From @EugeneSteuerle: Combined tax rates and creating a 21st century social welfare budget tpc.io/1GCdrYF http://t.co/aNRPqz5gAc—
Tax Policy Center (@TaxPolicyCenter) June 28, 2015
All in less cash transfers average income tax rates at average wage, USA, UK, Australia and New Zealand
27 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in labour supply, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, poverty and inequality, public economics Tags: Australia, British economy, family tax credits, family taxation, in-work tax credits, social insurance, taxation and the labour supply, welfare state
Figure 1: All in less cash transfers average income tax rates at average wage, 2014
Source: OECD tax database
@MaxRashbrooke The top 1% in New Zealand are lazy and incompetent as a ruling class
24 Jun 2015 1 Comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, economic history, entrepreneurship, health and safety, human capital, industrial organisation, liberalism, Marxist economics, poverty and inequality, Rawls and Nozick, unions Tags: capitalism and freedom, Class war, Joan Robinson, Joseph Schumpeter, social insurance, The Great Enrichment, top 1%, welfare state, withering away in the proletariat
New work by Chris Ball and John Creedy shows substantial *declines* in NZ inequality.
initiativeblog.com/2015/06/24/ine… http://t.co/f94fw4Bhae—
Eric Crampton (@EricCrampton) June 24, 2015
The top 1% in New Zealand really have been dropping the class war ball for at least a generation.
Source: The World Top Incomes Database.
Not only have the New Zealand top 1% been pretty miserable at increasing their share of incomes, hardly any change since 1990 and not much before that, the top 1% allowed inequality in both consumption and disposable income to actually fall since 1990 as shown by Treasury analysis published today.
Joan Robinson was on to this in the 1940s when she said the battle cry of Marxists would have to change from the 1848 version “rise up ye workers, rise up for you have nothing to lose but your chains” to “rise up ye workers, rise up for you have nothing to lose but the prospect of a suburban home and a motorcar”.
Today that battle cry of the Marxist revolution would have to be “rise up ye workers rise up for you have nothing to lose but your iPhone and your air points”. As Joan Robinson observed in the 1940s, that’s not much of a basis for a revolutionary movement.
Does the NZ Superannuation Fund recover the deadweight cost of the taxes that funded it?
24 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, financial economics, income redistribution, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice, public economics Tags: ageing society, demographic crisis, New Zealand superannuation fund, old age pensions, social insurance, sovereign wealth funds, welfare state
The $30 billion New Zealand Superannuation Fund is the best performing sovereign wealth fund over the past five years, generating returns of more than 17 per cent a year.
Those returns easily beat all other sovereign wealth funds that publish their figures, according to a global study by JP Morgan. In the last three years alone, the fund returned an average of 21 per cent a year.
Good thing to do considering that the default deadweight cost of taxation is put by that Treasury to be 20%:
As a general rule, deadweight losses should be included if they are of sufficient size relative to the overall costs and benefits of the proposal that they are capable of altering the decision as to whether or not to proceed with the proposal.
Having said this, deadweight losses are notoriously difficult to quantify. Estimates vary from 14% up to 50% of the revenue collected.
Treasury suggests a rate of 20% as a default deadweight loss value in the absence of an alternative evidence based value. Thus public expenditures should be multiplied by a factor of 1.2 prior to discounting to incorporate the effects of deadweight loss.
This deadweight cost of taxation includes funds contributed to New Zealand government owned investment funds. In a speech last week, the Super Fund chairman Gavin Walker warned that the recent high returns were unlikely to continue in the long-term:
The last few years are likely to have been among the best years the fund will experience for some time,” he said. “On average and over the long-term we expect to earn the rather less exciting figure of 8 per cent [per annum] – but which will still provide a handsome return to New Zealander stakeholders.
The New Zealand Superannuation Fund must beat the market every single year to make up for the deadweight cost of its funding, the usual interest rate on borrowed funds, a premium for the investment risk added to the Crown’s portfolio and the cost to New Zealand’s growth rate of higher than otherwise taxes on income, entrepreneurship and investment.
Most mutual funds still can't beat their benchmark read.bi/1GkTig1 http://t.co/r7ezoDGJbV—
BI Chart of the Day (@chartoftheday) June 03, 2015
Who gained the most from US 1996 Federal welfare reforms?
01 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in discrimination, gender, labour economics, labour supply, politics - USA, poverty and inequality, welfare reform Tags: 1996 US welfare reforms, racial discrimination, social insurance, welfare state
Who has the smallest Anglo-Saxon welfare state of them all?
02 Apr 2015 1 Comment
in income redistribution, labour economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, welfare reform Tags: social insurance, social safety nets, welfare reform, welfare state
I have reanalysed data published by the Peterson Institute on the true levels of social expenditure across the industrialised countries for the Anglo-Saxon countries.
Figure 1: gross public social expenditures in OECD countries, 2011
Source: POLICY BRIEF 15-4: The True Levels of Government and Social Expenditures in Advanced Economies.
When you just look at gross public social expenditure, New Zealand is in the middle of the pack with the United Kingdom having the largest spending. There are not particularly large differences across social spending in the Anglo-Saxon welfare states.
Figure 2: Gross public social expenditure and the effects of taxation in OECD countries, 2011
Source: POLICY BRIEF 15-4: The True Levels of Government and Social Expenditures in Advanced Economies.
There is not much change when you include the effects of taxation on consumption by benefit recipients.
Figure 3: Net after-tax public and private social expenditure in OECD countries, 2011
Source: POLICY BRIEF 15-4: The True Levels of Government and Social Expenditures in Advanced Economies.
When private mandatory social spending is included, such as employer sponsored health cover, there is considerable change with United States leaping to the front and New Zealand dropping to the bottom. The USA has the largest and most expensive is health sector in the world so they are leaping of the front, either because healthcare is expensive in United States or people in the United States are not constrained by government rationing to spend less than they would prefer on their own healthcare. Let’s leave that war of ideas for another day.
Figure 4: Net after-tax total social expenditures in OECD countries, 2011
Source: POLICY BRIEF 15-4: The True Levels of Government and Social Expenditures in Advanced Economies.
On the face of it, New Zealand has the smallest Anglo-Saxon welfare state while the United States has the largest. A more accurate measure of the relative sizes of these Anglo-Saxon welfare states would require the wisdom of Solomon in measuring waste and underfunding in the respective systems and more trust than you should have in services sector in purchasing power parity adjustments.
For those that are interested, the OECD-wide gross social spending and net after-tax total social spending are reproduced below in figures 5 and 6.
Figure 5: Net after-tax total social expenditures in OECD countries, 2011
Source: POLICY BRIEF 15-4: The True Levels of Government and Social Expenditures in Advanced Economies.
The Figure 5 data on the OECD wide welfare state sizes shows that when you add private spending, including social spending mandated by law, the US has the second largest OECD social safety net as Kirkegaard said in his Peterson Institute paper:
Taking the full effects of tax systems and social spending from both private and public sources into account, the United States is seen to be devoting more resources toward social purposes than is generally acknowledged. In fact, only the French spend more than Americans, while the alleged welfare-addicted Scandinavians and Europeans spend less on average.
Figure 6: Gross public social expenditures in OECD countries, 2011
Source: POLICY BRIEF 15-4: The True Levels of Government and Social Expenditures in Advanced Economies.
Via The US welfare state and safety net are bigger than you think. But who are they helping? – AEI | Pethokoukis Blog » AEIdeas and POLICY BRIEF 15-4: The True Levels of Government and Social Expenditures in Advanced Economies
Disability insurance recipients are disproportionately older and less educated
25 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
in labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice, welfare reform Tags: David Autor, disability insurance, social insurance, welfare reform
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David Autor found that the effective replacement rate of Social Security disability insurance payments for labour earnings with SSDI benefits has also risen in recent decades due both to the rising value of in-kind Medicare benefits and to a subtle interaction between the benefits formula and rising income inequality in the U.S.
This interaction causes the effective generosity for low-wage workers to rise and encourages older workers with limited education to go on the disability benefit because its income replacement rate for what they can earn in the workforce can be as high as 80% when Medicare is included. As Autor and Duggan explain:
The rapid expansion of the beneficiary population has three main causes.
First, a set of congressional reforms in 1984 to Disability Insurance screening led to rapid growth in the share of recipients suffering from back pain and mental illness. Because these disorders have comparatively low mortality, the average duration of disability spells—and hence the size of the recipient population—has increased.
Second, a rise in the after-tax DI income replacement rate—that is, the ratio of disability income to former labour earnings—strengthened the incentives for workers to seek benefits.
Third, a rapid increase in female labour force participation expanded the pool of insured workers. The aging of the baby boom generation has contributed little to the rise of receipt of disability benefits, while improvements in population health have likely reduced the incidence of disabling medical disorders.
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