The largest global exporters and why everyone is so keen to agree new trade deals econ.st/1eOdcEj http://t.co/TXZCYkUToU—
The Economist (@EconEconomics) June 27, 2015
The largest global exporters
04 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in international economics Tags: globalisation, overseas trade
Terrorist attacks and tourism
30 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of media and culture, industrial organisation, international economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, survivor principle, war and peace Tags: economics of tourism, war on terror
Daily chart: Tourist visits before and after African terror attacks econ.st/1JmvUN3 http://t.co/5nWKUQbey8—
The Economist (@TheEconomist) June 30, 2015
Gambling for Redemption and Self-fulfilling Debt Crises in the Eurozone
29 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in business cycles, currency unions, economic growth, Euro crisis, fiscal policy, global financial crisis (GFC), international economic law, international economics, macroeconomics Tags: game theory, Greece, Patrick Kehoe, sovereign default
Donald Trump explained
27 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in international economic law, international economics, politics - USA, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: 2016 presidential election, antiforeign bias, antimarket bias, crony capitalism, Donald Trump, expressive voting, left-wing populists, populists, right-wing populists
Is investor state dispute settlement a form of overseas development assistance?
24 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, development economics, growth disasters, growth miracles, international economic law, international economics, law and economics, property rights, Public Choice, rentseeking, Richard Posner Tags: European Court of Justice, free trade agreements, International Court of Justice, international law, investor state dispute settlement, ODA, overseas development assistance, preferential trade agreements, regional trade agreements, WTO
Would objections to the Investor State Dispute Settlement provisions in the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership wilt away if the adjudicating body was the International Court of Justice? The left-wing opponents of investor state dispute settlement genuflect at the very mention of the International Court of Justice and international law generally (unless it is international economic law).

Disputes over the provisions of European union treaties are adjudicated by the European Court of Justice. The judgements of that court brought by individuals against member states so annoy the British that it is a leading reason for many British wanting to leave the European Union and replace the Human Rights Act 1998 with a British Bill Of Rights policed by British courts rather than by the European Court of Justice and European human rights law.
It is routine for any treaty to have some provision for arbitration of disputes. This includes trade and investment treaties.
The World Trade Organisation treaty includes a dispute settlement provision with arbitrators based in Geneva. Some of the more than 400 cases heard have been motivated by discrimination against imports on the basis of a breached environmental protection policies of the importing country.

A number of countries want to ban imports that are produced in ways that upset them. Others want to include labour and environmental standards in trade agreements to impose developed country standards on developing countries in what is a new form of colonialism.
I have previously said that investor State Dispute Settlement provisions have no place in trade and investment treaties between democracies. I must now admit there are good reasons to have arbitration clauses in treaties between democracies.
The puzzle is why refer these trade and investment disputes to a little-known arbitration body adjunct to the World Bank rather than the far more prestigious International Court of Justice.
Perhaps the reason is both sides want an arbitrator who is not too strong and not too credible. It would look very bad if the International Court of Justice was to rule against you.
William Landes and Richard Posner contended that judicial independence maximises the value of legislative deals with interest groups by enhancing the durability of those deals.
Why no International Court of Commercial Law? When deciding what type in judiciary to enforce international trade bargains, the signatories may prefer a less credible adjudication and enforcement mechanism in case they want to opt out of it or chip around the decision.
The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice is to settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by special agreement and matters specifically provided for in treaties and conventions in force.
UN member states are the parties to any litigation but that doesn’t stop them raising cases on behalf of individuals. That said, organizations, private enterprises, and individuals cannot have their cases taken to the International Court, such as to appeal a national supreme court’s ruling. Only the states can bring the cases and become the defendants of the cases.
The International Court of Justice is different from the European Court of Justice because individuals cannot easily bring complaints before it. One of the causes of action before the European Court of Adjusters is under European competition law over member states providing financial aid to industries.
Democratic countries with high levels of economic and social integration, such as the European union, do find it in advantage to set up a European wide Court to adjudicate disputes over rights under European law.
Why then would a democracy sign up to an investment protection treaty with a developing country? One reason is overseas development assistance.
Developing countries with corrupt and incompetent courts, politicians and bureaucracies sign international treaties as a way of assuring foreign investors and trading partners of some degree of security of their property rights and their ability to enforce contracts with suppliers and buyers.
By folding these assurances into trade treaties, the developing country has a stronger incentive to honour its promises. There will be domestic constituencies wanting to retain reciprocal export market access who will lobby for the honouring of the promises of legal protection to investors and businesses in their home country.
New Zealand signing up to the Trans-Pacific Partnership is an example of this form of overseas development assistance. Exporters and investors from the developing country who export and invest in New Zealand have another reason to support more secure property rights and better enforcement of contracts in their home country as a way of securing their treaty rights to export and invest in New Zealand.
The Left of the political spectrum should be keen on this form of overseas development considering their general belief in greatly increasing the amount spent on overseas development assistance. Rather than pay cash to the development country, the payment is in kind as reciprocal legal promises.
Trade treaties that include investor state dispute settlement are forms of governance assistance to developing countries. The reciprocal exchange of promises about investor protection and the enforcement of contracts and property rights improves the quality of governance in the developing country.
The countries most likely to be subject to investor state dispute settlement are those with weaker governance. Even in the European Union, the member states most likely to be sued are former communist countries. The most common course of action was the cancellation of a licence or permit.

Investor state dispute settlement clauses are no different from any other international treaty include environmental and human rights treaties. All these treaties require countries to give up part of their sovereignty.

Democracies give up their sovereignty in investor state dispute settlement in the hope that developing country partners to the treaty will improve the development potential of their country through better governance and more secure property rights.
That is an overseas development aid objective the Left of the political spectrum should support, but it does not. The Left of the political spectrum is happy to use trade agreements to impose developed country labour and environmental standards on poor countries desperate for access to rich country markets, but is not willing to give up anything in return.
The difference between tariffs and quotas
18 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, industrial organisation, international economics Tags: antimarket bias, import competition, international trade, protectionism, quotas, tariffs
What’s the difference between #tariffs and #quotas? Let’s find out buff.ly/1FS7QkZ http://t.co/hsx2VVG5e6—
MRUniversity (@MRevUniversity) May 30, 2015
What does America import and export?
13 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in international economics, politics - USA Tags: globalisation, international trade
As the House votes on trade, see last month's post on what the US actually imports and exports pewrsr.ch/1Jsonh0 http://t.co/B976iVeDjg—
PewResearch FactTank (@FactTank) June 12, 2015
The scourge of lower prices illustrated
12 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, industrial organisation, international economics, survivor principle Tags: antimarket bias, competition in monopoly, globalisation, import competition, import parity pricing, international trade, The meaning of competition
The balance of payments always balances
11 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in international economics Tags: balance of payments, capital account surpluses, current account deficits, economic fallacies
How do trade imbalances affect the #economy? buff.ly/1e32Dg9 http://t.co/8TsPbxXlvf—
MRUniversity (@MRevUniversity) June 10, 2015
The market erodes discrimination
01 Jun 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, discrimination, economic history, entrepreneurship, international economics Tags: entrepreneurial alertness, racial discrimination, sex discrimination
Great excerpt on #immigration as #development from @bill_easterly's Tyranny of Experts @AlexNowrasteh @m_clem http://t.co/5eruOdEcGm—
David Bier (@myfreesociety) May 09, 2014
Sovereign defaults are mainly a Latin American thing
29 May 2015 1 Comment
in international economics Tags: Argentina, Greece, international economic law, Latin America, sovereign defaults
#Dailychart: Nine of the top ten sovereign debt defaulters are from Latin America econ.st/UDi8B1 http://t.co/s0jb2yh5PN—
The Economist (@ECONdailycharts) July 31, 2014
What should be the Green Party case for free trade
23 May 2015 Leave a comment
in international economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, war and peace Tags: Left-wing hypocrisy, New Zealand Greens
Why America refuses to sign climate treaties that don’t include the BRICs
12 May 2015 Leave a comment
in environmental economics, global warming, international economic law, international economics Tags: climate alarmism, climate treaties, free riding, game theory, global warming
Hypocritical Greens betray NZ sovereignty to US court decision but oppose investor state dispute settlement on sovereignty grounds
10 May 2015 Leave a comment
in defence economics, economics of crime, international economic law, international economics, International law, law and economics, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA Tags: foreign policy, free trade agreements, green hypocrisy, green party, investor state disputes settlement, national security, preferential trading agreements, war against terror
The Greens are happy to betray New Zealand’s sovereignty to a US court where New Zealand’s side of the story was not heard, New Zealand was not a litigant, New Zealand was not named in the proceedings and New Zealand had not agreed to waive its sovereign immunity under US law.
The Greens on the other hand are hysterical about the prospect of New Zealand voluntarily submitting to investor state disputes settlement through an international treaty. International treaties normally are about trading in sovereignty: you give up some form of sovereignty return for something you value more.
It is thoroughly hypocritical of the Greens to argue the New Zealand should bow down to a foreign court when that court rules in a way that it favours its ideological agenda but refuse to support the principle of international arbitration in circumstances where that may advance New Zealand’s national interests.
At a minimum, New Zealand itself chose to give up its sovereignty if it agrees to investor state dispute settlement in a trade agreement. The decision was not imposed by a foreign court where it was not heard nor was a party.


Of particular concern to the Greens is international arbitration could "trump the public’s vote vote". New Zealand has repeatedly elected parties that support the alliance with America, and support a robust security and intelligence policy, including electronic surveillance as part of the war on terror.
The last week of the 2014 general election campaign was dominated by the Government Security Communications Bureau and its cooperation with the National Security Agency and the extent to which New Zealand security services engaged in electronic surveillance in New Zealand and abroad.
The Greens want to subvert that democratic decision that has been repeated over many New Zealand elections about national security and foreign relations to defer to an American court when New Zealand didn’t even appear as a party.
The US Court of appeal was deciding an issue of statutory interpretation of the Patriot Act. There was no constitutional issues at hand.
The Patriot Act expires in a month unless it is extended. Congress has ample opportunity to amend the renewed law to overturn the appeal court’s decision for the future operation of its security and intelligence laws.
The Greens want a Court of Appeal interpretation of the American Patriot Act to extend to New Zealand without a vote of the New Zealand people or the parliament having any say on whether to give up New Zealand’s sovereignty or waive sovereign immunity in American courts.
.

Recent Comments