Actual and potential GDP in the USA

via The Grumpy Economist: Summers on Stagnation.

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 Thinking on the Margin: Principles of Macroeconomics: Every Graph You Need to Know

via  Thinking on the Margin: Principles of Macroeconomics: Every Graph You Need to Know.

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What did fiscal policy do in World War II?

It is ironic that both camps use World War II as evidence that the fiscal policy might work (Keynesian macroeconomics) or it does not work (Barro and Ohanian).

The nature of the new spending and how it was financed both matter, as does whether the new spending was a public good, a private good or a general or contingent income transfer matter, and whether the new spending was tax or bond financed all matter to the income and substitution effects of taxes and the additional public debt.

World War II was a temporary increase in government military purchases that will be followed by a long period of primary budget surpluses and perhaps surprise spikes in price inflation to pay down the massive wartime debt.

  • A military build-up financed by debt lowers consumer wealth which induces households to consume less leisure and work more while the temporary nature of the fiscal shock increases labour input through inter-temporal substitution of labour into the period of lower taxes.
  • The increase in the supply of labour leads to a fall in productivity and real wages. Inter-temporal substitution of labour also raises the real interest rate and lowers private investment.

Barro found that World War II U.S. defence expenditures increased by $540 billion per year at the peak in 1943-44, amounting to 44% of real GDP.  this increased real GDP by $430 billion per year in 1943-44  – a multiplier was 0.8 (430/540). The main declines were in private investment, non-military government purchases, and net exports. Wartime production was  a dampener, rather than a multiplier.

The war-based multiplier of 0.8 overstates the multiplier that would apply  to peacetime government purchases. Public spending crowds out private spending wartime because of intertemporal substitution of labour and consumption smoothing so private investment falls substantially.

People expect the added wartime spending to be temporary so consumer demand will fall by less. Consumers saving less to smooth out the changes in consumption relative the changes in their current after-tax income if the war is expected to last no more than a few years and no major destruction of capital stock and population is anticipated.

Korean War expenditures were financed mostly by higher taxes resulted in a much lower output and welfare compared to the tax smoothing policy for World War II.

The US borrowed heavily to finance World War II as did  for most of its previous wars. This means the tax rises necessary to pa for the war debt were spread over a much longer period of time and would in consequence have less effect on labour supply and investment.

In the Korean War, taxes were increased immediately  to finance the war. In consequence,labour supply and investment dropped immediately during the period of high taxes

Britain taxed capital income at a much higher rate than the United States during the war and for much of the post-war period. Lee Ohanian explains what happened:

British capital income tax rates rose substantially during the war—they approached 90 per cent—and remained high after it.

Not surprisingly, savings and investment were close to zero over this period, reflecting the very low after-tax return to savings.

In time, London reduced tax rates on savings and investment—and, as a result, savings and investment began to rise, increasing from about 3 per cent of British GDP in the early 1950s to 20 per cent of GDP in the 1980s.

But before its capital income tax rates fell, the United Kingdom was among the slowest growing countries in the industrialized West.

Milton Friedman on the future of the Euro

I think the euro is in its honeymoon phase. I hope it succeeds, but I have very low expectations for it.

I think that differences are going to accumulate among the various countries and that non-synchronous shocks are going to affect them. Right now, Ireland is a very different state; it needs a very different monetary policy from that of Spain or Italy.

You know, the various countries in the euro are not a natural currency trading group. They are not a currency area. There is very little mobility of people among the countries.

They have extensive controls and regulations and rules, and so they need some kind of an adjustment mechanism to adjust to asynchronous shocks—and the floating exchange rate gave them one. They have no mechanism now.

If we look back at recent history, they’ve tried in the past to have rigid exchange rates, and each time it has broken down. 1992, 1993, you had the crises. Before that, Europe had the snake, and then it broke down into something else.

So the verdict isn’t in on the euro. It’s only a year old. Give it time to develop its troubles (2000)

AND

The drive for the Euro has been motivated by politics not economics.

The aim has been to link Germany and France so closely as to make a future European war impossible, and to set the stage for a federal United States of Europe.

I believe that adoption of the Euro would have the opposite effect.

It would exacerbate political tensions by converting divergent shocks that could have been readily accommodated by exchange rate changes into divisive political issues.

Murray Rothbard on the European Union

The Union will increase pressures  for high taxes and higher inflation.

Taxes and the labour supply in Europe

Richard Rogerson, 2008. "Structural Transformation and the Deterioration of European Labor Market Outcomes", Journal of Political Economy found that:
1. Hours worked per adult in France, Germany, Italy Europe decline by almost 45% compared to the US since 1956
2. The decline occurs at a steady pace from 1956 until the mid 1990s, in contrast to the fact that the relative increase in unemployment occurs in the mid 1970s.
3. The decline in hours worked in Europe is almost entirely accounted for by the fact that Europe develops a much smaller service sector than the US.
4. Relative increases in taxes and technological catch-up can account for most of the differences between the European and American time allocations to the market and outside over this per.

Ohanian, Rao and Rogerson 2008 in "Work and taxes: allocation of time in OECD countries" found
1. A steep decline in average hours worked per adult and large variations across OECD member countries in the magnitude of this decline.
2. Changes in labour taxes accounted for a large share of the trend differences.
3. Countries with high tax rates devote less time to market work, but more time to home activities, such as cooking and cleaning.
4. This reallocation of time from market work to home work is much stronger for females than for males.

The higher elasticities of labour supply of women, and married women and mothers are beyond dispute. Modern empirical labour economics as led by Mincer was built around explaining female and joint labour supply.

Richard Rogerson, 2007 in "Taxation and market work: is Scandinavia an outlier?" Economic Theory, found that how the government spends tax revenues when assessing the effects of tax rates on aggregate hours of market work.
1. Different forms of government spending imply different elasticities of hours of work with regard to tax rates.
2. While tax rates are highest in Scandinavia, hours worked in Scandinavia are significantly higher than they are in Continental Europe with differences in the form of government spending can potentially account for this pattern.
3. There is a much higher rate of government employment and greater expenditures on child and elderly care in Scandinavia.

Examining how tax revenue is spent is central to understanding labour supply effects:
1. If higher taxes fund disability payments which may only be received when not in work, the effect on hours worked is greater relative to a lump-sum transfer.
2. If higher taxes subsidise day care for individuals who work, then the effect on hours of work will be less than under the lump-sum transfer case.

Crony capitalism flashback – who voted against the TARP in 2008?

The US House of Representatives initially voted down the TARP in a grand coalition of right-wing republicans and left-wing democrats, voting 205–228. The right-wing republicans opposed the bailout because capitalism is a profit AND loss system. Democrats voted 140–95 in favour of the Bill while Republicans voted 133–65 against it.

The chart above shows that the degree of risk in commercial loans made by TARP recipients appears to have increased. This is no surprise. In the 1960s, Sam Peltzman published a paper in in the 1960s showing that when deposit insurance was introduced in the USA in the 1930s, the banks halve their capital ratios. They did not need to have as much capital as before to back their lending. The chart below shows that the TARP really didn’t do much for economic policy uncertainty.

In an open letter sent to Congress, over 100 university economists described three fatal pitfalls in the TARP:

1) Its fairness. The plan is a subsidy to investors at taxpayers’ expense. Investors who took risks to earn profits must also bear the losses. The government can ensure a well-functioning financial industry without bailing out particular investors and institutions whose choices proved unwise.

2) Its ambiguity. Neither the mission of the new agency nor its oversight is clear. If taxpayers are to buy illiquid and opaque assets from troubled sellers, the terms, timing and methods of such purchases must be crystal clear ahead of time and carefully monitored afterwards.

3) Its long-term effects. If the plan is enacted, its effects will be with us for a generation. For all their recent troubles, America’s dynamic and innovative private capital markets have brought the nation unparalleled prosperity. Fundamentally weakening those markets in order to calm short-run disruptions is will short-sighted.

A recent IMF study of 42 systemic banking crises showed that in 32 cases, there was government financial intervention.

Of these 32 cases where the government recapitalised the banking system, only seven included a programme of purchase of bad assets/loans (like the one proposed by the US Treasury). These countries were Mexico, Japan, Bolivia, Czech Republic, Jamaica, Malaysia, and Paraguay.

The Government purchase of bad assets was the exception rather than the rule in banking crises and rightly so. The TARP mostly benefited bank shareholders. A case of privatising the gains and socialising the losses from banking was passed on the votes of Congressional Democrats.

A different view of the start of Great Depression | Lee Ohanian

Friedman and Schwartz argue that the great depression was caused by a collapse of the money supply due to the negligence of the Fed that turned what should have been a garden-variety recession that started in late 1929.

Lee Ohanian argues that there was a steep industrial decline in the USA in 1929 began before monetary contractions or banking panics in 1930 and 1933. The figure below shows manufacturing industry hours worked between January 1929 and September 1930, and measures of the money stock from Friedman and Schwartz corresponding to M1 and M2. Manufacturing industry hours decline substantially and abruptly in late 1929 while money supply fall only about 4% and 1%, respectively.

This sharp decline in the manufacturing sector (a decline of nearly 30% by the fall of 1930 )began before monetary contraction or banking panics – the conventional culprits:

  • There are no significant banking panics in 1929 and 1930. The banking panics in the great depression were mostly in 1933 and in 1934.
  • Manufacturing hours worked had already fallen by 30% against trend by the time of the first banking panics in 1931, and these  first banking panics had minor macroeconomic effects.

The data in the above figure shows that a factor other than monetary contractions or bank runs were central to the onset of the Great Depression.

Nominal wages declined by little during the early stages of the Depression. in September 1931 nominal wage rates were 92 per cent of their level two years earlier. Since a significant price deflation had occurred during these two years, real wages rose by 10 per cent during the same period, while gross domestic product fell by 27 per cent.

With a substantial depression  in employment mostly in the manufacturing sector, any explanation of the onset of the great depression in the United States must start with an explanation of why the labour market failed to clear in that sector, why manufacturing  decline was so immediately severe before significant monetary contraction and banking panics, why the Depression was so asymmetric across sectors, and provide a theory for why industrial sector wages were persistently well above their market-clearing level.

Just to make it harder for you,nominal wages in the agricultural sector will fell by 40% over the same period in which wages in the manufacturing sector did not fall to all. As Ohanian notes:

The Depression was the first time in the history of the US that wages did not fall during a period of significant deflation.”

Any explanation based on wage rigidity or sluggish wage adjustment or  employee resistance to wage cuts must explain why this resistance was so effective in the manufacturing sector but so ineffective in the agricultural sector. Ohanian concluded that:

…the Depression is the consequence of government programs and policies, including those of Hoover, that increased labour’s ability to raise wages above their competitive levels.

To avert a financial panic, central banks should lend early and freely to solvent banks against good collateral but at penal rates

First. That these loans should only be made at a very high rate of interest. This will operate as a heavy fine on unreasonable timidity, and will prevent the greatest number of applications by persons who do not require it. The rate should be raised early in the panic, so that the fine may be paid early; that no one may borrow out of idle precaution without paying well for it; that the Banking reserve may be protected as far as possible.

Secondly. That at this rate these advances should be made on all good banking securities, and as largely as the public ask for them. The reason is plain. The object is to stay alarm, and nothing therefore should be done to cause alarm. But the way to cause alarm is to refuse some one who has good security to offer… No advances indeed need be made by which the Bank will ultimately lose. The amount of bad business in commercial countries is an infinitesimally small fraction of the whole business…

The great majority, the majority to be protected, are the ‘sound’ people, the people who have good security to offer. If it is known that the Bank of England is freely advancing on what in ordinary times is reckoned a good security—on what is then commonly pledged and easily convertible—the alarm of the solvent merchants and bankers will be stayed. But if securities, really good and usually convertible, are refused by the Bank, the alarm will not abate, the other loans made will fail in obtaining their end, and the panic will become worse and worse.

Walter Bagehot Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (1873).

The classical theory of the lender of last resort stressed

(1) protecting the aggregate money stock, not individual institutions,

(2) letting insolvent institutions fail,

(3) accommodating sound but temporarily illiquid institutions only,

(4) charging penalty rates,

(5) requiring good collateral, and

(6) preannouncing these conditions in advance of crises so as to remove uncertainty.

Did anyone follow these rules in the global financial crisis? The Fed violated the classical model in at least seven ways:

  1. Emphasis on Credit (Loans) as Opposed to Money
  2. Taking Junk Collateral
  3. Charging Subsidy Rates
  4. Rescuing Insolvent Firms Too Big and Interconnected to Fail
  5. Extension of Loan Repayment Deadlines
  6. No Pre-announced Commitment
  7. No Clear Exit Strategy

…{the Fed’s} policies are hardly benign, and that extension of central bank assistance to insolvent too-big-to-fail firms at below-market rates on junk-bond collateral may, besides the uncertainty, inefficiency, and moral hazard it generates, bring losses to the Fed and the taxpayer, all without compensating benefits. Worse still, it is a probable prelude to a severe inflation and to future crises dwarfing the current one.

Thomas Humphrey (2010)

2014 Homer Jones Memorial Lecture – Robert E. Lucas Jr.

The first part of his lecture discusses how the Fed can influence inflation and financial stability.

Central banks can control inflation. Can central banks maintain economic stability’s financial stability? This is still an open question as to whether central banks can do that. The quantity theory of money makes certain sharp predictions about monetary neutrality which are well borne out by the cross country evidence.

In the second part of this lecture, Lucas discusses how central banks around the world have used inflation targeting to keep inflation under control.

What is the Fed to do with the stable relationship between money and prices? Inflation targeting is superior to a fixed growth monetary supply growth rule. This always pushes policy in the direction of the inflation rate you want. Central banks around the world have succeeded in keeping inflation low by explicitly or implicitly targeting the inflation rate.

In the last part of his lecture, Lucas discusses financial crises. he agrees with Gary Gordon’s analysis that 2008 financial crisis was a run on Repo. A run on liquid assets accepted as money because they can be so quickly changed into money. The effective money supply shrank drastically when there was a run on these liquid assets.

Lucas favoured the Diamond and Dybvig of bank runs as panics. The logic of that model applies to the Repo markets now was well as to the banking system. How to extend Glass–Steagall Act type regulation of bank portfolios to the Repo market is a question for future research.

Inflation targeting is working well but the lender of last resort function is yet to be fully understood.

Note: The Diamond-Dybvig view is that bank runs are inherent to the liquidity transformation carried out by banks. A bank transforms illiquid assets into liquid liabilities, subject to withdrawal.

Because of this maturity mismatch, if depositors suspect that others will run on the bank, it is optimal for each depositor to run to the bank to withdraw his or her deposit before the assets are exhausted. The bank run is not driven by some decline in the fundamentals of the bank. Depositors are spooked for some reason, panic, and attempt to withdraw their funds before others get in first. In this case, the provision of deposit insurance and lender of last resort facilities reassures depositors and stems the bank run

In the Kareken and Wallace model of bank runs, deposit insurance is problematic because of the incentives it gives to deposit taking institutions that are insured to take much greater risks. When there is deposit insurance, depositors don’t care about the greater risk in the portfolios of their banks. The greater risk taking leads to higher returns at no extra cost because if these risky investments do fail, the deposit insurance covers their losses

It is therefore necessary to regulate the portfolio of insured banks to ensure that they do not do this. That is the great dilemma for banking regulation because quasi-banks and other liquidity transformation intermediaries such as a Repo market spring up just outside the regulatory net.

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Lee Ohanian: Economic Priorities and Restoring Prosperity

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Austrian economics, labour economics and the economics of unemployment

Austrian economists seem not to be as thorough as they could be in applying the concepts of dispersed knowledge, tendency to equilibrium and entrepreneurial appraisal, discovery and learning to the labour market.

In a nutshell, the position of Mises and Rothbard is the problem of unemployment is not jobs being fewer than workers. On some terms, a job is always available in an open market. But a wage and the hours of labour required to earn it can be so unrewarding that a person is rational to decline the job offer and remain unemployed. Of course, they acknowledge institutional unemployment that results from are laws and arrangements which inhibit adjustment of prices of labour services.

Kirzner and Rothbard argue that the market is a process that is always in disequilibrium. Does this disequilibrium not imply some unemployment in the labour market? Why should the tendency toward equilibrium be any stronger in the labour market that elsewhere?  Bill Allen explained search unemployment this way:

…many officially counted as unemployed are heavily and rationally investing their resources in looking for work. They are sampling the market, seeking information on employment alternatives. That information is valuable, but it is not obtained either freely or instantaneously, and generally, the faster it is to be acquired, the more costly it will be…

as output falls [because of a demand or supply shock], there will be some rise in unemployment, for the economy’s adjustment to the new circumstances of supply and prices will not be made instantaneously, without frictions and lags.

Rothbard was well aware of search unemployment:

It might be objected that workers often do not know what job opportunities await them. This, however, applies to the owner of any goods up for sale. The very function of marketing is the acquisition and dissemination of information about the goods or services available for sale.

Except to those writers who posit a fantastic world where everyone has “perfect knowledge” of all relevant data, the marketing function is a vital aspect of the pro­duction structure.

The marketing function can be performed in the labour market, as well as in any other, through agencies or other means for the discovery of who or where the potential buyers and sellers of a particular service may be. In the labour market this has been done through “want ads” in the newspa­pers, employment agencies used by both employer and employee, etc.

Mises also spoke of search unemployment:

Unemployment is a phenomenon of a changing economy. The fact that a worker discharged on account of changes occurring in the arrangement of production processes does not instantly take advantage of every opportunity to get another job but waits for a more propitious opportunity is not a consequence of the tardiness of the adjustment to the change in conditions, but is one of the factors slowing down the pace of this adjustment.

It is not an automatic reaction to the changes which have occurred , independent of the will and the choices of the job-seekers concerned, but the effect of their intentional actions. It is speculative, not frictional

These are good discussions of search unemployment. But when discussing mismatch unemployment as identified by Hayek after a shortening of the produc­tion structure on the market where there might be temporary unemployment of workmen in the higher stages, lasting until the workers can be reabsorbed in the shorter proc­esses of the later stages, Rothbard’s repost to this possible case of involuntary unem­ployment on the free market is:

It is also true that the shortening of the structure means that there is a transition period when, at final wage rates, there will be un­employment of the men displaced from the longer processes. How­ever, during this transition period there is no reason why these workers cannot bid down wage rates until they are low enough to enable the employment of all the workers during the transi­tion. This transition wage rate will be lower than the new equilibrium wage rate. But at no time is there a necessity for unem­ployment.

The labour market is a process just as is any other market: it is a communication network that mobilises dispersed knowledge to overcoming ignorance. Why should knowledge unfold in the labour market process through entrepreneurial discovery any faster than elsewhere? There should be disequilibrium wages, entrepreneurial errors, unemployed and mispriced resources, and a process of entrepreneurial learning and error correction. Hayek held that unemployment is always a pricing problem:

The normal cause of recurrent waves of widespread unemployment is … a discrepancy between the way in which demand is distributed between products and services, and the proportions in which resources are devoted to producing them.

Unemployment is the result of divergent changes in the direction of demand and the techniques of production. If labour is not deployed according to demand for products, there is unemployment…

It is the continuous change of relative market prices and particularly wages which can alone bring about that steady adjustment of the proportions of the different efforts to the distribution of demand, and thus a steady flow of the stream of products.

True, but the correction of erroneous wage rates and the reallocation of labour and other resources to new jobs, new firms and new industries is neither instantaneous nor a free process. Kirzner explains:

The entrepreneurial forces acting on the market for any one commodity are thus continually pushing that market toward the market-clearing point—that is, to where (a) the quantity produced is such that (only) all units “worth producing” are indeed produced, and (b) the market price for this commodity is just high enough to make it, as a practical matter, worthwhile for producers to produce this quantity, and is just low enough to make it worthwhile for consumers to buy it…

The process through which the market tends to generate the “right” quantity of a commodity, and the “right” price for it, can be seen as a series of steps during which market participants gradually tend to discover the gaps or errors in the information on which they had previously been basing their erroneous production and/or buying decisions…

The market process is one in which, driven by the entrepreneurial sense for grasping at pure profit opportunities (and for avoiding entrepreneurial losses), market participants, learning more accurate assessments of the attitudes of other market participants, tend toward the market-clearing price-quantity combination.

Alchian, Demsetz and Barzel were on the mark when they pointed out that too frequently the process of change and reaching a new equilibrium is assumed to be a free good, having no resource costs. Hayek also spoke of the time that is takes to reach a new equilibrium because the new constellation of prices and wages must emerge through the free-play of the market:

The primary cause of the appearance of extensive unemployment, however, is a deviation of the actual structure of prices and wages from its equilibrium structure. Remember, please: that is the crucial concept. The point I want to make is that this equilibrium structure of prices is something which we cannot know beforehand because the only way to discover it is to give the market free play; by definition, therefore, the divergence of actual prices from the equilibrium structure is something that can never be statistically measured.

As Kirzner has well argued, entrepreneurs thrive on alertness to disequilibrium prices and they buy and sell to profit from their discoveries, thereby correcting the mispricing, but this takes time. The knowledge and intentions of the different members of society both across all markets and in the labour market about how to match workers to new jobs must come into agreement through a process of discovery and mutual learning that takes time. Phelps (1969) put forward a fine metaphor for how this process of learning and discovery takes place:

I have found it instructive to picture the economy as a group of islands between which information flows are costly: to learn the wage paid on an adjacent island, the worker must spend the day travelling to that island to sample its wage instead of spending the day at work.

Beveridge has similar views of a multiplicity of markets in 1912:

Why should it be the normal condition of the labour market to have more sellers than buyers, two men to every job and at least as often two jobs for every man? The explanation of the paradox is really a very simple one … that there is no one labour market but only an infinite number of separate labour markets.

Gary Becker drew a parallel between the theory of marriage and the theory of job search and matching. In both cases, it takes time to sort among the options and find a suitable pairing. Some are clearly unacceptable.  Good  matches will often take a long time to find unless people are just plain lucky. Involuntary unemployment is like saying you are involuntarily unmarried. You could marry the first person you meet, if they will have you, but few would say that is wise.

Workers must search for and discover each other. Both are entrepreneurs. The information, knowledge and forecasts of future wages and prices each needs to improve co-ordination of supply and demand will not be discovered immediately:

  • The behavioural responses of employers and workers to change are so pronounced because the cost of acquiring new information is profound (Alchian 1969). Many such costs impede wages from instantly fluctuating to rebalance labour supply with demand.
  • A job seeker does not initially know the location of suitable vacancies, the wages for various skills, differences in job security and other factors. Job seekers must search for this information, keep this knowledge current and forecast whether better vacancies may open soon.
  • Employers must search to learn the location, availability and asking wages of applicants.

The time consumed in labour market search is why Rothbard’s views below that wages just adjust to clear the market has been over taken by developments in economic thinking:

To talk of unemployment or employment without reference to a wage rate is as meaningless as talking of “supply” or “de­mand” without reference to a price. And it is precisely analogous. The demand for a commodity makes sense only with reference to a certain price.

In a market for goods, it is obvious that what­ever stock is offered as supply, it will be “cleared,” i.e., sold, at a price determined by the demand of the consumers…

Whatever supply of labour service is brought to market can be sold, but only if wages are set at what­ever rate will clear the market…

We conclude that there can never be, on the free market, an unemployment problem. If a man wishes to be employed, he will be, provided the wage rate is adjusted according.

Mises in the quote below treated unemployment as a investment in prospecting for a better wage offer very much along the lines of W.H. Hutt:

If a job-seeker cannot obtain the position he prefers, he must look for another kind of job. If he cannot find an employer ready to pay him as much as he would like to earn, he must abate his pretensions. If he refuses, he will not get any job. He remains unemployed.

What causes unemployment is the fact that–contrary to the above-mentioned doctrine of the worker’s inability to wait–those eager to earn wages can and do wait. A job-seeker who does not want to wait will always get a job in the unhampered market economy in which there is always unused capacity of natural resources and very often also unused capacity of produced factors of production. It is only necessary for him either to reduce the amount of pay he is asking for or to alter his occupation or his place of work.

Alchian (1969) lists three ways to adjust to unanticipated demand fluctuations:
• output adjustments;
• wage and price adjustments; and
• Inventories and queues (including reservations).

Alchian (1969) suggests that there is no reason for wage and price changes to be used regardless of the relative cost of these other options:
• The cost of output adjustment stems from the fact that marginal costs rise with output;
• The cost of price adjustment arises because uncertain prices and wages induce costly search by buyers and sellers seeking the best offer; and
• The third method of adjustment has holding and queuing costs.

There is a tendency for unpredicted price and wage changes to induce costly additional search. Long-term contracts including implicit contracts arise to share risks and curb opportunism over sunken investments in relationship-specific capital such as firm-specific human capital and specialised machinery. These factors lead to queues, unemployment, spare capacity, layoffs, shortages, inventories and non-price rationing in conjunction with wage stability. Alchian and Woodward in their 1987 paper ‘Reflections on a theory of the firm’ say that :

… the notion of a quickly equilibrating market price is baffling save in a very few markets. Imagine an employer and an employee. Will they renegotiate price every hour, or with every perceived change in circumstances? If the employee is a waiter in a restaurant, would the waiter’s wage be renegotiated with every new customer? Would it be renegotiated to zero when no customers are present, and then back to a high level that would extract the entire customer value when a queue appears?

… But what is the right interval for renegotiation or change in price? The usual answer ‘as soon as demand or supply changes’ is uninformative.

Alchian and Woodward then go on to a long discussion of the role of protecting composite quasi-rents from dependent resources as the decider of the timing of wage and price revisions. Alchian and Woodward explain unemployment to the side effect of the purpose of wage and price rigidity, which is the prevention of hold-ups over dependent assets. They note that unemployment cannot be understood until an adequate theory of the firm that explains the type of contracts the members of a firm contract with one another.

Walter Oi has also written on slack capacity as being productive and he included references back to W.H. Hutt. Oi’s work on retailing and supermarkets spends a lot of time explaining how an empty store is efficient because the owners are waiting for a mass of customers to arrive at unpredictable time. Oi redeveloped the term the economies of massed reserves to describe this. Oi thought that this was a better term than Hutt’s pseudo-idleness. Oi argued that all resource idleness could, in principle, be eliminated, but to accomplish this, the synchronization of the arrival rates of customers, sales clerks, and just-in-time inventories would be prohibitively expensive.

Benjamin Klein’s theory of rigid wages in American Economic Review in 1984 is one of the few that explored rigid wages as an industrial organisation issue. Klein treated rigid wages as a response to opportunism and hold-up problems over specialised assets and are forms of exclusive dealership or take-or-pay contracts.

The labour market is better understood by forgetting it is the labour market and treating it as a market for long-term contracts for relationship-specific services, firm-specific human capital and mutually dependent assets owned by multiple parties.

Labour is more heterogeneous than capital. The notion that buyers and sellers in the labour market can pair up instantly contradicts the Austrian traditions that markets only tend to equilibrium and entrepreneurs are needed to move things along.

Morgan O. Reynolds makes a good point in his labour economics textbook about how labour markets are different from other markets because there are no speculators and no forward markets in labour to quickly clear the market and allow entrepreneurs to drive the market towards equilibrium through arbitrage as quickly as they do elsewhere.

The U.S. Economic Growth Gap Revisited

Robert Lucas has asked:

Is it possible that by imitating European policies on labor markets, welfare, and taxes that the U.S. has chosen a new, lower GDP trend?

If so, it may be that the weak recovery we have had so far is all the recovery we will get.

via The Economic Growth Gap Revisited.

The limitations of forecasting are well-known

  • Forecasts are conditional on a number of variables; there are important unresolved analytical differences about the operation of the economy; and large uncertainties about the size and timing of responses to macroeconomic changes. Shocks to the output, prices, employment and other variables are partly permanent and partly transitory.
  • We have very little reliable information about the distribution of shocks or about how the distributions change over time. The same is true for the distribution of real and nominal shocks, of shocks to aggregate demand relative to aggregate supply and so on.
  • Forecast errors arise from changes in the parameters in the model; mis-specification of the model, estimation uncertainty, mis-measurement of the initial conditions and error accumulation.
  • Forecasting has had a turbulent history. Most early discussions argued against the forecasting in principle. Forecasting was not properly grounded in statistical theory, it presupposed that causation implies predictability and the forecast themselves were invalidated by the reactions of economic agents to them

The voter as a fiscal conservative

Now that every election policy must be fully costed, and every major party promises a return to surplus in a few years, the Ricardian theory of budget deficits is now an optimistic view of the power of fiscal policy.

By running a budget deficit, it shifts from collecting taxes today to collecting them tomorrow and fund the intervening shortfall was selling government bonds to the private sector. A finance minister may choose to lower taxes today (thereby increasing the deficit), but without any planned changes in the government’s expenditure program, such a policy must imply higher taxes at some point in the future.

The Ricardian theory of budget deficits is people are smart enough to recognise that today’s fiscal deficits mean tomorrow’s taxes must increase to to repay the debt so taxpayers cut back consumption dollar for dollar to save for those future taxes.

If you know your taxes will go up in the future, the right thing to do is save to  pay those higher taxes. A fiscal stimulus is then completely offset by the reduction in private consumption. The stimulus has no effect on spending, prices, production, or interest rates  because households know that deficit spending means future taxes: to smooth consumption, they save more now.

To make things worse, the lower taxes today and the higher taxes tomorrow encourage intertemporal substitution of labour. People will work more now because taxes  are low but work less in the future when taxes are high. Investors also take into account that taxes on their investment income will be higher in the future so they will invest less now.

Notice below the mirror trends of net private and government savings as a per cent of U.S. GDP. Financing U.S. government consumption through deficits or through taxation is equivalent:  households know net present value of taxation will rise and save to offset that.

HT: correctionspageone.blogspot

If you think a fiscal stimulus works by fooling people into ignoring the future tax hikes or spending cuts, then loudly announcing in an election campaign those  tax hikes and spending cuts in a few year’s time that will pay for the current fiscal stimulus must undermine that stimulus even more!

When Robert Barro wrote in the 1970s and 1980s, he pointed out that there is no reason to assume that forecasting errors about future taxes are always biased in the direction of under-estimating the future taxes. People can over-estimate the future taxes. Individual uncertainty about their future tax liabilities does not normally induce them to save less, it induces them to save more.

The fact that much political debate surrounds government budget deficits clearly suggests that the voters understand the government budget constraint  and that  high budget deficits today signal higher taxes in the future and they change their behaviour accordingly.

Robert Barro likes to refer to Israel as a natural experiment in the Ricardian budget deficit theory. In 1983, the national saving rate of 13% of GDP corresponded to a private saving rate of 17% and a public saving rate of -4%.  In 1984, the dramatic rise in the budget deficit reduced the public saving rate to -11%.  Private saving rate rose to 26%, so that the national saving rate changed little.  Then a stabilisation program in 1985 eliminated the budget deficit, so that the public saving rate rose to 0% in 1985-86 and -2% in 1987.  The private saving rate declined dramatically to 19% in 1985 and 14% in 1986-87.  The national saving rate remained relatively stable, going from 15% in 1984 to 18% in 1985, 14% in 1986, and 12% in 1987.

The best evidence that people do take future taxes into account is the method in which old age pensions are financed in different countries.  An expansion of social security pensions for the retired is analogous to a deficit-financed tax cut. People respond to more social security by shifting private intergenerational transfers, rather than by consuming more.

In the US, the growth of social security strongly diminished the tendency of children to support their aged parents because they are paying taxes now and in the future to support them.  In countries were weak social security,  children spend more  of their money looking after their parents.

It is certainly the case that most younger people think they have to provide for their own retirement and that government will not tax enough to support them in 20 to 30 years time.

People have relatively sophisticated views of both long-run  government spending and taxing in an ageing society and that deficits must be paid for. The voter is a fiscal conservative.

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