After Nigeria, 19 incumbent African leaders have been defeated at the polls. Ever. (ht @calestous) http://t.co/nRdeFYS122—
ian bremmer (@ianbremmer) April 02, 2015
19 incumbent African leaders have been defeated at the polls
06 Apr 2015 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, development economics, growth disasters, growth miracles, Public Choice Tags: Africa, capitalism and freedom, free elections, second turnover
Tax reform leads to higher taxes – the evidence on the GST
31 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice, public economics, taxation Tags: Geoffrey Brennan, James Buchanan, tax reform
The GST increased from 10 to 15% in New Zealand; more than doubled in the UK; but GST rates were stable or went up and down in the remaining Anglo-Saxon countries.
As for a selection of other non-Anglo-Saxon countries , Brennan and Buchanan were right. Tax reforms such as a broad-based consumption tax leads to higher taxes through time.
ICYMI: How does Australia's GST compare with other nations? ab.co/1eBsdrS #factcheck http://t.co/QFP05xonEB—
ABC Fact Check (@ABCFactCheck) July 31, 2015
The GST (goods and services tax) in Europe is known as the value added tax (VAT).
Source: OECD Tax Database – OECD.
To punish the discussion of public affairs through libel judgments is to shut off discussion of the very kind most needed
29 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
No one says this about economists
27 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, Austrian economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, F.A. Hayek, liberalism, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: evidence-based policy, offsetting behaviour, science and public policy, The fatal conceit, The pretence to knowledge, unintended consequences
Scientists dream about what could be.
Economists remind you of price tags and unintended consequences
Israel’s Arab political parties have united for the first time
12 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, Public Choice Tags: Israel, Knesset, Middle-East politics

the coalition is a result of a move last year to increase the minimum number of votes a party needs to secure a place in the 120-seat Knesset, Israel’s parliament.
Some saw that change as an attempt to oust small Arab parties, but instead it prompted the fragmented and fairly powerless Arab leadership to unite under the banner of the Joint List.
David Friedman on global warming, population and problems with the externality argument
02 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, David Friedman, economic history, economics of information, economics of regulation, environmental economics, environmentalism, global warming, law and economics, population economics, property rights Tags: climate alarmism, competition as a discovery procedure, David Friedman, externalities, global warming, population bomb, The fatal conceit, The pretence to knowledge
Priests could first stand for the House of Commons in 2001
01 Mar 2015 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, law and economics, Public Choice Tags: British constitutional law, Catholic Emancipation, equality before the wall, House of Commons, religious discrimination
The House of Commons (Removal of Clergy Disqualification) Act 2001 removed the disqualifications for clergy in standing for election and sit in the House of Commons. Through the interaction of different anti-Catholic legislation in the 18th and 19th century, Roman Catholic priests were still barred from sitting in the House of Commons until 2001. This included ex-priests.
The issue first came to a head when Bruce Kent came third in a seat in the 1997 election. The bill was drafted, but lapsed until the Labour Party endorsed an ex-priest for a safe seat. Without legislative action, he would not have been able to take his place in the House of Commons.
James MacManaway was the first priest to win a House of Commons seat in 150 years when he won a Belfast seat in 1950. The advice of the Attorney-General prior to his standing was there was no bar from standing because the Church of Ireland had been disestablished in 1869.
When he moved to take his seat, a select committee looked into the matter and then referred it to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that the Irish Church Act 1869 did disestablish the Church of Ireland, but since there was no express provision in that Act permitting its clergymen to sit as MPs, the House of Commons (Clergy Disqualification) Act 1801 still debarred any person
ordained to the office of priest or deacon’ from sitting or voting in the House of Commons. Roman Catholic Relief Act 1829 specifically barred ‘person[s] in holy orders in the Church of Rome.
Although MacManaway was disqualified from its seat after sitting for 238 days, and he did not stand for the by-election, no legislative action was taken to correct this blot on British democracy.
Parliament passed up the opportunity to remedy the matter when passing the House of Commons (Disqualification) Act 1975. This Act disqualifies a large number of public office holders from sitting in the House of Commons.
Likewise, when the Lord Chancellor (Tenure of Office and Discharge of Ecclesiastical Functions) Act 1974 was passed, the issue of Catholic priests in the House of Commons was left to one side. This Act may provision for the exercise of Church of England ecclesiastical functions during any tenure of the office of Lord Chancellor, of horror of horrors, by Roman Catholics. The Lord Chancellor makes many appointments within the Church of England.
The Clergy Disqualification Act 1870 provided a procedure which enabled Church of England clergy to relinquish their clerical positions and, after a period of six months, be freed from the parliamentary disqualification. There is no equivalent statutory procedure for clergy of other churches.

And here ends my constitutional curio of the day.
Come see the violence inherent in the system!
28 Feb 2015 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, Marxist economics, movies, Public Choice Tags: Monty Python
What happens when a metropolitan area has way too many governments – The Washington Post
20 Feb 2015 Leave a comment
in constitutional political economy, Federalism, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, Public Choice Tags: local government
The OECD, in a report on the "Metropolitan Century" we’ve just entered, found across all of its member countries that when you double the number of municipalities per 100,000 residents within a single metropolitan area, regional labour productivity falls by 5 to 6 percent.
In short: the more little governments you have, the less productive the entire local economy is.
via What happens when a metropolitan area has way too many governments – The Washington Post.



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