04 Feb 2016
by Jim Rose
in constitutional political economy, economics of regulation, international economic law, international economics, International law, labour economics, law and economics, politics - New Zealand, unions
Tags: employment law, employment protection, employment regulation, ILO, labour market regulation, social clauses, TPPA
New Zealand has signed and ratified dozens of International Labour Organisation Conventions dating back to 1921. They all fetter the sovereignty of New Zealand. As a member of the ILO, New Zealand is required to report on its application of ILO Conventions.
That limitation on the sovereignty of New Zealand is no more and no less than in an international trade agreement. New Zealand can renounce an international trade agreement and has renounced nine International Labour Organisation conventions.
Jane Kelsey makes the following points about the legal implications of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement:
The 30 chapter Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) constrains domestic law and policy at central government level, and in places by local government and SOEs, in diverse areas beyond traditional aspects of international trade.
…The TPP provides cumulative opportunities for foreign states and corporations to influence domestic decisions which may be burdensome and intrusive.
The exact same objections apply to the ILO conventions. The union movement does not hesitate to argue that the democratic process in New Zealand should be overridden because the proposal at hand purportedly conflicts with an ILO convention.
For example, when the government was choosing to deregulate collective bargaining, the sovereignty of Parliament was questioned because of an ILO convention. Helen Kelly, CTU President said:
in Parliament on 4 June, the Minister was asked if he agreed with advice from officials that the ability for employers to opt out of multi-employer bargaining may breach our obligations under ILO Convention 98 on the right to organise and collective bargaining.
…There is no point attending such an important UN ILO conference at the time your Government is being advised it is breaching its undertakings to that very organisation…
The CTU President also referred to the regulatory impact statement prepared for that collective bargaining legislation:
The paper also points out that these changes open NZ up to international examination by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) for non-compliance with Convention 98 – on the Right to Organise and Collectively Bargain, which New Zealand has signed up to.
Helen Kelly says “at least four of the proposals are deemed to be inconsistent with our international obligations, and two of them are classified as uncertain. Why the Government wants law changes that damage our international obligations is unclear.”
Council of Trade Unions submissions to minimum wage reviews have at least a dozen references to ILO conventions and the requirement to honour their provisions.
Posner and Goldsmith rightly argue that international law is a product of states pursuing their interests on the international stage. It does not induce states to comply contrary to their interests. The possibilities for what it can achieve are limited.
Government sign-up to various international agreements depending on their political priorities. You cannot complain that governments that you did not vote do what government you voted for also did, which was sign up to international agreements that suited their political agendas. The solution is to work harder to win the next general election.
As for opposing trade agreements on sovereignty grounds, it is rank hypocrisy for the union movement to do so given the number of times it cites international labour agreements when it suits them and seeks their inclusion in trade agreements to raise labour costs in developing countries.
20 Jan 2016
by Jim Rose
in applied welfare economics, economic history, labour economics, politics - New Zealand, poverty and inequality
Tags: Employment Contracts Act, employment law, Leftover Left, rational ignorance, rational irrationality, top 1%, union power, Withering away of the proletariat
The union movement posted two excellent charts during the last election showing how well things have gone since the 1980s economic reforms and their consolidation in the early 1990s.
The charts show that real wage growth returned in the early 1990s after the passage of the Employment Contracts Act and the consolidation of government finances. This was after two decades of wage stagnation in what the unions regards as the good old days.
Furthermore, as the union chart shows, the average incomes of the top 1% in New Zealand is a pretty stable for several decades. Whatever else is happening New Zealand, you cannot blame it on the top 1% because they are lazy. What increase there was in average top incomes in New Zealand was followed by the return of real wage growth in New Zealand and a long economic boom where the unemployment rate drop below 3.5%
The main bugbear is housing affordability which is a result of the Resource Management Act passed in 1993 as the union chart shows. The unions, the Labour Party and Greens all support the laws that result in this housing unaffordability.
19 Jan 2016
by Jim Rose
in Euro crisis, great recession, job search and matching, labour economics, macroeconomics, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, unemployment
Tags: Denmark, employment law, employment protection, flexicurity, labour market regulation, social insurance, welfare state
https://twitter.com/KiwiLiveNews/status/688503382181449728
My search for an example of how Danish flexicurity might have an advantage over the status quo in the New Zealand labour market is still to yield results. Danish flexicurity is no better than New Zealand and often worse in keeping long-term male unemployment rates down as the charts below show. The flexicurity model combines flexible hiring and firing with a generous social safety net and an extensive system of activation policies for the unemployed.
Data extracted on 18 Jan 2016 21:55 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat.
The charts above and below do show is that a more generous social safety net for the unemployed introduced with the onset of the Great Recession in the USA was followed by a sharp increase in the incidence of long-term unemployment.
Data extracted on 18 Jan 2016 21:55 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat.
13 Nov 2015
by Jim Rose
in economic history, Euro crisis, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, politics - USA, public economics
Tags: employment law, Eurosclerosis, France, Germany, growth of government, labour market regulation, size of government, taxation and labour supply
10 Nov 2015
by Jim Rose
in business cycles, economic history, economics of regulation, Euro crisis, job search and matching, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics
Tags: British economy, employment law, equilibrium unemployment rate, Eurosclerosis, France, Germany, Italy, labour market reforms, Margaret Thatcher, Thatchernomics, The British Disease
Unlike the USA, the German, Italian, British and French equilibrium unemployment rates all show fluctuations that reflect changes in their underlying economic circumstances and labour market reforms. The case of the British, the rise of the British disease and Thatchernomics. The case of German, its equilibrium unemployment rate rose after German unification and then fell after the labour market reforms of 2002 to 2005.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook November 2015 Data extracted on 10 Nov 2015 07:07 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat.
25 Sep 2015
by Jim Rose
in applied price theory, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice, personnel economics, politics - New Zealand
Tags: employment law, employment protection law, employment regulation, fixed costs of employment, Leftover Left, The fatal conceit, unintended consequences, zero hours contracts
This Labour Party link made it very easy for me to submit to the Select Committee of Parliament to oppose the Bill on regulating zero hours contracts. I oppose the Bill for the exact opposite reasons that the Labour Party opposes the Bill.
I encourage others to make a submission to Parliament as well opposing this draft amendment that will lower the wages of workers. My submission is as follows:
I do not support the proposed changes to the legislation governing zero hour contracts in the Employment Standards Legislation Bill. There should be no regulation of zero hours contracts.
Zero hours contracts is creative destruction at work in the labour market, sweeping away obsolete working time arrangements, mostly in the retail services sector. Plenty of new ways of working have emerged in recent years that include the proliferation of part-time work, temporary workers, leased workers, working from home, teleworking and sub-contracting. Employment laws were built on the now decaying assumption that workers had career-long, stable relationships with single employers.
Advance notice of work schedules is always known only to a minority of temporary and permanent employees in New Zealand, and there’s not much difference between that advance notice between temporary and permanent employees.
Critics overplay their hand if they suggest that somehow workers are very much disadvantaged and employers are holding all the cards. Job turnover and recruitment problems are a serious cost to a business. Workers will not sign zero hours contracts if they are not to their advantage.
Unless labour markets are highly uncompetitive with employers having massive power over employees, employers should have to pay a wage premium if zero-hour contracts are a hassle for workers.
The fixed costs of employment are such that you shouldn’t expect zero-hour contracts: you’ll typically do better with one 40-hour worker over two 20-hour workers because of these costs. Zero hour contracts would be most likely in jobs with low recruitment costs and where specialised training needs are low. Workers with low fixed costs of working will move into the zero-hour sector while those with higher fixed costs would prefer lower hourly rates but more guaranteed hours. Again, read lower here as meaning relative to what they could elsewhere earn.
Unless we have a good idea about why firms are moving to zero hours contracts, which we don’t, and why employees sign these contracts rather than work for other employers who offer more regular hours, meddling in these novel working time arrangements is risky.
Employers must pay a wage premium to induce in workers to sign zero hours contracts. This Bill seeks to deny workers the right to seek higher wages.
Feel free to use the above text as the basis for your own submission to Parliament.
17 Sep 2015
by Jim Rose
in applied price theory, economic history, economics of regulation, industrial organisation, job search and matching, labour economics, minimum wage, survivor principle, unions
Tags: Australia, employment law, employment protection law, federalism, labour market deregulation, labour market regulation, union power, unions
10 Sep 2015
by Jim Rose
in currency unions, economic growth, Euro crisis, job search and matching, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, poverty and inequality, unemployment, welfare reform
Tags: employment law, equilibrium unemployment rate, Eurosclerosis, labour market regulation, natural unemployment rate, social insurance, unemployment duration, unemployment insurance
17 Aug 2015
by Jim Rose
in business cycles, currency unions, economic growth, economic history, Euro crisis, job search and matching, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, occupational choice, unemployment, unions, welfare reform
Tags: employment law, equilibrium unemployment, Greece, Italy, labour market regulation, natural unemployment rate, Portugal, Spain, unemployment duration
The boom that preceded the bust in the Greek economy did nothing for the rate of long-term unemployment among Greeks. Long-term unemployment had been pretty stable prior to the economic boom after joining the euro currency union.
Source: OECD StatExtract.
Nothing much happened to long-term unemployment in Italy or Portugal in recent decades. Spanish long-term unemployment fell in line with the economic boom in Spain over the 1980s and 1990s up until the global financial crisis.
12 Aug 2015
by Jim Rose
in business cycles, economic history, Euro crisis, job search and matching, labour economics, macroeconomics, unemployment
Tags: employment law, equilibrium unemployment rate, Eurosclerosis, Italy, labour market regulation, natural unemployment rate, unemployment duration
Unemployment of more than a year was slowly tapering down in Italy before the global financial crisis, but ever so slowly.
Source: OECD StatExtract.
08 Aug 2015
by Jim Rose
in Euro crisis, job search and matching, labour economics, macroeconomics, minimum wage, unemployment
Tags: employment law, equilibrium unemployment rates, Eurosclerosis, expressive voting, labour market regulation, natural unemployment rate, offsetting behaviour, rational irrationality, unintended consequences
05 Aug 2015
by Jim Rose
in economic history, Euro crisis, job search and matching, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, unemployment
Tags: employment law, equilibrium unemployment rate, France, labour market regulation, natural unemployment rate, unemployment duration
Nothing really changes in France recently unemployment duration. Italian labour market is notorious for having very low inflows and outflows from employment and unemployment.
Source: OECD StatExtract.
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