
Default and Lost Opportunities: A Message from Argentina for Euro-Zone Countries – Dallas Fed
22 Feb 2015 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, development economics, economic history, growth disasters, growth miracles, international economics Tags: Argentina, sovereign defaults
What happens when you play “chicken” with a game theorist (The Greek Finance Minister)?
14 Feb 2015 Leave a comment
in currency unions, Euro crisis, international economics Tags: game theory, Greece, Greek default, optimal currency areas, sovereign default

Luke Froeb suggests:
However, opting for forgiveness risks creating dangerous incentives for other countries to act in the same way as Athens. “Germany may decide that if the eurozone does not punish Greece, it will have problems with other countries such as Spain and Italy,” says Roger Myerson, a Nobel-winning economist at the University of Chicago.
Mr Varoufakis should therefore try to convince Germany that Athens’ situation is unique and that other eurozone countries will not seek debt relief as a result, he says. In doing so, he would follow the illustrious precedent of the citizens of Melos, to whom Athens, during the Peloponnesian war between Athens and Sparta, gave the choice of surrendering or facing annihilation.
“The Melians sought to argue that they were different and that sparing them would not set a dangerous precedent vis-à-vis other islands,” says Mr Myerson.
The problem with this strategy, however, is that the other player may choose to build a reputation for toughness. This is what Athens opted for — it laid siege to the island and starved the inhabitants into submission.

via Managerial Econ: What happens when you play “chicken” with a game theorist? and Greek Game Theory: Default, Devaluation, Deliverance?..
The Evolution of Trade Agreements — Information is Beautiful Awards
09 Feb 2015 Leave a comment
in economic history, international economics Tags: free trade agreements, preferential trading agreements, regional trade agreements, trade creation, trade diversion
Undiscovered Arctic oil and potential trade routes
06 Feb 2015 Leave a comment
in energy economics, international economics Tags: Arctic oil
Why is NZ so hostile to foreign investment, 32nd in the Index of Economic Freedom 2015? USA is 66th!
02 Feb 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, economics of media and culture, economics of regulation, international economics, politics - New Zealand Tags: bootleggers and baptists, foreign direct investment, foreign investment, free trade, Index of Economic Freedom
Source: 2015 Index of Economic Freedom
According to the Index of Economic Freedom 2015, in New Zealand
Foreign investment is welcomed, but the government may screen some large investments.
There was a major review of New Zealand foreign investment regulations about 10 years ago. The purpose of that review commissioned by the Labour government’s Minister of Finance, Dr Michael Cullen, was to deregulate the regulation of foreign investment in New Zealand.
At the time,under the Overseas Investment Act, the Minister of Finance could refuse permission to any investment. Australia’s current overseas investment regulations are the same. The federal treasurer may reject foreign investment proposals on the basis of an open-ended definition of national interest.
The last time that foreign investors had been refused permission to invest in New Zealand was in the early 1980s under then National Party Government Prime Minister Robert Muldoon. In a fit of pique, he refused permission to an Australian investor.
The revised foreign investment regulations limits the ability of government to reject foreign investors to narrow criteria such as the acquisition of sensitive land and large New Zealand companies. As part of this theme that foreign acquisitions of land was the main policy concern regarding foreign investment, the administration of the foreign investment regulations was moved out of a Overseas Investment Commission housed at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand to the very low key Land Information Office:
The Overseas Investment Office (OIO) assesses applications from overseas investors seeking to invest in sensitive New Zealand assets – being ‘sensitive’ land, high value businesses (worth more than $100 million) and fishing quota.
Naturally, subsequent to this genuine attempt by the Labour government of 10 years ago to deregulate foreign investment regulation, a number of investments have been refused since then often on the pretext that some part of the investment acquired sensitive coastal land door or rural land. The criteria for regulating foreign investment is as follows:
As regards the criteria relating to the relevant “overseas person”, the OIO needs to be satisfied that:
- the “overseas person” has demonstrated financial commitment to the investment; and
- the “overseas person” or (if that person is not an individual) the individuals with ownership and control of the overseas person (such as the shareholders and directors of the overseas purchaser):
- have the business experience and acumen relevant to that investment;
- are of good character; and
- are not prohibited from entering New Zealand by reason of sections 15 or 16 of the Immigration Act 2009 (e.g. persons who have been imprisoned for certain periods of time).
As regards the criteria relating to the particular investment, the OIO needs to be satisfied that the overseas investment will, or is likely to, benefit New Zealand (or any part of it or group of New Zealanders). When considering this, the OIO has a range of factors that it must consider (including, for example, whether the investment will create new job opportunities, introduce new technology or business skills, advance a significant Government policy or strategy, or bring other consequential benefits to New Zealand).
The New Zealand Initiative recently reviewed this criteria for regulating overseas investment into New Zealand and found that:
the report finds that the criteria for approval do not test the economic benefit to New Zealanders, where sensitive land is sold to an overseas person not intending to live in New Zealand indefinitely.
Indeed, the criteria are unambiguously hostile, even excluding the gain to a New Zealand vendor. This opens the way for the imposition of approval conditions that could impose net costs on New Zealanders given the regime’s potentially adverse effects on land values
The regulation of foreign investment in other countries is much more specific about what it is trying to achieve,as New Zealand Initiative also noted in its recent review:
New Zealand’s comprehensive screening regime accounts for our poor international ranking in the OECD’s FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index.
Most other countries focus their regimes more narrowly on national security considerations, often relating to particularly sensitive industries or sectors.
The main reason the public supports foreign investment regulation is because the public doesn’t like foreigners, and politicians pander to that xenophobia. If foreign investment is reduced, more of total investment spending has to be funded from domestic saving.

Access to foreign savings – trade in savings – allows investment to be made sooner, consumption to be smoothed over hiatuses such as recessions, and consumption to be bought forward in the light of better times such higher output and higher future incomes as because of foreign investment.The

The large national gains from foreign capital inflows is not part of that debate. A recent review of the gains from foreign capital inflows to New Zealanders found access to foreign saving led to national income per head, net of the servicing cost of foreign capital:
- average income gains of $2,600 per worker arising on a cumulative basis from capital inflow over the period 1996 – 2006; and
- growth in the value of New Zealand’s assets has greatly exceeded the rise in external liabilities to the extent that national wealth per head has risen by $14,000 in 2007 prices between 1996 and 2006.
You can’t let facts bugger a good story.
The foreign investment is in response to the high returns in the local market and the inflow of foreign capital will continue until local rates of return match those in other countries. Equalisation of risk-adjusted rate of returns is central to the operation of capital markets.
Stopping this process of equalisation of returns on capital through regulation only benefits the capitalists inside the country because the curbing of foreign investment stops rates of return falling to those overseas. Foreign investment regulation reduces the wages of New Zealand workers because they have less capital and fewer modern technologies to work with.
Fortunately, local capitalists can work in league with economic populists on the left and the right and the anti-foreign bias of the voting public to make it more difficult for foreign investors to come to New Zealand and drive down the profits of New Zealand capitalists. Who gains from that? As Paul Krugman said:
The conflict among nations that so many policy intellectuals imagine prevails is an illusion; but it is an illusion that can destroy the reality of mutual gains from trade.
I, iPhone
30 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
in international economics Tags: division of labour, global value chains, globalisation
The cheek to complain about ICT enabled off shoring of services
25 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
in international economics, politics - USA Tags: expressive voting, jingoism, offshoring, outsourcing, popularism
Milton Friedman on the lessons of the East Asian financial crisis (and Switzerland going off its peg)
24 Jan 2015 Leave a comment

The payoff from foreign direct investment in the USA
14 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, international economics, labour economics, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA Tags: foreign direct investment
Exclusive economic zones around the world – New Zealand’s exclusive economic zone is rather large
08 Jan 2015 Leave a comment
in fisheries economics, international economic law, international economics, International law, resource economics Tags: exclusive economic zones, Law of the Sea, maps, national sovereignty
The Democracy Deficit of International Law
12 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in environmental economics, environmentalism, international economics, law and economics Tags: Democracy deficit, international economic law, international human rights law, international humanitarian law, international investment law, international law, international trade law
Charles Murray and the OECD’s Trends in Income Inequality and its Impact on Economic Growth – IQ, signalling, over-education and plain bad career advice
11 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in economics of education, human capital, international economics, labour supply, occupational choice, poverty and inequality Tags: Bryan Caplan, Charles Murray, IQ and education, poverty and inequality, signalling
Charles Murray has been cooking with gas lately – on fire. One of his points is too many go to college. Murray points out that succeeded at college requires an IQ of at least 115 but 84% of the population don’t have this:
Historically, an IQ of 115 or higher was deemed to make someone “prime college material.”
That range comprises about 16 per cent of the population.
Since 28 per cent of all adults have BAs, the IQ required to get a degree these days is obviously a lot lower than 115.
Those on the margins of this IQ are getting poor advice to go to college. Murray argues that other occupational and educational choices would serve them better in light of their abilities and likelihood of succeeding at college. Moreover, Murray is keen on replacing college degrees with certification after shorter periods of study such as in the certified public accountants exam.
Murray believes a lot of students make poor investments by going on to College, in part, because many of them don’t complete their degrees:
…even though college has been dumbed down, it is still too intellectually demanding for a large majority of students, in an age when about 50 per cent of all high school graduates are heading to four-year colleges the next fall.
The result is lots of failure. Of those who entered a four-year college in 1995, only 58 per cent had gotten their BA five academic years later.
Murray does not want to abandon these teenagers:
Recognizing the fact that most young people do not have ability and/or the interest to succeed on the conventional academic track does not mean spending less effort on the education of some children than of others.
…Too few counsellors tell work-bound high-school students how much money crane operators or master stonemasons make (a lot).
Too few tell them about the well-paying technical specialties that are being produced by a changing job market.
Too few assess the non-academic abilities of work-bound students and direct them toward occupations in which they can reasonably expect to succeed.
Worst of all: As these students approach the age at which they can legally drop out of school, they are urged to take more courses in mathematics, literature, history and science so that they can pursue the college fantasy. Is it any wonder that so many of them drop out?
To add to that, he is in the Bryan Caplan School: education is often an elaborate former of signalling for many degrees. Murray says that college is a waste of time because:
Outside a handful of majors — engineering and some of the sciences — a bachelor’s degree tells an employer nothing except that the applicant has a certain amount of intellectual ability and perseverance.
Even a degree in a vocational major like business administration can mean anything from a solid base of knowledge to four years of barely remembered gut courses.
If the OECD is to be believed, that not enough people are going to college from lower middle class families, obviously IQ is not one of the constraints on access to college Charles Murray suggested it to be.
The growing strength of the case that education is a form of signalling is a literature that the now famous OECD paper reviewed, found wanting, but did not have time to discuss in the working paper.

Another contemporary theme the OECD paper reviewed, found wanting, but did not have time to discuss is a large number of graduates who end up holding jobs that do not require a university education – going to college:
About 48 per cent of employed U.S. college graduates are in jobs that the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) suggests requires less than a four-year college education.
Eleven per cent of employed college graduates are in occupations requiring more than a high-school diploma but less than a bachelor’s, and 37 per cent are in occupations requiring no more than a high-school diploma.
The proportion of overeducated workers in occupations appears to have grown substantially; in 1970, fewer than one per cent of taxi drivers and two per cent of fire-fighters had college degrees, while now more than 15 per cent do in both jobs
All in all, the OECD has gone into the dragons den by backing the accumulation of human capital as its mechanism to link inequality with lower growth. No matter how you spin it, this linking of lower economic growth to greater inequality through financial constraints on the accumulation of human capital by the lower middle class was a bold hypothesis.

The case for investing more in education is not a slam dunk. Higher education – university or polytechnic – is a rat race that many don’t need to join.The case for the government paying a great many more to join that rat race is rather weak.







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