Many American families face negative affected income taxes rates
23 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of love and marriage, labour economics, politics - USA, public economics Tags: earned income tax credit, economics of families, family tax credits
Who pays income tax in the USA?
23 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in politics - USA, taxation Tags: top 1%
Child poverty rates in single parent and couple families, Anglo-Saxon countries
22 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in labour economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, population economics, poverty and inequality, welfare reform Tags: Australia, British economy, Canada, child poverty, economics of the family, family poverty, Ireland, single mothers, single parents
Figure 1: Child poverty rates by family type, Anglo-Saxon countries, 2010
Source: OECD Family Database; Poverty thresholds are set at 50% of the median income of the entire population.
The impact of top tax rates on the migration of superstars
22 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in human capital, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, public economics, sports economics Tags: British economy, CEO pay, Denmark, economics of migration, endogenous growth theory, Spain, superstar wages, taxation and entrepreneurship, taxation and superstars, taxation and the labour supply, Thomas Piketty, top 1%
Emmanuel Saez is leading a literature showing how sensitive migration decisions of superstars are to top marginal tax rates. Specifically, he and his co-authors studied Spain’s Beckham’s law.
Cristiano Ronaldo moved from Manchester United to Real Madrid in 2009 partly to avoid the announced 50% top marginal income tax in the UK to benefit from “Beckham Law” in Spain. Beckham’s Law was a preferential tax scheme of 24% on foreign residents in Spain. When David Beckham transferred to Real Madrid, the manager of Arsenal football club commented that the supremacy of British soccer was at risk unless the U.K.’s top marginal tax rate changed.
A number of EU member states offer substantially lower tax rates to immigrant football players, including Denmark (1991), Belgium (2002) and Spain (2004). Beckham’s law had a big impact in Spain:
…when Spain introduced the Beckham Law in 2004, the fraction of foreigners in the Spanish league immediately and sharply started to diverge from the fraction of foreigners in the comparable Italian league.
Moreover, exploiting the specific eligibility rules in the Beckham Law, we show that the extra influx of foreigners in Spain is driven entirely by players eligible for the scheme with no effect on ineligible players.

Suez also found evidence from tax reforms in all 14 countries that the location decisions of players are very responsive to tax rates. Suez in another paper with Thomas Piketty wants the top tax rate to be 80%. However, their work on taxation and the labour supply supports a much lower rate:
First, higher top tax rates may discourage work effort and business creation among the most talented – the so-called supply-side effect. In this scenario, lower top tax rates would lead to more economic activity by the rich and hence more economic growth. If all the correlation of top income shares and top tax rates documented on Figure 1 were due to such supply-side effects, the revenue-maximising top tax rate would be 57%.
Suez and Piketty then go on to argue that the pay of chief executives of public companies, a subset of the top 1% and top 0.1%, may not reflect their productivity but that is a much more complicated argument about agency costs and the separation of ownership and control which they make rather weakly.
Much of their other work on top incomes is about the emergence of a working rich whose top incomes are wages earned by holding superstar jobs in a global economy. It would be peculiar and perhaps overzealous to organise the entire taxation of high incomes around the correction of agency costs arising from the separation of ownership and control of some of the companies listed on the stock exchange.
Figure 1: Percentage of national income (including capital gains) received by top 1%, and each primary taxpayer occupation in top 1%, USA
Source: Jon Bakija, Adam Cole and Bradley T. Heim “Jobs and Income Growth of Top Earners and the Causes of Changing Income Inequality: Evidence from U.S. Tax Return Data”.
There is a long history showing how the labour supply of sports stars is highly sensitive to top marginal income tax rates. For a very long time, boxing was the only really big-money sport for athletes:
The 1950s was the era of the 90 percent top marginal tax rate, and by the end of that decade live gate receipts for top championship fights were supplemented by the proceeds from closed circuit telecasts to movie theatres.
A second fight in one tax year would yield very little additional income, hardly worth the risk of losing the title. And so, the three fights between Floyd Patterson and Ingemar Johansson stretched over three years (1959-1961); the two between Patterson and Sonny Liston over two years (1962-1963), as was also true for the two bouts between Liston and Cassius Clay (Muhammad Ali) (1964-1965).
Then, the Tax Reform Act of 1964 cut the top marginal tax rate to 70 percent effective in 1965. The result: two heavyweight title fights in 1965, and five in 1966. You can look it up.
Ufuk Akcigit, Salome Baslandze, and Stefanie Stantcheva found that the migration of superstar inventors is highly responsive to top marginal tax rates.
#Braindrain is real, even quantifiable — as per NBER paper 21024. Geniuses don't tolerate extra taxes easily. http://t.co/HVP8uEFAfz—
Amity Shlaes (@AmityShlaes) June 07, 2015
Ufuk Akcigit, Salome Baslandze, and Stefanie Stantcheva studied the international migration responses of superstar inventors to top income tax rates for the period 1977-2003 using data from the European and US Patent offices.
our results suggest that, given a ten percentage point decrease in top tax rates, the average country would be able to retain 1% more domestic superstar inventors and attract 38% more foreign superstar inventors.

Emmanuel Saez and co-authors also found that a preferential top tax scheme for high earning migrants in their first three years in Denmark was highly successful in attracting highly skilled labour to that country:
…the number of foreigners in Denmark paid above the eligibility threshold (that is the group affected by the tax scheme) doubles relative to the number of foreigners paid slightly below the threshold (those are comparison groups not affected by the tax scheme) after the scheme is introduced.
This effect builds up in the first five years of the scheme and remains stable afterwards. As a result, the fraction of foreigners in the top 0.5% of the earnings distribution is 7.5% in recent years compared to a 4% counterfactual absent the scheme.
This very large behavioural response implies that the resulting revenue-maximising tax rate for a scheme targeting highly paid foreigners is relatively small (about 35%). This corresponds roughly to the current tax rate on foreigners in Denmark under the scheme once we account for other relevant taxes (VAT and excises).

This blog post was motivated by a courageous tweet about Tony Atkinson saying that increases in the top tax rate have little effect on the supply of labour! Not so.
Auckland housing is more expensive than many big US cities
22 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, urban economics Tags: Auckland, land supply, land use planning, RMA, zoning
Rising mortgage rates to test U.S. housing market rebound on.wsj.com/1IsKVde http://t.co/vHDJAdM292—
Pedro da Costa (@pdacosta) June 22, 2015
Millennials’ Political Views Don’t Make Any Sense
22 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, economics of information, economics of media and culture, income redistribution, politics - USA, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: antiforeign bias, antimarket bias, expressive voting, make-work bias, rational ignorance, rational irrationality, voter demographics
Millennial politics is simple, really. Young people support big government, unless it costs any more money. They’re for smaller government, unless budget cuts scratch a program they’ve heard of. They’d like Washington to fix everything, just so long as it doesn’t run anything.

Young people lean way left on issues like gay marriage, pot, and immigration. On abortion and gun control, they swim closer to the rest of the electorate.
But on economics, they’re all over the map. You get the sense, reading the Reason Foundation and Pew studies, that a savvy pollster could trick a young person into supporting basically any economic policy in the world with the right combination of triggers. Conservative and liberal partisans can cherry-pick this survey to paint Millennials as whatever ideology they want.

On spending:
Conservatives can say: 65 percent of Millennials would like to cut spending.
Liberals can say: 62 percent would like to spend more on infrastructure and jobs.On taxes:
Conservatives can say: 58 percent of Millennials want to cut taxes overall.
Liberals can say: 66 percent want to raise taxes on the wealthy.On government’s role in our lives:
Conservatives can say: 66 percent of Millennials say that “when something is funded by the government, it is usually inefficient and wasteful.”
Liberals can say: More than two-thirds think the government should guarantee food, shelter, and a living wage.On government size:
Conservatives can say: 57 percent want smaller government with fewer services (if you mention the magic word “taxes”).
Liberals can say: 54 percent want larger government with more services (if you don’t mention “taxes”).

via Millennials’ Political Views Don’t Make Any Sense – The Atlantic and This poll proves that millennials have totally incoherent political views – Vox.
The Quantity and Quality of Australian, New Zealand, Canadian, American and English & Welsh Lives, 1965 to 1995
21 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, economic history, Gary Becker, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, population economics, technological progress Tags: Australia, British economy, Canada, life expectancy, lost decades, New Zealand, The Great Enrichment
Figure 1: increase in real GDP and increase in real GDP plus life expectancy GDP increase equivalent, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, USA and England & Wales, 1965 to 1995
GDP per capita is usually used to proxy for the quality of life of individuals living in different countries. Becker and his co-authors computed a "full" growth rate that incorporates the gains in health and life expectancy.
Figure 1 shows that New Zealand was way behind the other countries in improvements in the quantity and quality of life between 1965 and 1995. This brings new meaning to the two decades of lost growth between 1973 and 1995. Canada should refer to 1965 to 1995 as its golden era.
Would you rather make $50,000 in today’s New Zealand or $100,000 in the 1980s before neo-liberalism?
21 Jun 2015 1 Comment
in applied welfare economics, economic history, politics - New Zealand, population economics, technological progress Tags: good old days, left-wing fantasies, Leftover Left, life expectancies, neoliberalism, The Great Enrichment, time machine, welfare state
Ezra Klein and Matt O’Brien posed an interesting variation of Brad De Long’s Time Machine question. O’Brien asked:
Try this thought experiment. Adjusted for inflation, would you rather make $50,000 in today’s world or $100,000 in 1980’s? In other words, is an extra $50,000 enough to get you to give up the internet and TV and computer that you have now? The answer isn’t obvious.
And if $100,000 isn’t enough, what would be? $200,000? More? This might be the best way to get a sense of how much better technology has made our lives—not to mention the fact that people are living longer—the past 35 years, but the problem is it’s particular to you and your tastes. It’s not easy to generalize.
This doesn’t mean, though, that the middle class is doing well or even as well as it should be. Just that it’s doing better than the official numbers say it is.
Let them have iPhones is the new let them eat cake.
The same questions are asked in New Zealand in a different way when people go on about how much more unequal New Zealand is compared to the 1980s and how bad things have got because of that rise in inequality.
Would it better to be on the welfare benefit in the 1980s than on a benefit today in a less equal New Zealand than in the 1980s? It is certainly the case that the Gini coefficient is worse than it was in the 1980s – see figure 1.
Figure 1: Gini coefficient New Zealand 1980-2015
Source: Bryan Perry, Household incomes in New Zealand: Trends in indicators of inequality and hardship 1982 to 2013. Ministry of Social Development (July 2014).
But household incomes on a real basis increased across the border in New Zealand – see figure 2 – including for Maori and Pasifika. As shown in figure 2 below, between 1994 and 2010, real equivalised median New Zealand household income rose by 47%; for Māori, this rise was 68%; for Pasifika, the rise in real equivalised median household income was 77%.
Figure 2: Real equivalised median household income (before housing costs) by ethnicity, 1988 to 2013 ($2013)
Source: Bryan Perry, Household incomes in New Zealand: Trends in indicators of inequality and hardship 1982 to 2013. Ministry of Social Development (July 2014).
The biggest worry for anyone longing to be on a welfare benefit or to be otherwise working back in the good old days in the 1980s on the more equal incomes of back then is instant death.

Stepping into that Time Machine to go back to the more equal, more egalitarian 1980s shaves about five years off your life expectancy, if not more! Death certainly is the great leveller when it comes to Left over Left fantasies about the good old days before the economic reforms of the 1980s. Indeed, the 1980s was a period where life expectancies started to increase again after a hiatus in the 1960s and 1970s.

Time travel back to the good old days in the 1980s before neoliberalism would be particularly grim from Maori because of their much lower life expectancies of Maori back in the 1980s – see figure 3.
Figure 3: Life expectancy at birth, Maori and non-Maori by sex
Source: Statistics New Zealand.
The most apt summary of how bad it was in the 1980s compared to today is by veteran left-wing grumbler Max Rashbrooke. To paint pre-1984 New Zealand, pre-neoliberal New Zealand as an egalitarian paradise, he had to ignore the economic progress of two thirds of the population and the inequalities they suffered:
New Zealand up until the 1980s was fairly egalitarian, apart from Maori and women, our increasing income gap started in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
How Al Gore spins global warming
21 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in energy economics, environmental economics, global warming, politics - USA, rentseeking Tags: Al Gore, climate alarmism, global warming, green rent seeking
The impact of parental employment on child poverty in couple families, Anglo-Saxon countries
21 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of love and marriage, labour economics, labour supply, law and economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, population economics, poverty and inequality, welfare reform Tags: Australia, British economy, Canada, child poverty, economics of families, family poverty, Ireland, labour force participation, single parents
Figure 1: child poverty rates in couple families by employment status, Anglo-Saxon countries, 2010
Source: OECD Family Database; Poverty thresholds are set at 50% of the median income of the entire population.
Green parties score 2/3 on this test?
21 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, health economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, technological progress Tags: 9/11, anti-vaccination movement, antiscience left, conspiracy theories, expressive voting, GMOs, inspiriting theorists, rational ignorance, rational irrationality, risk risk trade-offs, vaccines
Proportion of births out of wedlock, 2011, Anglo-Saxon countries
20 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in gender, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, population economics Tags: economics of fertility, economics of the family, single mothers, single parents
Figure 1: Proportion of births out of wedlock, 2011, Anglo-Saxon countries
Source: OECD family database; no data for Ireland.
The GMO food die-hard GMO opponents love (and oppose a label for)
20 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of information, economics of media and culture, economics of regulation, environmental economics, health economics, law and economics, politics - USA Tags: antiscience left, expressive voting, food labelling, GMOs, product labelling, rational ignorance, rational irrationality
Who is where on the Laffer curve?
20 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economic growth, fiscal policy, human capital, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, politics - USA, public economics Tags: endogenous growth theory, EU, Eurosclerosis, laffer curve, optimal tax theory, taxation and entrepreneurship, taxation and investment, taxation and the labour supply
@asymmetricinfo paper:"How Far Are We From The Slippery Slope? The Laffer Curve Revisited" bit.ly/1HMhmqu http://t.co/D9IffNhd92—
Old Whig (@aClassicLiberal) April 20, 2015
The impact of single parent employment on child poverty rates, Anglo-Saxon countries
20 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in labour economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, poverty and inequality, welfare reform Tags: Australia, British economy, Canada, child poverty, economics of the family, family poverty, female labour force participation rates, Ireland, maternal labour supply, single mothers, single parents
Figure 1: Child poverty rate by employment status of single parent, Anglo-Saxon countries, 2010
Source: OECD Family Database; Poverty thresholds are set at 50% of the median income of the entire population.

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