Unemployment rates across the OECD member countries
30 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in business cycles, currency unions, economic growth, Euro crisis, job search and matching, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, unemployment Tags: employment law, employment regulation, EU, Euro sclerosis, Euroland, Eurosclerosis, Japan, labour market regulation
Has there been any labour market deregulation ever in the UK, Australia or New Zealand?
29 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in economic history, job search and matching, labour economics, labour supply, law and economics, minimum wage, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, unions Tags: Australia, British economy, employment law, employment law regulation
Major deregulations and re-regulations of the labour market in Australia and New Zealand did not move the employment protection inducts around that much in figure 1. All is been quiet on the labour market regulation front of the UK pretty much since the index was started.
Figure 1: OECD employment protection index (EPI), strictness of employment protection – individual and collective dismissals, USA, UK, Australia and New Zealand, 1990 – 2013
Source: OECD StatExtract.
The Work Choices legislation in Australia in 2006 was looked upon by the OECD as a somewhat minor deregulation not much more in scale than the deregulation introduced in 2008 with the election of the National Party led government.

Nobody told the unions that.
Strictness of employment protections for individual dismissals – USA, UK, France, Germany and the PIGS
28 Jul 2015 1 Comment
in Euro crisis, job search and matching, labour economics, law and economics, macroeconomics Tags: British economy, employment law, employment law regulation, Eurosclerosis, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain
Much easier to fire someone in the USA or UK than on continental Europe. Greece and Spain aren’t that bad by continental European standards for employment law protections against dismissals of individuals.
Figure 1: Strictness of employment protection for individual dismissals, 2013
Source: OECD StatExtract.
The impact of neoliberalism on labour market freedom in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela
22 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in development economics, economic history, economics of regulation, growth disasters, growth miracles, labour economics, labour supply, minimum wage, unions Tags: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, conspiracy theories, employment law, employment regulation, Index of Economic Freedom, Leftover Left, Mont Pelerin Society, neoliberalism, Twitter left, Venezuela
All was quiet on the neoliberalism front in Latin America for the last 20 years. In yet another defeat for the Mont Pelerin Society led transnational conspiracy, labour market freedom has declined in the four countries in figure 1. I’ve always had my doubts about the ability of a transnational conspiracy to be led by a society with such a crappy website.
Figure 1: Index of Economic Freedom, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, 95 – 2015
Source: Index of Economic Freedom 2015.
Trends in labour market freedom in the UK, USA, Germany and France – Index of Economic Freedom rankings
21 Jul 2015 Leave a comment
in economic history, economics of regulation, global financial crisis (GFC), job search and matching, labour economics, labour supply, law and economics, minimum wage, politics - USA, unions Tags: British economy, employment law, employment regulation, Eurosclerosis, France, Germany, Index of Economic Freedom
The writers of the Index of Economic Freedom at the Heritage foundation really loves the USA and didn’t think much of the Conservative Party – Liberal Democratic Party coalition government because labour market freedom actually fell in the UK during their administration. Bring back Tony Blair, all is forgiven. The information on their website throws no insight into why this reduction in labour market freedom in Britain happened.
Figure 1: Index of Economic Freedom, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, 95 – 2015 ![]()
Source: Index of Economic Freedom 2015.
Fortunately for Germany, labour market freedom increased over the course of the global financial crisis and its aftermath. This helps explains low unemployment in Germany during that period. Nothing much happened in France in regard to labour market freedom.
@WJRosenbergCTU How the unions argued for the Employment Contracts Act when arguing strongly against it
25 May 2015 1 Comment
in economic growth, economic history, economics of regulation, industrial organisation, job search and matching, labour economics, unions Tags: Employment Contracts Act, employment law, employment protection laws, employment regulation, labour market deregulation, lost decades, union power
The Council of Trade Unions scored something of an own goal in the 2014 election campaign when it was denouncing the Employment Contracts Act 1991 as the reason for wages growth have not kept up with GDP per capita growth since its passage in 1991. Its evidence in chief against the deregulation of the New Zealand labour market is in the snapshot below showing their graph of real GDP per capita and average real wages from 1965 to 2014.
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Source: Low Wage Economy | New Zealand Council of Trade Unions – Te Kauae Kaimahi.
The chart selected by the Council of Trade Unions shows several distinct trends in wages growth and real GDP growth per capita in New Zealand. None of these trends nor breaks in trends support the hypothesis that the days prior to the Employment Contracts Act 1991 were the good old days where workers shared generally in gains from economic growth.
From about 1970 to 1975 in the snapshot below of the Council of Trade Unions chart there was rapid real wages growth, well in excess of real growth in per capita GDP. This wages breakout was followed by some ups and downs but essentially wages in 1995 were no different from what they were in 1975. Real wages were about $24 per hour in real terms in New Zealand for about 20 years – from 1975 to 1995.
These are the good old days in the eyes of the Council of Trade Unions. No real wages growth for 20 years. There was no real GDP per capita growth from 1975 until 1979 nor in the five years leading up to the passage of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 in the chart selected by the Council of Trade Unions in the snapshot above.
The period leading up to 1975 in the preceding wages breakout was the zenith of union membership with nearly 70% of all workers belonging to a union – see figure 1. What followed from 1975 was a long declining in trade union membership that did not end until just after the Employment Contracts Act in 1991 – see figure 1.
Figure 1: Trade union densities, New Zealand, Australia, United Kingdom and United States, 1970–2013
Source: OECD StatExtract.
Whatever happened to union power in New Zealand happened before the passage of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 and with it the deregulation of the New Zealand labour market. 20 years of no real wages growth and economic stagnation may explain part of the decline of unions in New Zealand.
Real GDP per capita growth was pretty stagnant after 1975 to 1994 in the chart of data selected by the Council of Trade Unions, which is why I have previously referred to 1974 to 1992 as New Zealand’s Lost Decades – see figures 2 and 3.
Figure 2: Real GDP per New Zealander and Australian aged 15-64, converted to 2013 price level with updated 2005 EKS purchasing power parities, 1956-2013, $US
Source: Computed from OECD Stat Extract and The Conference Board, Total Database, January 2014, http://www.conference-board.org/economics
Figure 2 shows that New Zealand lost two decades of productivity growth between 1974 and 1992 after level pegging with Australia for the preceding two decades.
These lost decades of growth are the unions’ good old days but workers cannot share in the general gains of economic growth when there isn’t any economic growth as the chart selected by the Council of Trade Unions and figure 2 both show.
New Zealand returned to trend growth in real GDP per working age New Zealander between 1992 and 2007, which is straight after the passage of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 – see figure 2. Coincidence?
Figure 3: Real GDP per New Zealander and Australian aged 15-64, converted to 2013 price level with updated 2005 EKS purchasing power parities, 1.9 per cent detrended, base 100 = 1974, 1956-2013, $US

Source: Computed from OECD Stat Extract and The Conference Board, Total Database, January 2014, http://www.conference-board.org/economics
In Figure 3, a flat line equates to a 1.9% annual growth rate in real GDP per working age person; a falling line is a below trend growth rate; a rising line is an above 1.9% growth rate of real GDP per working age person. The trend growth rate of 1.9% per working age person is the 20th century trend growth rate that Edward Prescott currently estimates for the global industrial leader, which is the United States of America.
Figure 3 shows that there was a 34% drop against trend growth in real GDP per working age New Zealander between 1974 and 1992; a return to trend growth between 1992 and 2007; and a recession to 2010. this 34% drop against trend productivity growth is looked upon by the Council of Trade Unions as some sort of good old days.
A long period of no labour productivity growth and little real GDP per capita growth are pretty good reasons to rethink New Zealand’s economic policies at a fundamental level, which is exactly what happened after 1984 with the election of a Labour Government.
The unions have conveniently provided another explanation for the Lost Decades of growth in New Zealand from 1974 to 1992. That is the rapid growth of real wages ahead of real GDP per capita in the seven years before growth stalled in New Zealand in 1974 in the snapshot above. This real wages breakout was followed by two decades of lost growth.
Most ironically of all, steady growth in real wages in New Zealand did not return until after the passage of the Employment Contracts Act in 1991! After nearly 20 years of no real wages growth, real wages growth returned at long last in 1995.
After staying at about $24 per hour for 20 years from 1975 in the good old days of union power and collective bargaining, average wages in New Zealand have increased from $24 an hour to about $28 per hour by 2014 in one of the most deregulated labour markets in the world.
The Council of Trade Unions regards the return of real wages growth after a 20 year hiatus as an unwelcome development or something to complain about.
Paid sick day entitlements across the OECD membership
17 May 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, labour economics, labour supply, occupational choice Tags: employment law, employment protection laws, employment regulation
More and more employees have rules about not been a dork online
04 May 2015 Leave a comment
in economics of media and culture, labour economics, law and economics, occupational choice, property rights Tags: employment law
France, here the New Zealand labour market comes – part 2! How the Employment Court is re-regulating
04 Mar 2015 7 Comments
in applied price theory, Austrian economics, entrepreneurship, F.A. Hayek, George Stigler, human capital, industrial organisation, job search and matching, labour economics, law and economics, Ludwig von Mises, politics - New Zealand, survivor principle Tags: Armen Alchian, employment law, employment protection laws, entrepreneurial alertness, France, Israel Kirzner, The fatal conceit, The pretence to knowledge
As discussed yesterday, if the Employment Court had its way, New Zealand case law under the Employment Relations Act regarding redundancies and layoffs would be as job destroying as those in France.

The Employment Court’s war against jobs goes back more than 20 years. To 1991 and G N Hale & Son Ltd v Wellington etc Caretakers etc IUW where the Court held that a redundancy to be justifiable under law it must be ‘unavoidable’, as in redundancies could only arise where the employer’s capacity for business survival was threatened.
The Court of Appeal slapped that down and affirm the right of the employer to manage his business in no uncertain terms:
…this Court must now make it clear that an employer is entitled to make his business more efficient, as for example by automation, abandonment of unprofitable activities, re-organisation or other cost-saving steps, no matter whether or not the business would otherwise go to the wall…
The personal grievance provisions … should not be treated as derogating from the rights of employers to make management decisions genuinely on such grounds. Nor could it be right for the Labour Court to substitute its own opinion as to the wisdom or the expediency of the employer’s decision.
When a dismissal is based on redundancy, it is the good faith of that basis and the fairness of the procedure followed that may fall to be examined on a complaint of unjustifiable dismissal
… the Court and the grievance committees cannot properly be concerned with an examination of the employer’s accounts except in so far as it bears on the true reason for dismissal.
The Employment Court could only inquire as to the genuineness of the employer’s decision and the procedures adopted. The Court could not substitute their views on management decisions. No second-guessing.
In Brake v Grace Team Accounting Ltd, the Employment Court found its way back into second-guessing employer’s decisions about how to manage their business. The figures used by the employer to decide that a redundancy was required were in error. The employer miscalculated.
The Employment Court had previously held in Rittson-Thomas T/A Totara Hills Farm v Hamish Davidson that the statutory test of what a fair and reasonable employer could have done in all the circumstances applies to the substantive reasoning for redundancies. Some enquiry into the employer’s substantive decision is required to establish that a hypothetical fair and reasonable employer could also make the same decision in all of the circumstances.
Subsequently in Brake v Grace Team Accounting Ltd, the Employment Court found that the actions by the employer were “not what a fair and reasonable employer would have done in all the circumstances” and “failed to discharge the burden of showing that the plaintiff’s dismissal for redundancy was justified”.
The Court found that the redundancy was “a genuine, but mistaken, dismissal”, but it still found that the dismissal was substantively unjustified. That is a major new development. Mistaken dismissals that are genuine are unlawful and grounds for compensation under the employment law.
The case was appealed where the issues were whether the correct test had been applied. The Court of Appeal, in a sad day for employers, job creation and the unemployed, found that the Employment Court was within its rights to do what it did and applied the statutory tests correctly:
GTA acted precipitously and did not exercise proper care in its evaluation of its business situation and it made its decision about Ms Brake’s redundancy on a false premise.
So it never turned its mind to what its proper business needs were but rather proceeded to evaluate its options based on incorrect information. We can see no error in the finding by the Employment Court that a fair and reasonable employer would not do this.
The test is now that fair and reasonable employers in New Zealand do not make mistakes. A much greater burden is now laid upon employers to show that not only that redundancies are justified, but they have made careful calculations and no mistakes.
No more seat of your pants entrepreneurship in New Zealand. No more entrepreneurial hunches – the essence of entrepreneurship is acting on hunches and other judgements that are incapable of being articulated to others and about which there is mighty disagreement in many cases. As Lavoie (1991) states:
…most acts of entrepreneurship are not like an isolated individual finding things on beaches; they require efforts of the creative imagination, skillful judgments of future costs and revenue possibilities, and an ability to read the significance of complex social situations.
The essence of entrepreneurship is your hunches are better than the next guy’s and you survive in competition by backing that hunch often to the consternation of the crowd. As Mises explains:
[Economics] also calls entrepreneurs those who are especially eager to profit from adjusting production to the expected changes in conditions, those who have more initiative, more venturesomeness, and a quicker eye than the crowd, the pushing and promoting pioneers of economic improvement…
The entrepreneurial idea that carries on and brings profits is precisely that idea which did not occur to the majority… The prize goes only to those dissenters who do not let themselves be misled by the errors accepted by the multitude
In many cases, those entrepreneurial hunches are sorted, sifted and selected on the basis of trial and error in the marketplace. Central to Hayek’s conception of the meaning of competition is it is a process of trial and error with many errors:
Although the result would, of course, within fairly wide margins be indeterminate, the market would still bring about a set of prices at which each commodity sold just cheap enough to outbid its potential close substitutes — and this in itself is no small thing when we consider the insurmountable difficulties of discovering even such a system of prices by any other method except that of trial and error in the market, with the individual participants gradually learning the relevant circumstances.
Remember Hayek’s conception of competition as a discovery procedure where prices and production emerge through the clash of entrepreneurial judgements and competitive rivalry:
…competition is important only because and insofar as its outcomes are unpredictable and on the whole different from those that anyone would have been able to consciously strive for; and that its salutary effects must manifest themselves by frustrating certain intentions and disappointing certain expectations
Errors are no longer permitted in the New Zealand labour market by the Employment Court. The Court has outlawed error in redundancy decisions.
This is despite the fact that the conception by Kirzner of the market process is that it is an error correction procedure without rival and a central role of entrepreneurial alertness is to correct errors in pricing and production:
It is important to notice the role played in this process of market discovery by pure entrepreneurial profit. Pure profit opportunities emerge continually as errors are made by market participants in a changing world. The inevitably fleeting character of these opportunities arises from the powerful market tendency for entrepreneurs to notice, exploit, and then eliminate these pure price differentials.
The paradox of pure profit opportunities is precisely that they are at the same time both continually emerging and yet continually disappearing. It is this incessant process of the creation and the destruction of opportunities for pure profit that makes up the discovery procedure of the market. It is this process that keeps entrepreneurs reasonably abreast of changes in consumer preferences, in available technologies, and in resource availabilities.
Rothbard made similar arguments about the centrality of discrepancies and error in entrepreneurship:
The capitalist-entrepreneur buys factors or factor services in the present; his product must be sold in the future. He is always on the alert, then, for discrepancies, for areas where he can earn more than the going rate of interest.
In Frank Knight’s conception of profit, there were temporary profits that arise from the correction of error:
In the theory of competition, all adjustments “tend” to be made correctly, through the correction of errors on the basis of experience, and pure profit accordingly tends to be temporary.
The Employment Court misunderstands the market process as a process of error correction. Those errors are identified through entrepreneurial alertness and trial and error. These errors are both of over-optimism and over-pessimism as Kirzner explains:
Errors of over-pessimism are those in which superior opportunities have been overlooked. They manifest themselves in the emergence of more than one price for a product which these resources can create. They generate pure profit opportunities which attract entrepreneurs who, by grasping them, correct these over-pessimistic errors.
The other kind of error, error due to over-optimism, has a different source and plays a different role in the entrepreneurial discovery process. Over-optimistic error occurs when a market participant expects to be able to complete a plan which cannot, in fact, be completed.
A considerable part of entrepreneurial alertness arises from the business opportunities created by sheer ignorance and pure error as Kirzner explains:
What distinguishes discovery (relevant to hitherto unknown profit opportunities) from successful search (relevant to the deliberate production of information which one knew one had lacked) is that the former (unlike the latter) involves that surprise which accompanies the realization that one had overlooked something in fact readily available. (“It was under my very nose!”)
The market process is a selection procedure where the more efficient survive for reasons that may be unknown to the entrepreneurs directly concerned as well as to observers and officious judges. Alchian pointed out the evolutionary struggle for survival in the face of market competition ensured that only the profit maximising firms survived:
- Realised profits, not maximum profits, are the marks of success and viability in any market. It does not matter through what process of reasoning or motivation that business success is achieved.
- Realised profit is the criterion by which the market process selects survivors.
- Positive profits accrue to those who are better than their competitors, even if the participants are ignorant, intelligent, skilful, etc. These lesser rivals will exhaust their retained earnings and fail to attract further investor support.
- As in a race, the prize goes to the relatively fastest ‘even if all the competitors loaf.’
- The firms which quickly imitate more successful firms increase their chances of survival. The firms that fail to adapt, or do so slowly, risk a greater likelihood of failure.
- The relatively fastest in this evolutionary process of learning, adaptation and imitation will, in fact, be the profit maximisers and market selection will lead to the survival only of these profit maximising firms.
The surviving firms may not know why they are successful, but they have survived and will keep surviving until overtaken by a better rival. All business needs to know is a practice is successful.
One method of organising production and supplying to the market will supplant another when it can supply at a lower price (Marshall 1920, Stigler 1958). Gary Becker (1962) argued that firms cannot survive for long in the market with inferior product and production methods regardless of what their motives are. They will not cover their costs.
The more efficient sized firms are the firm sizes that are currently expanding their market shares in the face of competition; the less efficient sized are those firms that are currently losing market share (Stigler 1958; Alchian 1950; Demsetz 1973, 1976). Business vitality and capacity for growth and innovation are only weakly related to cost conditions and often depends on many factors that are subtle and difficult to observe (Stigler 1958, 1987). The Employment Court pretends to know better than the outcome of the competitive struggle in the market for survival.
The Employment Court also believes employers have something akin to academic tenure. In 2010, the Court found that an employee’s redundancy was unjustified because the employer did not offer redeployment and there is no requirement that the right of the redeployment be written into the employment agreement (Wang v Hamilton Multicultural Services Trust). The particulars of this case were quite interesting:
- A new management role was created with significantly more responsibility for training, supervision and decision making than the redundant finance administrator role, with a 50% salary increase to recognise the increased responsibilities and duties.
- The vacancy was advertised externally but the existing finance administrator was encouraged to apply.
- His experience and qualifications meant that he could fulfil the new role, albeit with some up-skilling.
- He decided not to apply for it to avoid jeopardising a personal grievance claim that his redundancy was not genuine and therefore unjustified.
In the case at hand, the Employment Court held that the employer was obliged to look for alternatives to making the employee redundant. Given that he would be able to perform the new finance manager position with some up-skilling, the employer should have offered him the position rather than simply inviting him to apply for it.

The notion that an employee through training can quickly increase their marginal productivity by 50% to fill a more senior role contradicts the modern labour economics of human capital. A 50% salary increase through a bit of training would imply extraordinary annual returns on other forms of on-the-job training and formal education as well as the training at hand in the Employment Court case.

I would very much like to be in the position where I can get a 50% salary increase after a bit of training. As I recall, I required about 5-10 years of on-the-job human capital acquisition before my starting salary as a graduate was 50% higher through promotion and transfers.
In summary, the Employment Court stands apart from the modern labour economics of human capital and job search and matching as well as the modern theory of entrepreneurial alertness, and the market as a discovery procedure and an error correction mechanism. The Employment Court has fallen for both the pretence to knowledge and the fatal conceit.
Further evidence of the dynamic, deregulated nature of the New Zealand labour market
15 Dec 2014 2 Comments
in economics of regulation, labour economics, law and economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, unemployment Tags: employment law, employment protection, labour market dynamics, labour market regulation
The chart below shows that New Zealand is far more flexible than Western Europe and is pretty near the USA in terms of people moving in and out of the unemployment pool every month with great ease. There are very high outflow rates from unemployment among the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic economies. The economies of Continental Europe stand in stark contrast. Unemployment outflow rates in these economies lie below 10% at a monthly frequency.
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Source: Unemployment Dynamics in the OECD, Elsby, Hobijn and Şahin (2013).
Oops, I hope the boss wasn’t looking
11 Dec 2014 Leave a comment
in law and economics, personnel economics Tags: employment law
How flexible is the New Zealand labour market
31 Jul 2014 1 Comment
in economics of regulation, labour economics, politics - New Zealand, unemployment, welfare reform Tags: 90 day trials, employment law, employment probation periods, employment protection, labour market regulation
The first chart below shows that NZ is the 4th most deregulated labour market for individual dismissals.
Source: OECD employment protection index
The next figure below shows that NZ is top of the world for deregulation of lay-offs and redundancies.
Source: OECD employment protection index
The chart below shows that New Zealand is far more flexible than in Western Europe and is pretty near the USA in terms of people moving in and out of the unemployment pool every month with great ease.
Source: Elsby, Hobijn and Şahin (2013).
There are very high outflow rates from unemployment among the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic economies. The economies of Continental Europe stand in stark contrast. Unemployment outflow rates in these economies lie below 10% at a monthly frequency.
A major labour market reform in recent years in New Zealand was introduction of the option of a 90 day trial for new employees, initially in small businesses and then in all businesses.
The UK recently extended its trial period from one-year to two-years. Trial periods are common in OECD member countries.
There is plenty of evidence to back-up the notion that increased job security leads to less employee effort and more absenteeism. Some examples are:
· Sick leave spiking straight after probation periods ended;
· Teacher absenteeism increasing after getting tenure after 5-years; and
· Academic productivity declining after winning tenure.
The MBIE research into the actual operation of 90-day trials was highly favourable in terms of increased employment, the hiring of riskier applicants and lower costs of ending bad job matches (about 15-20% of trials did not work out). These outcomes are the usual importance of a test drive argument for employment trial periods.
Interestingly, the MBIE research also found that some employers hired new employees on 90-day trials for positions about which these employers were uncertain might be profitable. But for the option of the trial period, these jobs never would have existed.
This suggests that in some firms, 90-day trials are a decisively cheaper alternative to hiring an employee and perhaps making them redundant later if the new position does not pay for itself. No one’s fault: the market just did not sustain the expansion in staff as expected.
The MBIE research shows that winners from 90-day trials are new labour force entrants, the unemployed and beneficiaries, migrants and labour force re-entrants such as mothers.
I kept note of an interesting press report adding to this where Hospitality New Zealand Wellington president Jeremy Smith said he had hired dozens of staff he would not otherwise have considered. Because of the transient nature of the hospitality industry, it was often difficult to check references so a trial period “levelled the playing field”.

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