18 Apr 2016
by Jim Rose
in fiscal policy, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, poverty and inequality, public economics
Tags: growth of government, income inequality, measurement error, Ricardian theory of budget deficits, Social Security, top 1%, wealth inequality
Markus Poschke and Barış Kaymak have just put out a paper arguing that increased social spending is a major driver of wealth inequality:
Another important and often overlooked third factor is the rise in the generosity of government transfers since 1960, mostly due to the expansion of public pensions (social security) and the introduction of public health insurance for the elderly (Medicare).
Combined spending on these two programs accounted for almost 9% of US GDP in 2010, up from less than 3% in 1960…
These government programmes tend to curb the need to rely on personal savings for retirement, especially among low and middle-income households, and might thus explain why their share in total wealth has declined.
This makes a good to good degree of sense. I have previously argued that using the arguments of Edward Prescott that it is not wise for people on ordinary income to save for their retirement when they can go down to the local Social Security office and claim an old age pension.
It is even less wise to save that for retirement if those savings reduce your eligibility for an old age pension. Far better just to invest in a nicer house and pass it on to your children. Poschke and Kaymak note that measures of private wealth inequality miss these claims to old age pensions:
… statistics on wealth inequality that do not capture households’ claims on the public sector are incomplete and overstate top wealth shares.
This is not a new argument. Back when the Ricardian theories of budget deficits came to prominence and before that in debates on theories of the public debt, the more Keynesian sides of those arguments did argue that people were irrational for not including their old age pension entitlements under social security schemes in their calculations of their wealth.

Some of their taxes were paying for their future old age pension and were another form of wealth rather than a tax. As such, taxpayers should regard this part of their taxes as investments and not cutting back their labour supply in response as they do to other taxes.

Source: Barış Kaymak and Markus Poschke The evolution of wealth inequality over half a century: The role of taxes, transfers and technology, Journal of Monetary Economics (2016).
How much of the rise in wealth inequality is due to this failure to measure Social Security wealth as represented by old age pension entitlements? Their estimate is about 25%:
…technological factors play a dominant role not only for changes in income inequality, as is well known, but also for wealth inequality. As high-earning households save part of their additional income, their share of wealth also rises.
This channel accounts for about half of the total increase in wealth inequality. Tax cuts and the expansion of transfers each account for about half of the remainder…
While tax cuts encourage saving, larger transfers reduce saving incentives for retirement, in particular for low and middle income groups. This implies that these groups’ share of private wealth declines.
Note though that this is partly due to the fact that measures of private wealth inequality, like those compiled by Saez and Zucman, do not include claims to future government transfers, like social security, which constitute wealth for their owners.
17 Apr 2016
by Jim Rose
in applied price theory, entrepreneurship, fiscal policy, macroeconomics, politics - New Zealand, public economics
Tags: company tax, Gareth Morgan, rational irrationality, taxation and entrepreneurship, taxation and investment, taxation and labour supply, taxation of capital income

Source: Mankiw, N. Gregory, Matthew Weinzierl and Danny Yagan. 2009. "Optimal Taxation in Theory and Practice." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23(4):147-74.
The Morgan Foundation gave optimal tax theory a pass in yesterday’s publication about taxes on land and capital. Gareth Morgan is keen on a comprehensive capital tax.

Source: Taxing Wealth & Property – What Works? A Morgan Foundation Report.
This failure to refer to optimal tax theory is despite the Foundation’s strong commitment to evidence-based policy. Any discussion of tax policy that is evidence-based must refer optimal tax theory.

Source: Morgan Foundation, Public Policy Education.
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29 Mar 2016
by Jim Rose
in fiscal policy, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, politics - New Zealand, population economics, poverty and inequality
Tags: Edward Prescott, New Zealand superannuation, old age pensions, social insurance, timing inconsistency, universal basic income, welfare state
Gareth Morgan revealed today a hitherto unnoticed design feature in his Universal Basic Income of $11,000 per annum. It will be phased in over a long time. That will mean that Generation Rent will continue to pay taxes to fund a universal old age pension for their parents and grandparents, but will not be fortunate enough to receive that themselves.

Source: Morgan Foundation (2016) Taxpayers Union Critique of the UBI just bonkers – again
They are not left of their own devices. Generation Rent is expected to save the Universal Basic Income they receive over their working lives to avoid living in poverty in their retirement. Does not strike me as a political winner.
The Morgan Foundation does not understand the implications of time inconsistency for retirement savings policy:
- Which is better? Save for your retirement through the share market or save to own your own home and then present yourself at the local social security office to collect your taxpayer funded old-age pension?
- Under this fine game of bluff, you bleed the taxpayer in your old age and pass on your debt-free home to your children.
This strategy of not saving much for retirement is rational for the less well-paid. The family home is exempt from income and asset testing for social security. If you lose you bet, sell your house and live off the capital. For ordinary workers, this is a good bet. The middle class might prefer to live in a more luxurious retirement.
For ordinary workers, whose wages are not a lot more than their old age pension from the government, a government funded pension is a good political gamble. The old-age pension for a couple in New Zealand is set at no less that 60% of average earnings.
Edward Prescott argues for compulsory retirement savings account albeit with important twists because it is otherwise irrational for many to save for their retirement against the background of a welfare state:
The reason we need to have mandatory retirement accounts is not because people are irrational, but precisely because they are perfectly rational — they know exactly what they are doing.
If, for example, somebody knows that they will be cared for in old age — even if they don’t save a nickel — then what is their incentive to save that nickel? Wouldn’t it be rational to spend that nickel instead?
…Without mandatory savings accounts we will not solve the time-inconsistency problem of people under-saving and becoming a welfare burden on their families and on the taxpayers. That’s exactly where we are now.
19 Mar 2016
by Jim Rose
in economic growth, economic history, entrepreneurship, fiscal policy, macroeconomics, public economics
Tags: British disease, British economy, growth of government, sick man of Europe, size of government, taxation and entrepreneurship, taxation and investment, taxation and labour supply, Thatchernomics
The large rise in tax in personal income in the 1970s coincided with the rise of the British disease and British economy becoming widely known as the sick man of Europe. The large decline in taxation in personal income under Thatchernomics was followed by an economic boom.

Source: OECD Stat.
18 Mar 2016
by Jim Rose
in business cycles, economic history, fiscal policy, great recession, macroeconomics, politics - USA, public economics
Tags: company tax, company tax rate, growth of government, GST, indirect taxation, property taxes, size of government, Social Security contributions, taxation and investment, taxation and labour supply, welfare state
The only major change in the US tax mix in the last 50 years has been greater reliance on social security contributions.

Source: OECD Stat.
The share going to income taxes bobbing up and down quite a lot in the last 30 years much of that to do with the business cycle. In the 1990s, the share of taxes from personal income increased during boom times. In the Great Recession, the tax share to income tax rose with the declining economy as did that on corporate profits.
13 Mar 2016
by Jim Rose
in budget deficits, economic history, fiscal policy, macroeconomics, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, public economics
Tags: Australia, growth of government, size of government
I do not trust the numbers for New Zealand prior to the early 1990s released by the OECD. New Zealand simply did not have a tax structure including a GST in the double digits back then to support estate of that size. Nonetheless, the size of government in New Zealand is systematically larger than in Australia, a richer country which can afford a large government and generous welfare state.

Source: General government – General government revenue – OECD Data and Data extracted on 12 Feb 2016 08:45 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat from OECD Economic Outlook November 2015.
05 Mar 2016
by Jim Rose
in economics of love and marriage, fiscal policy, gender, labour economics, labour supply, law and economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, public economics
Tags: Australia, British economy, Canada, Denmark, effective marginal tax rates, family tax benefits, family tax credits, France, Germany, in-work tax credits, Italy, poverty traps, rational irrationality, social insurance, Sweden, taxation and labour supply
Some countries including New Zealand and Australia do not give ordinary families much of an incentive to earn more. Effective marginal tax rates on low income families is one of the few times that the Left discovers supply-side economics.

Source: Taxing Wages 2015 – OECD 2015.
05 Mar 2016
by Jim Rose
in fiscal policy, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, public economics
Tags: Australia, British economy, Canada, Denmark, family taxation, France, Germany, Italy, social insurance, Sweden, taxation and labour supply
Those sensitive and caring northern European welfare states do tax families rather heavily even after accounting for family cash benefits.

Source: Taxing Wages 2015 – OECD 2015.
04 Mar 2016
by Jim Rose
in fiscal policy, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, public economics
Tags: Australia, British economy, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, social insurance, Social Security, Sweden, taxation and labour supply
Those much admired northern European welfare states tax families and individuals much more than do the Anglo-Saxon welfare states.

Source: Taxing Wages 2015 – OECD 2015.
04 Mar 2016
by Jim Rose
in fiscal policy, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, public economics
Tags: Australia, British economy, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, social insurance, Social Security, Sweden, taxation and labour supply
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