
Thinking on the Margin: Principles of Macroeconomics: Every Graph You Need to Know
25 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
Milton Friedman on the future of the Euro
23 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in currency unions, Euro crisis, macroeconomics, Milton Friedman Tags: Euro, optimal currency areas
I think the euro is in its honeymoon phase. I hope it succeeds, but I have very low expectations for it.
I think that differences are going to accumulate among the various countries and that non-synchronous shocks are going to affect them. Right now, Ireland is a very different state; it needs a very different monetary policy from that of Spain or Italy.
You know, the various countries in the euro are not a natural currency trading group. They are not a currency area. There is very little mobility of people among the countries.
They have extensive controls and regulations and rules, and so they need some kind of an adjustment mechanism to adjust to asynchronous shocks—and the floating exchange rate gave them one. They have no mechanism now.
If we look back at recent history, they’ve tried in the past to have rigid exchange rates, and each time it has broken down. 1992, 1993, you had the crises. Before that, Europe had the snake, and then it broke down into something else.
So the verdict isn’t in on the euro. It’s only a year old. Give it time to develop its troubles (2000)
AND
The drive for the Euro has been motivated by politics not economics.
The aim has been to link Germany and France so closely as to make a future European war impossible, and to set the stage for a federal United States of Europe.
I believe that adoption of the Euro would have the opposite effect.
It would exacerbate political tensions by converting divergent shocks that could have been readily accommodated by exchange rate changes into divisive political issues.
Taxes and the labour supply in Europe
20 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics Tags: labour supply, taxes

Richard Rogerson, 2008. "Structural Transformation and the Deterioration of European Labor Market Outcomes", Journal of Political Economy found that:
1. Hours worked per adult in France, Germany, Italy Europe decline by almost 45% compared to the US since 1956
2. The decline occurs at a steady pace from 1956 until the mid 1990s, in contrast to the fact that the relative increase in unemployment occurs in the mid 1970s.
3. The decline in hours worked in Europe is almost entirely accounted for by the fact that Europe develops a much smaller service sector than the US.
4. Relative increases in taxes and technological catch-up can account for most of the differences between the European and American time allocations to the market and outside over this per.
Ohanian, Rao and Rogerson 2008 in "Work and taxes: allocation of time in OECD countries" found
1. A steep decline in average hours worked per adult and large variations across OECD member countries in the magnitude of this decline.
2. Changes in labour taxes accounted for a large share of the trend differences.
3. Countries with high tax rates devote less time to market work, but more time to home activities, such as cooking and cleaning.
4. This reallocation of time from market work to home work is much stronger for females than for males.
The higher elasticities of labour supply of women, and married women and mothers are beyond dispute. Modern empirical labour economics as led by Mincer was built around explaining female and joint labour supply.
Richard Rogerson, 2007 in "Taxation and market work: is Scandinavia an outlier?" Economic Theory, found that how the government spends tax revenues when assessing the effects of tax rates on aggregate hours of market work.
1. Different forms of government spending imply different elasticities of hours of work with regard to tax rates.
2. While tax rates are highest in Scandinavia, hours worked in Scandinavia are significantly higher than they are in Continental Europe with differences in the form of government spending can potentially account for this pattern.
3. There is a much higher rate of government employment and greater expenditures on child and elderly care in Scandinavia.
Examining how tax revenue is spent is central to understanding labour supply effects:
1. If higher taxes fund disability payments which may only be received when not in work, the effect on hours worked is greater relative to a lump-sum transfer.
2. If higher taxes subsidise day care for individuals who work, then the effect on hours of work will be less than under the lump-sum transfer case.
Crony capitalism flashback – who voted against the TARP in 2008?
20 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in financial economics, global financial crisis (GFC), great recession, macroeconomics, rentseeking Tags: crony capitalism, TARP
The US House of Representatives initially voted down the TARP in a grand coalition of right-wing republicans and left-wing democrats, voting 205–228. The right-wing republicans opposed the bailout because capitalism is a profit AND loss system. Democrats voted 140–95 in favour of the Bill while Republicans voted 133–65 against it.

The chart above shows that the degree of risk in commercial loans made by TARP recipients appears to have increased. This is no surprise. In the 1960s, Sam Peltzman published a paper in in the 1960s showing that when deposit insurance was introduced in the USA in the 1930s, the banks halve their capital ratios. They did not need to have as much capital as before to back their lending. The chart below shows that the TARP really didn’t do much for economic policy uncertainty.

In an open letter sent to Congress, over 100 university economists described three fatal pitfalls in the TARP:
1) Its fairness. The plan is a subsidy to investors at taxpayers’ expense. Investors who took risks to earn profits must also bear the losses. The government can ensure a well-functioning financial industry without bailing out particular investors and institutions whose choices proved unwise.
2) Its ambiguity. Neither the mission of the new agency nor its oversight is clear. If taxpayers are to buy illiquid and opaque assets from troubled sellers, the terms, timing and methods of such purchases must be crystal clear ahead of time and carefully monitored afterwards.
3) Its long-term effects. If the plan is enacted, its effects will be with us for a generation. For all their recent troubles, America’s dynamic and innovative private capital markets have brought the nation unparalleled prosperity. Fundamentally weakening those markets in order to calm short-run disruptions is will short-sighted.
A recent IMF study of 42 systemic banking crises showed that in 32 cases, there was government financial intervention.
Of these 32 cases where the government recapitalised the banking system, only seven included a programme of purchase of bad assets/loans (like the one proposed by the US Treasury). These countries were Mexico, Japan, Bolivia, Czech Republic, Jamaica, Malaysia, and Paraguay.
The Government purchase of bad assets was the exception rather than the rule in banking crises and rightly so. The TARP mostly benefited bank shareholders. A case of privatising the gains and socialising the losses from banking was passed on the votes of Congressional Democrats.
A different view of the start of Great Depression | Lee Ohanian
19 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in great depression, macroeconomics Tags: great depression, Lee Ohanian, Milton Friedman
Friedman and Schwartz argue that the great depression was caused by a collapse of the money supply due to the negligence of the Fed that turned what should have been a garden-variety recession that started in late 1929.
Lee Ohanian argues that there was a steep industrial decline in the USA in 1929 began before monetary contractions or banking panics in 1930 and 1933. The figure below shows manufacturing industry hours worked between January 1929 and September 1930, and measures of the money stock from Friedman and Schwartz corresponding to M1 and M2. Manufacturing industry hours decline substantially and abruptly in late 1929 while money supply fall only about 4% and 1%, respectively.
This sharp decline in the manufacturing sector (a decline of nearly 30% by the fall of 1930 )began before monetary contraction or banking panics – the conventional culprits:
- There are no significant banking panics in 1929 and 1930. The banking panics in the great depression were mostly in 1933 and in 1934.
- Manufacturing hours worked had already fallen by 30% against trend by the time of the first banking panics in 1931, and these first banking panics had minor macroeconomic effects.
The data in the above figure shows that a factor other than monetary contractions or bank runs were central to the onset of the Great Depression.
Nominal wages declined by little during the early stages of the Depression. in September 1931 nominal wage rates were 92 per cent of their level two years earlier. Since a significant price deflation had occurred during these two years, real wages rose by 10 per cent during the same period, while gross domestic product fell by 27 per cent.
With a substantial depression in employment mostly in the manufacturing sector, any explanation of the onset of the great depression in the United States must start with an explanation of why the labour market failed to clear in that sector, why manufacturing decline was so immediately severe before significant monetary contraction and banking panics, why the Depression was so asymmetric across sectors, and provide a theory for why industrial sector wages were persistently well above their market-clearing level.
Just to make it harder for you,nominal wages in the agricultural sector will fell by 40% over the same period in which wages in the manufacturing sector did not fall to all. As Ohanian notes:
The Depression was the first time in the history of the US that wages did not fall during a period of significant deflation.”
Any explanation based on wage rigidity or sluggish wage adjustment or employee resistance to wage cuts must explain why this resistance was so effective in the manufacturing sector but so ineffective in the agricultural sector. Ohanian concluded that:
…the Depression is the consequence of government programs and policies, including those of Hoover, that increased labour’s ability to raise wages above their competitive levels.
To avert a financial panic, central banks should lend early and freely to solvent banks against good collateral but at penal rates
19 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in financial economics, global financial crisis (GFC), great recession, macroeconomics, monetary economics, Thomas M. Humphrey Tags: lender of last resort, Thomas Humphrey, Walter Bagehot

First. That these loans should only be made at a very high rate of interest. This will operate as a heavy fine on unreasonable timidity, and will prevent the greatest number of applications by persons who do not require it. The rate should be raised early in the panic, so that the fine may be paid early; that no one may borrow out of idle precaution without paying well for it; that the Banking reserve may be protected as far as possible.
Secondly. That at this rate these advances should be made on all good banking securities, and as largely as the public ask for them. The reason is plain. The object is to stay alarm, and nothing therefore should be done to cause alarm. But the way to cause alarm is to refuse some one who has good security to offer… No advances indeed need be made by which the Bank will ultimately lose. The amount of bad business in commercial countries is an infinitesimally small fraction of the whole business…
The great majority, the majority to be protected, are the ‘sound’ people, the people who have good security to offer. If it is known that the Bank of England is freely advancing on what in ordinary times is reckoned a good security—on what is then commonly pledged and easily convertible—the alarm of the solvent merchants and bankers will be stayed. But if securities, really good and usually convertible, are refused by the Bank, the alarm will not abate, the other loans made will fail in obtaining their end, and the panic will become worse and worse.
Walter Bagehot Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (1873).
The classical theory of the lender of last resort stressed
(1) protecting the aggregate money stock, not individual institutions,
(2) letting insolvent institutions fail,
(3) accommodating sound but temporarily illiquid institutions only,
(4) charging penalty rates,
(5) requiring good collateral, and
(6) preannouncing these conditions in advance of crises so as to remove uncertainty.
Did anyone follow these rules in the global financial crisis? The Fed violated the classical model in at least seven ways:
- Emphasis on Credit (Loans) as Opposed to Money
- Taking Junk Collateral
- Charging Subsidy Rates
- Rescuing Insolvent Firms Too Big and Interconnected to Fail
- Extension of Loan Repayment Deadlines
- No Pre-announced Commitment
- No Clear Exit Strategy
…{the Fed’s} policies are hardly benign, and that extension of central bank assistance to insolvent too-big-to-fail firms at below-market rates on junk-bond collateral may, besides the uncertainty, inefficiency, and moral hazard it generates, bring losses to the Fed and the taxpayer, all without compensating benefits. Worse still, it is a probable prelude to a severe inflation and to future crises dwarfing the current one.
2014 Homer Jones Memorial Lecture – Robert E. Lucas Jr.
18 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
The first part of his lecture discusses how the Fed can influence inflation and financial stability.
Central banks can control inflation. Can central banks maintain economic stability’s financial stability? This is still an open question as to whether central banks can do that. The quantity theory of money makes certain sharp predictions about monetary neutrality which are well borne out by the cross country evidence.
In the second part of this lecture, Lucas discusses how central banks around the world have used inflation targeting to keep inflation under control.
What is the Fed to do with the stable relationship between money and prices? Inflation targeting is superior to a fixed growth monetary supply growth rule. This always pushes policy in the direction of the inflation rate you want. Central banks around the world have succeeded in keeping inflation low by explicitly or implicitly targeting the inflation rate.
In the last part of his lecture, Lucas discusses financial crises. he agrees with Gary Gordon’s analysis that 2008 financial crisis was a run on Repo. A run on liquid assets accepted as money because they can be so quickly changed into money. The effective money supply shrank drastically when there was a run on these liquid assets.
Lucas favoured the Diamond and Dybvig of bank runs as panics. The logic of that model applies to the Repo markets now was well as to the banking system. How to extend Glass–Steagall Act type regulation of bank portfolios to the Repo market is a question for future research.
Inflation targeting is working well but the lender of last resort function is yet to be fully understood.
Note: The Diamond-Dybvig view is that bank runs are inherent to the liquidity transformation carried out by banks. A bank transforms illiquid assets into liquid liabilities, subject to withdrawal.
Because of this maturity mismatch, if depositors suspect that others will run on the bank, it is optimal for each depositor to run to the bank to withdraw his or her deposit before the assets are exhausted. The bank run is not driven by some decline in the fundamentals of the bank. Depositors are spooked for some reason, panic, and attempt to withdraw their funds before others get in first. In this case, the provision of deposit insurance and lender of last resort facilities reassures depositors and stems the bank run
In the Kareken and Wallace model of bank runs, deposit insurance is problematic because of the incentives it gives to deposit taking institutions that are insured to take much greater risks. When there is deposit insurance, depositors don’t care about the greater risk in the portfolios of their banks. The greater risk taking leads to higher returns at no extra cost because if these risky investments do fail, the deposit insurance covers their losses
It is therefore necessary to regulate the portfolio of insured banks to ensure that they do not do this. That is the great dilemma for banking regulation because quasi-banks and other liquidity transformation intermediaries such as a Repo market spring up just outside the regulatory net.
The U.S. Economic Growth Gap Revisited
18 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in economic growth, great recession, macroeconomics Tags: The Great Recession

Robert Lucas has asked:
Is it possible that by imitating European policies on labor markets, welfare, and taxes that the U.S. has chosen a new, lower GDP trend?
If so, it may be that the weak recovery we have had so far is all the recovery we will get.
The limitations of forecasting are well-known
16 Jun 2014 Leave a comment
in macroeconomics Tags: forecasting errors

- Forecasts are conditional on a number of variables; there are important unresolved analytical differences about the operation of the economy; and large uncertainties about the size and timing of responses to macroeconomic changes. Shocks to the output, prices, employment and other variables are partly permanent and partly transitory.
- We have very little reliable information about the distribution of shocks or about how the distributions change over time. The same is true for the distribution of real and nominal shocks, of shocks to aggregate demand relative to aggregate supply and so on.
- Forecast errors arise from changes in the parameters in the model; mis-specification of the model, estimation uncertainty, mis-measurement of the initial conditions and error accumulation.
- Forecasting has had a turbulent history. Most early discussions argued against the forecasting in principle. Forecasting was not properly grounded in statistical theory, it presupposed that causation implies predictability and the forecast themselves were invalidated by the reactions of economic agents to them





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