What I admire most about John Howard was his decision to intervene in East Timor to stop massacres, which were a by-product of succession struggles within TNI. Howard didn’t have to do that. He didn’t.
If there ever was a prime directive in Australian national security policy, more so than have a great and powerful friend (first the UK, than the USA, dumping Britain like a stone in 1941 when a better great and powerful friend became available), it’s never put Australian military forces in a position risking an exchange of fire with TNI.
That did happen during the East Timor intervention. There were armed stand-offs at roadblocks between the Australian Army and TNI. Platoon leaders in the Australian Army had to keep their cool with guns drawn on both sides otherwise it would be a real shooting war that could spiral out of control.
That is why there is a genuine risk of major war not from accidents in the military machine but through a diplomatic process of commitment and escalation that is itself unpredictable. Schelling also argues that nations, like people, are continually engaged in demonstrations of resolve, tests of nerve, and explorations for understandings and many misunderstandings.
In Schelling’s view, many wars including World War 1 were products of mutual alarm and unpredictable tests of will. When people discuss the futility of World War 1, they under rate the role of unintended consequences and the dark side of human rationality in situations involving collective action.
Indonesia and its politically ambitious and corrupt military wing are next door to Australia forever. A pragmatic approach is a necessity of survival along such a volatile border.
That’s actually why Whitlam did what he did, and sat on his hands over the East Timor massacres in 1975. Australia had no credible capability of intervening, particularly against a country with such a large military and unstable politics. In 1975, the Indonesian military most certainly would have shot back.
Utopia, you are standing in it! 
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