owned enterprise attacked the stewardship of the Minister of Finance as a shareholding Minister, but had nothing to say in terms of solutions, including putting the company into receivership.
The Green Party did a little bit better in 2013 when its spokesman talked about a need for a transition to sustainable jobs – the Green party code for layoffs:
“The National Government need to take responsibility for their mismanagement of Solid Energy and cut their losses,” said Mr Hughes.
“The banks that made risky loans to Solid Energy need to bear the cost of their mistakes”. “Coal is not going to be the fuel of our future if we are to stabilise our climate”.
“New Zealanders and Solid Energy workers need a just transition into more sustainable jobs – jobs that don’t fry the planet.”
“The longer this Government effectively denies climate change, the more taxpayer money will go to subsidising coal and its foreign backers.”
Things are getting desperate when the Greens find a corporate welfare so appalling that they actually oppose it, if only because of support for lower carbon emissions. That is one green hypocrisy too many if it supported a bailout of a coal miner.
Winston’s big port up North won’t have any business
10 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, industrial organisation, politics - New Zealand, rentseeking, transport economics
In the first shot in the pork-barrelling for a by-election, veteran New Zealand populist Winston Peters wants to stop the expansion of the Port of Auckland and move the extra shipping traffic up north to the Port of Whangarei:
And we will upgrade the Auckland to Northland railway line and build the rail link to your port
The Port of Whangarei is about two hours north by car from Auckland. Auckland is a global city of approaching 2 million. Whangarei is the only city up North, with a population of 50,000.

45% of the import traffic to the Port of Auckland is cars. Around 90% of light vehicle imports in New Zealand come through the Port of Auckland. The rest may go through Littleton.
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Jellicoe and Freyberg wharves are located between the two container terminals. |
Bledisloe multipurpose Wharf |
Striving to move some of this light vehicle imports from the Port of Auckland up north to the Port of Whangarei where they be unloaded from a ship onto trains for a short train ride to Auckland, unloaded again onto trucks all seems unnecessary expense.

Photo: Port of Whangarei.
Auckland appears to have spare container capacity up until at least 2035, so this port up North will simply not have much to do in terms of extra container traffic because it will have to compete on the basis of cost and proximity to markets.

Photo: The Marsden Point Oil Refinery on the opposite shore of Whangarei Harbour.
The traffic that is coming under pressure regarding capacity of the Port of Auckland is multi-cargo traffic such as building materials, vegetables, wheat, vehicles and other goods. The situation is further aggravated by the rapid increase in the number and increased size of cruise ships.
As a good part of the market for the multi cargo traffic is in Auckland, landing them away from their main market just makes no sense and will not happen unless the port of Auckland is prohibited by law from expanding and ships are not allowed to divert to ports such as Wellington and Christchurch.
The number of cruise ships visiting Auckland in the last 10 years to about 90 and is expected to reach one 20 by 2020 and 150 by 2030. That traffic cannot be diverted up north to the Port of Whangarei.

Any export traffic that would be viable to send through the Port of Whangarei up north will already be going through it. Export competitiveness is highly sensitive to costs as exporters must simply take the going price in the international market.
This question should be asked more often about the regulation of purported natural monopolies
09 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
Follow the money – The Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2014 CPI Report Climate Policy Initiative
09 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in environmental economics, global warming, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: bootleggers and baptists, climate alarmism, global warming, green rent seeking
In 2013, annual global climate finance flows totalled approximately USD 331 billion, falling USD 28 billion below 2012 levels.
Public actors and intermediaries contributed USD 137 billion (USD 134-140 billion) largely unchanged from last year. Private investment totalled USD 193 billion, falling by USD 31 billion or 14% from 2012, see Figure ES1. The actual decrease in total flows may be even larger as, for the first time, Landscape 2014 captures public finance flowing to large hydro and research and development (USD 4 billion and USD 3 billion respectively).
Climate finance flows were split almost equally between developed (OECD) and developing (non-OECD) countries, USD 164 billion and USD 165 billion respectively. The amount we tracked flowing from developed to developing countries fell by USD 8 billion from 2012, to USD 34 billion, with multilateral DFI contributions falling by USD 5 billion and private investment contracting by USD 2 billion.
Almost three-quarters of total flows were invested in their country of origin. Private actors had an especially strong domestic investment focus with USD 174 billion or 90% of their investments remaining in the country of origin. This demonstrates that investment environments that are more familiar and perceived to be less risky are key to investment decisions, highlighting the importance of domestic policy frameworks in unlocking scaled up climate finance flows.
The weight of science in contentious social issues
07 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, Public Choice Tags: evidence-based policy, expressive voting, rational ignorance, rational irrationality, science and public policy
Americans are making a big mistake about health care funding – Vox
02 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, income redistribution, politics - USA, rentseeking Tags: Obamacare, rational ignorance
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Almost everyone who has health insurance in the United States gets help from the government to afford it.
For the elderly, that’s Medicare. For the disabled and the poor, that’s Medicaid. For full-time workers it’s the tax subsidy for employer-provided health insurance.
via Americans are making a big mistake about health care – Vox.
The role of regulation in raising rivals’ costs
02 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: bootleggers and baptists, demand and supply for regulation, interest group politics, raising rivals costs
Public opinion and incarceration rates in the USA
02 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of crime, law and economics, Public Choice Tags: incapacitation, incarceration rates, law and order, median voter theorem, prison numbers
Priests could first stand for the House of Commons in 2001
01 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, law and economics, Public Choice Tags: British constitutional law, Catholic Emancipation, equality before the wall, House of Commons, religious discrimination
The House of Commons (Removal of Clergy Disqualification) Act 2001 removed the disqualifications for clergy in standing for election and sit in the House of Commons. Through the interaction of different anti-Catholic legislation in the 18th and 19th century, Roman Catholic priests were still barred from sitting in the House of Commons until 2001. This included ex-priests.
The issue first came to a head when Bruce Kent came third in a seat in the 1997 election. The bill was drafted, but lapsed until the Labour Party endorsed an ex-priest for a safe seat. Without legislative action, he would not have been able to take his place in the House of Commons.
James MacManaway was the first priest to win a House of Commons seat in 150 years when he won a Belfast seat in 1950. The advice of the Attorney-General prior to his standing was there was no bar from standing because the Church of Ireland had been disestablished in 1869.
When he moved to take his seat, a select committee looked into the matter and then referred it to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that the Irish Church Act 1869 did disestablish the Church of Ireland, but since there was no express provision in that Act permitting its clergymen to sit as MPs, the House of Commons (Clergy Disqualification) Act 1801 still debarred any person
ordained to the office of priest or deacon’ from sitting or voting in the House of Commons. Roman Catholic Relief Act 1829 specifically barred ‘person[s] in holy orders in the Church of Rome.
Although MacManaway was disqualified from its seat after sitting for 238 days, and he did not stand for the by-election, no legislative action was taken to correct this blot on British democracy.
Parliament passed up the opportunity to remedy the matter when passing the House of Commons (Disqualification) Act 1975. This Act disqualifies a large number of public office holders from sitting in the House of Commons.
Likewise, when the Lord Chancellor (Tenure of Office and Discharge of Ecclesiastical Functions) Act 1974 was passed, the issue of Catholic priests in the House of Commons was left to one side. This Act may provision for the exercise of Church of England ecclesiastical functions during any tenure of the office of Lord Chancellor, of horror of horrors, by Roman Catholics. The Lord Chancellor makes many appointments within the Church of England.
The Clergy Disqualification Act 1870 provided a procedure which enabled Church of England clergy to relinquish their clerical positions and, after a period of six months, be freed from the parliamentary disqualification. There is no equivalent statutory procedure for clergy of other churches.

And here ends my constitutional curio of the day.




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